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Constitution of India — Arts. 16(4), 341, 342, 14, 15(1) and 15(4) — State/UT benefits or concessions allowed to SCs/STs in matter of employment or education in a particular State/UT: Person belonging to SC/ST in one State cannot be deemed to be SC/ST person in State of his migration for purpose of employment or education. Expressions “in relation to State or Union Territory” and “for the purpose of this Constitution” used in Arts. 341 and 342 mean that benefits of reservation stand confined to geographical territories of State/UT in respect of which lists of SCs/STs have been notified by Presidential Orders under Arts. 341 and 342. Further held, any expansion/deletion of list of SCs/STs notified by President by any authority except Parliament would be against constitutional mandate. Furthermore, unquestionable principle of interpretation is that interrelated statutory as well as constitutional provisions must be harmoniously construed to avoid making any provisions nugatory or redundant. Enabling provision under Art. 16(4) is available only to provide reservation to classes or categories of SCs/STs enumerated in Presidential Orders for a particular State/UT within its geographical area and cannot be extended beyond those categories within that State/UT. [Bir Singh v. Delhi Jal Board, (2018) 10 SCC 312]

Penal Code,1860 — S. 377 — Constitutional validity: Section 377, insofar as it criminalizes/penalizes any consensual sexual conduct/relationship between two adults, be it homosexuals (man and a man), heterosexuals (man and a woman) or lesbians (woman and a woman), cannot be regarded as constitutional. However, if anyone, i.e. both a man and a woman, engages in any kind of sexual activity with an animal, the said aspect of Section 377 is constitutional and it shall remain a penal offence under the said section. Any act of the description covered under Section 377 IPC done between two individuals without the consent of any one of them would invite penal liability under the said section, Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation, (2014) 1 SCC 1, is overruled. [Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1]

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Ss. 7 and 11(5) — Arbitration agreement/clause — Existence of: Agreement between the parties giving an option to the parties to choose dispute resolution by “arbitration” or “court”, can be considered as a valid arbitration agreement. [Zhejiang Bonly Elevator Guide Rail Manufacture Co. Ltd. v. Jade Elevator Components, (2018) 9 SCC 774]

Constitution of India — Art. 226 — Appeal against order of Single Judge under Art. 226 (Writ Appeal/Letters Patent Appeal): Once legal and factual issues are raised in intra-court appeal challenging order passed by Single Judge, it is incumbent upon Division Bench to deal with all such issues raised. Then record its finding on such issues keeping in view the submissions urged and applicability of legal provisions. [BDA v. B.N. Ramalingaswamy, (2018) 9 SCC 778]

Constitution of India — Art. 32 — CBI Investigation: Prayer for CBI investigation into degradation of forest due to illegal mining activities declined as requisite steps has been taken by State Government. [T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, (2018) 9 SCC 760]

Constitution of India — Art. 32 — Public Interest Litigation — Frivolous or vexatious PIL: In PIL filed seeking guidelines for conducting Caesarean deliveries, it was alleged that there was flagrant violation of health norms and C-sections performed without there being medical necessity. Through this PIL, constitution of Medical Board for supervising such activities was prayed for. Treating this writ petition as abuse of process of court, Supreme Court dismissed it by imposing costs of Rs 25,000. [Reepak Kansal v. Union of India, (2018) 9 SCC 744]

Constitution of India — Arts. 19(1)(a) and 19(2) — Restrictions upon free speech, expression, creativity and imagination of poets and authors: Meesha published in the weekly Mathrubhumi is not derogatory to women nor obscene, thus does not require intervention of the Court. Creative voices cannot be stifled or silenced and intellectual freedom cannot be annihilated and the culture of banning books directly impacts the free flow of ideas and is an affront to the freedom of speech, thought and expression. Further, a creative work has to be read with a matured spirit, catholicity of approach, objective tolerance and a sense of acceptability founded on reality that is differently projected but not with the obsessed idea of perversity that immediately connects one with the passion of didacticism or, for that matter, perception of puritanical attitude. The freedom enjoyed by an author is not absolute, but before imposition of any restriction, the duty of the Court is to see whether there is really something that comes within the ambit and sweep of Art. 19(2) of the Constitution. Also, a book should not be read in a fragmented manner and has to be read as a whole. The language used, the ideas developed, the style adopted, the manner in which the characters are portrayed, the type of imagery taken aid of for depiction, the thematic subsidiary concepts projected and the nature of delineation of situations have to be understood from an objective point of view. Further, there may be subjective perception of a book as regards its worth and evaluation but the said subjectivity cannot be allowed to enter into the legal arena for censorship or ban of a book. The craftsmanship of a writer deserves respect by acceptation of the concept of objective perceptibility. [N. Radhakrishnan v. Union of India, (2018) 9 SCC 725]

Constitution of India — Arts. 226, 32, 21 and 22(2) — Habeas corpus petition — Maintainability: When no challenge has been made to remand order in force, writ petition filed restricting it to relief of habeas corpus with respect to a person who is in police custody pursuant to the said remand order passed by the jurisdictional Magistrate in connection with the offence under investigation is not maintainable in such a case. [State of Maharashtra v. Tasneem Rizwan Siddiquee, (2018) 9 SCC 745]

Education Law — Medical and Dental Colleges — New College/Courses/Upgradation of College/Increase in capacity/seats: Medical Council of India (MCI) conducting surprise inspection in spite of observation of Hearing Committee (of Central Government) that deficiencies detected earlier had been prima facie removed, held, permissible and valid. In case where actual physical verification is required, it is within discretion of MCI to cause such physical verification. MCI can conduct compliance verification in manner in which it decides. It can look for additional deficiencies and if deficiencies detected earlier are not removed or additional deficiencies detected, college is not entitled for renewal of permission. [Medical Council of India v. KMCT Medical College, (2018) 9 SCC 766]

Election — Election Petition/Trial — Maintainability — Limitation/Delay/Laches: The Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 is a complete code for presentation of election petitions. It mandates that an election petition must be filed within 30 days from the date of declaration of results of election. Under the Act, there is no provision for condoning delay or extending the period of limitation. Hence, extension of that period of limitation by virtue of provisions under Limitation Act, 1963 (i.e. S. 14, Limitation Act, 1963 herein), not permissible. Legislature having prescribed a specific period for filing an election petition, any petition which fails to comply therewith is liable to be dismissed. [Suman Devi v. Manisha Devi, (2018) 9 SCC 808]

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — S. 15 — Interpretation of: Restriction placed on second marriage under S. 15 till dismissal of appeal, held, would not apply to such cases, where the facts establish, that the parties have decided not to pursue appeal. [Anurag Mittal v. Shaily Mishra Mittal, (2018) 9 SCC 691]

Income Tax Act, 1961 — S. 80-IC (as inserted by virtue of the Finance Act, 2003, applicable w.e.f. 1-4-2004): Availing of 100% deduction from sixth year onwards, in lieu of 25% deduction otherwise available, on the premise of having made substantial expansion is not permissible when the assessee had already claimed deduction under S. 80-IC @ 100% for five years. [CIT v. Classic Binding Industries, (2018) 9 SCC 753]

Insurance — Repudiation/Rescission of Insurance Policy — Repudiation of claim on ground of delay — When permissible: It is the duty of insured to inform insurer of loss forthwith so that insurer may make a meaningful investigation into cause of damage and nature of loss. This is of crucial importance in insurance claims. Breach of policy term stipulating such condition, given the crucial importance of such term, held, is a material breach. It is not a technical matter but sine qua non for a valid claim to be pursued by the insured. [Sonell Clocks & Gifts Ltd. v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2018) 9 SCC 784]

Insurance — Repudiation/Rescission of Insurance Policy — Repudiation of claim on ground of delay — When permissible: As per terms of insurance policy insured is duty-bound to inform insurer about the loss immediately after the incident. On account of delayed intimation, insurer was deprived of its legitimate right to get an inquiry conducted into cause and nature of the loss, hence, held, repudiation of claim on ground of delay, was proper. [Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Parvesh Chander Chadha, (2018) 9 SCC 798]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Ss. 166 and 147: When death of owner-cum-driver of motor vehicle has been caused due to his own negligence, claim for compensation is not maintainable. [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ashalata Bhowmik, (2018) 9 SCC 801]

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Ss. 42, 43 and 20(b)(ii)(C) — Search and seizure: In case of search and seizure in public place, when contraband has been recovered from bag carried by accused, compliance with S. 42 is not mandatory in such circumstances. Rather it is S. 43 which would apply. [Raju v. State of W.B., (2018) 9 SCC 708]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 304 Pt. II/34, 323/34 & 324/34 or 307/34: In this case regarding dispute between neighbours with regard to cattle which had strayed and resulted in assault by accused persons which led to death of one and injuries to others, it was held by the Supreme Court that as occurrence took place on the spur of the moment without premeditation and assault was not made on vital part of body and no common intention was found to kill or knowledge that death was likely to ensue, conviction under Ss. 307/34 set aside, but under Ss. 304 Pt. II/34, 323/324/34, confirmed. [Lakshmi Chand v. State of U.P., (2018) 9 SCC 704]

Practice and Procedure — Appeal — Locus standi/Standing — Appeal at the instance of stranger to proceedings: A stranger to proceedings does not have locus standi to question legality of order passed in those proceedings. [Ashok Singh v. State of U.P., (2018) 9 SCC 723]

Service Law — Promotion — Ad hoc promotion: Ad hoc promotions in excess of eligible quota, not permissible. [Abdul Jawad M.F. v. R. Raj Pradeep, (2018) 9 SCC 781]

Specific Relief Act, 1963 — S. 16(c) — Readiness and willingness on part of plaintiff as condition precedent: Plaintiff must always plead and prove that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of contract — It must be established that he was ready and willing and has had capacity to perform his part of contract from date of contract up to date of filing of suit. If case of failure of plaintiff to establish readiness and willingness on his part, he is disentitled to specific performance of contract. [Jagjit Singh v. Amarjit Singh, (2018) 9 SCC 805]

Armed Forces — Pension — Computation: Cl. 4(a) of Navy Instruction No. 2/S/74 defined “basic pay” to denote pay “actually drawn” in scale prescribed for rank and group, which was issued to give effect to recommendations of Third Pay Commission and remained in force till 1-1-1986. It was held that appellants’ case was governed by said Instructions as they retired on 1-1-1983. Submission of respondents that submarine pay was excluded from ambit of basic pay as per Special Navy Instructions Nos. 1/S/86, 1/S/9-W and 1/S/08 liable to be rejected, since these notifications came into force subsequent to date of superannuation of appellants. Thus, submarine pay was includible in “pay” for purposes of computing Service Pension of appellants. [N.N. Godfred v. Union of India, (2018) 9 SCC 666]

Associations, Societies and Clubs — Body discharging public function but not amounting to “State” — BCCI: Draft Constitution prepared by Committee of Administrators of BCCI keeping in view recommendations of Justice Lodha Committee Report, approved. [BCCI v. Cricket Assn. of Bihar, (2018) 9 SCC 624]

Constitution of India — Art. 226 — Writs —Habeas corpus: In a habeas corpus petition the High Court must examine at the threshold whether the minor is in lawful or unlawful custody of another person. The Court must take into account the totality of the facts and circumstances whilst ensuring the best interest of the minor child. Further, the fact that the minor child will have better prospects upon return to his/her native country, may be a relevant aspect in a substantive proceedings for grant of custody of the minor child but will not be decisive to examine the threshold issues in a habeas corpus petition. For the purpose of habeas corpus petition, the Court ought to focus on the obtaining circumstances of the minor child having been removed from the native country and taken to a place to encounter alien environment, language, custom, etc. interfering with his/her overall growth and grooming and whether continuance there will be harmful. [Kanika Goel v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 9 SCC 578]

Constitution of India — Arts. 25 and 26 r/w Art. 145(3) — Freedom to follow faith and manage religious affairs: 1934 Constitution of Malankara Orthodox Syrian Church, cannot be said to be in violation of Arts. 25 and 26. [Mathews Mar Koorilos v. M. Pappy, (2018) 9 SCC 672]

Constitution of India — Arts. 27, 19(1)(g), 19(6) and 14 — Haj Policy of Private Tour Operators, 2018, Annexure-A — Rejection of claim of petitioner for registration of PTO for Haj 2018: In this case petitioner applied for quota as private limited company but turnover relied upon was of proprietorship firm without offering any satisfactory explanation therefor nor submitting any relevant documents including conversion of proprietorship firm into private limited company with transfer of its assets and liabilities as alleged. Hence it was held that there was no infirmity in order dt. 31-5-2018 refusing registration for non-compliance with Clause (iv), Appendix A, Haj Policy, 2018. [Ruby Tour Services (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2018) 9 SCC 537]

Crimes Against Women and Children — Sexual Abuse and Rape of Minor Girls in Shelter Homes/Child Homes: Repeated interrogation, questioning, visiting/interviewing of victims regarding incident by officials and journalist is hardly conducive for the welfare and well-being of minor victims of sexual abuse and rape in Shelter Homes/Child Homes. Media must be restrained from publishing images of victims even in morphed or blurred form. Media directed to keep interests of victims in mind while dissemination of news. Process to be followed by investigating agencies dealing with case, set out. Various Authorities/Institutions directed to submit reports, for further directions. [Sampurna Behura v. Union of India, (2018) 9 SCC 555]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss. 320 and 482 — Compounding of offences with permission of Court: In this case related to offences under Ss. 406 and 420 IPC, as complainant was satisfied that his amount was received as per direction of Supreme Court, parties were relegated to trial court for compounding. Trial court directed to pass appropriate orders and coercive orders passed against accused withdrawn. [Raj Sharma v. State of U.P., (2018) 9 SCC 660]

Criminal Trial — Confession — Extra-judicial confession/Hearsay — Evidentiary value of: Extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence. It cannot form basis for conviction, unless supported by other substantive evidence. [State of Karnataka v. P. Ravikumar, (2018) 9 SCC 614]

Family and Personal Laws — Hindu Law — Adoption — Proof of — Principles summarized: Factum of adoption and its validity has to be duly proved. Though formal ceremony of giving and taking is essential ingredient for valid adoption, long duration of time during which a person is treated as adopted cannot be ignored. Such fact by itself may carry a presumption in favour of adoption. [Kamla Rani v. Ram Lalit Rai, (2018) 9 SCC 663]

Government Grants, Largesse, Public Property and Public Premises — Recovery of possession/Re-entry by State upon Termination/Cancellation/Resumption/Lapse: In this case lease was expired a long time ago, and was not renewed, but tenants continued to be in possession. Eviction order was passed in such without opportunity of hearing. Tenant cannot claim indefeasible right to continue in premises. Balancing of this principle with fact that rights of tenants under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution might be affected, open auction of such premises in bidding and allotment to highest bidder, directed. On facts, balancing rights of both parties, occupation of premises by tenant, directed not to be disturbed till bidding process is completed. [Bharmal Medical Store v. State of M.P., (2018) 9 SCC 617]

Hindu Law — Marriage and Divorce — Grounds for Divorce — Irretrievable breakdown of marriage: In this case divorce was granted ex parte by impugned judgment, thus prejudicing rights of appellant wife. It was held that logical consequence would normally be to set aside impugned judgment and remit matter for fresh consideration. However, considering that parties were willing to part company on mutually acceptable terms, appellant husband was directed to pay Rs 30 lakhs towards permanent alimony plus Rs 5 lakhs by way of gesture of goodwill towards her medical expenses finding that parties were living separately for more than a decade and there was absolutely no chance of reconciliation, no issue was born from wedlock, appellant wife ailing for long time and staying with her relatives having no independent income while respondent husband was quite resourceful residing in independent bungalow in posh colony in Pune. [Usha Uday Khiwansara v. Uday Kumar Jethamal Khiwansara, (2018) 9 SCC 569]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Ss. 149, 147 and 168 — Third-party insurance: When award has been passed against insured owner, it is to be paid by insurer and recovered from owner. Insurer is not required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before executing court concerned as if dispute between insurer and owner was subject-matter of determination before Tribunal and issue is decided against owner and in favour of insurer. [Shamanna v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2018) 9 SCC 650]

National Security Act, 1980 — Ss. 3(4) and 8 — Requirement of reporting detention to State Government “forthwith” — “Forthwith” — Connotation of: “Forthwith” does not mean instantaneous, but without undue delay and within reasonable time at the earliest possible. Further held, fact whether detention order was reported to State Government within reasonable time and without undue delay is to be ascertained from facts of each case. Delay between date of detention and date of submitting report to State Government must be due to unavoidable circumstances beyond control of authority and not because of administrative laxity. [Hetchin Haokip v. State of Manipur, (2018) 9 SCC 562]

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 — Ss. 4(5) and (6) — Forfeiture of gratuity — When permissible: Forfeiture of gratuity on the ground of misconduct which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude, is permissible only if the person is convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction for the said offence. [Union Bank of India v. C.G. Ajay Babu, (2018) 9 SCC 529]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 304 Pt. I — Culpable homicide not amounting to murder — Inference of, from nature of injury inflicted: In this case death of one was due to gunshot injury on thigh, and injuries to one other using other weapons. Conviction of accused for firing said gunshot alone, for culpable homicide not amounting to murder, and acquittal of the rest of the accused, confirmed. [State of M.P. v. Gangabishan, (2018) 9 SCC 574]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302, 201, 392 and 397 — Murder trial: High Court reversed conviction of all respondent-accused due to inconsistencies and material contradiction present in this case, hence, acquittal confirmed. [State of Karnataka v. A.B. Mahesha, (2018) 9 SCC 612]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 498-A and 306 — Bride committing suicide: In this case harassment due to alleged dowry demand and cruelty meted out to deceased by appellant-accused husband, having illicit relationship with another woman, were established as causes of suicide. It was held that High Court rightly maintained conviction of appellant under Ss. 498-A and 306 IPC, with RI for 2 and 5 years, respectively. Furthermore, held, there were no grounds for reduction of sentence. [Siddaling v. State, (2018) 9 SCC 621]

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — S. 34(5) and Ss. 34(6), 34(3) and 29-A: Requirement of issuance of prior notice to the other party and filing of an affidavit endorsing compliance with the said requirement under S. 34(5), is directory and not mandatory. Considerations of convenience and justice are uppermost, and if general inconvenience or injustice results, without promoting the real aim and object of the enactment, the provision must be declared to be directory. Subsection (5) is not a condition precedent, but a procedural provision which seeks to reduce the delay in deciding applications under S. 34. Further, to construe such a provision as being mandatory would defeat the advancement of justice as it would provide the consequence of dismissing an application filed without adhering to the requirements of S. 34(5), thereby scuttling the process of justice by burying the element of fairness. However, it shall be the endeavour of every court in which a S. 34 application is filed, to stick to the time-limit of one year from the date of service of notice to the opposite party by the applicant, or by the court, as the case may be. Further, in case the court issues notice after the period mentioned in S. 34(3) has elapsed, every court shall endeavour to dispose of the S. 34 application within a period of one year from the date of filing of the said application similar to what has been provided in S. 14 of Commercial Courts Act, 2015. Also, in cases covered by S. 10 r/w S. 14 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, the Commercial Appellate Division shall endeavour to dispose of appeals filed before it within six months, as stipulated and appeals which are not so covered will also be disposed of as expeditiously as possible, preferably within one year from the date on which the appeal is filed. [State of Bihar v. Bihar Rajya Bhumi Vikas Bank Samiti, (2018) 9 SCC 472]

 Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 39 Rr. 1 & 2 — Interim stay — Grant or refusal: While passing an order on interim stay application, justifiable reason(s) to support grant or rejection of prayer as to stay must be stated in the order keeping in view the facts and law applicable to the controversy involved. [Birwati Chaudhary v. State of Haryana, (2018) 9 SCC 458]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 41 R. 27, Or. 41 R. 23-A & Or. 41 R. 25 and Ss. 96 & 100 — Procedure to be followed by appellate courts after receiving additional evidence: Once additional evidence is permitted at appellate stage, other side must be given opportunity to lead rebuttal evidence to counter additional evidence. Appellate courts have two options (i) to take recourse remanding entire matter under Or. 41 R. 23-A for retrial, or (ii) to make limited remand under Or. 41 R. 25 by retaining main appeal with itself so that parties can lead evidence on particular issues in light of additional evidence and then to decide main appeal on merits. [Corpn. of Madras v. M. Parthasarathy, (2018) 9 SCC 445]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Ss. 96(3), 100, 114 & Or. 23 R. 3-A: Challenge to compromise decree is not permissible except on ground of fraud. Such challenge can be by way of fresh suit, or review petition. [Ved Pal v. Prem Devi, (2018) 9 SCC 496]

Constitution of India — Arts. 21, 25, 19 and 29 and Preamble — Cow vigilantism and incidents of lynching solely based on perception: There is necessity of strengthening police administration. Pluralism and tolerance is essential values constituting building blocks of free and democratic society. It is the duty of State to promote fraternity amongst all citizens so that dignity of every citizen is protected, nourished and promoted, and to prevent crime and untoward incidents. Lynching affront to rule of law and exalted values of Constitution itself while vigilantism for whatever purpose or borne out of whatever cause undermines legal institutions of State. Such extrajudicial attempts under guise of law required to be nipped in bud lest it leads to anarchy and lawlessness corroding nation. It is the primary responsibility of State to foster secular, pluralistic and multicultural social order so as to allow free play to ideas and beliefs and coexistence of mutually contradictory perspectives. Directions covering areas of preventive, remedial and punitive measures, issued. [Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India, (2018) 9 SCC 501]

Contempt of Court — Civil Contempt — Purging of contempt/Opportunity to comply: Once the order dt. 8-3-2001 passed by Single Judge directing appellant FCI to frame scheme or to find ways to absorb respondent workmen within one year had attained finality it was required to be complied with in pith and substance. [Food Corpn. of India v. W.B. FCI Workmen’s Union, (2018) 9 SCC 469]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 378(3) — Application for grant of leave to appeal under — Parameters which High Court should keep in mind while deciding — Principles reiterated: In this case Trial court acquitted respondent-accused of charge of offences punishable under Ss. 363, 366, 376 and 120-B IPC. Application was filed by State for leave to appeal against such acquittal before High Court and High Court rejected it without assigning any reasons. Such casual approach of High Court, disapproved by the Supreme Court and matter was remanded back to it for decision afresh on merits, keeping in view law laid down by Supreme Court in Sujay Mangesh Poyarekar, (2008) 9 SCC 475. [State of U.P. v. Anil Kumar, (2018) 9 SCC 492]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 482: Quashment of subsequent criminal proceedings based on new set of facts merely because earlier criminal proceedings related to present matter were quashed, not proper. [Om Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar, (2018) 9 SCC 440]

Criminal Trial — Practice and Procedure — Abatement — Abatement of appeal: As there was report by High Court along with copy of death certificate regarding death of sole respondent in appeal, appeal stood abated against deceased and was dismissed as having abated. [State of Karnataka v. Srinivasa, (2018) 9 SCC 463]

Environment Law — Vehicular Pollution: NGT passed an order of plying of only CNG buses/coaches and other vehicles at Delhi Airport. Due to incompatibility of other vehicles to CNG mode, direction issued by NGT restricted to only buses and coaches. [Narangs International Hotels (P) Ltd. v. Society for Protection of CHETNA, (2018) 9 SCC 499]

Income Tax Act, 1961 — S. 10(20) (as amended by the Finance Act, 2002) — Noida Authority: After omission of S. 10(20-A) the only provision under which a body or authority can claim exemption was S. 10(20) and further, local authority having been exhaustively defined in the Explanation to S. 10(20), an entity has to fall under S. 10(20) to claim exemption. Further, the Explanation now containing the exhaustive definition of local authority, the definition of local authority as contained in S. 3(31) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 no more applicable. Also, the Explanatory Note to Finance Act, 2002 clearly indicate that by the Finance Act, 2002 the exemption under S. 10(20) had been restricted to Panchayats and Municipalities as referred to in Arts. 243-P(d) and 243-P(e) of the Constitution, and further by deletion of clause (20-A), the income of the Housing Boards of the States and of Development Authorities became taxable. Noti. dt. 24-12-2001 was issued by the Governor in exercise of the power under the proviso to clause (1) of Art. 243-Q of the Constitution of India specifying the appellant Authority to be an “industrial township” with effect from the date of the notification in the Official Gazette. The proviso did not contemplate constitution of an industrial establishment as a Municipality, rather clarified that an exception where Municipality under clause (1) of Art. 243-Q may not be constituted in an urban area. Further, the object of issuance of notification was to relieve the mandatory requirement of constitution of a Municipality in a State in the circumstances as mentioned in the proviso but exemption from constituting Municipality does not lead to mean that the industrial establishment which is providing municipal services to an industrial township is same as Municipality as defined in Art. 243-P(e).  Thus, held, industrial township as specified under Noti. dt. 24-12-2001 was not akin to Municipality as contemplated under Art. 243-Q. Hence, held, appellant Authority is not covered by the definition of “local authority” as contained in the Explanation to S. 10(20). [NOIDA v. CIT, (2018) 9 SCC 351]

Income Tax Act, 1961 — S. 194-A(3)(iii)(f) — Benefit of exemption given under Noti. No. S.O. 3489 dt. 22-10-1970 — Tax deduction at source on payment of interest by bank to Noida Authority: There is a well-marked distinction between a body which is created by the statute, on the one hand, and a body which after having come into existence is governed in accordance with the provisions of the statute, on the other. For instance, a company incorporated under the Companies Act is not a statutory body because it is not created by the statute but it is a body created in accordance with the provisions of the statute. When the words “by and under an Act” are preceded by the words “established”, the reference is to a corporation established, that it is brought into existence, by an Act or under an Act i.e. the term refers to a statutory corporation as contrasted from a non-statutory corporation incorporated or registered under the Companies Act. The preamble of that Act reads “an Act to provide for the constitution of an Authority for the development of certain areas in the State into industrial and urban township and for matters connected therewith”. Thus, the Act itself provided for constitution of an authority. Further, “the Authority” had been constituted by a Noti. dt. 17-4-1976 issued under S. 3 of the 1976 Act. Further, following the ruling in Satish Prabhakar Padhye, (2010) 4 SCC 378, wherein the State Financial Corporation was stated to be a corporation established under a Central Act, held, the Authority was covered by the Noti. dt. 22-10-1970. [CIT v. Canara Bank, (2018) 9 SCC 322]

Income Tax Act, 1961 — S. 194-I r/w S. 10(20) (as amended by the Finance Act, 2002) — Circular dt. 30-1-1995 — Deduction of income tax at source on payment of lease rent to Noida/Greater Noida Authority: The definition of rent as contained in the Explanation to S. 194-I is a very wide definition and payment to be made as annual rent is rent within the meaning of S. 194-I. Further, Circular dt. 30-1-1995 granting exemption from deduction of income tax at source, was issued on the strength of Ss. 10(20-A) and 10(20) as it existed at the relevant time and the very basis of the circular has been knocked out by the amendments made by the Finance Act, 2002. Thus, the circular could not be relied on by Noida/Greater Noida Authorities to contend that there was no requirement of deduction of tax at source. Therefore, tax is required to be deducted at source on payment of lease rent to Greater Noida Authority, as per S. 194-I. [NOIDA v. CIT, (2018) 9 SCC 342]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Ss. 166 & 173 and Sch. II — Compensation: Award of lump sum compensation without following multiplier method is not permissible. Compensation has to be just compensation. Mode of award in cases of permanent disability has to be based on functional disability or actual loss of income/income-earning capacity. Due to changed scenario in view of cost of living and current rate of inflation, Second Schedule provided under Motor Vehicles Act became redundant. [Anant v. Pratap, (2018) 9 SCC 450]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 302 — Accused allegedly strangulated his wife to death: A-1(respondent-accused) was allegedly having illicit relationship with A-2 (since dead) and on account of which, there was altercation between A-1 and his wife, and he allegedly strangulated her to death. However, conviction of A-1 under S. 302, was held to be rightly reversed by High Court. [State of Karnataka v. Srinivasa, (2018) 9 SCC 460]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302, 147 and 148 r/w S. 149 — Murder trial — Appeal against acquittal: Re-appreciation of evidence was done by High Court as Trial court did not properly appreciate evidence and approach of trial court was found perverse. Testimony of eyewitnesses was also found credible. FIR was lodged promptly. Evidence of eyewitnesses was corroborated by medical evidence. Prosecution case was further corroborated by recovery of weapons from accused. Bloodstains found on weapons recovered from accused, were of blood group of deceased, which was yet another piece of evidence corroborating evidence of eyewitnesses and strengthening prosecution case. Hence, reversal of acquittal by High Court, confirmed. [Motiram Padu Joshi v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 9 SCC 429]

Public Accountability, Vigilance and Prevention of Corruption — Vigilance Authorities: Validity of appointments to post of Central Vigilance Commissioner (CVC) and Vigilance Commissioner (VC), affirmed. Ground of violation of principle of impeccable integrity and institutional integrity, rejected as aspersions were based on false, vague, non-specific, unsubstantiated and/or baseless allegations/representations/complaints. [Common Cause v. Union of India, (2018) 9 SCC 382]

Service Law — Regularisation — Entitlement to regularization: The issue raised in this case was whether the employees employed to carry out appellant FCI’s business operations at its branch offices are contractual employees or employees of appellant. Findings of Tribunal to effect that (i) Agreement with contract labourers for doing work had ended in 1991 and thereafter it was not renewed; (ii) All 955 workers were paid wages directly by appellant; (iii) Nature of work which these workers were doing was of perennial nature in the set-up of FCI; (iv) All 955 workmen were performing their duties as permanent workmen; and (v) No evidence was adduced by appellant to rebut claim of respondent Union; were affirmed by the Single Judge as well as Division Bench. The Supreme Court held that the findings of fact recorded against appellant by Tribunal were based on sufficient evidence. Besides, said findings being concurrent in nature were binding on Supreme Court while hearing appeals under Art. 136 of the Constitution. Furthermore, very fact that appellant FCI failed to adduce any evidence to prove their case, Tribunal was justified in drawing adverse inference against them. Respondent employees were entitled to regularisation in services of appellant FCI. [Food Corpn. of India v. Employees Union, (2018) 9 SCC 464]

Arbitration Act, 1940 — S. 29 — Award of pre-reference, pendente lite and future interest by arbitrator — Permissibility of: Under the 1940 Act, an arbitrator has power to grant pre-reference interest under the Interest Act as well as pendente lite and future interest, however, he is constricted only by the fact that an agreement between the parties may contain an express bar to the award of pre-reference and/or pendente lite interest. Further, the Court has evolved the test of strict construction of such clauses, and unless there is a clear and express bar to the payment of interest that can be awarded by an arbitrator, clauses which do not refer to claims before the arbitrators or disputes between parties and clearly bar payment of interest, cannot stand in the way of an arbitrator awarding pre-reference or pendente lite interest. Further, unless a contractor agrees that no claim for interest will either be entertained or payable by the other party owing to dispute, difference, or misunderstandings between the parties or in respect of delay on the part of the engineer or in any other respect whatsoever, leading the Court to find an express bar against payment of interest, a clause which merely states that no interest will be payable upon amounts payable to the contractor under the contract would not be sufficient to bar an arbitrator from awarding pendente lite interest. Further, the grant of pendente lite interest depends upon the phraseology used in the agreement, clauses conferring power relating to arbitration, the nature of claim and dispute referred to the arbitrator, and on what items the power to award interest has been taken away and for which period. Also, the position under S. 31(7) of the 1996 Act, is wholly different, inasmuch as S. 31(7) of the 1996 Act sanctifies agreements between the parties and states that the moment the agreement says otherwise, no interest becomes payable right from the date of the cause of action until the award is delivered. [Reliance Cellulose Products Ltd. v. ONGC Ltd., (2018) 9 SCC 266]

Citizens, Migrants and Aliens — National Register of Citizens of India (NRC): Complete draft prepared after claims/objections cannot be basis for any action by authorities. Authorities must grant reasonable opportunity to each concerned. Statements made by authorities before media touching upon matters pending before Supreme Court, strongly deprecated. [Assam Public Works v. Union of India, (2018) 9 SCC 229]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 2 and Or. 6 R. 17, Or. 14 R. 5 and Or. 18 R. 17 — Suit to include whole claim: When family property dispute resulted in two different civil suits before two different courts, respective claims of parties are required to be decided in one suit rather than in two different suits. [P.K. Narayanan Raja v. Ambika, (2018) 9 SCC 164]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Ss. 96 and 100 — Appeal — Locus standi to file appeal: Appeal by person who was not a party to the civil suit or in first appeal is not maintainable when the judgment in appeal is not adverse to any party in the suit. [Lakshmi Sreenivasa Coop. Building Society Ltd. v. Puvvada Rama, (2018) 9 SCC 251]

Education Law — Fee Structure/Capitation Fee/Fee Regulatory Committee — Statutory prohibition of fees in excess of that prescribed by Fee Fixation Committee constituted under T.N. Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Collection of Capitation Fee) Act, 1992 — Institutions covered by: T.N. Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Collection of Capitation Fee) Act, 1992 is applicable to medical and engineering courses in Annamalai University deemed to be constituted under Annamalai University Act, 2013. For this it is not necessary to notify a statutory university like present one as an “educational institution” under S. 2(b) of 1992 Act. In relation to imparting of education leading to a degree in Medicine or Engineering, S. 4(2-A) of 1992 Act has been given an overriding effect by incorporating non obstante provision. S. 4(2-A), unlike S. 4(1) of 1992 Act does not require any notification by the Government. [M. Aamira Fathima v. Annamalai University, (2018) 9 SCC 171]

Government Contracts and Tenders Termination/Discharge/Repudiation/ Cancellation/Suspension of Contract — Generally — Proper exercise of power by State: In this case dealership of petroleum products was terminated as factum of breach of conditions of dealership agreement was established. Division Bench of High Court issued mandamus in favour of party who breached standard requirements by overturning Single Judge order. The Supreme Court held that writ court is not appellate court nor can it substitute its decision in administrative matters where there is no case of arbitrariness. Consequently, termination of dealership was upheld. [Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. T. Natarajan, (2018) 9 SCC 235]

Information Technology Act, 2000 — S. 70(1) as existing prior to Amendment Act 10 of 2009 r/w S. 17 r/w Ss. 2(o) and 2(k) of Copyright Act, 1957 — Power to declare “protected system” in respect of “government work” — Permissibility of: The provisions of S. 70(1) of the IT Act have to be read conjointly with Ss. 2(k) and 17 of the Copyright Act, 1957 in order to give due effect to related provisions of the two different enactments made by the legislature. Further, plainly read, the power of declaration of a “protected system” may invade a copyright which may be vested in a private owner, however, such a situation is taken care of by the provisions contained in S. 2(k) of the Copyright Act, 1957 which defines “government work” and S. 17(d) of the Copyright Act, 1957 which vests in the Government, copyright in a government work as defined by S. 2(k). The balance is struck by S. 17 between copyright pertaining to any other person and copyright vested in the Government in a “government work”. Therefore, S. 70 cannot be construed independent of the provisions of the Copyright Act. If S. 70 of the IT Act has to be read in conjunction with Ss. 2(k) and 17 of the Copyright Act, 1957 the rigours that would control the operation of S. 70(1) of the IT Act are clearly manifested. [B.N. Firos v. State of Kerala, (2018) 9 SCC 220]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — S. 23 — Market Value — Compensation — Determination of — Particular class of land — Wet lands vis-à-vis dry and chira lands: Award of Rs 2000 per cent for wet land appears is just, proper and reasonable keeping in view nature of land, its surroundings and location and similarity with land owned by other landowners to whom compensation was awarded at Rs 2000 per cent. [K.S. Rajan v. State of Kerala, (2018) 9 SCC 167]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 326, 331, 343 and 346: In this case of illegal detention and custodial torture of one B, by appellant-accused (police officials), High Court reversed their acquittal, convicting them under Ss. 326, 331, 343 and 346 IPC and imposing 2 yrs’, imprisonment upon them. Occurrence was of year 1992 and appellants, after acquittal by trial court, also attained age of superannuation. One was 80 yrs old and the other was more than 70 yrs. Appellants have already undergone about 15 months’ imprisonment and victim was also given government job and is presently working. Hence, considering facts and circumstance of case, imprisonment of appellants was reduced by the Supreme Court to period already undergone. However, reduction of sentence was in peculiar facts and circumstances of instant case and the same may not be treated as precedent. [Bhagwan Dass v. State of Haryana, (2018) 9 SCC 227]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 363, 366 and 376 — Abduction and rape — Age of prosecutrix — Relevance: In this case, appellant-accused was convicted by High Court under Ss. 363, 366 and 376. Evidence of PW 6 (prosecutrix) regarding incident was contradicted by her previous statement under S. 161 CrPC. Materials on record indicated that PW 6 remained in company of appellant for about 12 days until she was recovered and she had freely moved around with appellant, in course of which movement, she came across many people at different points of time, yet, she did not complain of any criminal act on part of appellant. The Supreme Court held that in view of above, age of prosecutrix becomes relevant for determining whether she was a major so as to give her consent. Herein, prosecution had not succeeded in proving that prosecutrix was a minor on date of alleged occurrence. Possibility of prosecutrix being a consenting party cannot be altogether ruled out. Hence, order of High Court was set aside and appellant was acquitted on benefit of doubt. [Rajak Mohammad v. State of H.P., (2018) 9 SCC 248]

Police — Police Atrocities/Inaction/Custodial Death/Custodial Violence/ Illegal Detention: In this case involving allegation of custodial torture, parties relegated to High Court permitted to seek appropriate remedy. It was, however, clarified that grant of such liberty should not be construed as expression of any doubt regarding investigation process. [Sahil Sharma v. Union of India, (2018) 9 SCC 234]

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Ss. 7, 13(1)(d) and 20 — Illegal gratification: Demand and acceptance of illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute offence under Ss. 7 and 13(1)(d). In this case demand of money by first accused and acceptance of bribe amount by second accused at the behest of first accused, was proved by evidence of complainant and trap witness. The Supreme Court held that findings of trial court did not suffer from any infirmity and High Court was not justified in setting aside conviction of both accused. No explanation was also offered by accused to rebut presumption under S. 20, hence, conviction under Ss. 7 and 13(1)(d), restored. [State of Gujarat v. Navinbhai Chandrakant Joshi, (2018) 9 SCC 242]

Service Law — Judiciary — Appointment — Nature of appointment: Appointments on ad-hoc basis are not “contractual appointment” when against sanctioned posts or on pay scale. Hence, appointment of appellants as Fast Track Court Judges for five years which was extended against sanctioned posts on ad hoc basis on pay scale, not contractual appointment. [K. Anbazhagan v. High Court of Madras, (2018) 9 SCC 293]

Service Law — Recruitment Process — Eligibility criteria/conditions — Relaxation of norms/conditions: In this case, for recruitment to posts of Assistant Traffic Inspectors, 75% was by promotion and 25% by direct recruitment, however, due to existence of large number of vacancies and dire need of Assistant Traffic Inspectors but absence of qualified people for promotion, relaxation of requirement of experience of 5 yrs was given, which was notified as part of educational qualifications in terms of Kolhapur Municipal Corporation Regulation No. 119 dt. 14-5-1991, and appellants (15 candidates) were appointed by direct recruitment. It was held by the Supreme Court that interest of justice would be served if appellants and others recruited along with them who had worked for over 23 yrs now are allowed to continue as having been regularly recruited and appointed since in case their appointments are quashed there would only be 1 Asstt. Traffic Inspector actually working and 2 Assistant Traffic Inspectors eligible for promotion against 25 available posts. It was also noted that notification relaxing criteria was also challenged by respondent Trade Union only after appointments were made. [Sunil Shamrao Jadhav v. Kolhapur Municipal Corpn., (2018) 9 SCC 215]

Trade Marks Act, 1999 — Ss. 9, 11 and 18 — Registration of the phonetically similar mark “NANDHINI” to the earlier registered/in use mark “NANDINI” — Test of deceptiveness/confusion — Application of: Registration is permissible when such latter mark is used for different goods/nature of business and visual appearance of two marks is so different that average person of ordinary intelligence would not be deceived or confused between goods concerned. Further, registration of trade mark qua certain goods falling under one class does not vest monopoly over the entire class of goods with the proprietor of registered mark. [Nandhini Deluxe v. Karnataka Coop. Milk Producers Federation Ltd., (2018) 9 SCC 183]

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — S. 34 and S. 13(6) — Practice and procedure qua applications made for setting aside an award under S. 34: An application for setting aside an arbitral award will not ordinarily require anything beyond the record that was before the arbitrator. However, if there are matters not contained in such record, and are relevant to the determination of issues arising under S. 34(2)(a), they may be brought to the notice of the Court by way of affidavits filed by both parties. Further, cross-examination of persons swearing to the affidavits should not be allowed unless absolutely necessary. [Emkay Global Financial Services Ltd. v. Girdhar Sondhi, (2018) 9 SCC 49]

Armed Forces — Appointment — Criteria/Eligibility — Post of DGMS (Army): Word “inter se” in Para (i) of Administrative Instructions dt. 10-7-1992, issued by Government of India, Ministry of Defence, inter alia, stipulating “inter se seniority and suitability of officers in rank of Lieutenant General (and equivalent) … shall be assessed in light of their earlier experience of serving in particular services …” applies both to seniority as well as suitability. As far as inter se seniority is concerned, person who is senior gets precedence. Further held, while assessing “suitability” fitness of the incumbent to post is to be measured and “inter se suitability” has reference to assessing suitability of all eligible officers. Respondent was senior-most Lieutenant General fulfilling eligibility criteria for appointment to post of DGMS (Army). Finding in Para 7 of Note dt. 23-1-2018 issued by DGAFMS that since respondent was newly promoted from rank of Major General, he did not have “previous exposure to working and environs of IHQ of MoD” and hence proposing him to be appointed as DGMS (AF) instead of DGMS (Army) not fair and objective consideration of his suitability to post as it is not necessary to have work experience in IHQ alone. While affirming conclusion of AFT quashing appointment one S as DGMS (Army), but disagreeing with its direction to appoint respondent straightaway to said post, matter remitted to Raksha Mantri for fair, dispassionate and objective consideration. [Union of India v. Manomoy Ganguly, (2018) 9 SCC 65]

Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 (12 of 1976) — Ss. 27, 17, 36, 52, 18, 19 and 15 — Benevolent development scheme in public interest — Delay in implementation of, after issuance of preliminary notification under S. 17, BDA Act: Time constraints under S. 11-A, LA Act not applicable to scheme under BDA Act. Shock expressed at non-consideration of precise law required to adjudicate matter, laid down by Constitution Bench in Offshore Holdings (P) Ltd., (2011) 3 SCC 139. With regard to limitation of 5 years under S. 27 of BDA Act, it was clarified that there is a vast difference between provisions and action taken pursuant to preliminary notification (S. 17) and final notification (S. 19) under BDA Act. [BDA v. State of Karnataka, (2018) 9 SCC 122]

Constitution of India — Art. 136: Permission to file SLPs against High Court order was granted to informant. Subsequently, petitions for withdrawal of SLPs filed by informant. It was held that proceedings of criminal case, specially of instant nature i.e. case under S. 396 IPC, cannot depend on whims of informant, hence, prayer for withdrawal of SLPs rejected. [Amar Nath Jha v. Nand Kishore Singh, (2018) 9 SCC 144]

Constitution of India — Art. 21 — Right to Proper Legal Representation on part of accused lodged in jail: To facilitate dialogue between counsel and his client, which would further cause of justice and make legal aid meaningful, videoconferencing between counsel for accused on one hand and accused lodged in jail or anybody knowing the matter on the other, was made mandatory as per directions of Supreme Court Legal Services Committee (SCLSC). Said directions affirmed, and directed to be extended nationwide. [Imtiyaz Ramzan Khan v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 9 SCC 160]

Constitution of India — Arts. 233 to 235 and 32 — Public Interest Litigation (PIL): Directions were sought for immediate filling of unfilled vacancies in subordinate judiciary leading to pendency of matters but Supreme Court declined to interfere as steps to fill up vacancies had already been taken by High Courts. [Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India, (2018) 9 SCC 64]

Constitution of India — Arts. 80(4), 81, 158 and 171 — Elections to Council of States (Rajya Sabha): Introduction of NOTA in election to Council of States (Rajya Sabha) by Election Commission is not permissible, as it is in opposition to discipline of political parties. Votes polled in election to Council of States being of transferable nature, NOTA would alter value of vote. Introduction of NOTA is anathema to free and fair election to Rajya Sabha and brings in likelihood of promoting defection. Distinctions between elections to Council of States (Rajya Sabha)/Legislative Council and House of People (Lok Sabha)/Legislative Assembly (Vidhan Sabha), summarized. [Shailesh Manubhai Parmar v. Election Commission of India, (2018) 9 SCC 100]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — S. 166 — Compensation — Computation of income: Deceased was aged 38 yrs at the time of death and in business of selling desi ghee and namkin bhujia, with monthly income of Rs 3500. Tribunal however, held that deceased had an unnamed shop in a small village not paying tax, assessed income at Rs 1200 p.m. and awarded Rs 1,15,200 after applying a multiplier of 12, with interest at 15 per cent p.a. It was held by the Supreme Court that income should have been assessed at Rs 2500 p.m. having due regard to nature of business, date of accident and all circumstances of case. Following Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680, quantum of compensation recomputed as monthly income: Rs 2500, and annual income: Rs 30,000, deduction of one-third for personal expenses: Rs 10,000, net annual income: Rs 20,000, future prospects at 40 per cent: Rs 8000, total income: Rs 28,000, using appropriate multiplier 16, total compensation for loss of dependency: Rs 4,48,000. For conventional heads Rs 75,000, total compensation: Rs 5,23,000, appellants entitled to interest @ 9 per cent p.a. from date of petition until payment. [Santosh Devi v. Mahaveer Singh, (2018) 9 SCC 146]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 363 and 366 — Conviction under: Appellant-accused was sentenced to 7 years’ imprisonment with Rs 1000 fine but there was subsequent compromise between parties. De facto complainant, since married to another person and living happily, had no complaint against appellant. In such circumstances, conviction confirmed, but, sentence modified, being limited to period already undergone. [Sajid v. State of Uttarakhand, (2018) 9 SCC 159]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 396 and 412 — Dacoity with murder: High Court appreciated every aspect of matter on facts and considered entire material on record, while acquitting two accused and remanded appeal of third accused for consideration by Juvenile Justice Board on finding arrived at by High Court, that he was a juvenile at the time of commission of said offence and as no material was present, to disagree with reasons assigned and conclusions arrived at by High Court, High Court judgment affirmed. [Amar Nath Jha v. Nand Kishore Singh, (2018) 9 SCC 137]

Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 — Ss. 3(b), 4 and 7(3) — Jurisdiction of Estate Officer with respect to proceedings relating to public premises: An Estate Officer has to exercise his jurisdiction in relation to public premises falling in local limits specified in notification issued under S. 3 of PP Act, 1971 for exercise of that jurisdiction. [Savatram Rampratap Mills v. Radheyshyam, (2018) 9 SCC 154]

SCs, STs OBCs and Minorities — Caste/Tribe Certificate — Remand — When warranted — Non-consideration of entire evidence: When a party relies upon any evidence in support of his case, the Court/Committee/authority, as the case may be, especially original court is under obligation to apply its mind to entire evidence produced and record its reasoned findings. Consideration of entire evidence in accordance with law is important. [Vilas Dinkar Bhat v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 9 SCC 89]

Service Law — Pay — Pay fixation — Pay protection — Entitlement to — Resolution dt. 27-11-1991 granting benefit of pay scale of Rs 700-1600 from their initial appointment date in Senior College to “rest category” Teachers: Security of tenure for teacher, who dedicates her life for education of students is of utmost importance and insecurity should not be created, more so when they are through a process of really subterfuge of giving artificial breaks. But for artificial break of one day which was due to change in curriculum, appellant was in continuous service for two decades and that was how it was really understood by the college as well as the State Government since they had given pension to her which is admissible only after 20 years of service. Appellant is entitled to be treated in pay scale of Rs 700-1600 and all benefits of Resolution dt. 27-11-1991. Respondents directed to calculate emoluments due to appellant and disburse the same within stipulated time failing which it would carry simple interest @ 12% p.a. [Ahalya A. Samtaney v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 9 SCC 92]

Taxation — Concession/Exemption/Incentive/Rebate/Subsidy — Exemption notification or exemption clause: General principle that in case of ambiguity, a taxing statute should be construed in favour of the assessee, is not applicable to an exempting provision. Every taxing statute including, charging, computation and exemption clauses, at the threshold stage should be interpreted strictly. Further, though in case of ambiguity in charging provisions, the benefit necessarily goes in favour of assessee, but for an exemption notification or exemption clause the benefit of ambiguity must be strictly interpreted in favour of the Revenue/State. [Commr. of Customs v. Dilip Kumar & Co., (2018) 9 SCC 1]

W.B. Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 (37 of 1997) — S. 5(8) (as incorporated by Amendment Act 14 of 2001) — Statutory liability to pay municipal taxes on tenants as occupiers, post amendment — Supersession of contractual liability to pay municipal taxes and enhancements in municipal taxes as part of rent — Effect of: Liability to pay enhanced municipal taxes by tenant as occupier, held, having become a statutory liability, there was no requirement on part of landlord of obtaining formal order of enhancement of rent from Rent Controller. [Popat & Kotecha Property v. Ashim Kumar Dey, (2018) 9 SCC 149]