#SCC

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 41 Rr. 27 to 29: Order for taking additional evidence in appeal without following procedure under Or. 41 Rr. 27, 28 and 29 is not permissible. Unless and until procedure under Or. 41 Rr. 27 to 29 is followed, parties to appeal cannot be permitted to lead additional evidence and/or appellate court is not justified to direct court from whose decree appeal is preferred or any other subordinate court, to take such evidence and to send it when taken to appellate court. [H.S. Goutham v. Rama Murthy, (2021) 5 SCC 241]

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 — S. 2(1)(r) — Unfair trade practice — Terms of agreement between buyer and seller whether one-sided and the same constitutes unfair trade practice: In case, when agreement fastening liability on purchaser to pay simple interest @ 12% p.a. if he failed to pay instalments on time, whereas if seller failed to hand over possession on time he would have to pay compensation @ Rs 2 per square foot per month for period of delay, held, such condition is one-sided and constitutes unfair trade practice. [NBCC (India) Ltd. v. Shri Ram Trivedi, (2021) 5 SCC 273]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 319 — Object and purpose of S. 319: Principles reiterated regarding scope and ambit of powers of Magistrate under S. 319 and when additional accused may be added and “evidence” on basis of which may be added. [Sartaj Singh v. State of Haryana, (2021) 5 SCC 337]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 439(2) — Cancellation of bail: In this case, bail was obtained by pleading change in circumstances, but without disclosing factum of dismissal of earlier bail application. Conduct of appellant in not disclosing the fate of the earlier bail application not approved, but considering certain subsequent developments including grant of bail to co-accused, impugned cancellation order was set aside and appellant was directed to be enlarged on bail. [Jitendera Taneja v. State of U.P., (2021) 5 SCC 308]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss. 200 to 204 — Frivolous or vexatious complaints — Duty and powers of Magistrate/trial court in preventing abuse of court process: Trial courts have the power to not merely decide on acquittal or conviction of the accused person after the trial, but also the duty to nip frivolous litigations in the bud even before they reach the stage of trial by discharging the accused in fit cases. This would not only save judicial time that comes at the cost of public money, but would also protect the right to liberty that every person is entitled to under Art. 21 of the Constitution. In this context, the trial Judges have as much, if not more, responsibility in safeguarding fundamental rights, as the Supreme Court. [Krishna Lal Chawla v. State of U.P., (2021) 5 SCC 435]

Environment Law — Forests, Wildlife and Zoos —Afforestation/Reforestation/Diversion/Encroachment/Illegal activity/Intrusion into Forest land/Wildlife sanctuaries/parks: Diversion of forest land for carrying out certain public welfare projects in State of H.P., permitted with and without conditions, as per directions issued herein. [T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, (2021) 5 SCC 358]

Evidence Act, 1872 — S. 32(1) — Multiple dying declarations — Evidentiary value of — Duty of court in such cases: Each dying declaration has to be considered independently on its own merit as to its evidentiary value and one cannot be rejected because of contents of the other. Court has to consider each of them in its correct perspective and satisfy itself as to which one of them or which of them reflects true state of affairs, and accordingly adjudicate the matter. [Nagabhushan v. State of Karnataka, (2021) 5 SCC 222]

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 — S. 20 Expln. — Effect of: In terms of S. 20, in all cases where the accused was above 16 yrs but below 18 yrs of age on the date of occurrence, the proceedings pending in the court would continue and be taken to the logical end subject to an exception that upon finding the juvenile to be guilty, the court would not pass an order of sentence against him but the juvenile would be referred to the Board for appropriate orders under the 2000 Act. [Devilal v. State of M.P., (2021) 5 SCC 292]

MCI Graduate Medical Education Regulations, 1997 — Regn. 6 and Note 2: Migration from an unrecognised college to a recognised college, held, is impermissible. Migration cannot be permitted contrary to the Regulations. [Medical Council of India v. Anchal Parihar, (2021) 5 SCC 417]

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Ss. 37, 67, 8, 9-A, 25-A, 23 and 29 — Limitations on grant of bail under NDPS Act: In this case, there was non-application of mind by High Court to rival submissions and, particularly, to seriousness of allegations involving offence punishable under NDPS Act. It was held that merely recording submissions of parties does not amount to indication of judicial, or, for that matter, judicious application of mind by High Court to basic question as to whether bail should be granted. Provisions of S. 37 of the NDPS Act provide legal norms which have to be applied in determining whether a case for grant of bail has been made out. Herein, there has been serious infraction by High Court of its duty to apply law. High Court misapplied law to facts in arriving at decision for grant of bail to respondent-accused. Consequently, bail granted by High Court to respondent, stood cancelled. [Union of India v. Prateek Shukla, (2021) 5 SCC 430]

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 — S. 16 proviso — Appeal — Delay — Condonation of — NGT’s refusal to exercise discretion — “Sufficient cause” not construed liberally by NGT — Legality: An appeal to NGT in matters like environmental clearance for construction of Greenfield international airport is no ordinary matter. It has potential of irrevocably changing environment with possibility of likely injury. Application of judicial mind by an independent tribunal in such cases, at first appellate stage, is almost a necessity. [Sridevi Datla v. Union of India, (2021) 5 SCC 321]

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — Ss. 139 and 118: Presumption in case of voluntarily signed blank cheque leaf as to legally enforceable debt, held, available against the accused even in case when he voluntarily signed and handed over a blank cheque leaf towards some payment. [Kalamani Tex v. P. Balasubramanian, (2021) 5 SCC 283]

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 — Ss. 2(r), 2(s), 2(zc), 2(y) and 20: Principle of reasonable accommodation, discussed. Intrinsic to individual dignity is recognising worth of every person as equal member of society, respect for dignity of others and fostering conditions in which every individual can evolve according to his capacities. Principle of reasonable accommodation acknowledges that if disability as a social construct must be remedied, conditions must affirmatively be created for facilitating development of disabled i.e. it is founded in norm of inclusion. Exclusion negates individual dignity and worth. Accommodation implies positive obligation to create conditions conducive to growth and fulfilment of disabled in every aspect of their existence. Accommodation which law mandates is “reasonable” since it has to meet requirement of each condition of disability. Expectations of disabled person are unique to nature of his disability and character of impediments encountered as its consequence. Reasonable accommodation determinations must be based on case-to-case basis in consultation with disabled person concerned. [Vikash Kumar v. UPSC, (2021) 5 SCC 370]

Service Law — Penalty/Punishment — Norms/Rules/Principles: Principles explained regarding determination of the applicable norms when there are conflicting requirements in the statutory Rules and statutory Regulations. Statutory Rules which are specifically applicable to service to which employee belongs vis-à-vis statutory Regulations which provide for a more general dispensation. Moreover, statutory provision providing for framing of such specifically applicable statutory Rules also contain non obstante clause. [U.P. Milk Union & Dairy Federation Centralised Services v. Jagpal Singh, (2021) 5 SCC 259]

Service Law — Recruitment Process — Norms/Principles/Rules applicable: Special rules for specialised post are valid. Rr. 5 and 10 of U.P. Police Motor Transport Unit Subordinate Officers Service Rules, 2015, relating to appointment for the Post of Head Constable Driver, Motor Transport which is highly technical, held valid. [Rajesh Kumar Singh v. State of U.P., (2021) 5 SCC 421]

Service Law — Reinstatement/Back Wages/Arrears — Reinstatement — Parity: Direction to reinstate petitioners whose services were terminated because of errors in selection process finding that though they were beneficiaries of irregular select list, but petitioners were not responsible therefor and were appointed after completion of training and had worked for some time, held sustainable. [Anmol Kumar Tiwari v. State of Jharkhand, (2021) 5 SCC 424]

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 — S. 43-A: In this case, Kerala journalist, namely, S was arrested in State of U.P. Permission to visit Kerala was sought by applicant S for seeing his mother lying in a critical condition and not likely to survive for long, the same was granted subject to certain conditions. [Kerala Union of Working Journalists v. Union of India, (2021) 5 SCC 311]

Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 — S. 6 — Excess land — Point in time at which to be determined: As per S. 6 the determination of “excess land” is to be made considering the status of the land at the time of commencement of the principal Act, and not at the time of filing of the declaration. In this case, admittedly partition was affected after the commencement of the Act and it would not affect the validity of the determination of excess land owned by the joint family at the time of commencement of the Act. [U.A. Basheer v. State of Karnataka, (2021) 5 SCC 313]

2021 SCC Vol. 5 Part 1

In this part read a very interesting decision delivered by the Supreme Court running into over 465 Pages which has been expertly analysed by our editors. While uphelding the validity of several provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2020, albeit with directions given in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. While so upholding the impugned amendments, the Bench expressed an observation that:

“There is nothing like a perfect law and as with all human institutions, there are bound to be imperfections. What is significant is however for the court ruling on constitutionality, the law must present a clear departure from constitutional limits.”

Short Notes: 7

Constitution of India — Art. 14 — Law enacting or modifying economic measure — Challenge to validity of — Approach of Court in such cases — Explained in detail: Wisdom of original or modified provision(s) is not subject to judicial scrutiny if provision(s) in question are otherwise compliant with the Constitution. Wider latitude given to legislature in economic matters essentially arises from separation of powers under the Constitution. Since the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 undoubtedly bears the brand of an economic measure upon its face, and in true spirit, being one of the most significant and dynamic economic experiments indulged in by the law giver, not by becoming servile to Parliament, but by way of time hallowed deference to the sovereign body experimenting in such matters, the Court will lean heavily in favour of such a law. [Manish Kumar v. Union of India, (2021) 5 SCC 1]

2021 SCC Vol. 4 Part 3

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Pt. II and S. 20 — Law of arbitration/curial law/seat of arbitration — Determination of, by consent of parties: In this case, Cl. 67 of the contract between the parties inter alia provided that in the absence of an Arbitration Act in Bhutan, the Arbitral Tribunal shall follow/be guided by the basic principles and procedures as contained in the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 while Cl. 67(vii)(a) provided that all arbitration shall be held at New Delhi, India/Thimphu, Bhutan. On 25-2-2013, the Kingdom of Bhutan enacted the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, 2013 while on 28-7-2020, the respondent Contractor sent a notice of arbitration to the appellant Authority under Cl. 67(ii) of the Contract, and nominated its arbitrator. Since the appellant Authority had failed to appoint its arbitrator, High Court exercised its jurisdiction under S. 11 of the Indian A&C Act, 1996 and made the appointment and also directed that the two arbitrators would proceed to appoint the presiding arbitrator. Appellant Authority did not have an issue with respect to the panel of arbitrators appointed and their grievance was limited to the applicability of the Indian A&C Act, 1996 and the seat of arbitration at New Delhi. In view of the consensus arrived at between the parties, the order of High Court was modified to the extent that all disputes arising out of the agreement dt. 14-4-2009 shall be conducted in accordance with the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of Bhutan, 2013 with the seat of arbitration at Thimphu. [Punatsangchhu-1 Hydroelectric Project Authority v. Larsen & Toubro Ltd., (2021) 4 SCC 511]

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Ss. 8 and 11 — Arbitration clause/agreement contained in substantive contract/instrument on which stamp duty has to be compulsorily paid: Issues referred to larger Bench of five Judges that whether the arbitration clause can be enforced/acted upon, when such substantive contract/instrument is unstamped, whilst adjudication of the rights and obligations under the underlying substantive contract cannot proceed before the deficit stamp duty is paid in accordance with law; Authority which must impound the unstamped instrument at different stages, so that the deficit stamp duty may be paid in accordance with law and adjudication of the rights and obligations under the underlying substantive contract, by the arbitrator may commence thereafter. [N.N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd., (2021) 4 SCC 379]

Constitution of India — Art. 226 — Exercise of power under — Reasoned and independent analysis — Necessity: Technology enables Judges to bring speed, efficiency and accuracy to judicial work but prolific use of “cut-copy-paste” function should not become substitute for substantive reasoning which, in ultimate analysis is defining feature of judicial process. The fact that Judges are indeed hard pressed for time, faced with burgeoning vacancies and large caseloads acknowledged and perhaps crisp reasoning could be answer to the issue. [UPSC v. Bibhu Prasad Sarangi, (2021) 4 SCC 516]

Contempt of Court — Civil Contempt — Wilful disobedience/contumacious conduct: Conduct lacking in bona fides alone, of successful resolution applicant under Insolvency Code is insufficiency to invite the penal consequences which emanate from the exercise of the contempt jurisdiction of the Court. [AMTEK Auto Ltd. Committee of Creditors v. Dinkar T. Venkatasubramanian, (2021) 4 SCC 457]

Courts, Tribunals and Judiciary — Courts, Tribunals and Special Courts — Tribunals — Tenure of Members/Chairperson — Competent authority — Scope of judicial interference: In this case, tenure of Chairperson of Tribunal directed/specified by Government under the applicable statutory provisions which held the field at the relevant time, come to an end. Prayer for extension of tenure on ground that incumbent Chairman was the only judicial member of the Board and that there was no other judicial member, held not tenable in the light of principles laid down in Rojer Mathew, (2020) 6 SCC 1 and Madras Bar Assn., (2021) 7 SCC 369. [International Assn. for Protection of Intellectual Property (India Group) v. Union of India, (2021) 4 SCC 519]

Government Grants, Largesse, Public Property and Public Premises — Affirmative Action Schemes, Pension and Other Schemes — Pension Schemes — Generally — Different pension schemes for freedom fighters: In this case, applicant had not produced required documents as per scheme concerned, hence he was held, not entitled to pension under that scheme though he might be getting Freedom Fighter’s Pension under some other scheme. [Union of India v. A. Alagam Perumal Kone, (2021) 4 SCC 535]

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Ss. 7 & 9 and S. 238 — Petition under S. 7 or S. 9 IBC — Maintainability of, even when there exists an admitted winding-up petition regarding the same company: IBC has overriding effect over winding-up provisions of the Companies Act, including S. 446 of the Companies Act, 1956/S. 279 & S. 434(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013. (1) Pendency of admitted winding-up proceedings, thus held, not a bar to S. 7 or S. 9 IBC petitions, as the latter are independent and overriding proceedings. (2) Transfer of such pending admitted winding-up petition to NCLT for adjudication under IBC, further held, is not the only route to IBC in such case, as S. 7 or S. 9 IBC petition are independent proceedings and IBC has overriding effect over winding-up provisions of the Companies Act. (3) Fresh petition under S. 7 or S. 9 IBC, or, transfer of pending admitted winding-up petition to NCLT under IBC, are subject only to: (i) test of irreversible/irretrievable act(s)/stage having been done or reached in the winding-up proceedings as laid down in Action Ispat, (2021) 2 SCC 641, or, (ii) where a company in winding up is near corporate death. These have to be determined in the facts and circumstances of each case, and an irresistible conclusion reached in this regard. (4) Irreversible/irretrievable act(s)/stage in the winding-up proceedings, clarified, must be act(s) or stage in or of the winding-up proceedings themselves. Sale of property of corporate creditor/company which is under winding-up proceedings by secured creditor who stood outside the winding-up proceedings, held, is not irreversible/irretrievable act/stage in the winding-up proceedings themselves, hence, not a bar to fresh petition under S. 7 or S. 9 IBC. (5) Fresh S. 7 or S. 9 IBC petition being an independent proceeding having overriding effect over winding-up provisions of the Companies Act, and which has to be determined on its own merits, held, it is irrelevant that pendency of winding-up proceedings was suppressed in S. 7 or S. 9 IBC application, nor would such act be a subterfuge. [A. Navinchandra Steels (P) Ltd. v. Srei Equipment Finance Ltd., (2021) 4 SCC 435]

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Ss. 9 and 8 — Application under S. 9 by operational creditor — Prerequisites for: In this case, operational creditor failed to prove operational debt and its default and there was a pre-existing dispute as to existence of such debt. Disputes raised by corporate debtor prior to receipt of demand notice and the demand notice also replied to within the statutory prescribed period of 10 days. The Supreme Court held that application under S. 9 was rightly rejected by NCLT and NCLAT. [Allied Silica Ltd. v. Tata Chemicals Ltd., (2021) 4 SCC 515]

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — S. 20 — Acquittal of co-accused: Claim of parity is not available to the appellant, when unlike the appellant, none of the co-accused were apprehended at the spot and no evidence produced to connect them with the alleged offence. Contrarily, not only was appellant apprehended at the spot of the incident but also found in conscious possession of the contraband. [Sk. Sakkar v. State of W.B., (2021) 4 SCC 483]

Reservation, Concession, Exemption, Relaxation and Affirmative Action — Migration of Category: Candidates belonging to vertical reservation categories are entitled to be selected in “Open or General” category on basis of their merit and in such circumstances their selection cannot be counted against their respective quota for vertical reservation. In case of migration to open category based on merit, manner in which vertical reservation and horizontal reservation are to be applied, explained in detail. [Saurav Yadav v. State of U.P., (2021) 4 SCC 542]

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 — Ss. 2(5) and 2(zc) r/w S. 2(i) of the 1995 Act — Dilated Cardiomyopathy — Whether disability: S. 2(i) of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, taking into account visual disability, locomotor disability, mental illness, mental retardation, hearing impairment and leprosy but not heart ailment. Under S. 2(s) of the 2016 Act, “a person with disabilities” is defined as a person with long term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairment which prevented his full and effective participation in society. S. 2(zc) defines “specified disability” as those mentioned in Schedule to the 2016 Act which envisage “physical disability”, “intellectual disability” and “mental behaviour”. Dilated Cardiomyopathy condition neither specified disability her relatable to broad spectrum of impairments, which hinders full and effective participation in society. Thus, Dilated Cardiomyopathy condition of appellant does not bring his case either within ambit of 1995 Act or the 2016 Act. [Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of India, (2021) 4 SCC 487]

Service Law — Pension — Cut-off date/point — Validity and binding effect of — Scope of judicial review — Freedom of employer to introduce new schemes and benefits having regard to its financial health: In this case,  Pension scheme was introduced vide Noti. dt. 6-10-1995 w.e.f. 5-6-1995 i.e. the date on which scheme was approved by Cabinet/Government. Respondent Union employees retiring prior to 5-6-1995 and governed by CPF scheme, held not entitled to pension under pension scheme in question. [Himachal RTC v. Retired Employees Union, (2021) 4 SCC 502]

Service Law — Police — Recruitment Process — Post of Police Sub-Inspector: Recruitment over and above notified vacancies, not permissible. [Gajanan Babulal Bansode v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 4 SCC 494]

Foreword to Anomalies in Law and Justice: A tribute to Justice Raveendran and an introduction to the book “Anomalies in Law & Justice” by Justice R.V. Raveendran, former Judge, Supreme Court of India. [Foreword to Anomalies in Law and Justice by M.N. Venkatachalaiah, (2021) 4 SCC (J-1)]

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Ss. 53 and 53-A: Officers empowered under S. 53, are police officers for the purpose of attracting bar under S. 25 of the Evidence Act, 1872 against admissibility of confession to a police officer. Hence, any confessional statement made to officers empowered under S. 53 cannot be taken into account in order to convict an accused, except to the extent found “relevant” under S. 53-A, and, when corroborated in accordance with law. Ss. 53 and 53-A of the NDPS Act, when read together, make it clear that S. 53-A is in the nature of an exception to Ss. 161, 162 and 172 CrPC. However, statements made before the officer empowered under S. 53 of the NDPS Act, even when “relevant” under S. 53-A, cannot, without corroborating evidence, be the basis for the conviction of an accused. [Tofan Singh v. State of T.N., (2021) 4 SCC 1]

SCC Issue dated April 14th, 2021 (Vol. 3 Part 5)

In this part read a very interesting article Existence and Mortgageability of Equitable Estates in Immovable Property in Indian Law – I, (2021) 3 SCC J-25 by Mr Sudeep Malik, Associate Editor, Supreme Court Cases. The author discusses the question “Whether a property can be equitably mortgaged by depositing documents which may not be title deeds or registered document of title? “ which was referred to 3-Judge Bench of Supreme Court in Syndicate Bank v. APIIC, (2021) 3 SCC 736.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 23 R. 3 and Ss. 151 and 96(3) — Consent decree — Modification or alteration of, by court — When permissible: It is settled law that consent decrees are intended to create estoppels by judgment against the parties, thereby putting an end to further litigation between the parties and it would be slow to unilaterally interfere in, modify, substitute or modulate the terms of a consent decree, unless it is done with the revised consent of all the parties thereto. However, this formulation is far from absolute and does not apply as a blanket rule in all cases and a consent decree would not serve as an estoppel, where the compromise was vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake. Court in the exercise of its inherent powers may also unilaterally rectify a consent decree suffering from clerical or arithmetical errors, so as to make it conform with the terms of the compromise. [Compack Enterprises (India) (P) Ltd. v. Beant Singh, (2021) 3 SCC 702]

Constitution of India — Art. 21 r/w Pt. III — Liberty guaranteed by Pt. III — Scope of: Liberty guaranteed by Pt. III of the Constitution covers within its protective ambit not only due procedure and fairness but also access to justice and a speedy trial. When a timely trial would not be possible and the accused has suffered incarceration for a significant period of time, the courts would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge accused on bail regardless of statutory restrictions imposed on right to bail by provisions like S. 43-D(5) of the UAPA. [Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713]

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 — S. 13(2)(a): Limitation period for filing response or written statement in reply to complaint, by respondent/opposite party, mandatorily cannot be extended beyond prescribed period of 45 days (i.e. period of 30 days along with discretionary extension of time up to 15 days) by Consumer Fora. [Daddy’s Builders (P) Ltd. v. Manisha Bhargava, (2021) 3 SCC 669]

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 — Ss. 13(2)(a), 18 and 22 — Power of Consumer Fora to extend time for filing written statement/reply to complaint beyond stipulated period of 45 days: In this case as the matter was pending decision of larger Bench on the said issue, direction issued that it would be open to Consumer Fora concerned to accept written statement filed beyond stipulated time of 45 days in an appropriate case, on suitable terms, including payment of costs, and to proceed with matter. [Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mampee Timbers and Hardwares (P) Ltd., (2021) 3 SCC 673]

Courts, Tribunals and Judiciary — Judicial Process — Recusal by Judge: Recusal by Judge is not warranted when on an earlier occasion first application filed by applicant for the very same relief as in present application was dismissed by the Bench in which one of the Judges of present Bench was present on the earlier occasion as well. Litigant cannot be permitted to browbeat Court by seeking Bench of its choice. [Neelam Manmohan Attavar v. Manmohan Attavar, (2021) 3 SCC 727]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 311 — Power to summon material witness, or examine person present: Principles summarised regarding object and scope of S. 311 and power and duties of court while exercising discretion under S. 311 CrPC. [V.N. Patil v. K. Niranjan Kumar, (2021) 3 SCC 661]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 439 r/w S. 41 — Interim bail: In this case, there was absence of compliance with procedure contained in S. 41 CrPC before arresting the petitioner. Same taken as factor for directing release of petitioner, a stand-up comedian, on ad interim bail by staying impugned judgment of High Court by which it declined bail to the petitioner involved in offences under Ss. 295-A, 298, 269 and 188/34 IPC, wherein complainant had alleged that jokes made by petitioner had outraged religious sentiments of the complainant and those similarly situated. [Munawar v. State of M.P., (2021) 3 SCC 712]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 482 — Quashment of proceedings under Ss. 419, 420, 323, 504 and 506 IPC: It was held that this case was fit for High Court to exercise jurisdiction under S. 482 CrPC and to quash criminal proceedings against accused under Ss. 419 and 420 IPC as it could not be said that averments in FIR and allegations in complaint against appellant constituted offences thereunder. But, regarding proceedings under Ss. 323, 504 and 506 IPC, High Court has rightly not quashed such proceedings, which shall be continued as per charge-sheet and shall be disposed of in accordance with law, on their own merits. [Archana Rana v. State of U.P., (2021) 3 SCC 751]

Existence Of Arbitration Agreement: This article seeks to examine the scope and purport of Section 7(4)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 which stipulates that an arbitration agreement is deemed to be in writing if it is contained in an exchange of statement of claim and defence wherein the existence of arbitration agreement is alleged by one party and not denied by the other. In order to accomplish the aforesaid objective, the authors first examined the legislative history of Section 7 of the Act resulting in its enactment. Thereafter, the authors briefly examined the divergent views expressed by the High Courts and the Supreme Court of India on the scope and meaning of Section 7(4)(c) of the Act. The authors concluded by summarising their views on the true scope and purport of the said sub-section. Section 7(4)(C) Of The Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996: Acquiesence By Silence? By M. Dhyan Chinnappa & Rohan Tigadi, [(2021) 3 SCC (J-32)]

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — S. 13(1)(i-a) — “Mental cruelty” — Grant of divorce on ground of — Factors to be considered: For considering dissolution of marriage at instance of a spouse who alleges mental cruelty, result of such mental cruelty must be such that it is not possible to continue with matrimonial relationship. In other words, wronged party cannot be expected to condone such conduct and continue to live with his/her spouse. Degree of tolerance will vary from one couple to another and court will have to bear in mind background, level of education and also status of parties, in order to determine whether cruelty alleged is sufficient to justify dissolution of marriage, at instance of wronged party. [Joydeep Majumdar v. Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar, (2021) 3 SCC 742]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Ss. 28-A, 4(1) and 23(1-A) — Redetermination of compensation: Claimant whose lands were acquired by a common notification, held, is entitled to enhanced compensation awarded by civil court to other landowners in same survey number. [Murali v. State of Kerala, (2021) 3 SCC 747]

Mortgage by deposit of title deeds: In this article, the author reflects upon several legal aspects relating to the issue raised before Supreme Court in Syndicate Bank v. APIIC, (2021) 3 SCC 736 regarding if a property can be equitably mortgaged by depositing documents which may not be title deeds or registered document of title. The author proposed some propositions in the matter. Those propositions are to be substantiated with statutory and case law analysis in several forthcoming articles in the SCC Journal Section by the author. Existence and Mortgageability of Equitable Estates in Immovable Property in Indian Law – I, by Sudeep Malik [(2021) 3 SCC (J-25)]

Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 — Ss. 6, 23 and 27 — Offences under the 1994 Act — Bail: In this case, accused and one other were found involved in pre-natal sex determination and abortion of female foetuses at their residence, without required registration or licence under law. There was sufficient evidence to hold that there is strong prima facie case against appellant-accused herein and that she had more active role in conducting alleged illegal medical practices of sex determination and sex-selective abortion as compared to other co-accused. Therefore, it is imperative that no leniency should be granted at instant stage. Thus, order of High Court denying bail to appellant-accused, confirmed. [Rekha Sengar v. State of M.P., (2021) 3 SCC 729]

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Ss. 7, 13(2) and 13(1)(d) — Illegal gratification: Mere recovery of tainted money in absence of any proof of demand and acceptance, cannot be said to be sufficient to convict the accused. [N. Vijayakumar v. State of T.N., (2021) 3 SCC 687]

Service Law — Departmental Enquiry — Enquiry Procedure — Issue of show-cause notice indicating proposed punishment of compulsory retirement before furnishing enquiry report — Legality of: After enquiry officer records his findings, it is always open for disciplinary authority to arrive at tentative conclusion of proposed punishment and it can indicate same to delinquent employee enclosing copy of enquiry report. [Boloram Bordoloi v. Lakhimi Gaolia Bank, (2021) 3 SCC 806]

Service Law — Judiciary — Recruitment process — Notification of vacancies — Periodicity with which to be made: While harmonising R. 7(2) of the Kerala Judicial Service Rules, 1991 with Malik Mazhar Sultan (3), (2008) 17 SCC 703, held, once process of selection is annual, notification of probable or anticipated vacancies must be for the selection year. Recruitment over and above notified vacancies, not permissible. [High Court of Kerala v. Reshma A., (2021) 3 SCC 755]

Specific Relief Act, 1963 — S. 38: In this case, suit for permanent injunction to restrain defendants from disturbing peaceful possession and enjoyment of plaintiff over the suit property was filed. Peaceful possession of the suit property by plaintiff was established on record and admitted by defendant. There being no dispute as to title, nor plaintiff raising any issues as to its title in the suit, as defendant’s prior suit for declaration of title and possession of the suit property standing dismissed and such dismissal attaining finality. [A. Subramanian v. R. Pannerselvam,(2021) 3 SCC 675]

Speedy resolution of arbitral disputes: In this article, the author states that while adjudicating appeals under Section 37, the Courts ought to be circumspect before condoning long delays, considering the objective of expeditious disposal of disputes under the Arbitration Act and prejudice being caused to the non-defaulting party. Appeal Under Section 37 Of The Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996 — To Condone Or Not To Condone Delay Beyond 120 Days, That Was The Question! By Sidharath Goyal [(2021) 3 SCC (J-56)]

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — Ss. 58(f) & 96 and Ss. 40 Pt. II, 53-A & 54 — Mortgage by deposit of title deeds: In this case it was held that reference of the question regarding if a property can be equitably mortgaged by depositing documents which may not be title deeds or registered document of title, to present larger Bench, not required to be answered in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, as allotter is estopped from challenging the mortgage sale of the property in question by the mortgagee Bank, as it had itself issued the permission to create a charge on the property in question, even though the allottee had only been issued an allotment letter. [Syndicate Bank v. A.P. Industrial Infrastructure Corpn. Ltd., (2021) 3 SCC 736]

Violation of fundamental rights by a judicial order: The protection and enforcement of fundamental rights and freedoms is both the power and duty of the courts and the grant of appropriate remedy is not discretionary but obligatory. This article discusses the issues regarding violation of fundamental rights by a judicial order and remedies against it. Courts — Guardian Of Our Liberties: Judicial Orders Can Violate Fundamental Rights? By V. Sudhish Pai [(2021) 3 SCC (J-44)]

SCC Issue dated April 14th, 2021 (Vol. 3 Part 4)

In this part, read the important judgment on right to life and liberty, deftly analysed by our editors in over 7 shortnotes, where the Supreme Court has held that custodial violence involving police atrocities which resulted in passing away of the deceased is a crime against humanity and a clear violation of rights guaranteed  under Article 21. It is held that permission for compounding such offence cannot be granted by the court, regardless of any settlement entered into by the parties.  [Pravat Chandra Mohanty v. State of Odisha, (2021) 3 SCC 529]

Short Notes: 8

Constitution of India — Art. 21 — Offences involving police brutality/atrocities and which are compoundable with permission of court: Permission for compounding of such offences involving police brutality/atrocities cannot to be granted by court. When the police is a violator of the law whose primary responsibility is to protect the law, the punishment for such violation has to be proportionately stringent so as to have effective deterrent effect and instil confidence in the society. Offences involving police brutality are crimes not against the victim alone but against humanity and a clear violation of rights guaranteed under Art. 21. Thus, permission for compounding of such offences cannot be granted by court, regardless of any settlement entered into by the parties. [Pravat Chandra Mohanty v. State of Odisha, (2021) 3 SCC 529]

Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 — S. 21 and proviso thereto — Condition of pre-deposit under S. 21 — Mandatory nature of: Discretion of DRAT to reduce pre-deposit amount from 50% of debt due, held, is limited to reducing the pre-deposit to 25% thereof. The pre-deposit cannot under any circumstances be reduced below 25% of the debt due. [Kotak Mahindra Bank (P) Ltd. v. Ambuj A. Kasliwal, (2021) 3 SCC 549]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — S. 89: True intendment of S. 89 is legally arrived at settlement of disputes outside court without intervention of courts, and not necessarily by only the modes prescribed in S. 89, nor necessarily upon direction of court. Settlement of disputes outside court and refund of court fees is permissible even in cases in which parties, without any reference by court, privately agree to settle their dispute outside modes contemplated under S. 89 CPC and such settlement is legally arrived at. [High Court of Madras v. M.C. Subramaniam, (2021) 3 SCC 560]

Constitution of India — Sch. VII List I Entry 23 and List II Entry 13 and Arts. 246, 73, 257 and Pt. XI Ch. II (Arts. 256 to 263) — Legislative and Executive power of Union under List I Entry 23 i.e. in respect of highways designated as national highways: Provisions of the Constitution unambiguously indicate that legislative as well as executive power regarding all matters concerning and connected with highways designated as national highways, vest exclusively in Union and are governed by laws made by Parliament alone in that regard. For the same reason, complete executive power in respect of highways designated as national highways also vests with Union, including the power to acquire land therefor and construct and develop the same. Further, Chapter II of Part XI of the Constitution dealing with administrative relations between Union and States makes it amply clear that executive power of every State shall be so exercised as to ensure compliance with laws made by Parliament and any existing laws which apply in that State, and executive power of Union shall extend to giving of such directions to a State as may appear to Government of India to be necessary for that purpose. Hence, Union also has the power to issue directions to State Government concerned for the development of national highways, in accordance with the National Highways Act, 1956. [Project Implementation Unit v. P.V. Krishnamoorthy, (2021) 3 SCC 572]

SCC Issue dated April 7th, 2021 (Vol. 3 Part 3)

In this part read a very important decision delivered by the Supreme Court running into over 90 pages which have been expertly analysed by our editors. Supreme Court has discussed the mode of dealing with withheld securities of a defaulting member by National Stock Exchange of India/National Securities Clearing Corporation Limited, consequent to his expulsion.[Rusoday Securities Ltd. v. National Stock Exchange of India Ltd., (2021) 3 SCC 401]

Short Notes: 4

Advocates before the Court:

For appellants:  Senior Advocate Siddhartha Mitra and Advocates-on-record Ashok Mathur and Devashish Bharuka

For Respondent(s): Senior Advocate Shyam Divan and Adocates-on-Record. S. S. Shroff, Rabin Majumder, Bhargava V. Desai

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 14 R. 2 — Framing of preliminary issue — Issues in regard to maintainability of suit: Framed issues relating to maintainability of suit, held, if taken up and decided by trial court as preliminary questions of law would cause no prejudice to appellant-plaintiff. [Santosh Kumar v. Ashok Chand, (2021) 3 SCC 385]

Constitution of India — Art. 21: Right to marry person of one’s choice is integral to Art. 21. Autonomy of an individual inter alia in relation to family and marriage is integral to the dignity of the individual. Training programme to be devised, and guidelines to be issued by police authorities in this regard. [Laxmibai Chandaragi B. v. State of Karnataka, (2021) 3 SCC 360]

Education Law — Professional Colleges/Education — Medical and Dental Colleges — Establishment, Running, Closure and Nationalisation of Medical/Dental Colleges — Affiliation/Recognition — Purpose of/Entitlement to/Prerequisites for/Competent Authority/Time-Schedule: In this case, denial of permission to College to admit students for particular academic years, held, fully justified, as College concerned had not utilised opportunities given to it to rectify deficiencies, and on the relevant date, as per time-schedule fixed in respect of permissions to be granted for the next academic year, application for renewal of permission had not been filed in time. [Chintpurni Medical College & Hospital v. Union of India, (2021) 3 SCC 374]

Family and Personal Laws — Judicial Intervention/Family Courts/Judges/Officers — Alternative Dispute Resolution/Mediation/Conciliation/Compromise — Mediation — Matrimonial dispute: In this case, there was reference to mediation on consent of counsel. Directions were issued as to expenses and interaction of child with parent and family of parent whose custody it was not in. [Roopsi Varun Gupta v. Varun Vikram Gupta, (2021) 3 SCC 373]

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Ss. 5(7) and 5(8), 43, 45(2), 49, 50 and Ss. 7 to 9 — Financial creditor — Who is: Collusive/Sham transactions cannot amount to “financial debts” under IBC. Under S. 5(7) a person can be categorised as a financial creditor if a financial debt is owed to it. S. 5(8) stipulates that the essential ingredient of a financial debt is disbursal against consideration for the time value of money. A transaction which is sham or collusive would only create an illusion that money has been disbursed to a borrower with the object of receiving consideration in the form of time value of money, when in fact the parties have entered into the transaction with a different or an ulterior motive i.e. the real agreement between the parties is something other than advancing a financial debt. Further, IBC recognises that for the success of an insolvency regime, the real nature of the transactions has to be unearthed in order to prevent any person from taking undue benefit of its provisions to the detriment of the rights of legitimate creditors. [Phoenix ARC (P) Ltd. v. Spade Financial Services Ltd., (2021) 3 SCC 475]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Ss. 11, 4, 6 and 18 — Acquisition of land: In this case of dispute over approval of award and reopening of acquisition proceedings, approval of award supported by material on the record, compensation paid thereunder and possession of the land handed over to the Government. Resultantly, reopening of acquisition proceedings by way of re-notification of the already acquired land under S. 4 of the LA Act by the Government, reiterated, is not permissible. Furthermore, as award had been approved before coming into force of the 2013 Act, S. 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act would not be applicable. [Assam Industrial Development Corpn. Ltd. v. Gillapukri Tea Co. Ltd., (2021) 3 SCC 388]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 302 and S. 53 Secondly: Imposition of sentence of life imprisonment by trial court with direction that it shall be for remainder of natural life, held, not permissible. Such power of imposing a fixed term of imprisonment, or for the remainder of natural term of life of convict, while imposing a sentence of life imprisonment, held, is available only to High Court and Supreme Court, and not the trial court. [Gauri Shankar v. State of Punjab, (2021) 3 SCC 380]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 302 or S. 304 — Murder or culpable homicide — Death due to septicaemia: There is no absolute proposition of law that in all cases where deceased died due to septicaemia, case would fall under S. 304. The same has to be determined in the facts and circumstances of each case. [Khokan v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2021) 3 SCC 365]

SEBI (Stockbrokers and Sub-Brokers) Regulations, 1992 — Circular dt. 19-5-1997 issued by NSCCL and adopted by Exchange, prescribing trading/exposure limits coupled with sanctions for non-compliance i.e. operational parameters — Vires of: In this case, Circular in question pertained to trading/exposure limits coupled with sanctions in case of non-compliance and the Exchange adopted the circular from the Clearing Corporation and notified it in the form of operational parameter. The Supreme Court held that the legislature has bestowed upon the Exchange sufficient freedom of action to effectively control and regulate the functioning of stockbrokers who use the Exchange as a means to enter into financial relationships with the investors and common public. Further, this freedom of action is guaranteed in the preapproved Bye-laws which enable the Exchange to frame Regulations, instructions, operational parameters, notice, etc. and bring them into force without subjecting them to any added condition of prior approval of the Central Government/SEBI. The only limitation on this power of the Exchange is that such Regulations or operational parameters issued under the Bye-laws are subject to the 1956 Act, the 1992 Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Further, rejecting the challenge to the legal sanctity of the circular, held, since the Bye-laws and Rules of the Exchange are duly approved by the Central Government/SEBI, it can safely be stated that actions taken by the Exchange under the Bye-laws or Regulations. By prescribing such operational parameters in the form of a circular and in consequence thereof would assume enforceable character. [Rusoday Securities Ltd. v. National Stock Exchange of India Ltd., (2021) 3 SCC 401]

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — Ss. 122 and 123 — Gift of immovable property when becomes complete — Acceptance of gift: Acceptance by or on behalf of donee must be made during lifetime of donor and while he is still capable of giving. Execution of gift deed registered and attested in accordance with S. 123 TPA, and acceptance of such gift make gift of immovable property complete. Thereafter, donor is divested of the title or interest being gifted, and donee becomes owner of the gifted property, estate or interest. [Daulat Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2021) 3 SCC 459]

SCC Issue dated April 7th, 2021 (Vol. 3 Part 2)

In this part read a very important decision delivered by the Supreme Court with respect to Consumer Protection Act which was expertly analysed by our editors in over 7 short notes. Supreme Court observed that “Developer cannot compel the apartment buyers to be bound by the one-sided contractual terms contained in the Apartment Buyer‘s Agreement.”[IREO Grace Realtech (P) Ltd. v. Abhishek Khanna, (2021) 3 SCC 241]

Short Notes: 7

Constitution of India — Arts. 32, 21, 19(1)(a) and (2) — Multiple FIRs against anchor of news debate show, on grounds of fomenting hatred amongst communities/hate speech — Interim stay and other directions — When warranted: In this case, ad interim stay was imposed on instituted criminal proceedings and possible FIRs relating to same telecast. Notice was issued and petitioner was directed to implead complainants and serve notice on newly added respondents. [Amish Devgan v. Union of India, (2021) 3 SCC 306]

Consumer Protection — Cause of Action — Unfair trade practice — Directions, declaration and relief that may be granted by Consumer Forums in case of: S. 14 of the CPA, 1986 empowers Consumer Fora to redress deficiency of service by issuing directions to opposite party, and compensate consumer for loss or injury caused by opposite party, or discontinue unfair or restrictive trade practices. Even under the CPA, 1986, powers of Consumer Fora are in no manner constrained to declare a contractual term as unfair or one-sided as an incident of power to discontinue unfair or restrictive trade practices. An “unfair contract” has been defined under the CPA, 2019, and powers have been conferred on State Consumer For a and National Commission to declare contractual terms which are unfair, as null and void. This is a statutory recognition of a power which is implicit under the CPA, 1986. [IREO Grace Realtech (P) Ltd. v. Abhishek Khanna, (2021) 3 SCC 241]

Designs Act, 2000 — S. 22(4) — Jurisdiction of court: Jurisdiction over infringement suits in which defendant seeks revocation of registration of design vests in High Court under S. 22(4) of the 2000 Act, even when the High Court does not exercise original side jurisdiction. Operation of S. 22(4) of the 2000 Act is not affected by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. [S.D. Containers v. Mold-Tek Packaging Ltd., (2021) 3 SCC 289]

Evidence Act, 1872 — S. 92 Proviso (6) r/w Ill. (f) and Ss. 94 and 95 — Entirety of correspondence, as opposed to a single/some correspondence(s): When there are a number of documents exchanged between the parties in the performance of a contract, all of them must be read as a connected whole, relating each particular document to “existing facts”, which include how particular words are used in a particular sense, given the entirety of correspondence between the parties. Further, after the application of Proviso (6) to S. 92, the adjudicating authority must be very careful when it applies provisions dealing with patent ambiguity, as it must first ascertain whether the plain language of a particular document applies accurately to existing facts. If, however, it is ambiguous or unmeaning in reference to existing facts, evidence may then be given to show that the words used in a particular document were used in a sense that would make the aforesaid words meaningful in the context of the entirety of the correspondence between the parties. [Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pty. Ltd. v. MMTC Ltd., (2021) 3 SCC 308]

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — S. 10-A (as inserted by Ordinance 9 of 2020 promulgated on 5-6-2020 followed by Amending Act 17 of 2020) r/w Ss. 5(11), 7, 9 and 10 — Bar against filing of applications for initiation of corporate insolvency resolution process (CIRP) in relation to defaults committed on or after 25-3-2020 for a period of six months, extendable to one year — Nature of: Said bar is retrospective in nature, and is thus applicable to applications filed prior to insertion of S. 10-A i.e. prior to 5-6-2020. Use of the expressions “shall be filed” and “no application shall ever be filed”, do not affect the retrospective applicability of such bar. The language of the provision is not always decisive to arrive at a determination whether the provision is applicable prospectively or retrospectively. The substantive part of S. 10-A is to be construed harmoniously with the first proviso and the Explanation. Reading the provisions together, it is evident that Parliament intended to impose a bar on filing of applications for commencement of CIRP in respect of a corporate debtor for a default occurring on or after 25-3-2020, the embargo remaining in force for a period of six months, extendable to one year. Thus, the embargo contained in S. 10-A must receive a purposive construction which will advance the object which was sought to be achieved by enacting the provision. Further held, the (retrospective) bar on the filing of applications for the commencement of CIRP during the stipulated period does not extinguish the debt owed by the corporate debtor or the right of creditors to recover it. [Ramesh Kymal v. Siemens Gamesa Renewable Power (P) Ltd., (2021) 3 SCC 224]

Institution of criminal proceedings for sexual offences involving children: Sexual abuse has an inherent social stigma having lifelong adverse consequences for the victims, resulting in a reluctance to report the crime. The callous and unprofessional attitude of law enforcement agencies further foments self-blame and victim-shaming tendencies and breeds discontent and despair amongst victims and their families. Lack of fair and scientific investigation and unusual delay in court proceedings also results in general in acquittal of the rape accused. Pendency of cases in trial courts is very high and is growing every year. Timely reporting and registration of cases are essential requisites for instituting criminal proceedings. This article attempts to deal with various steps and intricacies involved at various stages in dealing with sexual offences involving children. Procedural road map for handling child sexual abuse under the POCSO Act, 2012,  by Dr G.K. Goswami & Aditi Goswami, (2021) 3 SCC (J-1)]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 300 Exception 4 — Applicability of: In this case, considering relevant materials, the injuries, held, were inflicted without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the appellant having taken advantage or acted cruelly or unusually. Resultantly, the case, held, fell under S. 300 Exception 4. Thus, appellant held liable under S. 304 Pt. I. [Pardeshiram v. State of M.P., (2021) 3 SCC 238]

Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Rules, 1964 — R. 12(4) [as incorporated vide Noti. dt. 3-1-2008]: Necessary requirements for sale of non-cultivable panchayat land to inhabitants of village who constructed their houses on such land as prescribed in the Rules, must strictly be complied with. In this case, claimants being in illegal occupation of panchayat land cannot, as a matter of right, claim regularization. Regularisation of the illegal occupation can only be as per the policy of the State Government and strictly as per the conditions stipulated in the Rules. Even if there is a construction the same is required to be removed and the possession of the land must be handed back to the Gram Panchayat, if the conditions for regularisation are not satisfied. Long duration of such illegal occupation or huge expenditure in making constructions thereon or political connections must not be treated as a justification for condoning this illegal act or for regularising the illegal possession. [Joginder v. State of Haryana, (2021) 3 SCC 300]

SCC Issue dated January 14, 2021 (Vol. 1 Part 2)

Read the Supreme Court Judgment expertly analysed by our Editors directing States and UTs to install CCTV Cameras in all Police Station. How the installation of CCTV Cameras will curb Custodial Violence? Detailed directions laid down.[Paramvir Singh Saini v. Baljit Singh, (2021) 1 SCC 184]

Counsels heard:

Amicus Curiae Siddhartha Dave

Attorney General for India K.K. Venugopal,

Addl. Solicitor General of India Madhvi Divan,

Advocate Nitya Ramakrishnan for the intervenor

Read the following analytical articles:

• The Legality of Voice Exemplars: An Opportunity Missed: Ritesh Sinha V. State of U.P.:(2021) 1 SCC J-73
• Reflections on Existence-Unstamped Agreements After Garware Wall Ropes:(2021) 1 SCC J-81

Admissibility and enforceability of an unstamped document: In this article interpretative opinion in respect of the Supreme Court’s judgment in Garware Wall Ropes Ltd. v. Coastal Marine Constructions & Engg. Ltd., (2019) 9 SCC 209, regarding admissibility and enforceability of an unstamped document, has been discussed in the light of the relevant provisions of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, Contract Act, Arbitration Act, Court fees Act, 1870, etc. Reflections on Existence—Unstamped Agreements after Garware Wall Ropes by Akash Rebello, (2021) 1 SCC (J-81)]

Constitution of India — Art. 129: In this case, legal proceedings for extradition of contemnor to India, still pending in United Kingdom. As legal proceedings which attract strict confidentiality as a matter of United Kingdom law currently ongoing in United Kingdom, contemnor not able to provide any further information about nature of proceedings or relief sought. Time granted to Union of India for placing status report on record and discharge application of contemnor, rejected. [SBI v. Kingfisher Airlines Ltd., (2021) 1 SCC 223]

Constitution of India — Art. 21 — Installation of CCTV cameras in police stations — Credible recording of evidence and safeguarding human rights inside police stations: In this case regarding implementation of action plan prepared by Committee of Union of India, Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and as directed by Supreme Court in Shafhi Mohammad, (2018) 5 SCC 311, States and Union Territories directed to file compliance affidavit disclosing exact position of CCTV cameras qua each police station. Constitution of Oversight Committees in accordance with order in Shafhi Mohd. case to be done at State and district levels. Duty and composition of State Level Oversight Committee (SLOC) and District Level Oversight Committee (DLOC) defined. Duty and responsibility for working, maintenance and recording of CCTVs shall be that of SHO of police station concerned. Whenever there is information of force being used at police stations resulting in serious injury and/or custodial deaths, it is necessary that persons be free to complain for a redressal of the same. Such complaints may not only be made to State Human Rights Commission, which is then to utilise its powers, more particularly under Ss. 17 and 18 of the Human Rights Act, 1993, for redressal of such complaints, but also to Human Rights Courts, which must be set up in each district of every State/Union Territory under S. 30 of the Human Rights Act, 1993. Commission/Court can then immediately summon CCTV camera footage in relation to incident for its safe keeping, which may then be made available to an investigation agency in order to further process complaint made to it. Union of India also directed to file affidavit in which it will update Supreme Court on constitution and workings of Central Oversight Body (COB). Union of India further directed to install CCTV cameras and recording equipment in offices of agencies where such interrogation and holding of accused takes place in the same manner as it would in a police station. COB shall perform same function as SLOC for offices of investigative/enforcement agencies mentioned above both in Delhi and outside Delhi wherever they be located. [Paramvir Singh Saini v. Baljit Singh, (2021) 1 SCC 184]

Disaster Management Act, 2005 — Ss. 6 and 10(2)(1) — COVID-19 Pandemic — Relief to borrowers in specified loan accounts: Circular dt. 23-10-2020/Scheme announced by the Government of India granting reliefs to borrowers, including relief of waiver of “interest on interest” i.e. grant of ex gratia payment of difference between compound interest and simple interest for six months to borrowers in specified loan accounts (1-3-2020 to 31-8-2020), directed to be implemented in letter and spirit. [Gajendra Sharma v. Union of India, (2021) 1 SCC 210]

Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 — Ss. 4, 1(3), 2(e) & (f) r/w Ss. 2(g), 4, 7, 8, 10, 11 and 15 of the Private Security Agencies (Regulation) Act, 2005 — GSR No. 805 dt. 17-5-1971 making the 1952 Act applicable to establishments rendering expert services: In this case, in terms of provisions of 2005 Act, appellant is the employer paying wages to security guards. Merely because client pays money under contract to appellant, who in turn pays wages to security guards from such contractual amount do not make client employer of security guards. Further held, fact that appellant never made statutory registers under the 2005 Act available to authorities under the EPF Act shows that he was actually withholding relevant papers, which coupled with letter dt. 3-4-2001 written by appellant to Insurance Company seeking Group Janta Personnel Accident Insurance Policy of rupees one lakh each in respect of 79 security personnel, balance sheets seized for Financial Years 2003-2004, 2004-2005, 2005-2006, 2006-2007 showing payment of wages running into lakhs, only leads to irresistible conclusion that appellant had more than 20 employees on its rolls. Thus, appellant was engaged in specialised and expert services of providing trained and efficient security guards to its clients on payment basis and liable under EPF Act. Contention that appellant merely facilitated providing chowkidars, is rejected. [Panther Security Service (P) Ltd. v. EPFO, (2021) 1 SCC 193]

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Ss. 16 and 22 — Resolution professional (RP) — Who may be appointed as: Based merely upon the fact that the person who remained in service of one of the financial creditors and is getting pension, a person cannot be disentitled from being appointed as RP. [SBI v. Metenere Ltd., (2021) 1 SCC 191]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — S. 166 — Approach to be adopted by Tribunal and Court: In motor accident claims, standard of proof is one of preponderance of probabilities, rather than beyond reasonable doubt. Approach and role of courts while examining evidence in accident claim cases ought not to be to find fault with non-examination of some best eyewitnesses, as may happen in a criminal trial; but, instead should be only to analyse material placed on record by parties to ascertain whether claimant’s version is more likely than not true. [Anita Sharma v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2021) 1 SCC 171]

Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 — S. 19 r/w Ss. 11(1), 11(4)(d), 11(4-A), 11(5), 11-B and Regn. 10 of the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015: Passing of ex parte interim order by Whole-time Member of SEBI, invalid, when there was no urgency to pass such order. [SEBI v. Udayant Malhoutra, (2021) 1 SCC 219]

Service Law — Promotion  — Time-bound promotion scale/increment/scheme — Time-bound promotional scale — Entitlement — Parity — Claim to: In this case, appellant promotee diploma-holders were claiming time-bound promotional scales while working as AEs on a par with direct recruits K & R who were BE (Civil). In terms of First Circular dt. 1-1-1986 an employee on completion of 9 yrs of regular service was entitled to first time-bound promotion while second time-bound promotion was available on completion of 16 yrs; further, where normal promotion was granted before completion of 9 yrs from date of direct recruitment, he was not entitled to first time-bound promotion and was eligible for second time-bound promotion after completion of 16 yrs counted from date of recruitment provided he did not earn second normal promotion before completion of 16 yrs. In terms of Second Circular dt. 24-5-1990, AEs were granted first time-bound promotion on completion of 9 yrs of regular service and second time-bound promotion on completion of 16 yrs of service. The Supreme Court held that the promotee employees are entitled to time-bound promotional scale in terms of First Circular only and cannot claim parity with direct recruits K & R. Further held, benefit granted to some employees by virtue of High Court orders and dismissal of SLPs filed thereagainst would not create binding precedent which runs counter to subsequent Supreme Court judgment rendered in Krishan Kumar Vij, (2010) 8 SCC 701 which relied on Kunhayammed, (2000) 6 SCC 359. Besides, appellants being diploma-holders were promoted under Regn. 7(a)(ii) r/w Regn. 10.4 of the Regulations and had opportunity to compete for direct recruitment after 12 yrs of service which they never availed or remained unsuccessful. Appellants would have been entitled to claim parity with K & R only if they were qualified and promoted against posts reserved for employees by direct recruitment. Furthermore, claim of appellants of discrimination and arbitrariness on basis of time-bound promotion granted to K & R, held, unsustainable since K & R were direct recruits while appellants were promoted as per their seniority in cadre of JE. Appellants were held to be covered by First Circular and not Second Circular which was applicable to direct recruits. No interference with impugned judgment holding that appellants were not entitled to time-bound promotional scale on grounds of parity with other cases called for [Inderjit Singh Sodhi v. Punjab SEB, (2021) 1 SCC 198]

The Legality Of Voice Exemplars: While considering the question of legality of orders passed by criminal courts directing the accused to furnish voice samples for the purposes of investigation, this article presents an analysis of the order of a three- Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Ritesh Sinha v. State of U.P., (2019) 8 SCC 1. The Legality of Voice Exemplars: An Opportunity Missed: Ritesh Sinha v. State of U.P. by Justice P.N. Prakash, Sanjay S. Jain and Sharath Chandran, (2021) 1 SCC (J-73)]

Trusts and Trustees — Religious and Charitable Endowments and Trusts — Shebait  — Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple, Thiruvananthapuram — Ruler of Travancore: For centuries drawing back from founder of Travancore, till ruler of Travancore who had signed Covenant in May 1949 with the Government of India, shebaitship in respect of the Temple and its properties devolved on one ruler to succeeding ruler of the royal family in an unbroken line of succession in accordance with applicable law of custom and usage and as such ruler of Travancore was having all rights and interest attached to shebait. Successive rulers held office of shebait not as ruling Head of State but in personal capacity as manager and in-charge of the Temple and properties. Even on entering into the Covenant, Art. VIII thereof recognised pre-existing status of shebaitship held by successive line of rulers of Travancore and ruler of covenanting State of Travancore succeeded as shebait and administrator of the Temple, its properties as well as Pandaravaga properties. Position further remained unchanged before as well as after Constitution (Twenty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1971 and Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950. After death of ruler of Travancore who had signed the Covenant, shebaitship and administration the Temple and its properties and Pandaravaga properties would continue to devolve on his successor following same custom and usage. Shebaitship did not lapse in favour of State by principle of escheat. [Marthanda Varma v. State of Kerala, (2021) 1 SCC 225]

Also Read:

2021 SCC Vol. 1 Part 1