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Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — S. 9-A [as inserted by CPC (Maharashtra Amendment) Act, 1977]: Objection as to jurisdiction to entertain suit, to be decided by the court as a preliminary issue under S. 9-A. The word “jurisdiction” in S. 9-A, does not include issue of bar of limitation. The word “jurisdiction” in S. 9-A is qualified with the expression “to entertain the suit”. Both the said expressions when taken together give the meaning that court should have power or inherent jurisdiction to receive suit for consideration on merits. Meaning to be given to “jurisdiction to entertain” in S. 9-A is a narrow one as to maintainability. It is only the competence of the court to receive a suit for adjudication which is covered under S. 9-A. In a case barred by limitation, court possesses jurisdiction to decide that issue. Where court has no jurisdiction, it cannot decide that issue on merits at all. Thus, question of limitation in no case can be said to be a question of jurisdiction of court in the context of S. 9-A. Issue of limitation, therefore, cannot be decided as a preliminary issue of jurisdiction under S. 9-A. Kamalakar Eknath Salunkhe, (2015) 7 SCC 321, held, is correctly decided and is affirmed. Foreshore Coop. Housing Society Ltd., (2015) 6 SCC 412 which took a contrary view, overruled. [Nusli Neville Wadia v. Ivory Properties, (2020) 6 SCC 557]

Consumer Protection — Services — Medical practitioners/services — Medical negligence — Determination of: The burden of proof is on complainant to establish medical negligence. The cause of action arises after damage has been caused. The injury caused to victim should be sufficiently proximate to breach of duty by medical practitioner. He would be liable only when his conduct falls below the standards of a reasonably competent practitioner in his field. The applicable principles also explained in detail. [Maharaja Agrasen Hospital v. Rishabh Sharma, (2020) 6 SCC 501]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 439 — Rejection of bail — When warranted — Implication in large number of heinous crimes: In this case, petitioner’s husband was accused in murder case and 45 other cases of heinous crime were pending against him. Hence, held, his bail was rightly rejected by High Court. [Sunita Bhati v. State of U.P., (2020) 6 SCC 556]

Election — Delimitation/Reservation of Constituencies — Nature and Scope: In this case, delimitation notification by State Government for creating 9 out of 4 districts without following procedure therefor, that is, without any research or proposal by Delimitation Commission therefor, was held, illegal. [Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam v. State of T.N., (2020) 6 SCC 548]

Human and Civil Rights — Humanitarian and Natural Disasters, Epidemics and Pandemics — Visakhapatnam LG Polymers Gas leak disaster: In this case, there was a criminal case and High Court passed directions for complete seizure or sealing of plant/premises. The Supreme Curt observed that the interim order was issued regarding safety measures and liberty was granted to raise other issues. [LG Polymers (India) (P) Ltd. v. State of A.P.,(2020) 6 SCC 622]

Service Law — Pension — Entitlement to pension: In this case, the Supreme Court considered the issue that whether the employees opting for voluntary retirement under SBI-VRS 2000, are entitled to pension under SBI Employees’ Pension Fund Rules, 1995. The Court held that the voluntary retirement scheme (VRS) was not floated by SBI on its own volition but was pursuant to exercise undertaken by IBA, as approved by Government, in view of recent developments in modern technology, need to have new skill, and rationalize manpower, whereunder it was provided that pension would be granted after completion of 15 yrs of service, as special measure. Further held, once it approved the Scheme, SBI being instrumentality of State under Art. 12 of the Constitution was bound by it and could not wriggle out of its obligation by claiming shelter of the SBI Employees’ Pension Fund Rules, 1995 which provided for 20 yrs of qualifying service by not amending the said Rules. [SBI v. Radhey Shyam Pandey, (2020) 6 SCC 438]

Constitution of India — Art. 141 — Unanimous decisions versus split decisions — Precedential value: There is no difference in precedential value of unanimous decisions and those rendered by majority in split decisions. Prayer to commute death sentence on ground that death sentence in appeal was not unanimously approved but was approved by a 2:1 split decision, rejected. The contention that death ought not to be awarded in case of a single dissent notwithstanding opinion of majority is not supported by precedents. [Manoharan v. State, (2020) 5 SCC 782]

Constitution of India — Art. 145(3) — Substantial question of law as to interpretation of the Constitution: Questions of law formulated by two-Judge Bench of Supreme Court in para 14 of its order in Subhash Chandra Agrawal, (2011) 1 SCC 496, referred to Constitution Bench of Supreme Court, as earlier directed by the two-Judge Bench on 26-11-2010. [Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal, (2020) 5 SCC 674]

Constitution of India — Art. 226 — Maintainability — Delay/Laches: In this case, petitioners were challenging appointments made during years 2001 and 2003 only in the years 2012 and 2013 after they becoming qualified in year 2011. It was held that the petitioners were not entitled to any relief on ground of unexplained laches and inordinate delay of about more than 10 yrs in challenging appointments. Besides, though relief was claimed against State, benefit of regularisation was sought to be denied to appointed Teachers, who were not even impleaded as party respondents (Association impleaded as third respondent without furnishing any material to show that majority of appointees were members of said Association). [Chander Mohan Negi v. State of H.P., (2020) 5 SCC 732]

Constitution of India — Arts. 19(1)(a) & (2), 19(1)(g) & (6) and Art. 21 — Curtailment of fundamental rights (due to restriction on internet services in Jammu and Kashmir herein) — For reasons of national security (due to crossborder terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir): Fundamental rights, reiterated, need to be balanced with national security concerns, in line with the constitutional principles, when situation so demands. [Foundation for Media Professionals v. State (UT of J&K), (2020) 5 SCC 746]

Consumer Protection — Services — Banking/Shares/Securities and other Financial Services: Under-insurance by bank i.e. non-insuring of whole of the hypothecated assets of the borrower by the bank, amounted to deficiency of service, when the bank contractually bound to do so. Obtaining of insurance of only some of such assets by bank is not permissible when the bank exercises the option to itself insure the goods. [Canara Bank v. Leatheroid Plastics (P) Ltd., (2020) 5 SCC 722]

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 — Ss. 13(2)(a) and 13(2)(b)(ii) r/w Ss. 13(3), 13(3-A), 13(4), 14 and 24-A: Limitation period for filing reply/response to the complaint by the respondent/opposite party, mandatorily cannot be extended beyond the prescribed period of 45 days (i.e. period of 30 days along with discretionary extension of time up to 15 days). [New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (P) Ltd., (2020) 5 SCC 757]

Education Law — Employment and Service Matters Re Educational Institutions — Officers/Authorities/Staff, Faculty, etc. — Teachers/Part-time Teachers/Lecturers — Assistant Director in Centre for Adult Continuing Education and Extension (CACEE): In this case, appellant was appointed in CACEE w.e.f. 26-12-1989 which received sanction of University vide letter dt. 1-2-1990. CACEE was established on temporary basis for purpose of eradicating illiteracy. Posts in CACEE were not included in schedule to the University First Ordinances, 1978 which indicating that posts in Centre were not posts in University. Further, for a person to be “Teacher” in terms of S. 2(27) of 1974 Rules, he/she should be imparting instruction or supervising research in any of the colleges of recognized institutions.“College” in terms of S. 2(7) means an institution maintained by or affiliated to University while “recognised institution” as envisaged under S. 2(19) means institution for research or special studies other than affiliated college, recognised as such by University. Centre not a “college” since it is neither maintained nor affiliated to University, nor any evidence produced to establish that it was an institution recognised by University within meaning of S. 2(19). The Supreme Court in this case held that when appellant does not fulfil requirement of “Teacher”, he cannot claim applicability of Statute 10 of Kerala University First Statutes, 1977 and claim to retire at 60 yrs of age. Further held, even assuming that appellant was imparting instruction in different courses in the Centre, that cannot make him “Teacher” within meaning of Ss. 2(27) and (28). Furthermore, Government Letter dt. 3-10-2014 merging Centre with Institute of Distance Education also supports conclusion that Centre was not maintained by University but was self-financing centre. [P. Gopinathan Pillai v. University of Kerala, (2020) 5 SCC 711]

GST — Central Goods and Services Act, 2017 — Ss. 67(8) and 67(6) — Search and seizure — Release of seized goods — Procedure to be followed: The directions for release of seized goods by extricating the assessees from paying the applicable tax amount in cash, in exercise of writ jurisdiction by the High Court, not valid, when mechanism already provided for in the Act and the Rules for release. [State of U.P. v. Kay Pan Fragrance (P) Ltd., (2020) 5 SCC 811]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — S. 166 — Contributory negligence — If any — Determination of: In this case, deceased victim on two-wheeler at night dashed into truck trailer parked on road without any reflectors. The Supreme Court held that once substantive evidence of eyewitness before MACT established that truck trailer had been parked on road at night without any reflectors, there was no reason or justification for MACT to proceed on basis of conjecture in arriving at a finding of contributory negligence. The High Court had not discussed this at all and simply proceeded to confirm finding of contributory negligence. Consequently, it was held, there was no contributory negligence. [Jumani Begam v. Ram Narayan, (2020) 5 SCC 807]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302/34 — Murder in furtherance of common intention: In this case of collective assault resulted in death of one due to stabbing, there was involvement of 4 accused persons (including 3 appellant-accused herein). Prior meeting of minds of all accused, was established and all 3 appellants were found having intention common with that of fourth accused, who inflicted multiple injuries on deceased with knife. There were sufficient materials available, to establish that all appellants returned together to place of occurrence and attacked deceased victim. Eyewitnesses gave uniform account of assault on deceased and no major contradiction or discrepancy in their statements in course of their examination, was made out. Delay in filing FIR, was also properly explained. It was held that although eyewitnesses were known to deceased, and there was no neutral witness, but for that factor alone, appellants cannot be exonerated. Hence, conviction of appellants under Ss. 302/34, and sentence of life imprisonment with fine and default stipulation, was confirmed. [Dhanpal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 705]

Service Law — Departmental Enquiry — De novo/Fresh enquiry — When envisaged — Violation of principles of natural justice: In this case there were allegations pertaining to appointment of more than 500 Asstt. Teachers in Basic Schools in State of U.P. in violation of 1981 Rules. The High Court by impugned judgment set aside dismissal order and remitted matter to disciplinary authority to hold enquiry afresh from stage of charge-sheet finding that enquiry was held in violation of principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court held that serious allegations of corruption raised against respondent State require determination in full-fledged enquiry by disciplinary authority. [Ramesh Singh v. State of U.P., (2020) 5 SCC 677]

Service Law — Pension — Pension Scheme — General Provident Fundcum- pension-cum-gratuity benefit (Triple Benefit Scheme) — Extension of benefit to employees of deficit colleges vide amendment dt. 15-1-2014 — Prescription of cut-off date of 31-8-2010: In this case, in absence of arbitrariness in applicability of cut-off date as well as rationality behind it based on date of Cabinet decision granting Triple Benefit Scheme to such deficit grant colleges no interference with impugned judgment denying benefit of said Scheme to appellants who retired before 31-8-2010 is called for. [Mohd. Ali Imam v. State of Bihar, (2020) 5 SCC 685]

Service Law — Retirement/Superannuation — Voluntary retirement — Retiral benefits: In this case, the application dt. 28-7-2005 seeking voluntary retirement was not considered and subsequent resignation dt. 3-5-2006 was accepted. While considering the claim to retiral benefits, the Supreme Court held that though respondent’s husband was qualified to appear for voluntary retirement in terms of R. 50(2) of the Pension Rules, 1996, required its acceptance by appointing authority. Besides, when respondent’s husband submitted application for voluntary retirement he was already issued two charge-sheets alleging misconduct and pending disciplinary proceedings he had no absolute right seeking acceptance of his application for voluntary retirement since employer keen on proceeding with inquiry would be entitled not to consider the application. Moreover, proceeding pertaining to charge-sheet culminated in final order dt. 3-9-2005 whereunder punishment of withholding of increment was imposed. Thus, non-consideration of application for voluntary retirement was justified. Furthermore, on acceptance of respondent’s husband application for resignation he was relieved on 31-5-2006 and terminal benefits were paid, which he accepted and no dispute pertaining to same was raised during his lifetime. Impugned judgment directing payment of retiral benefits in writ petition filed belatedly in the year 2012 holding subsequent resignation dt. 3-5-2006 be considered as application for voluntary retirement, was held unsustainable and liable to be set aside. [Rajasthan SRTC v. Mohani Devi, (2020) 5 SCC 741]

Service Law — Seniority — Determination of seniority — Direct recruits vis-à-vis promotees — Inter se seniority — Rota-quota principle: In this case it was held that though N.R. Parmar, (2012) 13 SCC 340, purportedly interpreted Central Government OMs dt. 7-2-1986 and 3-7-1986 yet in effect it misconstrued them, and for this reason, it did not properly consider the purport of subsequent clarificatory OM dt. 3-3-2008. General principle of law, further held, is that a direct recruit cannot get backdated notional seniority earlier than he joined service. N.R. Parmar case, insofar as it confers backdated seniority with reference to initiation of recruitment process, is not sustainable in law. N.R. Parmar case overruled and Jagdish Ch. Patnaik, (1998) 4 SCC 456 affirmed on this point.  However, inter se seniority where already fixed by applying N.R. Parmar case and the Central Government OM dated 4-3-2014 based thereon, protected. [K. Meghachandra Singh v. Ningam Siro, (2020) 5 SCC 689]

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Ss. 2(2) and proviso thereto (proviso ins. w.e.f. 23-10-2015), 2(1)(f), Pt. I or Pt. II and Ss. 11(6) and 9 — Seat of arbitration — Determination of: Mere expression “place of arbitration” in the arbitration clause, held, cannot by itself be the basis to determine the intention of the parties that they have intended that place as the juridical “seat” of arbitration. Intention of the parties as to the “seat” should be determined from reading all clauses in arbitration agreement as a whole, as to whether there are any clear indicia which indicate the seat of arbitration; and the conduct of the parties. Designation of “place of arbitration” in arbitration clause, plus significant indica determine seat of arbitration. [Mankastu Impex (P) Ltd. v. Airvisual Ltd., (2020) 5 SCC 399]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 39 Rr. 1 and 2 — Grant of temporary injunction: Temporary injunction in a suit for specific performance of contract for sale cannot be granted when there are doubts as to existence of a concluded contract and there is delay in instituting the suit. The onus is on plaintiff to demonstrate that the parties were ad idem qua their obligations/concluded contract. The grant of relief in a suit for specific performance is itself a discretionary remedy and a plaintiff seeking temporary injunction will therefore have to establish a strong prima facie case on basis of undisputed facts. Further, the conduct of the plaintiff will also be a very relevant consideration for purposes of injunction and the discretion has to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. [Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprise Ltd. v. KS Infraspace LLP Ltd., (2020) 5 SCC 410]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 1 R. 8 — Representative suit: Decree in a representative suit is binding on all persons on whose behalf or for whose benefit suit is filed or defended. [C.J. Baby v. Fr. Jiju Varghese, (2020) 5 SCC 420]

Service Law — Pay — Pay revision — Expert Body — Prescription of pay scales and incentives — Exclusion of judicial review: When Government has taken decision based on recommendations of expert committee, and several other factors including financial implication, Court should not substitute its views ad interfere only when it is satisfied that Government’s decision was arbitrary. [Union of India v. M.V. Mohanan Nair, (2020) 5 SCC 421]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 21 R. 90 — S. 5 of Limitation Act — Inapplicability of, to proceedings under Or. 21 R. 90 CPC: The limitation for filing an application to set aside a sale in execution of decree is 60 days in terms of Art. 127 of the Limitation Act. S. 5 of the Limitation Act which deals with extension of time or condonation of delay is not applicable to proceedings under Or. 21 R. 90 CPC and therefore, the delay, if any in filing of proceedings under Or. 21 R. 90 CPC, cannot be condoned under S. 5 of the Limitation Act. [Aarifaben Yunusbhai Patel v. Mukul Thakorebhai Amin, (2020) 5 SCC 449]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss. 340/195(1)(b) — Giving false evidence in court: As there was no prima facie case made out against accused for giving false evidence in Court, requiring initiation of criminal proceedings against him, application for prosecution for giving false evidence in court dismissed. [Deepak Chandrakant Jhaveri v. Johnson Dye Works (P). Ltd., (2020) 5 SCC 456]

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Ss. 2(1)(e), 2(2), 11(6) and 20 — Seat of arbitration — Determination of, when only the venue is specified: If the “subject-matter of the suit” is situated within the arbitral jurisdiction of two or more courts, the parties can agree to confine the jurisdiction in one of the competent courts. Seat of arbitration once determined, amounts to exclusive jurisdiction clause. [Brahmani River Pellets Ltd. v. Kamachi Industries Ltd., (2020) 5 SCC 462]

Service Law — Departmental Enquiry — Charge/Charge-sheet — Competent authority — “Disciplinary authority”/“competent authority”: Under R. 3(h) of the Bharat Petroleum Corporation Management Staff Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1976, “competent authority” means any authority empowered by Board of Directors or Chairman by any general or special rule or order to discharge function or use powers specified in rule or order. Further held, “competent authority” includes “disciplinary authority”. Under Sch. I, Functional General Manager which include DGM was disciplinary authority for punishment lesser than dismissal while Functional Director was disciplinary authority for punishment of dismissal. Hence, DGM was competent to issue charge-sheet since penalty of discharge was imposed. Besides, employee neither in his reply to charges nor in departmental appeal raised any issue pertaining to competency of DGM to issue charge-sheet but raised it for first time in writ petition. Impugned judgment finding punishment of dismissal (discharge actually) to be vitiated since charge-sheet was not issued by competent authority unsustainable and liable to be set aside. Directions for issuance of fresh charge-sheet set aside and order of discharge not interfered with. [Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Anil Padegaonkar, (2020) 5 SCC 474]

Human and Civil Rights — Right to Information Act, 2005 — Ss. 2(h), (f), (j), 8(1)(d), (e), (j) and 11 — Information relating to assets declared by Judges of Supreme Court and High Courts: Chief Justice of India is a “public authority” under the Right to Information Act, 2005 and the Act covers the office of the CJI. Information relating to assets declared by Judges of Supreme Court is subject to the provisions of RTI Act. [Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal, (2020) 5 SCC 481]

Arbitration in electricity matters: It has been explained in this article that the judgment in Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd., (2008) 4 SCC 755 having been passed dehors the settled principles of statutory interpretation, is per incuriam and the same needs to be revisited by the Supreme Court as and when the opportunity presents itself in an appropriate case, so that the right of power sector entities to have recourse to alternative adjudicatory mechanism of “arbitration” is not subjected to the additional (discriminatory) requirement of approval of SERCs. Arbitration in electricity matters: a discordant Note struck by Supreme Court by Rajiv Yadav.[(2020) 5 SCC (J-12)]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — S. 9-A (as applicable in Maharashtra prior to its deletion in 2018) and Or. 14 R. 2 — Objection as to jurisdiction to be decided by the court as a preliminary issue under S. 9-A: As held by the three-Judge Bench in Nusli Neville Wadia, (2020) 6 SCC 557, under the provisions of S. 9-A and Or. 14 R. 2, it is open to decide a preliminary issue only if it is purely a question of law, and not a mixed question of law and fact requiring recording of evidence. Thus, held, “jurisdiction” in S. 9-A does not include issue of limitation as the same involves mixed questions of fact and law. Issue of limitation has to be considered along with other issues that would arise for adjudication in the suit concerned. [Shyam Madan Mohan Ruia v. Messer Holdings Ltd., (2020) 5 SCC 252]

Copyright Act, 1957 — Ss. 55, 51 and 18: The cause of action to a plaintiff to file a suit accrues when there is a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe a right.  The cause of action for filing suit for declaration and injunction qua infringement of copyright in scheduled films which had been assigned earlier by plaintiff arise, after the lapse of assignment period. [Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Suresh Productions, (2020) 5 SCC 353]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss. 200 to 204, 156(3), 173, 300 and 362 — Second complaint — Maintainability or otherwise under different scenarios: Principles regarding scope of inquiry under S. 202 and duty of Magistrate while entertaining private complaints, discussed in detail, and summarised. Second protest petition, held, stands on a similar footing as second complaint. [Samta Naidu v. State of M.P., (2020) 5 SCC 378]

Debt, Financial and Monetary Laws — Debt, Debt Recovery and Relief — Crown Debt/Debt owed to State/Tax arrears: Transfer/Auction-sale of property pursuant to orders of Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT), inspite of the property being attached by Income Tax Department is valid when there is already a prior charge on the property and the attachment by DRT is prior in time. There is primacy of dues of a secure creditor, over Crown debt, in the absence of a preference given to the Crown debt by statute. [Connectwell Industries (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2020) 5 SCC 373]

Decriminalisation of adultery: A critical analysis of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 39, Decriminalisation of adultery, the Indian experience and experiment: how much shine in the Joseph Shine verdict? by Rajesh Kapoor., [(2020) 5 SCC (J-25)]

Education Law — Medical and Dental Colleges — Admission — Allotment of Seats/College/Speciality/Counselling/Wait list — Counselling: In this case, there was common counselling or single online counselling for filling up seats for postgraduate courses leading to MD and MS, Diploma and Diplomate of National Board (DNB). As counselling was in advanced stage, Court declined to issue any directions for present academic session which would disturb entire process. Further, as the authorities were ready for next academic session 2021-2022, permission granted for holding common counselling from academic session 2021-2022. [Alapati Jyotsna v. Union of India, (2020) 5 SCC 320]

Effect of limitation of liability and exclusion of liability clauses: It is sometimes misunderstood that limitation of liability and exclusion of liability clauses simply fall away, under Indian law, in all cases of fundamental breach. This article, therefore, attempts to analyse whether such clauses would fall away in all cases of fundamental breach; and whether the liability of the party in breach would become unlimited, subject to proof of actual damage, in all cases of fundamental breach. Effect of limitation of liability and exclusion of Liability clauses in the event of fundamental Breach of contract by Gaurav Pachnanda.[(2020) 5 SCC (J-1)]

Excise — Concession/Exemption/Incentive/Rebate/Subsidy — Exim Policy of 1997-2002 — Paras 9.9(b) and 9.17(b) — Exemption Noti. No. 8/97 dt. 1-3-1997 as amended by Noti. No. 21/97-CE dt. 11-4-1997 — Circular dt. 22-5-2000: The terms “sale” and “purchase” under the Excise Act, if construed literally, would give a wider scope and also include transfer of possession for valuable consideration under the definition of the term “sale”. Thus, the transfer of manganese ore by TISCO to UFAC (assessee) in this case for the purposes of processing the same and converting it into Silicon Manganese, being for a valuable consideration, held to be “sale” for purposes of Excise Act. Para 9.9(b) of the Exim Policy, the circulars issued by the Board, particularly, the Circular dt. 22-5-2000 and reply to the query of the Customs Authorities by the Development Commissioner, SEEPZ showed that UFAC was entitled to carry out the job-work on behalf of TISCO on payment of duty as provided under exemption notification of 1997. In this case, held, the transaction between UFAC and TISCO satisfied all the three conditions of exemption notification, namely, the goods are produced and manufactured by UFAC, an 100% export oriented unit; they are manufactured wholly from the raw materials produced or manufactured in India; and, thirdly, they have been allowed to be sold in India in accordance with the provisions of Para 9.9(b) of the Exim Policy. Thus, assessee was held to be entitled to avail the benefit. [CCE v. Universal Ferro & Allied Chemicals Ltd., (2020) 5 SCC 332]

Family and Personal Laws — Succession Act, 1925 — Ss. 87, 82 and 88 — Will — Interpretation — Principles: The intention of testator has to be gathered from language of will read as a whole, having regard to nature and grammatical meaning of words and surrounding circumstances. The rule of last intention (contained in S. 88 of Succession Act) is only applicable when there are two bequests in the will which are inconsistent with each other. [M.S. Bhavani v. M.S. Raghu Nandan, (2020) 5 SCC 361]

Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 — Ss. 6, 7 and 11: The mandatory requirements of a valid adoption are consent of wife and proof of ceremony of actual giving and taking in adoption. In absence of proof of these requirements, mere fact of child being brought up by another couple and their names being entered in child’s school/college record as parents would not be sufficient to prove child’s adoption by them. [M. Vanaja v. M. Sarla Devi, (2020) 5 SCC 307]

Human and Civil Rights — Epidemics and Pandemics — COVID-19 Pandemic — Effect, prevention and medical facilities in prisons: There are greater chances of proliferation of this virus in overcrowded and closed places like prisons. Imminent need to take immediate measures for checking this contagious virus in prisons and for quarantining and providing medical treatment to affected prisoners, emphasized. [Contagion of Covid-19 Virus in Prisons, In re., (2020) 5 SCC 313]

 Income Tax Act, 1961 — S. 43-B(f) (as inserted vide Finance Act, 2001 w.e.f. 1-4-2002) — Validity: The validity of Cl. (f) providing for tax disincentive in deductions claimed by assessee from income tax in lieu of liability accrued under leave encashment scheme but not actually discharged by employer i.e. it making actual payment of liability condition precedent for extending benefit of deductions, affirmed. [Union of India v. Exide Industries Ltd., (2020) 5 SCC 274]

Labour Law — Transfer of Employee/Service — Challenge to transfer order: In this case, letter of appointment categorically stated that services of respondent can be transferred at any location in India. There was grant of interim stay to transfer order by Industrial Court prima facie finding it to be case of victimisation/mala fides without any evidence in support thereof. Hence, impugned order of High Court declining to exercise its writ jurisdiction, held unsustainable. [Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Rameshwar P. Gawade, (2020) 5 SCC 316]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Ss. 173 and 166 — Enhancement of compensation: In this case, even though claimant appellants did not file appeal against award of Tribunal before High Court, it was held appropriate to enhance compensation by exercising jurisdiction under Art. 142 of the Constitution in order to do complete justice between parties. [Sangita Arya v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2020) 5 SCC 327]

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Ss. 50 and 18 — Search and seizure: In this case there was recovery of contraband, weighing 6.3 kg, from bag carried by accused, hence compliance with S. 50 was not required. Hence, conviction of accused under S. 18, confirmed. [Than Kunwar v. State of Haryana, (2020) 5 SCC 260]

Property Tax In New Delhi: Property tax has been one of the main sources of revenue for New Delhi Municipal Council. This article gives you a brief understanding of the levy of property tax in New Delhi. Property Tax In New Delhi — A General Overview by Achal Gupta.[(2020) 5 SCC (J-39)]

Service Law — Judiciary — Seniority — Determination of seniority — Relevant date: The relevant date for determination of seniority is the date from which other candidates in same selection process were appointed. [C. Jayachandran v. State of Kerala, (2020) 5 SCC 230]

Service Law — Public Sector, Statutory Corporations and Local Bodies — Power of State Government to give directions in respect of conditions of service of Statutory Body/Corporation — Scope of — Scheme of applicable statutes: As relevant statutory provisions were not considered in earlier decision of Supreme Court, matter referred to larger Bench. [State of U.P. v. Virendra Kumar, (2020) 5 SCC 209]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 21 R. 89 and S. 151 — Auction-sale of property of guarantor in execution of decree: In this case, no opportunity was given to guarantor to repay entire decretal amount due before putting said property to sale. There was allegation of non-compliance with requirements of Or. 21 R. 89 CPC and application for setting aside the sale was also under S. 151 CPC. It was held that the property auctioned was that of guarantor, and even before auction-sale was held, said guarantor had started repaying the due amount in instalments and had repaid the full sum due, soon after auction-sale was confirmed. In such circumstances, without expressing any view on compliance/non-compliance with requirements of Or. 21 R. 89 CPC, the Supreme Court held, High Court had rightly set aside the auction-sale. [Paul v. T. Mohan, (2020) 5 SCC 138]

Contract and Specific Relief — Termination/Discharge of Contract — Termination by Frustration/Impossibility — Grounds of Frustration — Generally — Force majeure events: In case of occurrence of an event which renders performance of contract impossible, by virtue of S. 56, Contract Act, 1872, contract in such a case, held, becomes void and parties are exempted from further performance thereof. However, in terms of S. 32 of Contract Act, parties may instead choose consequences that would flow on happening of an uncertain future event. Further, under S. 65 of Contract Act, a limited mechanism exists to ameliorate harsh consequences of frustration of contract. Furthermore, in order to mitigate the harsh consequences of frustration and to uphold the sanctity of the contract, the parties may choose to mitigate the risk by inserting force majeure clauses, in which case the matter would be governed by the clause in question. [South East Asia Marine Engg. & constructions Ltd. (SEAMEC Ltd.) v. Oil India Ltd., (2020) 5 SCC 164]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 438 — Grant of anticipatory bail: Law clarified regarding (1) When may be granted; (2) Offences in respect of which may be granted [except where there is a statutory bar or restriction]; (3) Duration for which may be granted; (4) Anticipatory bail granted cannot be a blanket protection; (5) Normal conditions; and Restrictive conditions that may be imposed while granting anticipatory bail, depending on facts and circumstances of the case; (6) Requirements of investigating agency under S. 27 of Evidence Act, met by concept of deemed custody when accused is on anticipatory bail; (7) Effect of filing of charge-sheet/issuance of summons in a case where accused is on anticipatory bail; (8) Recourse of investigating agency to have accused on anticipatory bail arrested at any time by order of court under S. 439(2), if circumstances so warrant (it being not always necessary to seek cancellation of the bail therefor); (9) Permissibility of exclusion of right to anticipatory bail by statute. [Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1]

Energy, Power and Electricity — Electricity — Tariff — PPA: PPA is a statutory contract and it can be varied by statutory notifications. Notifications dt. 30-3-1992 and 6-11-1995 under S. 43-A of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, are statutory and binding on the parties. Further, any PPA between a generating company and the purchaser of electricity is subject to such statutory notifications. Parties by agreement cannot override statutory provisions, or such notifications, as far as they relate to matters of tariff. [CLP (India) (P) Ltd. v. Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd., (2020) 5 SCC 185]

Environment Law — Monuments and Environment — ‘Sisodia Rani ka Bagh’ monument located on Jaipur-Agra Highway: Directions were issued for protection of wildlife in reserve forest area and prohibition of laser lights, loud music and fireworks in monument. National Green Tribunal (NGT) completely prohibited all activities in ‘Sisodia Rani ka Bagh’ monument. As restricted use of monument was not going to affect wildlife and forest, and in view of the value of developmental projects of monument and surrounding area, order of NGT was modified. The Supreme Court would itself monitor beautification and other developmental projects relating to monument. However, laser lights, loud music and fireworks, completely prohibited. [Deptt. of Archaeology & Museums v. Ashish Gautam, (2020) 5 SCC 112] 

Evidence Act, 1872 — Ss. 65 and 66 — Secondary evidence — When can be admitted: Factual foundational evidence must be adduced showing reasons for not furnishing evidence. Mere admission in evidence and making exhibit of a document not enough as the same has to be proved in accordance with law. [Jagmail Singh v. Karamjit Singh, (2020) 5 SCC 178]

Human and Civil Rights — Humanitarian and Natural Disasters, Epidemics and Pandemics — COVID-19 Pandemic: In this case, there was challenge to Advisory whereby Rs 4500 was fixed as the price for screening and confirming COVID-19 (Coronavirus) by private labs. While considering overall aspects of matter, directions were issued for free of cost testing facility of COVID-19 (Coronavirus) by government or private labs, and tests to be carried out by labs accredited by National Accreditation Board for Testing and Calibration Laboratories (NABL). [Shashank Deo Sudhi v. Union of India, (2020) 5 SCC 132]

Human and Civil Rights — Humanitarian and Natural Disasters, Epidemics and Pandemics — COVID-19 Pandemic: The ambit of directions issued regarding free testing of COVID-19 (Coronavirus) cases by government or private labs in Shashank Deo Sudhi, (2020) 5 SCC 132, clarified. [Shashank Deo Sudhi v. Union of India, (2020) 5 SCC 134]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 302 or S. 304 or S. 326 [S. 300 Exceptions 1 and 2] and S. 148: In this case, there was assault by accused persons (5 in number), with intention of taking revenge on account of right-of-way dispute, leading to death of one and injuries to others. The blows inflicted by Respondent 1-Accused 5, were with intention to kill deceased. The death of deceased was caused due to blow inflicted by Accused 5, and was homicidal death. The exercise of right of private defence also not made out as accused party were clearly the aggressors. The Supreme Court held that the High Court not correct in converting offence under S. 302 to one under S. 326. However, Accused 5, at relevant time, was deprived of power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, due to repeated unauthorised entry by complainant party, on fields belonging to accused party. Further, solitary fatal blow on vital part of head, by Accused 5, caused death of deceased. The provocation was not invited by accused party, but was at instance of complainant party. As death of deceased was caused by act of Accused 5, giving one fatal blow on head, which was with intention of causing his death or causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, case would be covered by S. 304 Pt. I IPC. [State of Rajasthan v. Mehram, (2020) 5 SCC 143]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302/34 or S. 324: In this case, conviction of accessory accused (appellant A-3 herein) under Ss. 302/34 held, not sustainable given role ascribed to him by prosecution and failure of prosecution to establish that he shared common intention to murder deceased with main assailant A-1. But, his conviction under S. 324 for having injured PW 1, and sentence thereof to undergo RI for 3 yrs and fine of Rs 500, with default stipulation, stood confirmed. [Chellappa v. State, (2020) 5 SCC 160]

Service Law — Deputation — Deputation allowance — Entitlement to — Commencement of deputation — When envisaged: Deputation envisages assignment of employee of one department/cadre/organisation to another department/cadre/organisation in public interest which normally involves consent of employee. In this case, till 11-9-2009, respondent continued to be under control of his parent organisation i.e. CISF and was also getting his pay and allowances from said authority. Hence, though respondent was sent to NDRF on 18-4 2008, he continued to be member of his Battalion and could not be said to be on deputation. [Union of India v. R. Thiyagarajan, (2020) 5 SCC 201]

Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 — S. 15 — Conviction on basis of confession to police — When permissible: Law summarised regarding when conviction is permissible on basis of confession to police. In this case, there was conviction for conspiracy in respect of offences under TADA Act and Explosive Substances Act on basis of confession of appellant-accused and confession statement of two other co-accused, made before police. Said confession of accused does not met the requirements for reliance upon the same, hence, the same rejected. Furthermore, as per S. 30 of Evidence Act, 1872, if for any reason, a joint trial is not held, confession of co-accused cannot be held to be admissible in evidence against another accused, who would face trial at a later point of time in same case. Since trial of two co-accused was separate, their confession statements are not admissible in evidence and same cannot be taken as evidence against appellant-accused herein. Hence, conviction of appellant was set aside. [Raja v. State of T.N., (2020) 5 SCC 118]

Acquisition, Requisition and Nationalisation — Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act, 1995 — Ss. 4(2) and 4(5): Adjudication by High Court, exercising writ jurisdiction, on the liability of National Textile Corporation Ltd. (NTC) qua debts of textile mill taken over by it, not permissible. [UCO Bank v. National Textile Corpn. Ltd., (2020) 4 SCC 497]

Anomalies in law and justice: This article attempts to explain the anomalies in law and justice—that is, the inconsistencies, contradictions or absurdities in law and justice and identify the solutions for rectification wherever possible. Some Anomalies in Law and Justice by Justice R.V. Raveendran [(2020) 4 SCC (J-49)]

 Constitution of India — Arts. 72 & 161 and 32 — Disposal of mercy petition against death sentence: Principles summarised regarding limited scope of judicial review of disposal of mercy petition against death sentence. Issue of ground of non-supply of documents sought for under RTI Act, held, is beyond the scope of present judicial review. [Vinay Sharma v. Union of India, (2020) 4 SCC 391]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 482 — Quashment re action taken under SARFAESI Act and qua disbursal of sanctioned loan/valuation/auction-sale by creditor bank/auction-purchaser: Sanction of loan, creation of mortgage and the manner in which the sanctioned loan was to be released are all contractual matters between the parties. Further, if any amount was withheld, the complainant in this case was required to take appropriate action at that point in time and avail his remedy but the complainant had proceeded with the transaction, maintained the loan account until the account was classified as NPA. Further, SARFAESI Act is a complete code in itself which provides the procedure to be followed by the secured creditor and also the remedy to the aggrieved parties including the borrower and if there is any discrepancy in the manner of classifying the account of the appellants as NPA or in the manner in which the property was valued or was auctioned, DRT is vested with the power to set aside such auction at the stage after the secured creditor invokes the power under S. 13 of SARFAESI Act. Further, the petitioner after dismissal of the application before the DRT filed the impugned complaint which appeared to be an intimidatory tactic and an afterthought which is an abuse of the process of law. Also, S. 32 of SARFAESI Act provides for the immunity from prosecution since protection is provided thereunder for the action taken in good faith. [K. Virupaksha v. State of Karnataka, (2020) 4 SCC 440]

 Education Law — Employment and Service Matters re Educational Institutions — Appointment/Recruitment — Post of Principal in government polytechnic college — Eligibility criteria: The AICTE [Pay Scales, Service Conditions and Qualifications for the Teachers and Other Academic Staff in Technical Institutions (Diploma)] Regulations, 2010 prescribed “Qualification as above for post of HoD and PhD in Engineering or qualification as above for post of HoD”. The word “or” indicates that PhD in Engineering is optional. [Gelus Ram Sahu v. Surendra Kumar Singh, (2020) 4 SCC 484]

Foreign Trade, Export, Import and Investment — Foreign Trade Policy 2004-2009: In this case, appellant purchaser from 100% export-oriented unit claimed benefit of special Agricultural Produce Scheme in respect of exports made by it. Circular dt. 21-1-2009 was issued to clarify that scheme notified on 7-4-2006 specifically excluded 100% export-oriented units from its applicability. The validity of the said circular was challenged with the contention that Circular dt. 21-1-2009 was contrary to scheme notified on 7-4-2006 which had statutory force and hence, could not be modified or amended by executive instructions. The Supreme Court held that the Circular dt. 21-1-2009 did not modify or amend scheme notified on 7-4-2006 but only clarified that 100% export-oriented units which were not entitled to seek exemption could not avail benefit indirectly through purchasers from them. It was further held, in terms of Cl. 3.8.5 of the Scheme, Government had reserved right in public interest to specify from time to time exports which were not eligible for entitlement, and hence, Circular dt. 21-1-2009 was valid. [Nola Ram Dulichand Dal Mills v. Union of India, (2020) 4 SCC 406]

Income Tax Act, 1961 — Ss. 115-O, 115-Q, 115-QA, 2(22), 2(22)(d) and 2(22)(a) — Buyback of shares — Taxability of: While considering communication by Revenue qua tax liability of assessee Company on purchase of its own shares, as a show-cause notice, as opposed to a final order, directions issued for grant of opportunity to file reply, oral hearing to assessee and for decision of case on merits by authorities. [Cognizant Technology Solutions (India) (P) Ltd. v. CIT, (2020) 4 SCC 430]

Local Government, Municipalities and Panchayats — Town Planning — Layout/Master/Zonal Plan — Modification/Change in the approved layout plan: A modification cannot be struck down when the law permits such change which is in terms of the statute and the plans that have the force of law. Further, as long as the layout plans conform to the development control norms, the court would not substitute its own opinion as to what principle or policy would best serve greater public or private interest. [M.P. Housing & Infrastructure Development Board v. Vijay Bodana, (2020) 4 SCC 521]

Marine Insurance Act, 1963 — Ss. 35 and 36 — Liability of insurer under a marine insurance policy — Discharge of, when there is a breach of warranty by assured: Non-compliance with the Institute Classification Clause (ICC) of the marine insurance policy, dealing with seaworthiness of the vessel in which the cargo is carried, can be considered as a breach of warranty. Further, held, when a warranty is not complied with i.e. there is a breach of warranty, the insurer is discharged from liability from the date of such breach, by virtue of Section 35(3) of the Marine Insurance Act, 1963 and such discharge of liability does not require any express conduct or representation from the insurer. [Rajankumar & Bros. (Impex) v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2020) 4 SCC 364]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Ss. 166 and 168 — Permanent disability — Just compensation — Principles summarized: Principles for determination of just compensation contemplated under MV Act are well settled. Apart from injury, claimant has to be compensated for consequential losses. [Kajal v. Jagdish Chand, (2020) 4 SCC 413]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302 and 364: In this case of murder of three minor children by accused in disturbed mental state, wife of accused having run away with uncle of victim children, death sentence of accused commuted to life imprisonment for entire life without any remission for 25 yrs. [Manoj Suryavanshi v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2020) 4 SCC 451]

Stamp Act, 1899 — Ss. 35, 36 and Art. 23 Expln. & Art. 48(f) (as amended by Orissa Act 1 of 2003) — Impounding of powers of attorney dt. 21-2-2011 and 4-10-2008 when required to be treated as conveyance for insufficient stamping: Judicial determination of objection regarding necessity of payment of, and sufficiency of stamp duty paid, necessary. In this case, the findings of the Trial court as well as High Court that since power of attorney was a registered document, it was properly stamped without examining as to whether power of attorney was to be stamped as conveyance on account of delivery of possession at time of execution of power of attorney, not proper. The question whether possession was transferred at the time or after execution of power of attorney is question of fact which is required to be decided by court at time of final decision being adjudicated after evidence is led by parties and not merely on basis of recitals in power of attorney. Further held, though such objection is required to be decided at threshold but in case where evidence is required to determine nature of document, it is reasonable to defer that issue to time of final decision in suit. [Z. Engineers Construction (P) Ltd. v. Bipin Bihari Behera, (2020) 4 SCC 358]

U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (1 of 1951) — S. 157-B — Exchange of agricultural land between a member of a Scheduled Tribe and a person not belonging to a Scheduled Tribe — Impermissibility of: Under S. 157-B, a bhumidhar or asami belonging to the Scheduled Tribe cannot transfer his land to a person not belonging to the Scheduled Tribe. Further, contrasting Ss. 157-B and 157-A, held, the use of the words “or otherwise” emphasises that the land belonging to a Scheduled Tribe cannot be transferred in any manner whatsoever. Thus, the exchange deed, between a member of Scheduled Tribe and a person not belonging to a Scheduled Tribe, held, executed in violation of the provisions of S. 157-B and the transfer was thus void and liable to be set aside. [Commr. (Revenue) v. Akhalaq Hussain, (2020) 4 SCC 507]

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Ss. 11 and 8 — Arbitrability of disputes in question: Excluded/excepted matters i.e. matters excluded from the purview of arbitration agreement and referable to a named person/authority for adjudication, by consent of parties is non-arbitrable. Decision on excluded/excepted matters, as in present case by such named person/authority qua such excluded/excepted matters, in present case being delay in completion of work and levy of liquidated damages, would be binding. [Mitra Guha Builders (India) Co. v. ONGC, (2020) 3 SCC 222]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — S. 149: Power to make up deficiency of court fees should not permitted to be misused to abuse process of court. Plaintiff must file suit in the correct form, seeking proper reliefs, as warrranted by the facts of the case, and value its suit in bona fide manner. [Atma Ram v. Charanjit Singh, (2020) 3 SCC 311]

Colliery Control Order, 1945 — Cls. 3, 3-A, 4, 4-A and 4-B — Price Fixation — Authority of North Eastern Coalfields (NEC), Assam to enhance price for LSS consumers: In this case, Resolution dt. 16-11-1996 passed by the Linking Committee, specifically stipulates that the price to be charged from the appellants was to be decided by NEC, Assam as prevalent at any point of time. In view of this specific treatment of pricing along with reference to Appellant 1 as linked unit, said Resolution has to be construed to mean that treatment of the appellant as a linked unit was for purpose of regular supply of coal. Pricing factor was separated from such deemed linking. It is clear from Agenda Item 23 of the said meeting wherein reference has been made to SSF units and cokery units which had been allocated coal. It was these units to be treated as linked units. Distinction between allocation and linking clearly emerges from the said decision of the Linking Committee. It is a fact that treatment of Appellant 1 as a linked unit was fiction. Such fiction was replaced by reality on basis of specific provision in Resolution (Agenda Item 24) so far as pricing is concerned. As Resolution dealt with “linking” and “pricing” separately, fiction linking could not be extended to actual pricing. [S.K.J. Coke Industries Ltd. v. Coal India Ltd., (2020) 3 SCC 270]

Constitution of India — Art. 137 — Review Petition — Rejection of, in Nirbhaya Gang Rape case: Hearing of petitions in open court declined. Order under review did not suffer from any error apparent warranting its reconsideration, hence, review petitions rejected. [Pawan Kumar Gupta v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 3 SCC 239]

Constitution of India — Art. 137 — Review under — Nirbhaya case (Gang rape in bus, December 16, 2012, Delhi) — Brutal, barbaric gang rape, unnatural sex and assault, leading to death of victim: In this case, there was no error apparent on face of record in appreciation of evidence or findings of judgment under review. None of grounds raised in review petition call for review of judgment. Review petition is not for rehearing of appeal on reappreciation of evidence over and over again. A party is not entitled to seek review of judgment merely for purpose of rehearing of appeal and a fresh decision. Hence, review petition stands dismissed. [Akshay Kumar Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 3 SCC 431]

Constitution of India — Art. 21 — Informant acting as investigating officer: Rights of accused are undoubtedly important, but so are rights of victim. Law has to cater wider variety of situations as appear in society. While interpreting law, higher judiciary considers such exceptions as are called for without disturbing pith and substance and original intention of legislature. Principle of fair trial is constant, ongoing, evolutionary process continually adapting itself to changing circumstance and, therefore, higher courts endeavour to strike right balance while interpreting law. Societal interest mandates that law laid down in Mohan Lal, (2018) 17 SCC 627 cannot be allowed to become springboard seeking acquittal irrespective of all other considerations pursuant to investigating and prosecution when law in that regard was unclear. Applying prospective declaration of law, it is deemed that all actions taken contrary to declaration of law, prior to day of declaration are validated. Hence, all pending criminal prosecutions, trials and appeals prior to law laid down in Mohan Lal case shall continue to be governed by individual facts of case. [Varinder Kumar v. State of H.P., (2020) 3 SCC 321]

Constitution of India — Art. 366(29-A)(d) r/w Arts. 246(4), 286 and 297 — Jurisdiction of State to levy sales tax when the vessel/ship/tug involved is used in the territorial waters of India, which are deemed to be Union Territory: For the purposes of Art. 366(29-A)(d), the taxable event is the transfer of the right to use the goods regardless of when or where the goods are delivered for use. Thus, the deemed sale takes place at the site where the right to use the goods is transferred i.e. it is of no relevance where the goods are delivered under the right to transfer to use them. In this case, the agreement was signed in Mangalore, but the vessel was used in the territorial waters of India. It was held that the situs of the deemed sale was in Mangalore. Thus, the transaction was liable to be taxed by the authorities concerned in the State of Karnataka. [Great Eastern Shipping Co. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2020) 3 SCC 354]

Constitution of India — Arts. 19(1)(a) & (2) — Internet, cyberspace and social networking: Freedom of speech and expression through medium of internet enjoys constitutional protection under Art. 19(1)(a). Any restriction on the same must be in accordance with Art. 19(2), inclusive of the test of proportionality. [Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 SCC 637]

Constitution of India — Sch. VI Paras 2, 4, 5 & 20 — Exclusive jurisdiction of District Council Court to try suits and cases where both parties belong to Scheduled Tribes category: Noti. dt. 7-2-2017 appointed Additional Judge to District Council Court for trial of offences punishable with death, transportation of life or imprisonment of not less than five years. In expression “suits and cases”, “cases” includes trial of criminal case which had occurred in notified autonomous district, so long as victim and complainant are both from Scheduled Tribes. Fact that State is de jure complainant in all criminal cases, would not affect this position. [State of Meghalaya v. Melvin Sohlangpiaw, (2020) 3 SCC 711]

Consumer Protection — Services — Banking/Shares/Securities and other Financial Services — Delay in submission of insurance claim by lending bank qua cover obtained on behalf of borrower, as per terms of loan agreement — Compensation for, when not grantable: In this case in pursuance of the loan agreement, an insurance cover was obtained by the Bank on behalf of the borrower. A fire took place on the premises of the borrower and the hypothecated assets were destroyed, but the insurer not having accepted the claim, a consumer complaint was filed before SCDRC. SCDRC allowed the complaint and the Bank was directed to forward the claim of the insured to the insurer. In appeal, NCDRC found that the claim was submitted by the Bank nearly six-and-a-half years after the incident of the fire and was time-barred, and went on to foist the liability on the Bank. In this case, considering that the only direction of SCDRC was for the Bank to forward the insurance claim to the insurer, which had not been challenged by the borrower and that there had been a one-time settlement of the borrower with the Bank, the order of NCDRC holding the Bank liable to compensate the borrower in respect of the insurance claim, set aside. [SBI v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2020) 3 SCC 258]

Consumer Protection — Services — Banking/Shares/Securities and other Financial Services: Non-replacement/Encashment of lost/stolen or mutilated or defaced Indira Vikas Patras (IVPs) purchased in cash does not amount to deficiency of services. [Supt. of Post Office v. Jambu Kumar Jain, (2020) 3 SCC 764]

Consumer Protection — Services — Insurance — Cause of incident of fire i.e. whether accidental or caused by insured — Determination of: In this case, it was held that the concurrent findings of the forums below, being findings of facts cannot be interfered. The presence of hydrocarbons at the site is not conclusive to infer that fire is caused by insured/use of kerosene, considering the material used in construction of store/premises. Further, whether the fire took place by a short circuit or any other reason, as long as insured is not the person who caused the fire, the Insurance Company cannot escape its liability in terms of the insurance policy. [Canara Bank v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2020) 3 SCC 455]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 389 — Bail during pendency of appeal — Interim relief: Punitive harshness should be minimised and restorative devices to redeem the man, even through community service, meditative drill, etc. should be innovated. [Prahladbhai Jagabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2020) 3 SCC 341]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 482 — Quashment of proceedings — Criminal liability arising out of contract with a company: To establish dishonest intention at time of entering of contract, it is necessary to implead the company, and to make specific allegations against officer(s) of company against whom proceedings have been filed, to either constitute their direct liability or vicarious liability. In absence of all of the above, held, criminal proceedings are not maintainable. [Sushil Sethi v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, (2020) 3 SCC 240]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 482 — Quashment of proceedings: In this case, while civil suit was pending, complaint came to be filed alleging that the agreement produced by appellant in the suit was a false and fabricated document. In view of conclusive opinion of appellate court that the agreement was not a forged document, very substratum of criminal complaint vanishes. Hence it was held that it will only be a complete abuse of process of law to allow appellants to be prosecuted. [Mukul Agrawal v. State of U.P., (2020) 3 SCC 402]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 482 — Quashment proceedings — Material that may be considered by High Court: The evidence produced by the accused in his defence cannot be looked into by the court, except in very exceptional circumstances, at the initial stage of criminal proceedings. The High Court cannot embark upon the appreciation of evidence while considering the petition filed under S. 482 CrPC for quashing criminal proceedings. If a prima facie case is made out disclosing the ingredients of the offence alleged against the accused, the Court cannot quash a criminal proceeding. [Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab, (2020) 3 SCC 317]

Criminal Trial — Sentence — Death Sentence — Execution of — Nirbhaya Rape case: In this case, as convicts were not proceeding to avail legal remedies within a week as stipulated by High Court, liberty granted to petitioner to obtain fresh date for execution of death warrant. However, clarified that pendency of present SLP would not be impediment for trial court to consider prayer on its own merits. [Union of India v. Mukesh, (2020) 3 SCC 453]

Customs — Valuation — CBEC clarification dt. 28-11-2001 — Duty of customs, where the unclaimed/uncleared goods are sold by tender/auction: In this case, the importer had imported CTV kits and such goods were permitted by the Customs Department to be kept in warehouse for one year in terms of S. 59. The bond period expired but the importer did not clear the imported goods and also did not pay the rent for the warehouse. The imported goods were put for sale through auction under S. 63(2) with a valuation of imported goods at Rs 1,52,04,176 but could not be sold. Ultimately, the goods were sold by tender sale in which the highest bid received was of Rs 41,44,555. The Supreme Court held that this case was not a case of levy of customs duty on the importer as the importer had not sought the release of goods within the permitted period of warehouse. Thus, in view of the CBEC clarificatory Circular dt. 28-11-2001, held, the customs duty has to be paid on the basis of sale proceeds realized from the sale of the goods kept in a warehouse and not on the basis of the customs duty payable at the time of filing the bill of entry or on the date of expiry of permitted period of warehouse. In this case, directions were given to ascertain the customs duty keeping in mind the dispensation indicated in the enabling provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 and Ch. 21 of Central Board of Excise and Customs Manual read with circular dated 20-11-2011 and to adjust the same as per the priority specified in S. 150(2) of the Customs Act, 1962. [Union of India v. Associated Container Terminals Ltd., (2020) 3 SCC 756]

Customs Act, 1962 — S. 130-A r/w S. 129-B: Calling for a statement from the Tribunal by High Court is not mandatory. Considering that S. 130-A(4) opens with the word “if”, held, it is not mandatorily required to call for a statement from the Tribunal in every case, where a reference is made and High Court has a discretion on the facts of each case either to do so or not to do so. [CCE v. Adani Exports Ltd., (2020) 3 SCC 754]

Election — Democracy and General Principles — Criminalisation of politics/Electoral Reform: There is increase in incidents of criminals i.e. persons against whom criminal cases were pending at different stages, entering politics. Directions issued in Public Interest Foundation, (2019) 3 SCC 224, not complied with. Political parties failed to explain why candidates with pending criminal cases have been selected as candidates. Directions issued by exercising powers under Arts. 129 and 142 of Constitution, for compliance with the above directions in Public Interest Foundation case. [Rambabu Singh Thakur v. Sunil Arora, (2020) 3 SCC 733]

Evidence Act, 1872 — Ss. 65-A and 65-B — Electronic records — Admissibility of: In view of Anvar P.V., (2014) 10 SCC 473, pronouncement of Supreme Court in Shafhi Mohammad, (2018) 2 SCC 801, needs reconsideration. With the passage of time, reliance on electronic records during investigation is bound to increase. Law therefore needs to be laid down in such regard with certainty. Therefore, it is appropriate to refer instant matter to larger Bench. [Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 3 SCC 216]

Government Grants, Largesse, Public Property and Public Premises — Affirmative Action Schemes, Pension and Other Schemes — Pension Schemes — Swatantrata Sainik Samman Pension Scheme, 1980 — Paras 3 and 4 — Fixation of cut-off date for grant of SSS Pension to participants of Goa Liberation Movement, Phase II — Validity: Vide G.O. dt. 17-2-2003, under relaxed criteria, Freedom Fighters Pension was granted to participants of Goa Liberation Movement Phase II (1954-1955) who were in receipt of State pension by 1-8-2002. In this case, R-1 was granted State pension on 11-3-2008 w.e.f. 1-12-2007. The evidence indicated that issue of cut-off date was deliberated by GOI and cut-off date was consciously fixed. The Supreme Court held that when benefit is granted in relaxation of Scheme, it is open for Government to put conditions for eligibility. Further held, object of SSSP Scheme, 1980 was to grant Freedom Fighters Central Pension to those who fulfil eligibility which was clearly fulfilled in including Goa Liberation Movement also under the Scheme. Besides, relaxation granted by Order dt. 17-2-2003 was not the object of Government. Scheme dt. 17-2-2003 had intelligible differentia and also nexus with object. When relaxation is granted to limited category, others not covered by Scheme cannot claim violation of any right. Right of equality can be claimed only by those who fulfil eligibilities under the SSSP Scheme, 1980. [Union of India v. Sitakant S. Dubhashi, (2020) 3 SCC 297]

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — Ss. 13 and 9 — Divorce — Facts that may be considered — Facts arising subsequent to filing of divorce petition — Second appeal in divorce proceedings: Framing of substantial question of law on basis of criminal complaint filed by wife alleging harassment for dowry, said complaint having been filed subsequent to filing of divorce petition by husband on ground of mental cruelty, not proper. [Mangayakarasi v. M. Yuvaraj, (2020) 3 SCC 786]

Income Tax Act, 1961 — S. 43-B: The deduction of MODVAT credit of excise duty that remains unutilised at the end of the relevant accounting year, not permissible. The unutilised credit in MODVAT scheme cannot be considered as a sum actually paid by the assessee. [Maruti Suzuki (India) Ltd. v. CIT, (2020) 3 SCC 718]

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — S. 12 (as amended w.e.f. 16-8-2019) — Time-limit for completion of insolvency resolution process — Extension of, in the interest of justice: In this case, Homebuyers’ association filed an application before NCLT seeking clarification as to the manner in which the voting percentage of the allottees (homebuyers) will be reckoned in CoC, which remained pending for considerable time. Further, constant experimentation went about at different level due to lack of clarity on matters crucial to the decision-making process of CoC and also in view of the recent legislative changes, the scope of resolution plan stood expanded. Further, there was unanimity between all the stakeholders that liquidation of JIL must be eschewed. In exercise of powers under Art. 142 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court directed that the 90 days’ extended period [as provided under amended S. 12(3) IBC] be reckoned from the date of the present order instead of the date of commencement of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2019. [Jaiprakash Associates Ltd. v. IDBI Bank Ltd., (2020) 3 SCC 328]

Labour Law — Dismissal — Interference by Labour Court/Tribunal/Judicial review/validity — Interference with concurrent findings of fact — Scope: Setting aside of dismissal order by Division Bench of High Court relying upon circular issued subsequently, not proper. [A.P. SRTC v. N. Danaiah, (2020) 3 SCC 267]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Ss. 54, 23, 28 and 34 — Delay in filing appeal: Appellant is not entitled to interest for period of delay in filing appeal. The fact that at time of condoning of delay while admitting delayed appeal, no condition was imposed is irrelevant. [Nimna Dudhna Project v. State of Maharashtra, (2020) 3 SCC 255]

Limitation Act, 1963 — Arts. 54 and 113 — Applicability of Art. 54 or Art. 113 — Agreement to sell with fixed date of performance, entered into prior to acquisition proceedings in respect of suit property: In this case agreement to sell provided for date of performance (and which was later extended), thus attracting first limb of Art. 54 which provides that time from which period begins to run is from “the date fixed for performance”, ruling out applicability of second limb of Art. 54 which provides “…if no [date of performance] is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused”. Plaintiff was all along ready and willing to perform its part of the contract, and even obtained quashment of the acquisition proceedings. Thus, held, Art. 113 of the Limitation Act would apply and the right to sue accrued when subsequent to the quashment of the acquisition proceedings, the respondent-plaintiff served a notice upon the appellant-defendants to execute the sale deed and the defendants refused to execute the sale deed. As suit for specific performance was filed within three years thereof, said suit was correctly held by High Court to be within time. [Vundavalli Ratna Manikyam v. V.P.P.R.N. Prasada Rao, (2020) 3 SCC 289]

Limitation Act, 1963 — S. 27 & Arts. 65 and 64 — Acquisition of ownership by adverse possession — Nature of rights acquired by adverse possessor: Use of adverse possession as a sword by plaintiff is permissible in view of three-Judge Bench decision in Ravinder Kaur Grewal, (2019) 8 SCC 729. Person claiming acquisition of title by adverse possession can now file a suit for declaration of title and possession, based on his adverse possession. [Narendra Kumar Tripathi v. Karuna Auddy, (2020) 3 SCC 220]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 493 — Cohabitation caused by man deceitfully inducing a belief of lawful marriage — Ingredients of offence whether present — Determination of: In this case, on 21-7-2013, ring ceremony was performed and date of marriage between the appellant and victim was scheduled for 19-11-2013. On 16-8-2013 appellant established physical relationship with victim misleading her that, now since the marriage is finalised and only ceremony of “pheras” remains to be performed. The Supreme Court held that to constitute an offence under S. 493 IPC, the allegations in FIR must demonstrate that appellant had practised deception on the victim causing a false belief of existence of lawful marriage and which led her to cohabit with him. Insofar as offence under S. 493 IPC was concerned, since FIR does not disclose the commission of any offence under the said section and thus continuance of criminal prosecution under S. 493 IPC would amount to abuse of process of the court. However, insofar as offence against appellants under Ss. 3/4, Dowry Prohibition Act was concerned, since the allegations disclose the commission of cognizable offence in the FIR, it was not a fit case to exercise power under S. 482 CrPC. Charge-sheet under S. 493 IPC was quashed. However, in respect of charge-sheet under S. 3 r/w S. 4, Dowry Prohibition Act, the appeal stood dismissed. [Arun Singh v. State of U.P., (2020) 3 SCC 736]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 217 and 221: In this case, intentional disobeying of directions of law and intentional allowing accused persons to escape from place of occurrence was not proved by prosecution against appellant-accused police officer. Hence, reversal by High Court of his acquittal by trial court, thereby, convicting him under Ss. 217 and 221, set aside on consideration of evidence adduced by prosecution and acquittal of appellant, restored. [V. Rajaram v. State, (2020) 3 SCC 200]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302/34 and 201/34: In this case of death by strangulation body was recovered from well. The circumstances which were relied upon by prosecution to prove guilt of accused, were not complete. The circumstances were not leading to conclusion, that in all human probability, murder must have been committed by accused. Hence, conviction of accused, was reversed. [Mohd. Younus Ali Tarafdar v. State of W.B., (2020) 3 SCC 747]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 376(1) and 450 — Alleged rape of married lady after house trespass — Conviction of accused solely relying upon deposition of prosecutrix — Sustainability: In this case, material contradictions were present in deposition of prosecutrix. Further, neither any independent witness nor even medical evidence supported prosecution case. FSL report also not supported prosecution case. Variation in prosecutrix’s version about giving complaint, present. Prosecutrix failed to pass tests of “sterling witness”. Delay in lodging FIR, also present. Presence of enmity/dispute between both parties with respect to land, evident from records. In absence of any other supporting evidence, it was held that accused was entitled to benefit of doubt, hence, conviction was reversed. [Santosh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2020) 3 SCC 443]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 406, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471 and 114 — Cheating and forgery — Criminal proceedings for — When not sustainable: When issue as to genuineness of documents, forgery of which was the basis of the criminal proceedings, was pending consideration in civil suit, FIR ought not to have been allowed to continue in this case as it would prejudice the interest of parties and the stand taken by them in the civil suit. Rajeshbhai Muljibhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2020) 3 SCC 794]

Rent Control and Eviction — Arrears of Rent/Default/Tender of Rent/Striking off Defence — Arrears of rent: Disconnection of electricity by lessor for default in arrears of rent, maintenance and electricity charges, permissible. [Infinity Infotech Parks Ltd. v. Shiva Jute Mills (P) Ltd., (2020) 3 SCC 262]

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 — S. 18: The waiver of pre-deposit condition for filing an appeal before DRAT is not permissible, even when the auction-sale is challenged by the guarantor and not the primary borrower. A guarantor or a mortgagor, who has mortgaged its property to secure the repayment of the loan, held, stand on the same footing as the borrower and if guarantor/mortgagor other than the primary borrower wants to file an appeal, he must comply with the terms of S. 18. Union Bank of India v. Rajat Infrastructure (P) Ltd., (2020) 3 SCC 770]

Service Law — Age — Date of birth: Prayer for change in date of birth at fag end of career is not permissible. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Shyam Kishore Singh, (2020) 3 SCC 411]

Service Law — Age — Date of birth: Prayer for change in date of birth at fag end of career is not permissible. Kirloskar Bros. Ltd. v. Laxman, (2020) 3 SCC 419]

Service Law — Age — Date of birth: Prayer for change in date of birth at fag end of career is not permissible. Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Ram Samugh Yadav, (2020) 3 SCC 421]

Service Law — Appointment — Eligibility conditions/criteria: Non-appointment as candidates in question (contempt petitioners in this case) did not meet eligibility criteria, or did not take part in selection process, or did not opt for the specific vacancies concerned, held, proper and could not amount to contempt of orders of Court directing State to fill vacancies concerned in accordance with law. [Sanjai Kumar v. Prabhat Kumar, (2020) 3 SCC 184]

Service Law — Departmental Enquiry — Judicial review/Validity — Interference with findings — Scope: Power of judicial review conferred on constitutional court or Tribunal is not that of an appellate authority but is confined only to decision-making process. Only when finding recorded by disciplinary authority is not supported by evidence or is unreasonably arrived at, writ court can interfere with finding of disciplinary authority. Parameters when High Court shall not interfere in disciplinary proceedings stated. [State of Karnataka v. N. Gangaraj, (2020) 3 SCC 423]

Service Law — Promotion — MACP Scheme: In terms of Circular dt. 12-9-2012 issued by Ministry of Railways benefit under MACP scheme granted to employees who had qualified and were appointed under promotion quota after clearing LDCE. Hence it was held that enquiry in respect of appointments of respondents to post of ECRC was required in terms of Circular dt. 12-9-2012 as well as Cl. 129 of Indian Railway Establishment Manual, Vol. 1 dealing with filling up posts of ECRCs. Since Tribunal as well as High Court had failed to consider said issue, matter remanded to Tribunal for consideration afresh. [Union of India v. Rosamma Benny, (2020) 3 SCC 407]

Service Law — Resignation: Resignation cannot be deemed as “voluntary retirement” on completion of qualifying service for purposes of pensionary benefits. Resignation is different from “voluntary retirement” and applicable legal consequences are distinct. “Resignation” cannot be substituted for “voluntary retirement” based on employee’s tenure. [BSES Yamuna Power Ltd. v. Ghanshyam Chand Sharma, (2020) 3 SCC 346]

Service Law — Seniority — Determination of seniority — Deputationist — Absorption in deputee department: In this case, latter part of OM dt. 29-5-1986 envisaged that seniority would not be granted where transfer is “not strictly in public interest”. R-1 absorbed at his own insistence consequent to repeated representations despite departmental communication wanting R-1 to go back to his parent cadre. Hence the Supreme Court held, such transfer by absorption can hardly be stated to be “strictly in public interest”, much less in public interest. Further held, where conditions for absorption categorically stated that absorption would be “deemed to be new recruitment” and previous service would be counted for all purposes “except his/her seniority in cadre” and R-1 having accepted it without demur, seniority list prepared as a sequitur thereto was valid. Besides, this was not a case of transfer but of deputation and thus, principle of person moving to another cadre would squarely apply and such deputee would also be governed by terms and conditions of absorption. The High Court erred in relying on OMs dt. 29-5-1986 and 27-3-2001 in terms of which period of deputation was to be counted for seniority purposes ignoring latter part of OM dt. 29-5-1986. However, considering that R-1 had earned promotion in meantime and demoting him at this stage would be rather harsh, seniority list directed to be maintained by creating ex cadre/supernumerary post. [Govinda Chandra Tiria v. Sibaji Charan Panda, (2020) 3 SCC 803]

Service Law — Termination of Service — Termination order — Consequential termination order — Operation of: In this case, termination order of appellant being consequential to reversion order reverting senior to post of appellant, held, did not operate independently of said reversion order. Said reversion order having been stayed by Court, such stay would automatically result in stay of consequential termination order of appellant. Dismissal of independent writ petition of appellant challenging the termination order, thus held, was inconsequential. Rana Pratap Singh v. Vittiya Evam Lekha Adhikari,(2020) 3 SCC 478]

Service Law — Transfer of Employee/Service — Generally — Transfer: Employee, held, cannot claim a posting as of right to a place of his choice. [Union of India v. Deepak Niranjan Nath Pandit, (2020) 3 SCC 404]

Specific Relief Act, 1963 — S. 16(c) — Decree for specific performance — Readiness and willingness of plaintiff to perform his part of the contract — Essentialities to be considered: Mere plea that plaintiff was ready to pay consideration, without any material to substantiate this plea, cannot be accepted. It is not necessary for plaintiff to produce ready money to establish its readiness and willingness to pay the consideration, but it is mandatory on his part to prove that he had the means to generate consideration amount within the time-frame contemplated in the contract. [C.S. Venkatesh v. A.S.C. Murthy, (2020) 3 SCC 280]

Specific Relief Act, 1963 — S. 38: In this case, there was bare suit for injunction against trespass and for peaceful enjoyment of property by plaintiff whose possession was not disputed. The Supreme Court held that the questions of title and ownership are not precluded from consideration. Each case will have to be examined on its own merits keeping in view the nature of the pleading put forth before the trial court and the understanding of the case with which the parties have gone to trial. [Jose v. Johnson, (2020) 3 SCC 780]

Taxation — Concession/Exemption/Incentive/Rebate/Subsidy — Exemption — Possible scope of: Future levies i.e. levies imposed after the exemption notification comes into existence, not to be presumed to be within the contemplation of Government when issuing exemption notification i.e. Government cannot be presumed to have projected its mind into the future and granted exemption in respect of taxes which may be levied in the future. [Unicorn Industries v. Union of India, (2020) 3 SCC 492]

Telecommunications Laws — Licence Fees — National Telecom Policy, 1999 Regime — Licence agreement between Government of India and telecom service providers — Bindingness of: Gross revenue/Adjusted gross revenue, as defined under Cl. 19 of licence agreement between Government of India and telecom service providers under National Telecom Policy, 1999 Regime, valid. Contra proferentem rule of construction is not applicable, when there is no ambiguity. Doctrine of unconscionable bargaining is not applicable to commercial contracts. The jurisdiction of TDSAT does not extend to adjudication of validity of the terms and conditions incorporated in the licence of a service provider. [Union of India v. Assn. of Unified Telecom Service Providers of India, (2020) 3 SCC 525]

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — S. 108 — Unauthorised Occupant/Trespasser: In this case there was reduction of damages/compensation for unauthorised occupation by lessee, as awarded by trial court, in the interest of justice, considering that the lessee was a Consumer Cooperative Wholesale Store which had already vacated the leased premises and would be put in a financially precarious position owing to the burden imposed. [Periyar District Consumer Coop. Wholesale Stores Ltd. v. B. Balagopal, (2020) 3 SCC 775]