Legislation UpdatesStatutes/Bills/Ordinances

The Department of Law, Justice and Legislative Affairs has passed the Delhi Goods and Services Tax (Amendment) Act, 2021 to amend the Delhi Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 on August 9, 2021.

 

The key amendments are:

  • Section 7(1)(aa), inserted, Scope of supply : The tax shall also be levied in the ambit of supply, activities or transactions involving supply of goods or services by any person, other than an individual, to its members or constituents or vice-versa, for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration, so as to ensure levy of tax on the same.
  • Section 16(2)(aa), inserted, states that the Input tax credit on invoice or debit note may be availed only when the details of such invoice or debit note has been furnished by the supplier in GSTR-1 and is communicated to the recipient.
  • Section 35(5), omitted,Compulsory submission of audited annual accounts and reconciliation statements for the registered taxpayers is removed.
  • Section 44, substituted, Annual Return shall include a self-certified reconciliation statement, reconciling the value of supplies declared in the return furnished for the financial year, with the audited annual financial statement for every financial year electronically, within such time and in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed by the registered persons except those exempted by the Commissioner.
  • Section 50 proviso, substituted which provides interest on delayed payment of tax. The amendment provides to charge interest on net cash liability.
  • Section 75 explanation, inserted, Self-assessed tax, shall include the tax payable in respect of details of outward supplies furnished under section 37, but not included in the return furnished under section 39.
  • Section 83(1), substituted, provides that provisional attachment shall remain valid for the entire period starting from the initiation of any proceeding under Chapter XII, Chapter XIV or Chapter XV till the expiry of a period of 1 year from the date of order.
  • Section 107(6) proviso, substituted, which provides that a sum equal to twenty-five per cent. of the penalty to be paid by the appellant while filing appeal against an order under section 129(3).
  • Section 151, substituted, the jurisdictional commissioner has the power to call for information from any person relating to any matters dealt with in connection with the Act.

 


*Tanvi Singh, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: Kameswar Rao, J., decided a petition wherein on the invocation of the arbitration clause, one of the parties appointed the sole arbitrator on its own.

The instant petition was filed under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Petitioner and the respondents entered into a lease deed in respect of the premises.

It has been stated that pursuant to the execution of the lease deed, petitioner started fulfilling the obligations on the assumption that the respondents will also do the same and disbursed an amount of Rs 3,32,000 to the respondents in order to expedite the refurbishment and up-gradation of the premises to make it at par with the petitioner’s benchmark.

Due to the pandemic, petitioner sought to invoke the force majeure clause in the Lease Deed.

Even after repeated communications and grant of time as sought by the respondents, the respondents failed to furnish the complete set of documents as mandated under Clause 11.2.1 of the Lease Deed.

While the above-stated breach was being cured, respondents suddenly and to complete shock and dismay of the petitioner issued a letter demanding a sum of money by misrepresenting the clauses of the Lease Deed.

Respondents invoked arbitration clause citing the existence of disputes under the lease deed and nominated a Retired Judge of this Court as the Sole Arbitrator.

 Issue for consideration:

Whether the appointment of the arbitrator was at variance with the stipulation in the contract and as such non-est for this Court to grant the relief to the petitioner by appointing a new arbitrator?

Decision

  1. DISPUTE RESOLUTION- Any dispute or controversy arising out of or in connection with the Deed or its performance, including the validity, interpretation or application hereof, shall to the extent possible be settled amicably by negotiation and discussion among the Parties within 30 (thirty) days as of the date requested by either Party. Failing which, either Party shall be at liberty to refer the matter to arbitration in accordance with the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The arbitral panel shall consist of a sole arbitrator appointed mutually by the Parties. Any arbitral award issued by such sole arbitrator shall be final and binding on the Parties. The language of the arbitration shall be English and seat of arbitration shall be Delhi.”

(Emphasis supplied )

As per the arbitration clause contained in the deed, the arbitrator has to be appointed mutually by both the parties. In the present case, sole arbitrator was appointed by the respondent but was not confirmed by the petitioner.

Respondents should have approached the Court under Section 11 of the Act seeking an appointment of an Arbitrator when the same has not been confirmed.

Hence, the appointment is declared to be non-est.

Bench relied upon the Supreme Court decision in Walter Bau Ag. v. MCGM (2015) 3 SCC 800 and Naveen Kandhai v. Jai Mahal Hotels (P) Ltd., Arb. P. 53 of 2017.

With regard to the significance of adherence to the procedure agreed upon by the parties to an arbitration agreement with regard mutual/common consent in appointing an arbitrator, Court relied upon the decision of Manish Chibber

 While allowing the petition, Justice S.P. Garg, a retired Judge of this Court was appointed as the sole arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes and differences between the parties arising out of the lease deed. [Oyo Hotels and Homes (P) Ltd. v. Rajan Tewari,  2021 SCC OnLine Del 446, decided on 09-02-2021]


Advocates for the parties:

Petitioner: Jeevan Ballav Panda, Adv. with Satakshi Sood & Satish Padhi, Advs.

Respondents: Bobby Anand, Advocate

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: Suresh Kumar Kait, J., reversed the order of the lower court issuing summons against the accused in a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, holding that the lower courts fell in error while computing the period of limitation.

Factual Matrix

Petitioner had borrowed a sum of Rs 10 Lacs from respondent 2 who had lent the same vide two cheques amounting to Rs 5 lacs each. Further, it was stated that after approximately 3 years, respondent 2 approached petitioner for repayment of the loan amount, petitioner assured that he will return the entire amount and in order to discharge his part liability he issued a cheque amounting to Rs 10 lacs, which was dishonored with remarks “funds insufficient”.

Complainant stated that when the above-said was informed to the petitioner, he paid no heed to his complaint and thereafter, a legal demand notice was served upon him, yet petitioner failed to make payment, therefore a complaint was filed under Section 138 NI Act.

In view of the above complaint, summons were directed to be issued against the petitioner.

The above Order was challenged and the revisional court dismissed the said petition which has been challenged.

Contentions

Petitioners Counsel submitted that the Metropolitan Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance under Section 138 NI Act without that being accompanied by application under Section 142 (1) (b) NI Act for condoning the delay in filing the complaint.

Further, while taking cognizance of the complaint, Metropolitan Magistrate did not take note of the fact that the complaint was filed beyond the limitation period and did not rightly calculate the days and therefore, directed to issue summons to the petitioner was illegal and without jurisdiction.

Analysis and Decision

Bench referred to the decision of Supreme Court in Econ Antri Ltd. v. Rom Industries Ltd., (2014) 11 SCC 769, while deciding the issue of calculation of limitation period with regard to proviso (c) to Sections 138 and 142(b) of the NI Act.

Further, the Court added that the ratio of the decision in Saketh India Ltd. v. India Securities Limited, (1999) 3 SCC 1 has to be applied to the case in hand.

Crux in the instant case was that the 15 days period with regard to legal demand notice lapsed. In terms of Supreme Court decision in Saketh India Ltd. v. India Securities Limited,  (1999) 3 SCC 1 one day has to be excluded for counting the one month limitation period and therefore, excluding the day of 19-06-2019, the limitation period started from 20-06-2019 and the limitation period expired with the day in the succeeding month immediately preceding the day corresponding to the date upon which the period started.

Consequently, the limitation period in this case, which commenced on 20-06-2019, expired in the succeeding month on a day preceding the date of commencement i.e. 19-07-2019. Admittedly, the complaint, in this case, was instituted on 20-07-2019 i.e. 01 day after the limitation period had expired.

Hence, Bench held that both the courts below have fallen in error while computing the period of limitation. Moreover, at the time of filing, the complaint was not even accompanied by an application under Section 142(1) (b) NI Act for condoning the delay.

Adding to the above, Court stated that the Revisional Court erroneously took into consideration two different dates for service of demand notice while computing the limitation period.

Therefore, the lower courts orders were set aside. [Simranpal Singh Suri v. State,  2021 SCC OnLine Del 236, decided on 01-02-2021]


Advocates for the parties:

Petitioner: M.S. Oberoi, Siddharth Khattar and Gaurav Rohilla, Advocates

Respondents: Izhar Ahmed, Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent 1

Anil Kumar Dhupar, Advocate for respondent 2

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: Prathiba M. Singh, J., while considering the re-opening of spas in GNCTD expressed that:

“While the spread of Covid-19 is the main factor to be considered, it has to be also balanced with the interest of reopening of businesses and establishments to bring back a semblance of normalcy.”

Petitioner an association of wellness Ayurveda and Spa providers in NCT Delhi is aggrieved by the delay by GNCTD and the Ministry of Home Affairs in issuing guidelines for re-opening of spas sought quashing of order dated 03-08-2020 issued by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW).

After the lockdown in March, 2020, though various other establishments were permitted to reopen and commerce businesses, spas have still been forced to remain closed.

Petitioners relied on MOHFW’s office memorandum dated 18-11-2020 permitting the reopening of spas subject to conditions.

Despite the above, GNCTD did not permit the reopening of spas.

Senior Counsel, Mr Datta submitted that salons and other similar places have been opened but not giving permission for reopening of spas is discriminatory.

This Court vide order dated 04-12-2020 came to a prima facie conclusion that the distinction sought to be made between the salons and spas would be discriminatory.

GNCTD’s affidavit had the only reason for not giving permission on re-opening of spas which was the longer duration of proximity with the client.

Decision

Bench expressed that several developments have taken place including the reduction in the number of COVID-19 cases as also the introduction of a vaccine.

“…the question of reopening any particular class of establishments is a delicate one to be taken after due consideration of the relative merits and demerits.”

As of June, 2020, i.e., almost 6 months ago, salons which offer similar services have already been opened in Delhi, subject to such establishments observing standard operating procedure prescribed by the MoHFW.

High Court opined that the slight difference in the nature of services and a slightly higher percentage of risk due to the proximity of the client and the service provider can be obviated by prescribing stricter measures and safeguards rather than continuing to keep such establishments closed. 

Difference between salons and spas

Court observed that it cannot also be lost sight of that several salons also provide services akin to those provided in spas. The difference between the services provided in Salons and Spas is very minimal. The said services require service providers and service takers to remain in close proximity for sufficient duration.

Hence,

“…while allowing the opening of salons, continuing the embargo on spas would be violative of the rights of these establishments and their employees.”

High Court is conscious of the importance of prescribing strict safeguards that ought to be taken by establishments providing spa services as also the clients who visit the establishments, the continuation of the embargo on reopening of spas is unjustified.

Therefore, in light of the above, Court permitted the reopening of spas, wellness clinic and similar establishments, in the GNCTD, subject to the following conditions:

  • There shall be strict compliance of the conditions specified in the office memorandum of 18-11-2020 prescribed by the MoHFW in respect of spas. The 6 feet distance shall be in general maintained between clients and employees. Insofar as the service providers i.e., therapists etc., are concerned, they shall maintain all standards of hygiene, masking etc., as set out below;
  • In addition, considering the nature of services provided in spas, all employees in such establishments shall undergo fortnightly RTPCR tests, especially the therapists who are likely to come in close contact with the clients.
  • All therapists and other employees, as also the visitors, shall be subjected to thermal temperature checks and if anyone shows any symptoms, they would not be permitted entry in the establishment.
  • All service providers shall wear face shields and masks while providing therapy. For treatments which are longer than thirty minutes, a PPE kit should also be worn in addition.
  • Clients should preferably wear masks to the extent possible, considering the nature of services which are availed of.
  • All visitors/clients shall sign a declaration form to the effect that they have not contracted Covid-19 and if they have, they have tested negative. The establishments are permitted to take a written consent form accepting the risks that may be involved for clients/visitors.
  • Tools including clothing, other apparel, towels etc., used for clients, shall be sanitised after each and every treatment.
  • It shall be ensured that hygienic conditions are maintained in the spas and any other safeguards in force for salons shall also be adhered to by the spas.

Bench permitted to open spas, wellness clinics and similar establishments in light of the above conditions.[Sukaita v. GNCTD,    2021 SCC OnLine Del 61, decided 14-01-2021]


Advocates who appeared for the parties:
Petitioner: Sachin Dutta, Senior Advocate with Lal Singh and Sudhir Tewatia, Advocates. Randhir Kr. Lal, Advocate.
Respondents: Anupam Srivastava, ASC for GNCTD Advocate for R-1.

Shalini Nair, Anjana Gosain & Aditi Amitabh, Advocates. for R-2

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: Vibhu Bakhru, J., observed that If an HIV positive person is aware of their condition and has unprotected sex, the person can be punished under Section 270 of Penal Code, 1860.

Appellant was convicted by the trial court under Sections 376/313/307 of Penal Code, 1860.

Appellant was found guilty of raping his stepdaughter and since the appellant was found to be infected with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV Positive) and was convicted for an offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC — attempt to murder.

Trial Court also observed that since the appellant was aware that his acts could result in transmitting the potentially lethal disease, he had knowingly committed an act, which if resulted in transmitting of HIV and consequently, the death of the victim from that disease, it would amount to murder.

Analysis, Law and Decision

Conviction for Rape — offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC

Whether there is any doubt that the appellant is guilty of committing an offence punishable under Section 376 IPC?

Considering that the prosecutrix gave varied statements at various points of time and had changed her stand on oath. The testimony of the prosecutrix could not be considered as wholly reliable and the trial court erred in proceeding on the said basis. However, Court also denied accepting that she was a wholly unreliable witness.

Further, in view of the above Court stated that it would be unsafe to rely on the testimony of the prosecutrix without any corroborative evidence and hence solely on her testimony, the appellant cannot be convicted.

Bench made another observation that,

in the instant case, there is unimpeachable corroborative evidence that the petitioner had raped the prosecutrix. The DNA Fingerprints of the Products of Conception and the DNA Fingerprints generated from the blood sample of the petitioner conclusively established that the appellant was the biological father of the abortus.

Repeatedly Raped

It is also material to note that the prosecutrix had in the first instance, when she was brought to the Community Care Centre, reported to the nurse that her stepfather had been repeatedly establishing physical relations with her and had been sexually abusing her in front of her siblings.

Even the medical report recorded:

“Repeated Rape by HIV positive stepfather after the death of mother suffering from HIV/AIDS in Jan 2011. Patient was overdue by one week in April 2011 when she was given an injection to get back her periods back. She bled with clots and pieces. UPT done showing pregnancy positive result.”

High Court concurred with the decision of the trial court that the evidence obtained in the present case clearly established beyond any reasonable doubt that the appellant had engaged in sexual intercourse with prosecutrix without her consent and had committed an offence punishable under Section 376 IPC.

Conviction for causing miscarriage – offence punishable under Section 313 IPC

Whether it is established that the appellant is guilty of committing an offence punishable under Section 313 of the IPC?

Trial Court had held that the appellant was guilty of causing miscarriage to the prosecutrix by administering her pills. It is relevant to note that though the prosecutrix was in Sneh Sadan when she was allegedly administered pills by the appellant and the same was allegedly informed to doctors immediately, no action was taken by any of the doctors in this regard.

Bench stated that there is no material to indicate as to what pills were administered to the prosecutrix. Although three medical doctors were examined, none of them mentioned that in their opinion the prosecutrix‘s miscarriage was induced by the said pills.

Hence, the Court stated that there was no description of the pills allegedly administered to the prosecutrix. There is nothing on record to remotely indicate as to what was the substance that was allegedly administered to the prosecutrix.

Court was of the view that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the appellant had committed the offence of causing the prosecutrix‘s miscarriage. Therefore, the appellant‘s conviction for committing an offence under Section 313 of the IPC could not be sustained.

Conviction for an attempt to murder – offence punishable under Section 307 IPC

Bench did not concur with the view that the appellant was guilty of an offence punishable under Section 307 IPC for several reasons.

Firstly, that the import of holding so would also mean that any sexual activity by a person infected by HIV is punishable under Section 307 of the IPC, notwithstanding that his or her partner has consented to such sexual activity. This is because the culpable act under Section 307 of the IPC does not cease to be one if the victim of such an act has also consented to the same.

Secondly, the trial court had drawn support for its conclusion by mentioning that several countries prosecute cases of transmission of HIV and non-disclosure of HIV status. However, the court had not examined the specific provisions or the rationale used in various jurisdictions for prosecuting non-disclosure of HIV positive status as general offences.

In cases of actual transmission where an HIV Negative person acquires the said disease as a result of engaging in any sexual activity with an HIV Positive partner, the offender is prosecuted for causing bodily harm.

In certain cases where an HIV Positive person fails to disclose his status and engages in any sexual activity, he/she may be prosecuted for sexual assault as in such cases, the consent of the other person to engage in sexual intercourse is vitiated and the sexual act can be construed as one without consent.

In cases of sexual assault or rape, it is widely accepted that the HIV Positive status of the offender is an aggravating factor to be considered while sentencing the offender.

Thirdly, on a plain reading of Section 307 of IPC, an offence under Section 307 IPC is not made out.

Section 307 of the IPC punishes any act which is done by a person with such intention or knowledge and under the circumstances that by that act cause death, the persons committing such act would be guilty of murder.

Bench observed that clearly, in the facts of the present case, the appellant had not raped the prosecutrix with an intention of causing her death.

According to the prosecution, the appellant was lonely after the death of his wife and he had sexually preyed on his stepdaughter (as allegedly disclosed by him in his disclosure statement).

It is relevant to note that one of the key ingredients of the second, third and fourth limb of Section 300 of the IPC is that the culpable act is so inherently dangerous as is likely to cause death; or is sufficient in the normal course of nature to cause death; or in all probability, it would cause death.

The assumption that penetrative sexual assault would in all probability lead to transmission of the disease, which in all probability would result in the death of a healthy partner is not established. In the facts of the present case, no evidence whatsoever was led to establish the probability of the prosecutrix being transmitted the said disease.

In the given circumstances, the decision of the Trial Court is largely based on surmises and impressions, without analysis of any scientific data to assume that sexual intercourse by an HIV positive patient would in all probability lead to the demise of his partner.

Fourthly, the appellant was medically examined and there is no evidence to indicate that he was a carrier of Herpes Simplex Virus. Thus, there is no evidence that the appellant would have transmitted the said disease to the prosecutrix.

Lastly, this Court is of the view that the Trial Court had erred in proceeding on the basis that provisions of Section 270 of the IPC would not be applicable.

In Supreme Court’s decision of Mr ‘X’ v. Hospital ‘Z’: (1998) 8 SCC 296, a case was considered where the respondent hospital had disclosed that the appellant was HIV positive to his fiancé. As a result of such disclosure, the appellant‘s marriage to his fiancé was called off. Appellant instituted an action to recover damages on the ground that the information regarding his HIV positive status was required to be kept secret under medical ethics and was disclosed illegally. The appellant pleaded that since the hospital had breached its duty to maintain confidentiality, they were liable to pay damages to the appellant.

“…the reasoning that unprotected sexual engagement by an HIV positive person, who is aware of the nature of his disease, can be termed as a negligent act, which he knows is likely to spread the infection of a disease that endangers life and is thus, liable to be punished under Section 270 of the IPC is persuasive and cannot be faulted.”

Court opined that even if the Trial Court was of the view that it would not be apposite to frame charges under Section 270 of the IPC, the same did not necessarily warrant that charges be framed under Section 307 of IPC.

In view of the above, the impugned judgment to the extent that it convicts the appellant for committing an offence punishable under Section 376 of the IPC was upheld.

Punishment for offences under Sections 313 and 307 of IPC was set aside. [Sabhajeet Maurya v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2020 SCC OnLine Del 1525, decided on 26-11-2020]

Case BriefsCOVID 19Tribunals/Commissions/Regulatory Bodies

National Green Tribunal (NGT): Coram of Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel (Chairperson) and Sheo Kumar Singh (Judicial Member), Dr Satyawan Singh Garbyal and Dr Nagin Nanda (Expert Members), while addressing the issue and considering the ban on the use of firecrackers observed that:

Celebration by crackers is for happiness. It is not to celebrate deaths and diseases. Happiness of few at the cost of life of others is not the value in Indian society which stands for happiness and well-being of all.

Issue

Remedial Action against pollution by use of firecrackers aggravating the menace of COVID-19 pandemic, posing a higher danger to the lives and health of the vulnerable groups.

Current Restrictions of Firecrackers

Bench noted that considering the potentially harmful consequences of burning crackers amidst COVID-19 pandemic situation and approaching winter, the State of Odisha, Rajasthan, Sikkim, NCT of Delhi (DPCC) and UT Chandigarh prohibited sale and use of firecrackers to protect the vulnerable groups like elderly, children, persons with co-morbidities and others.

Tribunal also placed reliance on the Technical Expert Committee that prohibition on firecrackers is a necessity to avoid the harmful health impact on account of the bursting of crackers, aggravating COVID during increased pollution.

Calcutta High Court’s decision in Anasua Bhattacharya v. State of W.B., WPA No. 1984 of 2020, was also noted wherein the Court has banned firecrackers.

State of Tamil Nadu

State of Tamil Nadu submitted that banning of crackers will affect the livelihood of the manufacturers and workers and the same was justified.

State of Punjab

Punjab claimed that air quality in its non-attainment cities was satisfactory and moderate during certain months.

Assam Pollution Control Board also stood by the stand of State of Punjab.

Amicus

Amicus, Raj Panjwani submitted that air pollution increases the risk of mortality from COVID-19.

He referred to various articles and further added that Lung injuries, including the life-threatening acute respiratory distress syndrome and respiratory failure, as well as an acute coronary syndrome, arrhythmia, myocarditis, and heart failure, were shown to be clinically dominant, leading to critical complications of COVID-19.

Recent studies in China, the USA, as well as Europe, indicate that patients with cardiovascular risk factors or established cardiovascular disease and other comorbid conditions are predisposed to myocardial injury during the course of COVID-19. From the available information, it thus follows that air pollution-induced inflammation leads to greater vulnerability and less resiliency, and the pre-conditions increase the host vulnerability.

Nexus between Pollution and COVID-19

Amicus added that with Covid-19, even reduced pollution becomes hazardous. What may be permitted in normal time can also not be permitted during Covid-19. That is the reason for the ban by the States which was never considered without Covid. The States have gone by expert advice in doing so. There is enough material indicting nexus between the pollution and the Covid and that the increased pollution will increase Covid impact.

Tribunal: Decision and Analysis

Bench stated that the Supreme Court’s decision in regard to ‘Firecrackers’ does not involve the impact of COVID-19, due to which it makes necessary for the tribunal to proceed further.

Financial loss or loss of employment cannot be a consideration not to remedy the situation affecting lives and health of the citizens by pollution, aggravated by Covid.

Further, the bench emphasised that

“while it is true that any restriction on the sale and use of crackers may affect the business and employment, at the same time if the use of crakers results in pollution and affects life and health of the citizens and the environment, such use may have to be restricted/prohibited to effectuate ‘Sustainable Development’ principle of which ‘Precautionary’ principle is a part, as per the mandate of Section 20 read with Section 15 of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010.”

In view of the above stated, Tribunal stated that if authorities do no exercise its jurisdiction, the Tribunal has to exercise its jurisdiction.

Right of trade is not absolute and is to be subject to the ‘Sustainable Development’ principle, which is part of Right to life.

Relevant SC directions and Observations

In Arjun Gopal v. Union of India(2017) 1 SCC 412it was noted that air quality standards in Delhi are from ‘poor’ to ‘severe’ during winter resulting in the potential of diseases. Directions that were issued in the said decision were:

  1. Suspend all such licenses as permit sale of fireworks, wholesale and retail, within the territory of NCR.
  2. The suspension shall remain in force till further orders of this Court.
  3. No such licenses shall be granted or renewed till further orders.

The above directions were modified in the following Orders:

Arjun Gopal v. Union of India(2017) 16 SCC 280, It was noted that, the health of the people has to take precedence over any commercial or other interests, graded regulation of firecrackers was necessary which would eventually result in prohibition. Accordingly, directions were issued to restrict the temporary licenses to 50%, pending further consideration.

Supreme Court in Arjun Gopal v. Union of India, (2019) 13 SCC 523, while banning certain categories of firecrackers and directing regulation of the remaining, directed that on Diwali days or other festivals, firecrackers will be used strictly between 8 p.m to 10 pm only with different timings for some other festivals.

In the Supreme Court’s decision, the scope of the precautionary principle, even in absence of scientific certainty, was considered, apart from the contention of economic considerations, as a bar to remedy pollution.

In view of the data of CPCB, Tribunal stated that it is not possible to accept that in the State of Punjab ar quality is satisfactory or moderate everywhere in November. Bench stated that it needs a uniform yardstick needs to be applied based on objective criteria of air quality in the context of COVID-19 pandemic and associated adverse health impacts.

Green Firecrackers

While bursting of green firecrackers for the duration of two hours on festival days may be allowed in areas with moderate and below air quality, where not otherwise prohibited by authorities/Courts, there has to be total ban where air quality is poor and above.

With regard to the submission of States to not impose the ban of firecrackers or green crackers on festival days for 2 hours is justified where air quality is moderate and below but not where air quality is poor and above which may result in deaths and diseases.

Bench stated that to States/UTs falling in NCR and where 122 non-attainment cities are located, tribunal proposes to issue directions in rem applicable to all States/UTs.

Since air pollution aggravates COVID-19, not only crackers are to be banned/restricted depending upon air quality, all States/UTs, PCBs/PCCs must take special initiative to contain air pollution by regulating all other sources to pollution, particularly during COVID-19.

Conclusion & Directions

Tribunal in view of the above discussion held that a case is made out for issuing directions for banning the sale and use of firecrackers during November 9 to 30 in areas where air quality is ‘poor’, ‘very poor’ and ‘severe’.

Following are directions:

  • Total Ban against sale or use of all kinds of firecrackers in the NCR from midnight of November 9-10, 2020 to the midnight of November 30-December 1, 2020, to be reviewed thereafter.
  • Direction (i) will also apply to all cities/towns in the country where the average of ambient air quality during November (as per available data of last year) fall under ‘poor’ and above category.
  • Cities/Towns where air quality is ‘moderate’ or below, only green crackers be sold and the timings for use and bursting of crackers be restricted to two hours during festivals, like Diwali, Chatt, New Year/Christmas, etc. as may be specified by the State concerned. If nothing is specified by the State, timing will be 8 to 10 pm on Diwali and Gurupurb, 6 am to 8 am on Chatt and 11.55 pm to 12.30 am during Christmas and New year eve (which have yet to come and do not fall in November but if the ban continues) and not otherwise.
  • At other places, ban/restrictions are optional for the authorities but if there are more stringent measures under orders of the authorities, the same will prevail.
  • All States/UTs/PCBs/PCCs may initiate special drives to contain air pollution from all sources in view of the potential of aggravation of Covid-19.
  • States/UTs Chief Secretaries and DGPs may issue and circulate an appropriate order in above terms with appropriate enforcement guidelines to all the District Magistrates and Superintendents of police, PCBs/PCCs.
  • CPCB and the State PCBs/PCCs may regularly monitor the air quality during this period which may be uploaded on their respective websites.

Matter to be listed on 1-12-2020.[Tribunal on its own Motion v. Ministry of Environment, Forest & Climate Change; 2020 SCC OnLine NGT 860; decided on 09-11-2020]


Also Read:

NGT | Whether use of firecrackers be banned in Delhi-NCR from 7th November to 30th November, 2020 in public interest? Tribunal to decide

Cal HC | No sale or purchase of firecrackers in any form: State to ensure that there is no use of firecrackers during Diwali celebrations & Kali Puja

Case BriefsCOVID 19Tribunals/Commissions/Regulatory Bodies

National Green Tribunal (NGT): The Bench of Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel (Chairperson) and Justice Sheo Kumar Singh (Judicial Member), Dr Satyawan Singh Garbyal and Dr Nagin Nanda (Expert Members), issue notice to consider whether the use of firecrackers may be banned for the period from 07-11-2020 to 30-11-2020 in the interest of public health and environment.

Issue raised in the present application is in regard to the remedial action against pollution by the use of firecrackers against pollution by use of firecrackers in NCR during the time air quality is unsatisfactory with potential of severity of COVID-19 pandemic.

Present application has been filed in reference to the statement by Delhi’s Health Minister and Union Health Minister that during the festive season there will be rise on COVID cases due to air pollution. Further, it was added that the use of ‘green crackers’ won’t be a remedial option in view of the present situation.

“The smoke will choke and may create gas chamber like situation. It will lead to poor visibility, hazy conditions and asphyxia.”

Supreme Court had considered the issue in regard to firecrackers in light of right to clean environment in the.

In Arjun Gopal v. Union of India(2017) 1 SCC 412it was noted that air quality standards in Delhi are from ‘poor’ to ‘severe’ during winter resulting in the potential of diseases. Directions that were issued in the said decision were:

  1. Suspend all such licenses as permit sale of fireworks, wholesale and retail, within the territory of NCR.
  2. The suspension shall remain in force till further orders of this Court.
  3. No such licenses shall be granted or renewed till further orders.

Arjun Gopal v. Union of India, (2017) 16 SCC 280, It was noted that, the health of the people has to take precedence over any commercial or other interests, graded regulation of firecrackers was necessary which would eventually result in prohibition. Accordingly, directions were issued to restrict the temporary licenses to 50%, pending further consideration.

Supreme Court in Arjun Gopal v. Union of India, (2019) 13 SCC 523, while banning certain categories of firecrackers and directing regulation of the remaining, directed that on Diwali days or other festivals, firecrackers will be used strictly between 8 p. to 10 pm only with different timings for some other festivals.

In Supreme Court’s decision of Noise Pollution (V), In Re., (2005) 5 SCC 733, directions were issued with regard to the noise level of the crackers.

It has been stated in the present application that the above-cited Supreme Court decisions do not address the COVID-19 situation wherein the adverse effect may be so that the number of deaths may increase along with the number of diseases.

It has been added that several reports in public domain state that the air quality of Delhi is deteriorating and further deterioration may give rise to an increase in COVID cases.

Since the firecrackers emit poisonous gases like SO2, NOX, CO as well as the metal besides creating noise. In the given climatic conditions, this may result in respiratory/pulmonary diseases, diabetic, hypertension and other diseases.

Experts have also opined on clear nexus of air pollution with COVID-19. With increased air pollution, virus can cause more damage.

On noting the above stated, Tribunal issued notice to the MoEF&CC, CPCB, DPCC, Police Commissioner, Delhi, Governments of Delhi, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan on the question whether the use of firecrackers may be banned for the period from 07-11-2020 to 30-11-2020 in the interest of public health and environment.

Bench requested Raj Panjwani, Senior Advocate along with Advocate Shibani Ghosh to assist the Tribunal as amicus.

Matter to be listed don 05-11-2020.[Indian Social Responsibility Network v. Ministry of Environment, Forests & Climate Change;  2020 SCC OnLine NGT 858, decided on 02-11-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: A Division Bench of Vipin Sanghi and Rajnish Bhatnagar, JJ., in regard to Triple Talaq observed that,

Prima facie it appears that the object of Section 4 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019 is to discourage the age-old and traditional practice of pronouncement of talaq by a Muslim husband upon his wife by resort to talaq-e-biddat.

Issues in the instant petition have been pending for consideration before the Supreme Court in WP (C) No. 994 of 2019.

In view of the above, Bench stated that since the matter is pending before the Supreme Court, hence it would wait for the judgment of the Supreme Court.

Petitioners Counsel, Tarun Chandiok and Naseem Ahmed had moved the present application with the prayer that pending the consideration of the petition, all FIRs registered under Section 4 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019 be stayed.

Substantial Question of Law

Further, it added to its submissions that the minimum number of Judges who should sit for the purpose of deciding any case involving substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the constitution, or for the purpose of hearing any reference under Article 143 should be five.

Bench rejected the above-stated submission stating that there is no provision either in the Constitution or in any other law which required this Court to place the matter before a Larger Bench at this stage.

Section 4 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019

Bench noted that the present petition is not in the nature of a Public Interest Litigation. Hence Court denied invoking Section 4 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019.

Section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019

Petitioner also submitted that Section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019 declares the practice of triple talaq as popularly known, to be void and illegal.

What does the said provision state:

“any pronouncement of talaq by a Muslim husband upon his wife, by words, either spoken or written or in electronic form or in any other manner whatsoever, shall be void and illegal”. Section 2(c) defines talaq to mean “talaq-e-biddat or any other similar form of talaq having the effect of instantaneous and irrevocable divorce pronounced by a Muslim husband”.

Triple Talaq

Petitioner’s Counsel also added to its submissions that once triple talaq has been rendered void and illegal, there is no justification for criminalizing pronouncement of triple talaq, since such triple talaq would have no legal effect on the status of the Muslim Marriage.

Since it is of no consequence and does not end the marital status of the wife – who may be subjected to triple talaq, there is no purpose of penalising the said Act. Section 4 of the said Act provides “any Muslim husband who pronounces talaq referred to in Section 3 upon his wife shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 3 years and shall also be liable to fine.”

Counsel relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1 and Behram Khurshid Pesikaka v. State of Bombay, (1955) 1 SCR 613.

Bench held that,

“Legislation is presumed to be valid, unless it is declared to be invalid, or unconstitutional by a Competent Court, and is struck down.”

Court observed that the prima facie it appears that the object of Section 4 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019 is to discourage the age-old and traditional practice of pronouncement of talaq by a Muslim husband upon his wife by resort to talaq-e-biddat i.e. triple talaq.

Purpose of Section 4 appears to provide a deterrent against such practice.

Merely because triple talaq has been declared to be void and illegal, it does not mean that the legislature could not have made the continuation of such practice an offence.

High Court in view of the above discussion, did not grant any interim relief. [Nadeem Khan v. Union of India, 2020 SCC OnLine Del 1336, decided on 13-10-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: A Division Bench of Rajiv Sahai Endlaw and Asha Menon, JJ., dismissed an application filed under Section 151 CPC expressing surprise that advocates moved the application seeking the legal opinion of the Court.

The present application was filed invoking Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 by the appellant, respondents 3 and 5 seeking clarification on the following:

“Whether the share in the property received by a son on the partition of a HUF is “HUF” or “individual” in his hands?”

Bench stated that “neither Section 151 CPC nor any other provision of law vests in this Court, acting as the Company Appeal Court, advisory jurisdiction.”

Court was surprised to note that the advocates are moving applications seeking the legal opinion of the Court. The application is thoroughly misconceived.

Dismissing the matter, Court added that,

“one of us (Justice Rajiv Sahai Endlaw) will be demitting office on 13th August, 2021 and the advocates are at liberty to approach him for advice at that time, by deferring the execution of the sale deed till then!”

Advocate Lalit Gupta stated that he did not even sign the application and his name has just been added without consulting him. [Balraj Kishan Gupta v. Panna Lal Giridhar Lal (P) Ltd., 2020 SCC OnLine Del 1265, decided on 18-09-2020]

Hot Off The PressNews

The Press Council of India (PCI) has taken Suo Motu cognizance of the alleged attack by a mob on three journalists, including a female reporter from Caravan magazine who were reportedly beaten, and threatened in North East Delhi on 11.08.2020 while they were covering news.

A Report has been called for from the Chief Secretary, the Commissioner of Police and the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Delhi.


Press Council of India

[Press Release dt. 25-08-2020]

Case BriefsCOVID 19District Court

District Court, Saket, Delhi: Raj Kumar Chauhan, J., directed “Miniso” to pay the rent arrears for the lockdown and post lockdown period stating that the company has no dearth of money as the company has been operating almost 10 similar premises on rent in Delhi successfully.

Lease

Allegations placed by the petitioners are that they had leased their property to respondent i.e. Miniso Life Style Private Limited.

Monthly Rent

Monthly rent of the leased out property was Rs 9,75,000/- plus GST per month and the same was to be paid in equal proportions to lessor 1, 2 and 3 as per the agreement signed between the parties.

Head of Business Development of Miniso i.e. respondent asked the petitioner to consider the waiver of rent for the time period of lockdown — April, 2020 to May, 2020.

Further, the petitioner informed the respondent that as per clause 12 of the agreement i.e. Force Majeure Clause was not applicable to the existing circumstances and respondent cannot take unjust and wrongful benefit of said clause.

Though the petitioners agreed to waive the penal interest on the delayed payment @18% p.a. but the respondent continued to threaten for creating third party interest in the demised premises.

Petitioners were represented by Counsels Gaganmeet Singh Sachdeva, Sumit Thakur and Counsel for the respondent was Akash Tyagi.

Legal Notice

Petitioners had to in view of the above circumstances send a legal notice for recovery of rent and arrears on 23-05-2020.

Later the respondent sent a proposal of paying 70% of the arrears of rent for the month of April and 90% of the rent for June and July, 2020.

Petitioners in good­faith and trust sent the invoices of the rent for the above stated months and requested the respondent to pay the payment after deducting 15% rebate for arrears of rent for April, May, alongwith rent of June and July.

Despite sharing the invoice the respondent did not clear the arrears of rent and stopped taking calls from the petitioners.

In view of the above circumstances, the present petition was filed.

Respondents contention was with regard to the maintainability of the petitions stating that Clause 12 of the Lease Deed provides eventualities wherein in case the demised Premises is, whether fully or partially, destroyed or damaged by any Act of God, such as by flood, earthquake, storm etc. save and except fire, becomes unfit for occupation or use, the rent payable by the respondent shall be suspended till such time as the Demised Premises is once again rendered fit for use and occupation by the respondent.

Counsel for the Petitioners relied upon the decision in, Sona Corporation India (P) Ltd. v. Ingram Micro India (P) Ltd., O.M.P (COMM.) 249/2018 and Ramanand v. Dr Girish Soni, R. C. Rev. No. 447 of 2017.

The above two cases were cited with respect to the contentions that Court under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act can direct the payment of rent due as well as future rent in the same manner as the Court can grant in a civil suit under Order 39 Rule 10 CPC.

Adding to the above, the latter case was relied upon to rebut the respondent’s claim for waiver of rent.

Decision

Bench on perusal of the referred provisions and sections of Arbitration Act and CPC held that the respondents are directed to pay admitted rent to the petitioner for the period which has not been paid for the leased premises alongwith future payment also be paid as per the lease deed.

Further, adding to its analysis of the facts, Court stated that on perusal of the force majeure clause in the agreement, it can be stated that the lessee is entitled to suspension of the rent only if the property has been damaged or destroyed by any force Majeure event.

Admittedly, the property in question has not been damaged/destroyed in force majeure event.

Hence, in view of the law laid down by Delhi High Court in the decision of Sona Corporation India (P) Ltd. v. Ingram Micro India (P) Ltd., O.M.P(COMM.) 249/2018 and Ramanand v. Dr Girish Soni, R. C. Rev. No. 447 of 2017, Court concluded its decision stating that,

“mere temporary non-use of the tenanted premises by the respondent and yet being in power and possession of the premises in view of the temporary lockdown due to the COVID-19 Pandemic, the said event cannot be covered under the force Majeure clause of the lease agreement.”

Therefore, the respondent cannot claim waiver of rent.

Hence the Court is empowered under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act to order payment of arrears of rent for the lockdown period and also post lockdown period.

In view of the above terms, petitions were disposed off. [Uma Sharma v. Miniso Life Style (P) Ltd., 2020 SCC OnLine Del 979, decided on 06-08-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: Prathiba M. Singh, J., noted that Delhi University has now launched an online portal through which the students can obtain their digital degree certificates.

The above information came after a series of hearings in the matter.

Petitioners’ grievance was that they wished to pursue their post graduate medical education in USA and for the said purpose they required their degree certificates, however the same were not issued by Delhi University on the ground that the contract with printer had expired.

Court on 23-07-2020 had directed DU to come up with a protocol for issuance of digital degree certificates. On 4th August, Court appointed a committee for the said purpose.

The committee submitted a sample digital degree certificate and on perusal of the Court is satisfied.

Further, the Court added that the digital degree certificates are duly verified by two officials of the DU and digitally signed by the Authorised Officer of the DU, hence the same would satisfy the petitioners’ purpose.

Bench directed that the digital degree certificates for all the petitioners shall be issued by e-mail on or before 13-08-2020.

Adding to the above, Court noted that DU has now activated the online portal for issuance of digital degree certificates being www.digicerti.du.ac.in, wherein the students have to register themselves and give their details including their academic qualification, name of their college, etc. Upon the same being completed by the students, the digital degree certificates for the students shall be issued within a maximum period of one week, after completing the verification, etc.

Court also directed MEITY/Digilocker and DU to file an affidavit regarding what steps have been taken to ensure that the data is made available to students through DigiLocker.

Another aspect to be looked into by DU is whether mark sheets and transcripts of students can also be issued digitally.

Matter to be listed on 07-09-2020. [Dhritiman Ray v. University of Delhi, 2020 SCC OnLine Del 977, decided on 07-08-2020]


Also Read:

Del HC | “No reason why DU should not adopt technically advanced methods”; Court suggests DU to issue degree certificates online through email

Del HC | Obtaining a degree should have been a cause of celebration, but turned into a nightmare; Court constitutes committee to finalise the process of issuing digital degree certificates to DU students

Hot Off The PressNews

Supreme Court: The Government of NCT of Delhi has filed the affidavit in the plea challenging the conduct of final year exams amidst COVID-19 crisis and has said that it took the decision to cancel the conduct of examinations as

“In such peculiar circumstances, the students did not get the kind of preparation needed to attempt a full-fledged examination.”

The Affidavit states that best efforts were made to conduct online classes in Universities, but the reality of our digital divide is that online classes are not accessible equally by all. It further states that the completion of the teaching-learning process is fundamental to the conduct of regular examinations.

“During this extremely tough period, regular physical classes got completely interrupted. The students had no access to study material and the college libraries were closed, although getting access through online mode.”

Narinder Passi, Director of Higher Education, filing the affidavit on behalf of Delhi, stated that Deputy Chief Minister/Higher and Technical Education Minister of the National Capital Territory of Delhi had, in his decision dated 11.07.2020, asked all Delhi State Universities to cancel all written online/offline semester examinations including final year examinations. Universities were also advised to devise alternative assessment measures to promote students of intermediary semesters and grant degrees to students of final semesters. Vice chancellors of few Universities were, however, of the view that final semester exams should still be conducted, even if other semester exams were cancelled.

Submitting the status of the conduct of examinations in the State, the Director of Higher Education states that while GGSIP University and Delhi Pharmaceutical Science and Research University are devising mechanism for assessment to award marks to final year students, the other six Universities have completed the final year Examination by online mode.

Regarding the decisions of certain State Governments to cancel the Final Year exams, UGC has, in it’s affidavit, stated that the said decision is contrary to UGC Guidelines and encroaches on Parliament’s power under Entry 66 of List I of Schedule VII to coordinate and determine the standards of higher education.

UGC has also emphasised on the need to conduct the examinations as it is the crucial step in the academic career of a student.

“… it would be irrational to exempt students from final year/terminal semester examinations and to graduate them based on their past performance.”

Final Year Student Yash Dubey, who has also challenged the Revised Guidelines, along with 31 other students,  in his rejoinder, submitted that

“it is baffling to note that just one semester of examination will be determinative of the integrity and value of a degree for which students worked hard for six (for three years course) and to ten semesters (for five year course),…”

When the Court heard the matter on July 31, 2020, Senior Advocate Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, appearing for Yash Dubey, told the Court that Heavens will not fall if exams are not conducted.

The Court is set to hear the matter tomorrow i.e. on August 10, 2020.


ALSO READ


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COVID 19Hot Off The PressNews

As reported by media reports, use of “hookah” in public places has been banned by Delhi Government to prevent the spread of COVID-19.

The use of hookah with or without tobacco in public places including restaurants, bars, etc. has been prohibited.

“Smokers may also already have lung diseases or reduced lung capacity which would greatly increase the risk of serious illness.”

According to the order, Smokers are likely to be more vulnerable to COVID-19 as smoking means the fingers are in contact with the lips which increases the possibility of transmission of the virus, the health department said in an order.

Mouthpieces and hoses used for smoking could facilitate the transmission of COVID-19 in communal and social settings, hence the use of hookah has been prohibited in Delhi.


[Source: Economic Times]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: A Division Bench of D.N. Patel, CJ and Prateek Jalan, J., held that as and when any advocate approaches the Court with regard to the inclusion of “Advocates” in the definition of “Professionals” under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006, the same could be entertained on merits.

A Public Interest Litigation was filed wherein the grievance was the non-inclusion of the advocates in the definition of the word “professionals” under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006.

Purpose of the petition was the welfare of the advocates as a class so that the benefits which flow from the inclusion under the Act, 2006 are made available to them as well.

Bench declined to entertain the petition.

Adding to its decision, Court stated that such PIL for the benefit of a class of persons can be preferred if the affected persons are unable to access the courts, e.g. the poorest of the poor, illiterates, children, and other classes of people who may be handicapped by ignorance, indigence, illiteracy or lack of understanding of the law.

Advocates are capable enough to approach the Court, if aggrieved.

Hence, as and when any advocate approaches the Court, decision on merits could be taken.[Abhijit Mishra v. UOI, 2020 SCC OnLine Del 927, decided on 29-07-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: Jyoti Singh, J., addressed an issue with regard to revised wages for prisoners in Delhi Prisons.

Purpose of the present petition was to seek directions in order to make payment of wages to the prisoners at revised rates in terms of communication issued by Government of NCT of Delhi.

Sanjay Ghose, ASC appearing for the respondents submitted that an order for the approval of revised wages was passed by the Office of Director General (Prisons) on 23-07-2020, hence the payment shall be made thereof.

On perusal of the above-mentioned Order, Court stated that the convicts would be paid revised wages in terms of the Order passed on 20-06-2019, enhancing the wages and the arrears shall also be disbursed.

Additionally, 25% deduction from wages of the convicts meant for Victim Welfare Fund, has also been suspended till further Orders.

In view of the above, petition was disposed of. [Nitin Verma v. GNCTD, 2020 SCC OnLine Del 870 , decided on 24-07-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: Pratibha M. Singh, J., while addressing the matter with regard to issuance of degree certificates of students from Delhi University held that,

DU ought to take a pragmatic approach in this matter and seriously consider the option of setting up a special cell, which would entertain requests of students on email, for digital-certificates, mark-sheets, transcripts etc. and installing the software necessary for issuance of degree-certificates with security features, to be sent online through email in a timely manner.

Petitioners graduated from Lady Hardinge Medical College, Delhi in 2018 but have not received their degree-certificate till date.

Petitioners submitted that they wished to apply for their residency programmes in the United States and to sit in the USMLE examination. As per the petitioners, the date by which the degree-certificates would have to be uploaded for processing to the ‘My ECFMG’ mobile application would be 15th August, 2020.

Court has repeatedly faced petitions by students of Delhi University seeking their transcripts and degree-certificates.

Students especially doctors providing their services during the COVID-19 pandemic ought not to have been forced to approach this Court for seeking their degree-certificates, especially when they graduated two years ago.

For the above stated grievance by the students, Dean has not responded.

Bench stated that, there is no reason as to why DU should not be adopting technically advanced methods to ensure that the students are not inconvenienced.

Further adding to the above, it was stated that students ought not to be forced to approach Courts for issuance of their mark-sheets, transcripts, degree-certificates etc., which ought to be issued in the natural course within a reasonable time. [Dr Akshita Khosla v. University of Delhi, 2020 SCC OnLine Del 830 , decided on 22-07-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: A Division Bench of D.N. Patel, CJ and Prateek Jalan, J. requested Centre to consider the grievances with regard to disaster management operations in NCR with emphasis on synchronization of the work under the National Capital Region Planning Board Act, 1985 and the National Disaster Management Act, 2005 under a single nodal agency.

Present Public Interest Litigation was filed with following prayers put forward:

  • Issue directions to the centre to appoint a single nodal agency to carry out disaster management operations in the National Capital Region by having powers under the NCRPB Act and DM Act
  • Issue directions to Centre to implement the Regional Plan 2021 under the National Capital Region Planning Board Act, 1985 specifically measures in relation to medical infrastructure and disaster management;
  • Issue directions to Centre/District/State authorities of NCR Region to work in tandem and provide a single set of parameters under a common COVID-19 response plan for the entire NCR region.
  • Issue directions to Centre and other agencies concerned to effectively implement the Regional Plans under Section 7 of the NCRPB Act.
  • Issue directions to the Central / State Governments & District level authorities of NCR region to work in tandem and provide a single set of parameters / directions / guidelines to implement the Study on Health Infrastructure in NCR as published by the NCRPB in December 2015 on its website, which has highlighted several other key gaps in the health infrastructure of the NCR region, in addition to the disparity in terms of health infrastructure between Delhi and other NCR region, resulting in disharmonious development of NCR region resulting in day to day difficulties being suffered by the citizens of the country staying in NCR region outside of Delhi area but contributing to the revenue generation of Delhi.

Petitioner’s counsel submitted that it would suffice for the disposal of the PIL, if the same would be treated as a representation by the respondents and decided in accordance with law and also keeping in mind the provisions of National Capital Region Planning Board Act, 1985 to be read with National Disaster Management Act, 2005.

Bench requested the respondent authorities to consider the grievances as pointed above specially the synchronization of the work under the National Capital Region Planning Board Act, 1985 and the National Disaster Management Act, 2005 under a single nodal agency.

Court added that the said exercise will be carried out as early as possible and practicable.

Petition was disposed of in the above view. [Arjun Narang v. UOI, WP (C) 4115 of 2020, decided on 10-07-2020]

COVID 19Hot Off The PressNews

Whereas, the COVID-19 situation in Delhi is reviewed regularly in the Ministry of Home and Affairs and it was observed that ‘Home Isolation’ without physical contact to monitor the patients may be a reason for increase in spread of COVID-19 infections in Delhi.

To limit the spread of COVID-19, in view of the surge in cases, it is felt that mandatory physical verification of each case under home isolation needs to be carried out by the Surveillance teams of the District Surveillance officers under overall supervision of the District Magistrate.

Thus, in view of the above, LG of Delhi directs all the departments concerned i.e. Revenue and Health and family Welfare:

  • Discontinuation of services of outsourced services of M/s PORTEA which was making only telephonic contact with the Home quarantine individuals with immediate effect.
  • Mandatory physical verification of each case under home isolation is to be carried out by the Surveillance teams of the District Surveillance officers under overall supervision of the District Magistrate.
  • 5 days institutional quarantine of each case under home quarantine is to be made mandatory and thereafter will be sent for home isolation except in cases where symptoms require further hospitalisation.

All CDMOs, District Surveillance officers and District Magistrates to ensure adherence to these directions.


Delhi Disaster Management Authority

[Order dt. 19-06-2020]

COVID 19Hot Off The PressNews

In pursuance of decisions taken by the Union Home Minister Amit Shah during a series of meetings held on Sunday and Monday, June 14-15th, to handle the COVID-19 situation in Delhi, sample testing has been doubled immediately. A total of 16,618 test samples were collected on June 15-16.   Daily collection of samples varied between 4,000-4,500 till 14th June. Reports of 6,510 tests have been received so far and the remaining will be received by tomorrow.

As part of decisions taken by the Union Home Minister at COVID management meetings, door-to-door health survey of residents has been undertaken in 242 Containment Zones of Delhi. Out of total population of 2,30,466 in these zones, complete survey has been carried out of 1,77,692 persons during 15-16th June. Remaining persons will be covered by 20th June.

As part of actions to be completed as directed by Shri Amit Shah to tackle the COVID situation in Delhi, the report of high level Expert Committee headed by Dr. V.K Paul on rates to be charged by testing laboratories has been received in the Union Ministry of Health & Family Welfare and the same has been sent to Delhi Government for further necessary action.  Committee has fixed rate per test at Rs 2,400.

One more action taken as per decisions taken by the Union Home Minister Amit Shah, as per new protocol approved by ICMR, testing for COVID-19 will be done as per new Rapid Antigen methodology w.e.f 18th June. This technique will be much faster & cheaper.  Priority for supply of kits will be given to Delhi and a total of 169 centers have been set up in Delhi for collection & testing of samples.


Ministry of Home Affairs

[Press Release dt. 18-06-2020]

[Source:PIB]