
HIGH COURT NOVEMBER 2024 WEEKLY ROUNDUP | Stories on Amit Malviya defamation case; Shilpa Shetty SC/ST Act; Home Guards; Execution of Arbitral award; and more
A quick legal roundup to cover important stories from all High Courts this week.
A quick legal roundup to cover important stories from all High Courts this week.
The Court held that the petition was effectively a review in disguise, which is barred under Section 362 CrPC and cannot be entertained.
The Trial Court is trying its best to conclude the trial at the earliest, but, many times, many things are not under the control of the presiding officer and all parties concerned shall support the Court in concluding the trial within a reasonable period.
‘The wife was a victim of domestic violence because she had been subjected to physical as well as mental abuse from her husband and no woman can tolerate that her husband is cohabiting with another lady.’
‘Reputation is an essential attribute of personality, and the violation of this right is actionable both as a tort as well as a crime.’
by Aditya Mukherjee* and Jayati Sinha**
In this dynamic course by Legal Expatiate, you will delve into the fundamentals of of new criminal laws and art of contesting matters
To constitute an offence under Section 306 of the Penal Code, there should be instances of abetment under Section 107.
The word ‘he’ in Section 3 of the POCSO Act could not be given a restrictive meaning to say that it referred only to a ‘male’.
By a saving clause, which is construed to be an internal aid for the purpose of construction of a statute, saves the provisions of the old Code/repealed Code, i.e, in the present case, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, for certain categories of investigation, inquiry, appeals, application, etc.
The Export Promotion Council of India is merely a facilitator in promoting exports of pharmaceutical products, and the RMCC is a facilitator for the Customs officials in the enhancement of security; the non-provision of the Notification by them was not a justification for the applicant’s non-compliance.
Mere allegations of affiliation with Dawood Ibrahim do not attract the application of Section 20 of the UAPA; mere sharing of pictures of NDPS-prohibited substances does not attract the provisions of the NDPS.
The Court opined that since the petition was filed after 01-07-2024, it ought to have been filed under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.
The Court stated that “if an FIR is registered prior to 01-07-2023 under the CrPC, it would amount to a pending enquiry/investigation within the meaning of Section 531(2)(a) of BNSS.”
The Court referred to Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote (1980) 2 SCC 559, wherein it was explained that no lexical dexterity nor precedential profusion is needed to come to the realistic conclusion that he who is under the control of the court or is in the physical hold of an officer with coercive power is in custody for the purpose of Section 439, CrPC.
The Delhi High Court opined that true justice, and the ends of justice would not be served by quashing the FIR without a trial, but by conducting a trial to fairly ascertain the real culprit, whether it be the accused or the complainant.
The Court was of the view that the petition and the accompanying application seeking an extension of time were filed and registered in the registry of this Court when CrPC, 1973 was in force, hence, the matter would fall under the scope of Section 531(2)(a) and this petition should be adjudicated through the provisions of CrPC, 1973.
The Delhi High Court stated that a prima facie case of money laundering under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was made against K. Kavitha based on the material placed on record.
“There is clear distinction between rape and a consensual sex. The Court in such cases carefully examined whether accused actually wanted to marry victim or had a malafide motive and had made a false promise to this effect to satisfy his lust, as latter false ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between breach of promise or not fulfilling the promise.”
The Court reiterated that “investigation is the exclusive privilege and prerogative of the police which cannot be interfered with. But if the police does not perform its statutory duty in accordance with law or is remiss in the performance of its duty, the court cannot abdicate its duties on the precocious plea that investigation is the exclusive prerogative of the police.”