Supreme Court: In a long-standing dispute related to the succession to the spiritual office of Sajjadanashin of the Hazarath Mardane-e-Gaib Dargah, raising important questions regarding the nature of the office, the mode of succession, the evidentiary value of nomination, and the limits of judicial interference with concurrent findings of fact, whereby the Karnataka High Court declined interference on the ground that no substantial question of law arose, the Division Bench of M.M. Sundresh and Vipul M. Pancholi,* JJ., affirmed the concurrent findings of the courts below and held that the respondent was validly nominated through Khilafatnama dated 26 February 1981 and the nomination was supported by credible oral and documentary evidence.
The Court held that the entire challenge in hand essentially sought for reappreciation of evidence and reconsideration of factual findings recorded by courts below, which while exercising jurisdiction under Article 136, not allowed unless such findings suffer from manifest illegality or result in grave miscarriage of justice.
Factual Matrix
In the instant matter, the dispute concerns with succession to the office of Sajjadanashin of the Hazarath Mardane-e-Gaib Dargah at Shivasamudram, Karnataka. Peer Pasha Khadri was the original Sajjadanashin. He had earlier appointed his eldest son as Jan-Nasheen (successor-designate). However, eldest son died in 1980 during his father’s lifetime.
Subsequently, on 26 February 1981, in a religious ceremony attended by community elders and other Sajjadanashins, Peer Pasha Khadri (original Sajjadanashin) nominated his grandson (Respondent 1), through a written Khilafatnama, as Jan-Nasheen Sajjada. Upon the death of the original Sajjadanashin in 1988, Respondent 1 assumed the office.
The appellant, being the youngest son of the original Sajjadanashin, set up a rival claim based on documents such as a General Power of Attorney, a handwritten Khilafatnama, and an affidavit.
Two suits were filed, one by the appellant claiming Sajjadanashinship and another by Respondent 1 seeking declaration of his status. The courts below consistently ruled in favour of Respondent 1.
The trial court by judgment dated 14 November 2000 had decreed the suit filed by Respondent 1 and dismissed the appellant’s suit. The First Appellate Court, by judgment dated 7 July 2005, upheld these findings. The High Court by order dated 15 April 2008 dismissed the second appeals under Section 100, Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) and affirmed concurrent findings of the trial court and First Appellate Court.
Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court by way of special leave petitions, which were granted, resulting in the present appeals.
Issue for Determination
Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the second appeals under Section 100 CPC on the ground that no substantial question of law arose, particularly in light of concurrent findings regarding succession to the office of Sajjadanashin of Hazarath Mardanee-Gaib Dargah, Shivasamudram?
Court’s Analysis, Discussion and Findings
At the outset, the Court emphasised on the restricted jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 100 CPC and reiterated that second appeal lies only on the findings which are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or arrived at by ignoring material evidence or by applying erroneous legal principles, and not for reappreciation of facts.
The Court noted that both the trial court and the First Appellate Court had recorded concurrent findings that Peer Pasha Khadri was the original Sajjadanashin and that the office was hereditary in nature, with the incumbent Sajjadanashin possessing the authority to nominate a successor.
The Court proceeded to independently examine the legal character of the office of Sajjadanashin and observed that the Sajjadanashin is not merely an administrator but the spiritual head of the shrine, responsible for preserving the spiritual lineage (silsila), guiding disciples (murids), conducting ceremonies such as Urs and Sandal, and maintaining religious traditions of the Dargah.
Relying on Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai v. Mohd. Hanifa, (1976) 4 SCC 780, and authoritative texts, the Court reiterated that while the office may carry incidental managerial functions, its core remains spiritual. It also recognised the doctrinal distinction between a Sajjadanashin and a Mutawalli, the latter being essentially a secular manager.
The Court asserted that succession to such religious offices is governed by custom, usage, or nomination, depending on the institution. It stated that in the absence of rigid statutory rules, courts must look to established practice.
The Court observed that such office was often hereditary in character; but not governed by strict rules of inheritance; and nomination by the incumbent was a recognised and valid mode of succession. The Court affirmed that the material on record demonstrated that the prevailing practice in the Dargah recognises nomination by the incumbent Sajjadanashin.
The Court undertook a detailed examination of the Khilafatnama and noted that the document was executed in a religious ceremony attended by community members and other Sajjadan tashins, translated from Urdu, Persian and Arabic, and considered alongside oral evidence and reflected the intention of the incumbent to confer spiritual authority upon the respondent.
Addressing the appellant’s contention that the document merely granted Khilafat and did not amount to appointment as Sajjadanashin, the Court held that even if the document did not expressly use the term “Sajjadanashin”, it clearly conveyed the intention of the incumbent to designate the respondent as successor by conferring spiritual authority which necessarily implied succession. The Court emphasised that substance must prevail over form, and the intention behind the document must be gathered from its contents and surrounding circumstances.
The Court placed significant reliance on the testimony of attesting witnesses, particularly those associated with other Dargahs and noted that these witnesses confirmed that the predecessor conferred authority in a public religious ceremony, described the circumstances of execution of the Khilafatnama, and remained unshaken in cross-examination. The Court stated that the appellant failed to elicit any material contradiction or discredit these witnesses.
The Court rejected the appellant’s allegation that the word “Jannasheen” was inserted later is examined in detail, on the ground that the appellant admitted the existence and acceptance of the document, no effective cross-examination of witnesses on interpolation was undertaken and no attempt was made at the appropriate stage to send the document for expert examination.
The Court emphasised on the settled principle that mere suspicion cannot displace a duly proved document. The burden to establish forgery or interpolation lies on the party alleging it, and in the absence of cogent evidence, such allegations cannot be sustained. It further held that at this stage, it is not open to the appellant to seek forensic examination, having failed to do so earlier.
The Court rejected the argument that succession must follow strict hereditary lines as factually unsupported and legally untenable. The Court noted that the appellant himself had earlier admitted that succession could occur through nomination. This admission undermined his later argument that only a living son could succeed. The Court found no evidence of any rigid rule mandating succession only to a son.
The Court critically evaluates the documents relied upon by the appellant and held that a General Power of Attorney merely creates an agency relationship and does not confer succession or independent rights. Such authority is co-terminus with the life of the principal and cannot operate as a mode of succession to a spiritual office. It held that Khilafatnama dated 6 July 1969 did not establish nomination to the office of Sajjadanashin in the manner required by established custom. The Court further observed that appointment to such an important spiritual office would ordinarily be done through a clear and formal act consistent with tradition, not merely through an affidavit. In the absence of corroborative evidence, the affidavit cannot be treated as conferring succession.
The Court noted that the appellant relied on evidence showing that he had participated in the management and ceremonies of the Dargah but held that such participation may indicate involvement in affairs but did not establish legal succession to the office of Sajjadanashin.
The Court further rejected the contention that the respondent resided elsewhere on the ground that both courts below had recorded a concurrent finding of fact that the respondent was also residing at the Dargah location. Thus, such findings cannot be interfered with at this stage.
The Court clarified that the present dispute concerns with succession to the office, not proprietary rights in wakf property, therefore, recognition of a Sajjadanashin did not extinguish the rights of other descendants or beneficiaries.
Court’s Decision
After a holistic consideration of the record, the Court concluded that the respondent was validly nominated through Khilafatnama dated 26 February 1981, the nomination was supported by credible oral and documentary evidence, the appellant failed to establish interpolation or any superior claim, and the concurrent findings of the courts below were well-reasoned and not perverse.
The Court further held that the High Court had correctly exercised its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC in declining to interfere, as no substantial question of law arose. The Court found the entire challenge before it to be an attempt to reopen factual findings, which was impermissible under Article 136 unless there is manifest illegality or grave miscarriage of justice. No such infirmity was found in the present case.
Final Determination
The Court ultimately upheld the validity of nomination-based succession to the office of Sajjadanashin, affirmed the concurrent findings of fact, and clarified the legal distinction between spiritual and administrative roles in wakf institutions. It rejected the attempts to reopen factual findings and disapproved the exclusion of civil court jurisdiction.
[Syed Mohd. Ghouse Pasha Khadri v. Syed Mohd. Adil Pasha Khadri, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 518, decided on 2-4-2026]
*Judgment by Justice Vipul M. Pancholi
Advocates who appeared in this case:
Ms. Pritha Srikumar Iyer, AOR, Mr. Ankit Swami, Adv., Mr. Rabin Majumder, AOR, Counsel for the Appellant
Ms. Pritha Srikumar Iyer, AOR, Mr. Ankit Swami, Adv., Mr. Rabin Majumder, AOR, Mr. Gagan Gupta, Sr. Adv., Mr. Anand Shankar Jha, AOR, Mr. Parvez Rahman, Adv., Mr. Zeeshan Rizvi, Adv., Mr. Girish Bhardwaj, Adv., Mr. Sachin Mintri, Adv., Ms. Nandika Kaushik, Adv., Mr. S. Hari Haran, Adv., Mr. Vikash Singh, AOR, Mr. P.R. Ramasesh, AOR, Ms. Vrinda Bhandari, AOR, Mr. Irshad Ahmad, AOR, Mr. Junaid Ali Khan, Adv., Mr. Shoaib Khan, Adv., Mr. Ashok Kumar, Adv., Mr. Suneet Singh, Adv., Counsel for the Respondents
