Supreme Court: While considering an appeal wherein the appellant challenged the decision of Calcutta High Court’s division Bench whereby it had reversed the Single Judge Bench’s order directing the Local Complaint Committee (LCC) to rehear the appellant’s complaint on an alleged incident of sexual harassment committed by the Vice Chancellor (VC) of the West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences (NUJS); the Division Bench of Pankaj Mithal* and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ., opined that the High Court’s Division Bench did not commit any error in law in restoring the decision of the LCC that the complaint of the appellant was time barred and liable to be dismissed.
However, the Court was of the view that the incidents of alleged sexual harassment on part of NUJS VC may be forgiven but allowed to haunt the wrongdoer forever. Hence the Court directed that the present order of the Court shall be made part of the VC’s resume, compliance of which shall be strictly ensured by him personally.
“It is advisable to forgive the wrongdoer, but not to forget the wrongdoing. The wrong which has been committed against the appellant may not be investigated on technical grounds, but it must not be forgotten”.
Background and Legal trajectory:
The appellant is a faculty member of NUJS, while Dr. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti (Respondent) was appointed as Vice Chancellor of NUJS on 03-07-2019.
As per the complaint dated 26-12-2023, wherein the appellant narrated her ordeal, it was alleged that the Respondent called the appellant in his office in September 2019 with a proposition to go out on dinner and touched her inappropriately. He called her again in October 2019 with the same proposition, to which the appellant expressed her discomfort and stated that she wanted to keep her relationship professional. The complaint further alleged that the Respondent demanded sexual favour from her and threatened her if the offers are declined. In October 2019, the appellant’s promotion was put on hold by the Executive Council. Finally, the Executive Council in its meeting held on 02-04-2022 accepted the recommendations of the Selection Committee and cleared her for promotion. The complaint stated that the in April 2023, the appellant was called upon by the Vice-Chancellor in his office and asked her to accompany on a trip, which the appellant refused. Thereupon, the Respondent threatened the appellant on her career. On 29-08-2023, the appellant received a letter from the Vice-Chancellor removing her as Director, Centre of Financial, Regulatory and Governance Studies (CFRGS).
On 26-12-2023, the appellant lodged a formal complaint with the LCC alleging sexual harassment on part of Respondent. The LCC rejected the complaint as barred by time inasmuch as the last alleged incident of sexual harassment occurred in April 2023; whereas the complaint was filed on 26-12-2023 which was not only beyond the prescribed period of limitation of 3 months but also beyond the extendable period of limitation of 6 months.
Aggrieved with the rejection of her complaint, the appellant approached the Single Judge Bench of Calcutta High Court, whereby the Single Judge quashed the LCC’s order and directed them to rehear the complaint. The Single Judge had held that the appellant was subjected to threat of detrimental treatment in her employment even after April 2023 and as the Vice-Chancellor created an intimidating, offensive and hostile work environment for her, as such the complaint was within time, taking the subsequent event as the last incident of sexual harassment.
The Single Judge’s verdict was challenged before the Division Bench. Via the impugned order, the Division Bench reversed the Single Judge’s decision and held that administrative actions taken against the appellant after April 2023 were collective decisions of the Executive Council, consisting of eminent academicians, jurists and even Supreme Court Judges and were not just personal actions of the Vice-Chancellor. The alleged incidents of harassment, if any, after April 2023, did not constitute sexual harassment and that even the appellant in all her communications to the Chancellor and Executive Council prior to December 2023, had not made any allegation of such sexual harassment against the Vice-Chancellor. Therefore, the LCC’s order of rejection was restored.
Court’s Assessment:
Perusing the matter, the Court had to consider whether the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in non-suiting the appellant on the ground that her complaint was barred by limitation?
In order to answer the afore-stated question, the Court firstly, took note that ‘sexual harassment’ as defined in Section 2(n) of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (POSH Act) includes any one or more of the unwelcome act or behaviour (whether directly or by implication) such as physical contact and advances; or a demand or request for sexual favours; or making sexually coloured remarks; or showing pornography; or any other unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct of sexual nature. Section 3 of the POSH Act describes certain circumstances that would amount as an act or behaviour of sexual harassment, i.e., implied or explicit promise of preferential treatment in her employment; or implied or explicit threat of detrimental treatment in her employment; or implied or explicit threat about her present or future employment status; or interference with her work or creating an intimidating or offensive or hostile work environment for her; or humiliating treatment likely to affect her health or safety.
Therefore, not only the unwelcome act or behaviour in the form of physical contact or advances, a demand or request for sexual favours, making sexually coloured remarks, showing pornography or any unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct of sexual nature but also any other circumstances connected with the act or behaviour of sexual harassment, like implied or explicit promise of preferential treatment in employment, threat about the present and future employment status, interference with work or creating an intimidating, offensive or hostile work environment or subjecting to humiliating treatment which may likely affect her health or safety, would also amount to acts or behaviour of sexual harassment.
Section 9 of the POSH Act states where an aggrieved woman may file her complaint and the limitation period for filing such complaint. As per the provision, it is three months from the date of the last incident. Furthermore, the LCC may for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend the time of making the complaint not exceeding three months, if it is satisfied that the circumstances prevailing prevented the woman from filing of the complaint within the period prescribed.
The Court pointed out that the issue of limitation is ordinarily a mixed question of fact and law and it may not be possible to throw out a complaint at the threshold without collecting material on the factual aspects relating to the limitation. Nonetheless, where a complaint on the simple reading of the averments made therein appears to be patently barred by limitation, it can be rejected at the very first instance on the analogy of Order VII Rule 11 CPC, without even calling the other side to participate in the proceedings.
Taking note of the facts as narrated in the complaint, the Court pointed out the sexual harassment, if any, of the appellant at the hands of Respondent commenced sometime in September 2019, and the last incident in that connection took place in April 2023. Thereafter, no incident of sexual harassment is alleged to have taken place except for the fact that on 29-08-2023, the appellant was removed from the post of Director, CFRGS or that a preliminary inquiry was instituted against her by the Executive Council. The complaint of the appellant from the last incident of sexual harassment of April 2023, was certainly beyond time.
However, the Court had to consider whether the subsequent event of removal of the appellant from the post of the Director, CFRGS or initiation of inquiry by the Executive Council are in any way linked to sexual harassment or amounts to sexual harassment as described under Section 3(2) of the POSH Act.
The last incident of actual sexual harassment took place in April 2023. The subsequent incident of August 2023, whereunder the appellant was removed as Director of CFRGS, with no financial implications arose out of a complaint received from the Central Government undertaking i.e. NFCG wherein appellant was specifically named. the action of removal was taken independently on the basis of the complaint of NFCG. Therefore, the incident of removal of appellant as the Director of CFRGS could not be attributed as an act of sexual harassment in connection with the previous incidents.
The Court further found that actions taken against the appellant in August 2023, were administrative in nature and did not create a gender based hostile environment, and hence, fall short of being actions amounting to acts of sexual harassment. The Court did not find any direct link between the last incident of sexual harassment which happened in April 2023, and those referred to subsequently in August 2023 or December 2023.
The Court stated that alleged act of harassment of April 2023, was a complete act in itself and had not continued thereafter. The administrative measures of August 2023 were independent and were collective decisions of the NFCG and the Executive Council which cannot be solely attributed to the Vice-Chancellor. The appellant, in addressing her grievances to the Chancellor, had not made any mention whatsoever of the sexual harassment which may have taken place in August 2023 onwards.
The Court further pointed out that the appellant, in filing the complaint to the LCC, also moved an application for condonation of delay stating that there were “mitigating circumstances” which she had attempted to resolve within the institution and when she failed, she then filed the complaint. “The very fact that the appellant was conscious of the fact that her complaint was delayed, proves that she herself treated the act of April 2023, to be the last incident of sexual harassment and as such, tried to explain the delay in filing the complaint”.
Therefore, with the afore-stated assessment, the appeal was dismissed.
[X v. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1964, Order dated 12-9-2025]
*Order by Justice Pankaj Mithal
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For Petitioner(s): Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Sr. Adv. Mr. Rishad Ahmed Chowdhury, AOR
For Respondent(s): Ms. Madhavi Divan, Sr. Adv. Mr. Satya Ranjan Swain, Adv. Mr. Vishnu Kant, AOR Mr. Ankush Kapoor, Adv. Mr. Kautilya Birat, Adv. Ms. Aandrita Deb, Adv. Ms. Rajnandini, Adv. Mr. Vishwadeep Chandrakar, Adv. Mr. Aayush Gupta, Adv. Mr. Kunal Chatterji, AOR Ms. Maitrayee Banerjee, Adv. Mr. Varij Nayan Mishra, Adv. Mr. C. K. Rai, AOR Mr. Vinay Kumar Gupta, Adv. Mr. Sumit Panwar, Adv.
