Delhi High Court: In a petition was filed by the petitioner assailing the communication issued by the Deputy Inspector General, CISF, Ministry of Home Affairs, whereby the offer of appointment issued to him for the post of Constable/DCPO was withdrawn on the ground that he was declared “unsuitable for employment in CISF”, in view of a pending criminal case, Om Prakash Shukla, J., held that in matrimonial disputes wherein the petitioner is not the main accused and is a collateral accused, the mere inclusion of his name in the FIR should not be a bar for seeking public employment, without any explained overt act attributable to him.
The facts of the case are such that CISF began its recruitment drive for Constable/DCPO posts in January 2023. The petitioner successfully cleared every stage, physical tests, driving test, written exam, and medical examinations. On 31-12-2023, he received his appointment letter and reported for training at the CISF Regional Training Centre, Bhilai, in March 2024. At this stage, the petitioner disclosed that an FIR had been registered against him in 2021 under Sections 498-A, 323 and 506 IPC, on the complaint of his sister-in-law. The main accused was his brother; the petitioner was implicated only as the brother-in-law. Despite this context, the Standing Screening Committee halted his training and withdrew his offer of appointment by an order dated 03-09-2024 recording that upon scrutiny by the Standing Screening Committee and considering the directions of the Ministry of Home Affairs, the petitioner had been found “unsuitable for employment in CISF”. Thus, the present petition was filed.
Counsel for the petitioner argued that the Ministry of Home Affairs’ Office Memorandum (OM) dated 01-02-2012 drew a clear distinction between the main accused and collateral relatives in matrimonial disputes. The collateral relatives like a ‘devar’ or ‘jeth’ are not to be automatically debarred unless there is material showing specific involvement. The petitioner stressed that no overt act was attributed to him in the FIR or charge-sheet and the Courts have repeatedly recognized the misuse of matrimonial provisions to implicate the husband’s entire family.
Counsel for CISF contended that the force guards’ sensitive installations require the highest standards of integrity. Since a charge-sheet had already been filed, the petitioner’s antecedents could not be ignored. Thus, the respondents argued that the Standing Screening Committee was entitled to conclude he was unsuitable, especially given the seriousness of offences under Section 498-A IPC and the need to maintain discipline within the force.
The Court noted that the 2012 OM, issued on this Court’s own directions in Het Ram Meena v. Union of India, 2011 SCC Online Del 1323 specifically deals with offences relating to marriage. It states that candidates “may be debarred if he is main accused and not collateral accused such as devar, jeth etc.” The Bench emphasized that this language was a conscious safeguard against unfair disqualification of collateral relatives routinely dragged into dowry and cruelty cases.
The Court, looking at the FIR and charge-sheet found no allegations of independent conduct against the petitioner. He had been implicated only by virtue of being the complainant’s brother-in-law. The Standing Screening Committee, however, had failed to consider this crucial distinction and instead relied solely on the fact that his name figured in the criminal case.
The Court observed that the policy decision of the respondents provided for a shield or rather an exception to the general rule of debarment and provided that in case a candidate is a collateral accused such a devar, jeth etc. in an FIR relating to offence of matrimonial dispute, the said devar, jeth etc. may not be barred, however, in case the offence is of grave nature like section 340B is added along with section 498A IPC, he may be barred. Thus, the object of the policy is clearly to give some kind of solace to those candidates, who may have been roped in by virtue of family ties, without any substantive role being attributed to him, like the devar or jeth etc.
The Court also said that admittedly, the petitioner is a devar of the complainant and is a named accused in the FIR lodged by his sister-in-law, however this court finds that the impugned letter does not deliberate nor discusses about the said policy decision of the Government of India and has in a way brushed aside this explicit distinction and has proceeded on the sole basis of the petitioner’s name being referred in the FIR, which according to this court is clearly in derogation of the policy decision of the respondents themselves.
The Court remarked that a bare perusal of the FIR or the charge-sheet filed does not disclose any independent or overt act attributable to the petitioner. Thus, the respondents were required to assess the candidature of the petitioner on the anvil of his actual role attributable to him rather than to rush and brand him as unsuitable, on the sole ground of existence of the FIR, which essentially arises from a matrimonial dispute.
The Court noted that both Vikram Ruhal v. Delhi Police, (2023) 3 HCC Del 502 and Baba Singh v State of UP, 2024 SCC OnLine All 8244 underscored the need to protect collateral relatives from being treated as if they had criminal antecedents merely because of their names in matrimonial FIRs. The Bench also echoed the Supreme Court’s caution in Dara Lakshmi Narayana v. State of Telangana, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3682 that “mere reference to the names of family members in a criminal case arising out of matrimonial dispute…should be nipped in the bud.”
Thus, the Court held that the petitioner’s case fell squarely within the protective ambit of the 2012 OM. Since no overt act was attributed to him and he was only a collateral relative, the withdrawal of his appointment was unjustified. Accordingly, the Court quashed the CISF’s order dated 03-09-2024 and restored his appointment, granting consequential reliefs.
[Durvin Kumar v. Union of India, W.P.(C) 12743/2024, decided on 18-08-2025]
Advocates who appeared in this case:
Mr. Sahil Mongia, Ms. Sanjana Samor and Mr. Yash Yadav, Advocates for petitioner
Mr. Umang Chopra, Advocate for respondent
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