Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court: The petitioner (‘husband’), filed the present petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (‘CrPC’) seeking to quash a complaint under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (‘DV Act’) and to set aside the application filed along with the complaint under Section 23 of the DV Act. A Single Judge Bench of M.A. Chowdhary, J., stated that the bar of the period of limitation under Section 468 of CrPC would be applicable only to the penal proceedings under Section 31 of the DV Act seeking punishment for the breach of the protection order or an interim protection order. The Court thus, dismissed the petition, observed that the husband’s plea of the complaint being barred by limitation was misconceived as Section 468 of the CrPC was not applicable to Section 12 of the DV Act.
Background:
The respondent (‘wife’) filed a complaint under Section 12 of the DV Act along with an application under Section 23 of the DV Act, alleging that she was assaulted by the petitioner, thrown out of her matrimonial house on 20-07-2019, and threatened of dire consequences if she came back. She submitted that on 22-07-2019, the husband asked her mother and brother for dowry and that she and her minor son had no source of income and were left to fend for themselves. The husband had committed domestic violence against her, and she was made to suffer cruel acts. But the husband argued that he was falsely implicated in the complaint as well as in the application and contended that the said complaint was time-barred and in repugnance to Section 31 of the DV Act read with Section 468 of the CrPC.
Analysis and Decision:
The Court emphasised that the DV Act was enacted with the object of providing more effective protection to the women’s right granted under the Constitution and to tackle the menace of domestic violence faced by women in our society. The Court acknowledged that a very wide meaning was assigned to the term ‘domestic violence’ as provided under Section 3 of the DV Act, such as physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse, humiliation, repeated threats to cause physical pain, economic abuse, deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources, disposal of household effects, prohibition or restriction to continued access to resources or facilities.
The Court pointed out that different categories of reliefs were provided under the DV Act, like the right to reside in a shared household, protection orders, residence orders, monetary reliefs, custody orders, and compensation orders. These reliefs could be sought either by making an application under Section 12 of the DV Act or by making an application in a pending legal proceeding affecting an aggrieved person before a Civil Court, Family Court or a Criminal Court.
The Court observed that an application under Section 12 of the DV Act could not be equated with a complaint within the meaning of Section 200 of the CrPC or Section 223 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (‘BNSS’). The Court noted that notwithstanding the penal provisions under Sections 31 and 33, the proceedings before the Magistrate under the DV Act were predominantly of a civil nature. The Court opined that where the DV Act or Rules had specifically set out the procedure, thereby excluding the operation of CrPC as contemplated under Section 28(1) of the DV Act, the application under Section 12 could not be treated as a complaint under Section 2(d) CrPC. Similarly, the procedure for taking cognizance set out under Section 190(1) of the CrPC followed by the procedure set out in Chapter XV of CrPC for taking cognizance, would have no application to the proceedings under the DV Act. The Court observed that the husband’s contention wrongly equated filing of an application under Section 12 of the DV Act to lodging of a complaint or initiation of a prosecution, so as to hold that the application ought to have been filed within a period of one year of the alleged acts of domestic violence.
The Court pointed out that the issue was whether limitation as prescribed under CrPC was applicable to the applications or complaints filed under the DV Act. The Court opined that the bar of the period of limitation would be applicable only to the penal proceedings under Section 31 of the DV Act seeking punishment for the breach of the protection order or an interim protection order. Such penal proceedings could not be initiated, if the same were not brought up within the period of limitation as contained in Section 468 of the CrPC or the corresponding Section 514 of the BNSS. But there could be no bar to maintain an application under other provisions including Sections 12 and 23 of the DV Act. The Court relied on Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayanan, (2022) 15 SCC 50, wherein the Supreme Court held that the limitation period under Section 468 of the CrPC did not apply to applications made under Section 12 of the DV Act and that since Section 12 was not akin to a criminal complaint, the procedural safeguards or limitation rules applicable to criminal proceedings (like cognizance under CrPC) did not apply at that stage. The Court referred to Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1158, where it was held that the High Court should exercise its power under Section 482 of the CrPC considering the object of the DV Act with circumspection, while dealing with an application under Section 12(1) of the DV Act and that normally an interference under Section 482 was warranted only in the case of gross illegality or injustice.
Consequently, the Court observed that since the plea of limitation was not tenable in the case, the petition being misconceived and devoid of any merit, was liable to be dismissed.
[Tilak Raj v. Darshana Devi, Crm. (M) No. 864 of 2023, decided on 21-08-2025]
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioner: C. M. Koul, Sr. Adv with A R Bhat, Advocate.
For the Respondent: Ajay Bakshi, Advocate.
Buy Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 HERE
