Delhi High Court: The present petition was filed under Article 227 of the Constitution by VI-John Healthcare India LLP (‘VI-John’) being aggrieved by the order dated 6-2-2025 (‘Second Impugned Order’) passed by the Trial Court, whereby the application seeking condonation of 48 days delay in filing the written statement (‘Application’), in a suit claiming infringement of Trade Mark, copyright, passing off and damages to the tune of Rs 2,50,000 was allowed, subject to payment of Rs 25,000 per day of delay, without considering the grounds contained in the Application and in absence of any serious objection from Dabur India Ltd (‘Dabur’).
A Single Judge Bench of Tejas Karia J., allowed the petition, condoned the delay in filing written statement and set aside First and Second impugned orders, insofar as they imposed costs for delay, stating that the delay in filing the written statement was well within the prescribed 120 day limit and was supported by justifiable reasons stated in VI-John’s Application.
Background:
Dabur had filed a suit for infringement of Trade Mark, copyright, passing off and damages of Rs 2,50,000 alleging use of its packaging and the word “MISWAK” by VI-John. The summons were served on 5-8-2024, and on appearance on 7-8-2024, the Trial Court passed the First Impugned Order directing the written statement to be filed within 30 days and warning of Rs 25,000 per day cost for each day of delay. Subsequently, VI-John discovered that a parallel suit was filed by Dabur before the Saket Court (‘Saket suit’).
After the directions to file the written statement in the First Impugned Order, the Parties made a substantial headway in the settlement discussions, which were already ongoing between them. On 27-9-2024, the Trial Court was informed that the written statement was not filed due to ongoing settlement discussions, and the matter was adjourned. Meanwhile, the Saket suit was also adjourned for finalizing the settlement. VI-John filed the written statement and Application for condonation citing bona fide reasons and referencing the Saket Court’s orders.
In the meantime, the Presiding Officer was transferred, and the case came before a new Presiding Officer by which time Dabur had not filed any reply, leaving the Application uncontested. VI-John also relied on the Saket suit’s disposal on 23-12-2024 by way of settlement and cited precedents where courts imposed costs of Rs 5,000—Rs 10,000 even in cases involving claims exceeding Rs 2 crores.
Despite these submissions and no objection from Dabur, the Petitioner stated that the Trial Court after condoning the delay, imposed costs of Rs 25,000 for each day of 48 days’ delay, which amounted to Rs 12,00,000, without considering the Application’s grounds. VI-John contended that the cost was wholly disproportionate to the Rs2,50,000 damages sought in the suit.
Case Analysis and Decision
The Court observed that considering the facts and circumstances, the Second Impugned Order imposed the cost of Rs 25,000 for each day of delay solely by relying upon the First Impugned Order. The Court pointed out that the Trial Court had also observed that unless VI-John sought review of the First Impugned Order or the same was set aside from a higher Court, the First Impugned Order was final and binding on the Trial Court. Further, the Second Impugned Order was passed without considering the averments made in the Application. The Court pointed out that the reasoning given by the Trial Court was not justified as the First Impugned Order was passed peremptorily on the first date of appearance of VI-John. At the time of passing of the First Impugned Order, there was no delay and the said order only cautioned the Parties about imposition of costs in case of delay. “The said Order was precautionary and deterrent in the nature and not a penalty imposed”.
Further, on the date of passing the First Impugned Order, there was no occasion to consider any delay by the Parties as the time to file the written statement had commenced only on the date of passing of the First Impugned Order.
The Court noted that, there was no absolute bar on the Trial Court to consider the subsequent developments and condone the delay if justifiable grounds were made out in the Application for condonation of delay. The Second Impugned Order did not consider the submissions made by VI-John that the delay was caused as the parties were exploring possibility of amicable settlement, which is evident from the orders passed by the Trial Court as well as Saket Court. The only reason, which was provided in the Second Impugned Order was reliance upon the First Impugned Order.
Further, any application filed by the parties had to be decided on its own merits, independently, and without being influenced or bound by the previous orders passed by the same court in case there were subsequent developments and the circumstances prevailing at the time of passing of the previous order were changed while considering the application at a later stage. Courts must examine the facts and submissions without being influenced by the previous orders passed in a different context; and it should at least examine the grounds made out for delay and cannot brush it aside only on the ground that the previous order was binding.
The Court pointed out that the observations in the First Impugned Order were made so that the Parties are encouraged to comply with the timelines. The Court further noted that when Dabur had not even filed reply to the Application or raised any objection thereto, the Trial Court ought to have considered the fact that the Parties were exploring the possibility of settlement.
The Court further noted that the Trial Court also lost sight of the implications of passing of the Second Impugned Order, which resulted in imposition of the cost amounting to Rs 12,00,000 upon VI-John, whereas Dabur’s main relief in the suit was payment of Rs 2,50,000 by way of damages. Clearly, the cost imposed by the Trial Court in the Second Impugned Order was disproportionate to the main relief sought in the suit. “The Court should always encourage the settlement between the parties and if the parties are exploring the possibility of amicable settlement, the Court should always accommodate and grant time to the parties in accordance with law”.
Further, the Court noted that as the delay in filing of the written statement was only 48 days and well within the outer limit of 120 days as prescribed, it could not be said that there was an inordinate delay on the part of VI-John without any justifiable reason. The reason for delay as mentioned in the Application and submitted before the Trial Court at the time of passing of the Second Impugned Order, was justified. However, the same was entirely ignored by the Trial Court while passing the Second Impugned Order.
In light of the above, both the First and Second Impugned Orders, insofar as they imposed costs for the delay, were set aside.
[VI-John Healthcare India LLP v. Dabur India Ltd. , CM(M)-IPD 15 of 2025 , decided on 31-7-2025]
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioner: Neeraj Grover, Harshita Chawla, Angad Deep Singh & Mohona Sarkar, Advocates.
For the Respondent: Mohd. Sazid Rayeen & Avijit Sharma, Advocates.
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