Supreme Court: The present appeals were filed by MLAs belonging to Bharat Rashtra Samithi (BRS) who had been seeking disqualification of former BRS MLAs from Telangana Legislative Assembly on grounds of defection and had been aggrieved by the delay/inaction shown by the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly. While considering these appeals, the Division Bench of B.R. Gavai, CJ* and A.G. Masih, J., declined to accede to the appellants’ request of deciding the question of disqualification of the defected MLAs stating that, judicial precedents have consistently held that the Speaker is the authority who should decide the issue regarding disqualification at the first instance.
However, in view of specific findings in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651 and Subhash Desai v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 2 SCC 719, the Court deemed it fit to direct the Speaker of Telangana Legislative Assembly to conclude the disqualification proceedings pending against the 10 MLAs pertaining to the present appeals/petition as expeditiously as possible and in any case, within a period of three months from the date of this judgment.
The Court further directed that the Speaker would not permit any of the MLAs who are sought to be disqualified, to protract the proceedings. In the event, any of such MLAs attempt to protract the proceedings, the Speaker would draw an adverse inference against such of the MLAs.
Background and Legal Trajectory:
On 3-11-2023, on the recommendation of the Election Commission of India, the Governor of Telangana issued the notification for General Election to the State Legislative Assembly. Pursuant to the notification, certain BRS candidates filed their nominations. Thereafter, on 30-11-2023, the elections were held, and the results were declared on 3-12-2023. The afore-stated BRS candidates won the election from their respective constituencies and Indian National emerged as the single largest party and formed the Government along with its ally.
The appellants who are themselves MLAs belonging to BRS, alleged that the afore-mentioned BRS MLAs joined INC. Therefore, the appellants instituted separate petitions under Paragraph 2(1) of the Tenth Schedule read with Article 191(2) of the Constitution and Rules 6(1) and 6(2) of the Members of Telangana Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on ground of Defection) Rules, 1986 before the Telangana State Legislative Assembly. The common prayer in all the petitions was for a declaration from the Speaker of the Telangana Legislative Assembly that the MLAs from BRS who joined the INC, be declared as disqualified from continuing as members of the Telangana Legislative Assembly.
Thereafter, aggrieved by the inaction/delay on part of the Speaker in deciding the disqualification petitions, the Appellants filed petitions before Telangana High Court. The single Judge Bench of the Court vide a common order 9-9-2024, asked the Secretary of the Telangana Legislative Assembly to place the disqualification petitions before the Speaker for fixing a schedule of hearing. It was clarified by the Single Judge of the High Court that if nothing is heard within four weeks, then the matter would be reopened suo motu and appropriate orders would be passed.
Taking exception to the order of the single Judge Bench, the Secretary of the Telangana Legislative Assembly preferred intra-court appeals. The Division Bench of the High Court by a common judgment and final order, disposed of the Writ Appeals by setting aside the judgment and order passed by the Single Judge Bench.
Aggrieved with the Division Bench’s verdict, the appellants knocked the doors of the Supreme Court.
Contentions:
Counsels for the appellants submitted that under Rule 7 of the Disqualification Rules, 1986, a copy of the Disqualification Petition is required to be forwarded to the member in relation to whom the petition has been made or the Leader of the Legislature Party to which the member belongs. It was submitted that despite lapse of period of more than 11 months from the filing of disqualification petitions, the statutory requirement as per Rule 7 was not complied with. Since the Speaker was acting in such a lackadaisical manner, the Single Judge of the High Court was therefore completely justified in issuing directions to the Secretary of the Telangana Legislative Assembly to place the matter before the Speaker for fixing of the schedule of the hearing within a period of 4 weeks.
Per contra, the respondents submitted that Court cannot issue timelines to the Speaker for deciding the matter within a particular period. It was contended that the High Court does not have the power of judicial superintendence over the functioning of the Speaker as a Tribunal under Article 227 of the Constitution. The only power of judicial review that is available with the High Court is under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was submitted that while exercising the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court can only examine the decision arrived at by the Speaker.
Court’s Assessment:
Perusing the matter, the Court considered Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651, wherein the constitutional validity of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution was considered. Pointing out that Kihoto Hollohan (supra) has been relied on by both the sides, the Court stated that respondents’ contention that High Court cannot exercise powers under Article 227 of the Constitution, lacked merit.
The Court further referred to Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Manipur Legislative Assembly, (2021) 16 SCC 503, and observed that facts of the instant case are somewhat similar to Keisham Meghachandra (supra).
Referring to several relevant case laws on point, the Court said that in order to curb the evil of defections, the Parliament had found it appropriate to amend the Constitution in 1985 so as to provide for the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. By this amendment, certain changes were made to Articles 101, 102, 190 and 191. Most importantly, the Tenth Schedule which provided for disqualification on the ground of defection, came to be added by the said Amendment Act.
The Court also referred to the debates in the Parliament when Amendment Act of 1985 was being discussed and observed that adjudication of disqualification petitions was entrusted to the Speaker/Chairman because once such a disqualification petition goes outside the control of the House, it might take years and years for the courts to come to a decision due to appeals and further appeals ultimately leading to the matter being forgotten. The Court further observed that during the Parliamentary debates, the issue of fixture of time-limit was discussed and it was suggested that Speaker/Chairman should not be allowed to keep the matter pending for three to four months.
The Court further observed that Parliament decided to entrust the important question of adjudication of disqualification petitions, on account of defection, to the Speaker/Chairman expecting him to decide them fearlessly and expeditiously. “Parliament was conscious of the potential long delays that could arise if the petitions were left to be decided through court proceedings”.
The Court pointed out that while considering the challenge to the constitutional validity of the Tenth Schedule, the Constitution Bench in Kihoto Hollohan (supra), held that the power of the Speaker/Chairman to decide disqualification petitions under Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution is pre-eminently of a judicial complexion. Therein it was also held that the decision of the Speaker/Chairman exercising power under Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution does not enjoy immunity from judicial scrutiny under Articles 122 and 212 of the Constitution, because proceedings of disqualification were not before the House, but only before the Speaker as a specially designated authority. However, in Kihoto Hollohan (supra), it was also held that scope of judicial review under Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution in respect of an order passed by the Speaker/Chairman under Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution would be confined to jurisdictional errors only. Furthermore, in Kihoto Hollohan (supra), the Court did not permit Quia Timet action by the courts in order to prevent the passing of an order which would have the effect of protracting, interfering or delaying the proceedings pending before the Speaker/Chairman.
Taking note of the afore-stated dictums in Kihoto Hollohan (supra), the present Bench pointed out that at that time the Constitution Bench was not expected to anticipate that, in the future, situations may arise where the Speaker/Chairman, would keep the proceedings pending for years together and permit them to die a natural death at the end of the tenure of the members facing such disqualification proceedings. The Court also pointed out that in Subhash Desai (supra), it was held that the Speaker must decide disqualification petitions within a reasonable period.
Coming onto the trajectory of the present case, the Court observed that the Speaker did not even find it necessary to issue notices in the petitions filed by the appellants for a period of more than seven months and only after the proceedings were filed before the Supreme Court, did the Speaker find it necessary to issue notice.
“The question, therefore, that we ask ourselves is as to whether the Speaker has acted in an expeditious manner, when expedition was one of the main reasons, why the Parliament had entrusted the important task of adjudicating disqualification petitions to the Speaker/Chairman”. The Court thus opined that non-issuance of any notice for a period of more than seven months and issuing notice only after proceedings were filed before the Court, or after this Court had heard the matter for the first time cannot by any stretch be envisaged as acting in an expeditious manner.
The Court clarified that it does not possess any advisory jurisdiction, it is for the Parliament to consider whether the mechanism of entrusting the Speaker/Chairman the important task of deciding the issue of disqualification on the ground of defection, is serving the purpose of effectively combating political defections or not? “If the very foundation of our democracy and the principles that sustain it are to be safeguarded, it will have to be examined whether the present mechanism is sufficient or not”.
However, the Court also opined that it will be frustrate the very object of Tenth Schedule if it does not issue any direction in the present case as it will amount to “Permitting the Speaker to repeat the widely criticized situation of ‘operation successful, patient died’”.
The Court further found that the Division Bench of Telangana High Court made in error by interfering in the well-reasoned order of the single Judge Bench, as the order only asked the Speaker to fix a schedule of hearing (filing of pleadings, documents, personal hearing etc.) within a period of four weeks. The single Judge Bench had not even issued any direction to decide the disqualification proceedings within a time-bound period.
The Court further found that there was no occasion for the Secretary, Telangana Legislative Assembly to have challenged the order passed by the Single Judge inasmuch as nothing adverse was found in the said order.
The Court therefore directed the Speaker to decide the disqualification petitions pending before it within a stipulated period. The Court clarified that it is issuing the directions in view of specific findings in Kihoto Hollohan (supra) and Subhash Desai (supra), that the Speaker, while acting as an adjudicating authority in Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution, acts as a Tribunal, and is amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and of Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.
[Padi Kaushik Reddy v. State of Telangana, SLP(C) Nos. 2353-54 of 2025, decided on 31-7-2025]
*Judgment by CJI B.R. Gavai
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For Petitioner(s): Mr. C Aryama Sundaram, Sr. Adv. Mr. Dama Seshadri Naidu, Sr. Adv. Mr. Gandra Mohan Rao, Sr. Adv. Mr. P. Mohith Rao, AOR Ms. J Akshitha, Adv. Mr. J Venkat Sai, Adv. Mr. Eugene S Philomene, Adv. Mr. Zafar Inayat Ganai, Adv. Mr. Rahul Jayapala Reddy, Adv. Mr. Shubhankar Sharma, Adv. Ms. Rohini Musa, Adv. Mr. Abhishek Gupta, Adv. Mr. Vikas Mehta, AOR Mr. Basa Mithun Shashank, Adv. Mr. Anthony Reddy Katakam, Adv. Mr. R.V. Pavan Maitreya, Adv.
For Respondent(s): Mukul Rohatgi, Sr. Adv. Dr. Abhishek Singhvi, Sr. Adv. Mr. T. Rajnikant Reddy, A.A.G. Ms. Priyansha Sharma, Adv. Mr. Lavkesh Bhambhani, Adv. Mr. Aniket Singh, Adv. Mr. Sravan Kumar Karanam, AOR Mr. Gaurav Agarwal, Sr. Adv. Mr. Hitendra Nath Rath, AOR Mr. Kumar Abhishek, Adv. Ms. Laxmi, Adv. Mr. Ravi Shankar Jandhyala, Sr. Adv. Ms. Aarati Sah, Adv. Ms. Diya Purohit, Adv. Ms. Neha Rai, AOR Mr. S. Niranjan Reddy, Sr. Adv. Mr. Mahfooz Ahsan Nazki, AOR Ms. Akhila Palem Rami Reddy, Adv. Mr. Meeran Maqbool, Adv. Mr. Vivek Rajan D.b, Adv. Mr. Sumanth Nookala, AOR Ms. Devina Sehgal, AOR Mr. Kumar Vaibhaw, Adv. Mr. S.uday Bhanu, Adv. Mr. Vineet George, Adv. Mr. Ramesh Allanki, Adv. Ms. Aruna Gupta, AOR Mr. Syed Ahmad Naqvi, Adv. Mr. Ankit Agarwal, AOR Mr. Koustubh Desai, Adv. Mr. Mukesh Kumar, AOR Mr. Yashaswi Sk Chocksey, Adv. Mr. Madhup Kumar Tiwari, Adv. Mr. D. Abhinav Rao, AOR Ms. Megha Shaw, Adv. Mr. Abhisek Das, Adv. Mr. Raghav Bherwani, Adv.
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