Supreme Court: The present writ petition raised, for the first time, an important question concerning the proper interpretation of Section 3 of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 (Inquiry Act), particularly the scope and operation of the first proviso to Section 3(2) in a situation where notices of motion for removal of a Judge was given in both Houses of Parliament on the same day but the notice was not admitted in the Rajya Sabha. A Division Bench of Dipankar Datta* and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ., dismissed the writ petition challenging the impeachment proceeding against High Court Judge in Parliament and held that —
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The first proviso to Section 3(2) of the Inquiry Act applies only where notices given on the same day are admitted in both Houses.
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The Deputy Chairman is constitutionally competent under Article 91 to exercise the powers of the Chairman when the office is vacant.
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The Speaker’s power to constitute a Committee is not dependent upon the fate of a notice in the other House unless both notices are admitted.
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Secretariat of Parliament has only an administrative role and cannot assume a quasi-adjudicatory function.
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Article 32 cannot be invoked to interfere with parliamentary procedure absent infringement of Fundamental Rights.
Factual Matrix
In the instant matter, the petitioner, a sitting Judge of the Delhi High Court, became embroiled in controversy following an incident on 14-03-2025, when a fire broke out at his official residence. During the fire-fighting operation, burnt currency notes were allegedly discovered. Allegations of misbehaviour were thereafter levelled against him.
In accordance with the In-House Procedure adopted by the Supreme Court in its Full Court meeting dated 15-12-1999, the Chief Justice of India constituted a three-member committee on 22-03-2025 to examine the allegations. The committee submitted its report on 03-05-2025, and stated that the allegations were substantiated and warranted initiation of proceedings for the petitioner’s removal. The Chief Justice of India forwarded the report to the President of India and the Prime Minister of India.
Aggrieved, the petitioner approached the Supreme Court, challenging the In-House Procedure, the forwarding of the report, and the report itself. The Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition vide order 07-08-2025.
Meanwhile, during the Monsoon Session of Parliament commenced on 21-07-2025, Members of both Houses initiated proceedings under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. A notice of motion signed by more than 100 Members of Lok Sabha seeking removal of the petitioner was submitted to the Speaker at 12:30 p.m. Between 4:07 p.m. and 4:19 p.m., a similar notice signed by more than 50 Members was submitted in the Rajya Sabha.
The Chairman of the Rajya Sabha informed the House that a similar notice appeared to have been given in the Lok Sabha and, referring to the first proviso to Section 3(2) of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, directed that “the Secretary-General will take necessary steps in this direction.” Later the same day, the Chairman resigned from the office of Vice-President of India.
The Rajya Sabha Secretariat verified the signatures; three out of 62 were found to be mismatched. On 11-08-2025, the Secretary-General of Rajya Sabha scrutinised the notice and recorded a draft decision holding that the notice was “not in order.” The Deputy Chairman, acting under Article 91 of the Constitution due to vacancy in the office of Chairman, concurred with the conclusion and recorded that the notice was “not admitted.”
On 12-08-2025, the Speaker of Lok Sabha admitted the notice received on 21-07-2025 and constituted a three-member Inquiry Committee under Section 3(2) of the Judges (Inquiry) Act. The Committee thereafter issued a memorandum of charges to the petitioner.
Petitioner’s Contentions
The petitioner filed the present writ petition under Article 32, contending that since notices were given in both Houses on the same day, the first proviso to Section 3(2) mandated constitution of a Joint Committee by the Speaker and the Chairman. It was contended that the Deputy Chairman lacked competence to refuse admission of the motion. It was further contended that the unilateral constitution of the Committee by the Speaker was illegal and violative of his Fundamental Rights.
Moot Points
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How should the first proviso to Section 3(2) of the Inquiry Act be construed? Does it require the constitution of a Joint Committee where notices, having been given in both Houses on the same day, is later followed by refusal to admit the motion by the Presiding Officer of one House and admission of the motion by the Presiding Officer of the other House?
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Whether, in view of the office of the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha falling vacant, the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha was competent to refuse admission of the notice of motion?
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What is the effect, if any, of the Deputy Chairman’s refusal to admit the motion on the validity of the Speaker’s action under Section 3(2) of the Inquiry Act?
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Whether the draft decision prepared by the Secretary-General of the Rajya Sabha recording that the notice of motion given to the Chairman is not “in order” justified in law?
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Whether the petitioner is entitled to any relief under Article 32?
Court’s Analysis
The Court observed that the process of removal of a Judge is “indeed a tedious one involving various stages” and is designed as a carefully calibrated constitutional safeguard.
Issue I — Interpretation of the First Proviso to Section 3(2)
The petitioner contended that since notices were given in both Houses on the same day, and the Rajya Sabha notice was not admitted, the Speaker of the Lok Sabha had no authority to proceed. The Court rejected the petitioner’s contention that mere giving of notices on the same day triggers the requirement of a Joint Committee.
The Court held that the first proviso does not address all possible permutations and is confined to only one specific situation, namely, where notices given in both Houses on the same day have been admitted in both Houses.
The Court observed that “the first proviso is not exhaustive but situational in nature. It does not contemplate a scenario where a notice of motion is accepted in one House and rejected in the other.” The Court asserted that the proviso cannot be read as disabling the Speaker or the Chairman from exercising their statutory power unless the exact condition contemplated by the proviso is fulfilled.
The Court cautioned that that adopting the petitioner’s construction would amount to judicial legislation.
“To interpret the said proviso in the manner suggested by Mr. Rohatgi would require us to read into it a disabling consequence… Such an interpretation would amount to judicial legislation, a course we are neither empowered nor inclined to undertake.”
The Court further warned that such an interpretation would render the proviso open to abuse and allow proceedings to be deliberately scuttled by introduction of defective notices in the other House. The Court held that “the proviso cannot be allowed to be used as a weapon for scuttling proceedings or giving a veto to the Houses of Parliament.”
The Court emphasised that the object of the Inquiry Act is to provide a statutory mechanism for investigation of allegations against a Judge and not to frustrate it.
Accordingly, the Court held that the first proviso caters to only one situation, that is, when notices of motion were given in both Houses on the same day and were admitted by both House. The Court further held that “in a case where notices of motion were given in both Houses on the same day, the fact that a notice is not admitted in one House will not necessitate constitution of a Joint Committee and the Speaker or the Chairman, as the case may be, can independently proceed to constitute a Committee.”
Issue II — Competence of the Deputy Chairman
The Court rejected the petitioner contended that the Deputy Chairman lacked authority to refuse admission of the motion and that only the Chairman, as persona designata under the Inquiry Act, could exercise such power.
The Court held that under Article 91 of the Constitution, when the office of Chairman is vacant, the Deputy Chairman performs the duties of the office of Chairman. The Court stated that reading the statute in isolation of the Constitution would be grossly incorrect. The Court stated that the “onerous obligation, nay, duty of the Deputy Chairman, to perform the duties of the office of the Chairman is sacrosanct to the functioning of the Council of States.”
The Court further held that a narrow interpretation of the word “Chairman” in the Inquiry Act, ignoring Article 91, would be unconstitutional and create a constitutional vacuum.
“If we were to read the law in the manner proposed by Mr. Rohatgi, we would be left with a constitutional vacuum which, in the absence of the Chairman… would render the provisions of the Inquiry Act otiose.”
Accordingly, the Court held that the Deputy Chairman was fully competent to consider the notice and refuse admission of the motion.
Issue III — Effect of Deputy Chairman’s Refusal
The Court stated that the Speaker acted only after receiving official communication that the Rajya Sabha notice was not admitted. The Court reiterated that the first proviso to Section 3(2) of the Inquiry Act would come into play only when motions given on the same day are admitted in both Houses.
The Court held that even if the Deputy Chairman’s refusal were assumed to be illegal, it would not retrospectively invalidate the Speaker’s lawful exercise of power. The Court further held that the Speaker, having received official communication that the Rajya Sabha notice was not admitted, was fully empowered to proceed under Section 3(2).
“Even if the refusal by the Deputy Chairman were to be ignored as legally unsustainable, the factual as well as legal position would still remain as it is: that, as on the date when the Speaker acted, there was no admitted motion pending in the Rajya Sabha.”
Accordingly, the Court held that the Speaker’s action did not hinge upon the correctness of the Deputy Chairman’s decision.
The Court also rejected the argument that constitution of a Single-House Committee instead of a Joint Committee caused constitutional and reputational prejudice. The Court reiterated that the Inquiry Act contains elaborate safeguards including framing of charges, opportunity of defence, cross-examination of witnesses, and parliamentary scrutiny by special majority under Article 124(4).
“Reputational injury, howsoever unfortunate, cannot be a ground to subvert a constitutionally sanctioned statutory process.”
Issue IV — Draft Decision of Secretary-General
The Court expressed serious reservations about the about the procedure adopted by the Secretary-General of the Rajya Sabha.
The Court noted that there is no prescribed statutory format for a notice of motion, the Secretariat has no adjudicatory role under the Inquiry Act and the Secretary-General traversed beyond administrative scrutiny and entered into merits of allegations.
“The Inquiry Act does not contemplate a substantive assessment of the merits of the allegations by the Secretariat of a House. The Secretary General’s role was expected to remain confined to administrative scrutiny.”
The Court held that the manner in which the notice of motion was processed at the Secretariat level “does not fully align with the role contemplated under law.” However, the Court clarified that these observations were purely academic and did not affect the validity of the Deputy Chairman’s decision, which was not under challenge.
Issue V — Relief under Article 32
The Court held that Article 32 is confined to enforcement of Fundamental Rights and does not permit issuance of advisory or corrective directions in relation to internal statutory mechanisms of Parliament. Accordingly, the Court held that the petitioner was not entitled to any relief.
“The extraordinary remedy under Article 32 is confined to enforcement of Fundamental Rights and does not extend to issuing advisory or corrective directions in relation to internal statutory mechanisms of the Parliament, where no present or inevitable infraction of any Fundamental Right is evinced.”
Court’s Decision
The Court dismissed the writ petition challenging impeachment proceeding against High Court Judge and held that for above-mentioned reasons no interference is called for.
[X v. Office of the Speaker of the House of People, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 91, Decided on 16-01-2026]
*Judgment by Justice Dipankar Datta
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