Disclaimer: This has been reported after the availability of the order of the Court and not on media reports so as to give an accurate report to our readers.
Delhi High Court: In appeal challenging Single Judge’s order allowing an application under Order VII Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC), whereby the plaint, in a commercial suit seeking permanent injunction against infringement and passing off, was directed to be returned for presentation before the appropriate court, a Division Bench of C. Hari Shankar* and Om Prakash Shukla, JJ., affirmed the impugned judgment and held that the Single Judge’ Judgment that this Court did not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit cannot be faulted.
Factual Matrix
In the instant matter, the appellant is engaged in the business of developing, producing and marketing cotton hybrid seeds and is the registered proprietor of the trademarks “TADAAKHA” and “SADANAND” in Class 31, besides claiming common law rights in the mark “BASANT”. The appellant had, over the years, acquired substantial goodwill and reputation in respect of these marks in the agricultural seed market.
On 03-03-2014, the appellant entered into a non-exclusive co-marketing arrangement with the respondent, permitting the respondent to market and distribute specified cotton hybrid seeds manufactured by the appellant under the aforesaid trademarks. This arrangement was renewed from time to time, the last renewal being the Marketing Agreement dated 01-01-2022, valid till 31-12-2022. Under the agreement, the respondent expressly acknowledged the appellant’s ownership of the trademarks and undertook not to use them beyond the limited scope permitted thereunder.
In September—October 2022, the appellant decided not to renew the Marketing Agreement and communicated the same to the respondent and its distributors. Thereafter, the appellant came to know that the respondent was promoting and accepting advance bookings for cotton hybrid seeds for the ensuing Kharif season under the marks “VEDA TADAAKHA GOLD BG II”, “VEDA SADANAND GOLD BG II” and “VEDA BASANT GOLD BG II”, allegedly in respect of hybrids not produced by the appellant. According to the appellant, such use was outside the scope of the Marketing Agreement and amounted to infringement of its registered trademarks and passing off.
Consequently, the appellant instituted a commercial suit before the Delhi High Court seeking permanent injunction against infringement and passing off. The respondent contested the maintainability of the suit by filing an application under Order VII Rule 10 CPC and contended that no part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court.
The appellant in plain pleaded that the cause of action arose in October 2022 when it learnt of the respondent’s infringing activities; the appellant’s registered office was situated in New Delhi and it ordinarily carried on business there; the asserted trade marks were registered with the Delhi Trade Marks Registry; and the infringing products were available on e-commerce platforms accessible in Delhi.
Accepting the respondent’s objection, the Single Judge directed return of the plaint, leading to the present appeal before the Division Bench.
Moot Points
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Whether registration of the appellant’s trade marks in Delhi could, by itself, confer territorial jurisdiction?
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Whether the Marketing Agreement, executed in Delhi, constituted part of the cause of action for instituting the suit?
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Whether listing of the respondent’s products on IndiaMart or similar platforms gave rise to a cause of action within Delhi?
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Whether the appellant could invoke jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court solely based on its principal office being located in Delhi, notwithstanding that the cause of action arose elsewhere?
Court’s Analysis
The Court reiterated that an application under Order
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Registration of trademarks and jurisdiction
The Court affirmed the view taken by the Single Judge that territorial jurisdiction does not arise merely from the place of registration of a trademark. Relying on Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi, (2006) 9 SCC 41, the Court held that “cause of action arises only when a registered trademark is in use and not when the application is filed for registration of a trademark”, and therefore the appellant could not claim territorial jurisdiction merely because its marks stood registered in Delhi. The Court found no error in the rejection of this plea.
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Marketing Agreement and Cause of Act ion
The Court noted that on close reading of the plaint it is revealed that the cause of action paragraph 49 made no reference to the Marketing Agreement, on the contrary, paragraph 47 of the plaint expressly stated that the suit was limited to infringement and passing off and had sought leave to pursue breach of contract separately.
The Court asserted that the filing of an application under Order II Rule 2 CPC, and the leave granted therein, reinforced the conclusion that breach of the Marketing Agreement was treated as a distinct and separate cause of action. Accordingly, the Court held that the execution of the Marketing Agreement in Delhi could not be pressed into service to confer territorial jurisdiction.
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E-commerce listings and alleged online availability
Applying the law laid down in Banyan Tree Holding (P) Ltd. v. A Murali Krishna Reddy, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 3780, the Court held that reiterated that “mere accessibility of the defendant’s website in Delhi would not enable this Court to exercise jurisdiction”, and that the plaintiff must plead and prima facie show purposeful targeting of customers in the forum state, resulting in injury within that jurisdiction.
The Court noted that in the present case, the listings on IndiaMart and Kalgudi were by third parties, not by the respondent itself, and there was no pleading or material to show sales, delivery, or targeting of Delhi customers. Therefore, the Court held that no part of the cause of action could be said to have arisen in Delhi on this basis.
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Principal office v. subordinate office
On whether the appellant could nevertheless invoke jurisdiction under Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act on the basis that its principal office was located in Delhi, reaffirmed the law laid down in Indian Performing Rights Society v. Sanjay Dalia, (2015) 10 SCC 16 and as explained in Ultra Home Construction v. Purushottam Kumar Chaubey, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 376, the Court held that where a plaintiff has both a principal office and subordinate offices, and the cause of action arises entirely at the place of the subordinate office, the plaintiff “would be deemed to carry on business at the place of his subordinate office and not at the place of the principal office”.
The Court held that the present case squarely fell within this category and merely having a registered or principal office in Delhi did not entitle the appellant to sue in Delhi when no part of the cause of action arose there.
Court’s Decision
The Court found no infirmity in the impugned judgment of the Single Judge and held that —
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no part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court; and
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the plaint had been rightly returned under Order VII Rule 10 CPC.
Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order directing the return of the plaint.
[Kohinoor Seed Fields India (P) Ltd. v. Veda Seed Sciences (P) Ltd., FAO(OS)(COMM) 66/2025, Decided on 03-12-2025]
*Judgment by Justice C. Hari Shankar
Advocates who appeared in this case:
Mr. Saurav Agarwal, Mr. Shantanu Agarwal, Mr. Adarsh Ramanujan, Mr. Kapil Rustagi, Mr. Saurabh Seth, Ms. Chandreyee Maitra, Ms. Allaka M, Mr. Manas Arora, Mr. Raghav Thareja, Mr. Parth Singh and Mr. Ajay, Counsel for the Appellant
Mr. Raj Shekhar Rao, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Kapil Wadhwa, Ms. Sindoora, Ms. Vishakha Gupta, Mr. Wamic Wasim, Ms. Thithiksha Padmam and Mr. Anish Jandial, Counsel for the Respondent