Calcutta High Court
Case BriefsHigh Courts

Calcutta High Court: Moushumi Bhattacharya, J. took cognizance of a petition which was filed praying for quashing an order passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Traffic Department by which Driving Licence of the petitioner was suspended for 90 days from the date of interception.

The documents on record show that the petitioner’s car was intercepted while the petitioner was driving from South City Mall to her residence in New Alipore. The petitioner’s car was intercepted by the Traffic Sergeant (respondent 6) at the Southern Avenue-Lake Gardens interception. The particulars of violation showed that the petitioner was driving at a speed of 62.1 km/hr whereas the speed limit on the particular road was 30 km/hr.

Counsel appearing for the petitioner and the State have made their arguments on the legality of the action of the police to suspend the Driving Licence of the petitioner based on the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the notification issued by the Transport Department of the Government of West Bengal.

The Court discussed the relevant provisions of the Act in detail and observed that only a licensing authority can disqualify a person from holding or obtaining a driving licence or revoke such licence [19(1)(i) and (ii)]. The order of disqualification may also be given by the licensing authority under 19(1A) of the Act. The Court further remarked that since the Motor Vehicles Act gives the power, in no uncertain terms, to the licensing authority and limits the power of the police to disqualify a person or revoke his licence under the Act, the notification issued by the State Transport Department cannot override the provisions of the parent Act.

The Court quashed the impugned order holding that the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Traffic Department did not have the power to suspend the licence of the petitioner. The concerned respondents were directed to release the Driving Licence of the petitioner. However, the Court did not approve of the justification given by the petitioner for the act of over-speeding.

“The excuse for over speeding is no ground at all since the petitioner should have a sufficient eco-system in place and not become a risk to other travelers on the road.”

[Priyasha Bhattacharyya v. State of West Bengal, 2022 SCC OnLine Cal 2051, decided on 19-07-2022]

Advocates who appeared in this case :

Mr Phiroze Edulji, Ms Amrita Panja Moulick, Advocates, for the Petitioner;

Mr Amal Kumar Sen, Mr Jaladhi Das, Advocates, for the State.

*Suchita Shukla, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.

Bombay High Court
Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court: S.G. Mehare, J. allowed an appeal against the order passed by the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation and Judge Labour Court dated July 30, 2001. 

Appellant was a driver with respondent 1 who owned a truck which was insured with respondent 2. He met with a vehicular accident on April 13, 1997, sustained the injury to his femur and toe of the left leg. He sustained 35% physical disability. He was employed with respondent 2 on the day of the accident. He could not work as before the accident. He served the notices to both respondents. However, none of the respondents paid him the compensation. Thus, he filed application under Section 3 and 22 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act 1923 (now Employees Compensation Act 1923) where Commissioner rejected his Claim for the reason that the appellant had already approached the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal and had received the compensation under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 (hereinafter ‘M.V. Act’) making the claim barred under section 167 of the M.V. Act. Hence, the instant appeal.  

The counsel for the appellant argued that Commissioner has misread and misinterpreted section 167 of the M.V. Act. An application under Section 140 of M.V. Act has been excepted from the bar envisaged in Section 169 of M.V. Act and an application for compensation either under the Workmen’s Compensation Act or M.V. Act, is maintainable. 

Counsel for respondent 2 argued that appellant was exercising the remedies simultaneously by suppressing the material facts from the court. 

The point of consideration for the Court was, “Whether the compensation granted under chapter X of the M.V. act forfeits the right of the employee to claim the compensation under section 3 of the 1923 Act as provided under Section 167 of the M.V. Act ?” 

The Court reproduced Section 167 of the M.V. Act  and explained that words in section 167 of M.V.Act, “Without prejudice to the provisions of Chapter X”, are self speaking to interpret the said section that an application decided by the Claims Tribunal under section 140 of the said Act, does not bar the employee from availing remedy for compensation under the 1923 Act on the principles envisaged in the said Act. Reading section 167 would reveal that chapter X of the M.V. Act has no application while opting for the forum to claim the compensation. 

The reliefs granted under chapter X of the M.V. Act would not come in the way of claiming compensation before the Commissioner of Employee’s Compensation or the Claims Tribunal. 

The Court concluded that, Where the employee receives compensation under Chapter X of the M.V. Act, his remedy to seek compensation either under the 1923 Act or the M.V. Act cannot be forfeited under section 167. Such an employee has an option to move an application for compensation either under the 1923 Act or M.V. Act. 

The appeal was allowed holding that Commissioner has misread and misinterpreted Section 167 of the M.V. Act and erroneously dismissed the application of the appellant and the matter was remitted to the Commissioner of Employee’s Compensation for determination of the compensation afresh. 

[Narayan v. Sangita, 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 1214, decided on June 6, 2022] 

Mr B. R. Kedar, Advocate for Appellant 

Mr S. G. Chapalgaonkar, Advocate for Respondent 2 

*Suchita Shukla, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.

Karnataka High Court
Case BriefsHigh Courts

Karnataka High Court: K.S. Mudagal, J., allowed the petition and set aside the impugned award awarding compensation as well as the silver medal allowance without considering the question of maintainability of the petition under Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act.

The facts of the case are such that the respondent was working as a driver in the petitioner’s organization. On 03-03-2004, during the course of his duty, the bus driven by him met with an

accident on Bengaluru – Mangaluru route and he suffered injuries. The medical board issued certificate stating that due to the said injuries, the respondent cannot discharge his duty as driver. Thus, the petitioner assigned the respondent alternate light work. The petitioner treated the respondent’s period of absence from March 2004 to October 2005 as on duty and paid full salary. Admittedly, the respondent claimed compensation under Motor Vehicles Act and was awarded compensation with interest. The respondent got notice issued to the petitioner claiming compensation  with interest under the Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923 (for short ‘Act, 1923’) on the ground that he suffered disability during the course of employment. Then he preferred claim petition before the Labour Court Mangaluru under Section 33C (2) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (for short ‘the I.D.Act’) claiming compensation along with interest and Silver Medal Allowance. The Labour Court  allowed the claim petition and awarded compensation as well as the silver medal allowance without considering the question of maintainability of the petition under Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act. Assailing this, the present petition was filed.

Counsel for petitioner Ms. Shwetha Anand submitted that Section 33C (1) and (2) of the ID Act shall be read in an integrated and holistic manner. Section 33C (2) of the Act can be invoked only in relation to an award or the settlement contemplated under Section 33C(1) of the I.D. Act. As the respondent did not perform the duty of driver, after the accident he was not entitled to silver medal allowance.

Counsel for respondent Mr. VS Naik submitted that Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act is an independent provision and need not be preceded by an award. Irrespective of workmen getting compensation under the Motor Vehicle Act, he is entitled to claim under the Act, 1923.

The Court observed that Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act refers to any amount due to workman. Section 33C(1) of the I.D. Act speaks of any amount due to workman under the settlement or award under the provision of Chapter 5-A or 5-B of the I.D. Act. The respondent claimed that he was entitled to claim the amount due to the injuries suffered by him during the course of employment. Therefore his claim was under the Act, 1923. In such event the claim lies before the Employee’s Compensation Commissioner and not before the Labour Court.

The Court relied on judgment Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak,  (1995) 1 SCC 235  and State of U.P v. Brijpal Singh (2005) 8 SCC 58 wherein it was observed

The Labour Court has no jurisdiction to first decide the workmen’s entitlement and then proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated on that basis in exercise of its power under Section 33C(2) of the Act. It is only when the entitlement has been earlier adjudicated or recognised by the employer and thereafter for the purpose of implementation or enforcement thereof some ambiguity requires interpretation that the interpretation is treated as incidental to the Labour Court’s power under Section 33C(2) like that of the Executing Court’s power to interpret the decree for the purpose of its execution. 

It is not competent to the Labour Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 33C(2) to arrogate to itself the functions of an industrial tribunal and entertain a claim which is not based on an existing right but which may appropriately be made the subject matter of an industrial dispute in a reference under Section 10 of the Act.”

The Court thus observed that in view of the respondent not performing the work as a driver and assignment of lighter work to him, whether he was entitled to silver medal allowance was a matter of adjudication. Therefore that could have been subject matter of a dispute under the I.D Act. Without such adjudication, in the light of the judgment of Supreme Court, the respondent could not have maintained the petition under Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act.

The court held “The Labour Court committed error in assuming the jurisdiction under Section 33C(2) of the ID Act. The award is liable to be set aside.”  [Management of KSRTC v. K. Shivaram, WP No. 17583/2017, decided on 04-04-2022]

Arunima Bose, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.

Case Briefs

Rajasthan High Court: A Division Bench of Manindra Mohan Srivastava, CJ and Madan Gopal Vyas, J., dismissed the petition and directed the authorities that buses will only stand at the places earmarked.

The instant PIL was filed praying that instead of making operational bus-stand at the place donated by the petitioner, as per decision already taken, buses are operating from the main road seriously affecting the movement of the vehicles and also giving rise to apprehension of the accidents.

A compliance report was submitted stating that the bus-stand has now been made operational from the land given by way of donation by the petitioner, situated at village Shiv, District Barmer

The Court observed and held that as the bus-stand at the located place has become operational, “we are inclined to dispose off this PIL at this stage. The respondent authorities are, however, directed to ensure that no place other than the place earmarked for the bus-stand is allowed for standing buses and picking up or dropping the passengers.”

[Loonkaran v. State of Rajasthan, D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 13700/2020, decided on 07-03-2022]

For Petitioner(s): Mr. Amit Vyas

For Respondent(s): Mr. Sunil Beniwal with Mr. Saransh Vij, Mr. G.R. Kalla, Mr. Harshit Bhurani

Arunima Bose, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.

High Court Round UpLegal RoundUp

82 reports on High Court Judgments to read from February 2022.

Allahabad High Court


 22-year-old woman, burnt and buried due to demand of dowry: All HC denies bail to accused husband

Noting the brutality with wife a 22-year-old lady and mother of a one year’s infant child in causing her death, beating her cruelly by “her husband” Vikas Kunvar Srivastav, J. held that the said act was not only grave in nature but heinous also.

Read report, here…

Law on S. 311 CrPC

Power to the Court to summon a material witness or to examine a person present in Court or to recall a witness already examined: All HC discusses

Sanjay Kumar Pachori, J., while addressing a matter with regard to recalling of the witnesses expressed that, Section 311 of the Code confers a wide discretion on the Court to act as the exigencies of justice require.

Read report, here…

Law on Recovery of Maintenance

Limitation of 1 year for recovery of maintenance under S. 125(3) of CrPC and the law on enforcement to claim order of maintenance under S. 128 CrPC: All HC explains

Dr Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J., while addressing a matter regarding recovery of maintenance amount, expressed that,

“Sentencing to jail can only be seen as a means of recovering the amount of arrears and not a mode of discharging liability.”

Read report, here…

Andhra Pradesh High Court

If the de facto complainant feels insulted as he was beaten in front of public and if he takes a hasty decision to commit suicide; will the accused be held responsible in the eyes of law?

Cheekati Manavendranath Roy J. partly allowed the petition by quashing FIR for the offence punishable under Sections 306 r/w 116 IPC.

Read report, here…


AP HC considered alleged attempt to threatening witness as a vague allegation; Cancellation of bail sought was rejected

“…nothing was brought to the notice of the police or the investigating agency stating that the accused are interfering with course of investigation by way of threatening the witnesses through their men.”

Read report, here…

Bombay High Court

 Law on Voluntarily Causing Grievous Hurt

In a land dispute, a person subjected to grievous injury with the use of ‘Khurpi’: Will he be punished under S. 326 or 325 Penal Code, 1860? Bom HC explains

The Division Bench of S.S. Shinde and N.R. Borkar, JJ., upheld the decision of the Trial Court in a case of causing grievous injury voluntarily.

Read report, here…


Constant quarrels between husband and wife: Bom HC observes while granting bail to husband accused of dowry and cruelty

Sarang V. Kotwal, J., on noting that the husband and wife cannot live together and there were constant quarrels between them, granted bail to the husband who was accused under the provisions of Dowry Prohibition Act and Penal Code, 1860. 

Read report, here…

Provocation by Wife

Wife subjected husband to humiliation by publicly calling him impotent and abusing him resulting in assault by husband: Husband will be convicted for murder or culpable homicide? Bom HC analyses

The Division Bench of Sadhana S. Jadhav and Prithviraj K. Chavan, JJ., modified the conviction of a husband who in provocation by wife on being subjected to abuses assaulted wife.

Read report, here…

Abetment to Suicide

Employer setting big targets, not granting leave and not accepting resignation would be acts in normal course of business: Bom HC grants anticipatory bail to employer accused of abetting suicide committed by employee

 Sarang V. Kotwal, J., addressed a matter wherein an employer was accused of abetting the suicide of an employee.

Read report, here…

Law on Custody

9-year-old child prefers to stay with mother’s father and his family members and shows animosity towards father: Whether father will get custody of child or not? Bom HC decides 

Addressing a matter wherein a child’s mother was diagnosed with cancer due to which she started living at her parental home with the child, and after the passing of the mother, a custody battle arose between the father of the child and the father and brother of wifeDivision Bench of S.S. Shinde and N.J. Jamdar, JJ., noted animosity of the child towards his father, to which the Court expressed that, the same must have occurred due to ‘parental alienation syndrome’.

Read more, here…


Appellate court can reverse the finding and sentence of the trial court ordering re-trial

The Division Bench of S.S. Shinde and Milind N. Jadhav, JJ. allowed an appeal against conviction of the Appellant by the Trial Court. The appellant was convicted of the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Penal Code, 1860, (“IPC”) read with Section 34 IPC. He was sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 15,000.

Read report, here… 

Transparency in Functioning

Disqualification of Sarpanch in suspicion of benefitting her close relations by allotting work under Panchayat’s order, without establishment of direct or indirect involvement as per S. 14(1)(g) of Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act: Is it correct? Bom HC analyses

Quoting a phrase from a story of a Roman Ruler Julius Caesar that, “Caesar’s wife should be above suspicion”, Bharati H. Dangre, J., remarked that,

“…those who are vested with the powers are to be made more accountable and transparent in their functioning and subjected to social audit with a view to minimize their discretionary decisions.”

Read report, here…


Cinema Halls, Theaters, Malls, Restaurants, etc. permitted to carry on business with 50% capacity but banquet halls/Mangal Karyalaya & lawns not permitted with same capacity: Bom HC issues notice

The Division Bench of Sunil B. Shukre and Anil L. Pansare, JJ., addressed a petition wherein a grievance was filed stating that an unreasonable classification resulting in impermissible discrimination had been made by the respondents as Cinema Halls, Theaters, Malls, Restaurants and also other establishments have been permitted to carry on their business or operations with 50% capacity of the customers or attendees, provided customers or attendees are armed with two doses of vaccination, and whereas, Mangal Karyalaya/ Banquet Halls and Lawns where marriage functions are held and solemnised are not being permitted to carry on their business and operations with the same capacity of persons who have taken both the doses of vaccination. 

Read report, here… 

Consumer Protection

Consumer Protection Act requires State Government to constitute a State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission and create circumstances to its effective functioning: Bom HC at Goa directs State of Goa to ensure filling up of vacant positions expeditiously

Stating that the State Administration comprises several IAS Officers, the least expected out of them is to find the solution to problems, so that State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission functions effectively, The Division Bench of M.S. Sonak and R.N. Laddha, JJ., directed the State of Goa to ensure that the post of President and 3 other members of the Commission which are vacant be filled expeditiously.

Read report, here…

Dead Person

Notice to a dead person under S. 148 of Income Tax Act cannot be issued: Bom HC

The Division Bench of K.R. Shriram and N.J. Jamdar, JJ., reiterated that notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 to a dead person cannot be issued.

Read report, here…

Legal Profession

“Notaries operating from public taxis around vicinity of Court”: Dignity of the profession needs to be maintained and the legal profession cannot be allowed to function from the streets | Bom HC

The Division Bench of S.J. Kathawalla and Milind N. Jadhav, JJ., requested the Department of Legal Affairs to give due consideration to this Court’s Order and the Report dated 9-12-2021 submitted by Nausher Kohli, Advocate whilst enacting the Draft Bill.

Read report, here…

Murder or Culpable Homicide?

Husband killed wife brutally in a heat of passion leaving husband with a wounded pride: Bom HC decides whether the said offence will come under “Murder” or “Culpable Homicide not amounting to Murder

Stating that, in the moment of anger spouses almost forgot about the two children who were hardly three years old at the time of incident, the Division Bench of Sadhana S. Jadhav and Prithiviraj K. Chavan, JJ., found that the case of a husband killing wife with a knife was a case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

Read report, here…


Bombay HC rejects argument that a dispute cannot be referred for arbitration on account of fraud: Read why

B.P. Colabawalla, J., addressed an arbitration application filed under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

Read report, here…

Gangubai Kathiawadi

Can after certification granted by Board, public exhibition of a film be prohibited? Bom HC answers 

In respect to petitions with regard to the release of movie Gangubai Kathiawadi, Division Bench of Dipankar Datta, CJ and M.S Karnik, J., while expressing that “Once the film is granted a certificate by the competent statutory authority, i.e. the Board, the producer or distributor of the film has every right to exhibit the film in a hall unless, of course, the said certificate is modified/nullified by a superior authority/Court”, held that, there cannot be any kind of obstruction for the exhibition of a film, which is certified, unless the said certificate is challenged and Court stays its operation.

Read report, here…


If husband and wife get their marriage registered under Special Marriage Act & under Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936 as well, would this require them to get nullity of marriage under both Acts or one? Court decides

G.S. Kulkarni, J., expressed that, there is no provision under legislations, that if a marriage between the same couple is annulled under a competent law as enacted by the Parliament, it can as well be of a legal effect in the corresponding enactment.

Read report, here…

Calcutta High Court


S. 37 of the NDPS Act mandates a more stricter approach than an application for bail sans the NDPS Act: Cal HC

The Division Bench of Bibhas Ranjan De and Debangsu Basak, JJ., while addressing a bail application in a case under NDPS Act, remarked that,

Section 37 of the NDPS Act mandates a more stricter approach than an application for bail sans the NDPS Act.

Read report, here…

Sexual Assault

14-yr old girl subjected to penetrative sexual assault by man who called her grand daughter: Is girl’s complaint vital to form basis of conviction? Cal HC explains

The Division Bench of Joymalya Bagchi and Bivas Pattanayak, JJ., in a penetrative sexual assault case of a 14-year-old girl, expressed that,

“Crime against woman is increasing as a whole. Such type of crime is a direct insult to the human dignity of the society and therefore imposition of any inadequate sentence not only results in injustice to the victim and the society in general but also stimulates criminal activities.”

Read report, here…


Disparagement or mere puffery? Court decides in matter of offending/misleading advertisements [Dabur India v. Baidyanath Ayurved]

Saraf, J. decided on a petition which was filed seeking remedy against impugned advertisements disparaging the goodwill and reputation of the petitioner and its product.

Read report, here…

Chhattisgarh High Court


 Limited jurisdiction has been given to the High Court confined to the substantial question of law only

Anoop Kumar Dhand J. dismissed the appeal as it does not fulfill the requirement mandated under Section 30 of Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923.

Read report, here…

If the party is able to make out an exceptional case and the court finds irretrievable injustice would occur if writ jurisdiction is not invoked, High Courts do have the power to entertain the writ petition

Sam Koshy J. partly allowed the petition and partly disposed of the petition expressing no opinion on the termination notice issued against the petitioner.

Read report, here…

Child Custody

Due to father’s field job, mother granted custody of child: Did Chh HC also grant contact and visitation right to father? Read

In a child custody battle, the Division Bench of Goutam Bhaduri and Rajani Dubey, JJ., reiterated the position of law in the Supreme Court’s decision of Yashita Sahu v. State of Rajasthan(2020) 3 SCC 67, wherein it was held that the court cannot provide one happy home with two parents to the child then let the child have the benefit of two happy homes with one parent each, further this Court granted visitation and contact right to the father.

Read report, here…


If husband brings home concubine due to which wife leaves house, would that lead to desertion by wife? Chh HC explains

The Division Bench of Goutam Bhaduri and Rajani Dubey, JJ., expressed that,

“If the husband keeps another lady; gives shelter to her; and proceeds to have child with the said lady and for that reason if the first wife has to leave the matrimonial home because of physical and mental torture meted out to her it cannot be presumed as a desertion on the part of wife.”

Read report, here…

Delhi High Court

Trademark Dispute

Baazi v. WinZo | Trademark is used by a manufacturer or service provider to distinguish products from those of competitors: Here’s how Winzo appeared dishonest and unfair in adopting Baazi

“When people are satisfied with the products supplied by a manufacturer or service provider, they buy them on the basis of the trade mark and over time it becomes popular and well known. Thus, the use of a similar or identical trademark by a competitor in the same product would lead unwary customers to believe that it originates from the same source.”

Read report, here…

Deadly Weapons

Whether a ‘blade’ would be covered under S. 397 IPC as a deadly weapon? Del HC explains in view of settled position of law

Mukta Gupta, J., explained under what circumstances would Section 397 of penal Code, 1860 would be attracted.

Read report, here…

Law on Bail

Investigation complete, charge sheet filed, accused in jail since 6 months: Read whether Del HC grants bail

Dhari Singh, J., granted bail while referring to a catena of Supreme Court decisions with regard to the law on bail.

Read report, here…

4 years as undertrial, 2 witnesses examined out of 14, no probability of trial to be concluded in near future: Whether Del HC will grant bail to accused under S. 37(b)(ii) of NDPS Act? Read

Chandra Dhari Singh, J., granted bail to an accused on being satisfied with “reasonable grounds” as per Section 37 (b)(ii) of the NDPS Act, 1985.

Read report, here…

Judicial Separation 

Can judicial separation be granted instead of divorce for which party has approached the Court? Read what Del HC says

Expressing that the Family Court’s decision was based on optimism and hope rather than the actual factual matrix of the case, the Division Bench of Vipin Sanghi and Jasmeet Singh, JJ., while addressing a matter wherein matrimonial dispute occurred between the parties, observed that,

“..a decree of judicial separation can be rescinded by the same court; but a decree of divorce can be reversed only by a judicial order: either in review or in appeal. If it is passed ex parte, it may be recalled on an application being made for that purpose.” 

Read report, here…

Money Laundering

Money laundering offence under PMLA is, layered and multi-fold and includes stages preceding and succeeding offence of laundering money: Del HC

While expressing the object of PMLA Act Chandra Dhari Singh, J., expressed that, offence of money laundering is threefold including the stages of placement, whereby the criminals place the proceeds of crime to the general and genuine financial system, layering, whereby such proceeds of crime are spread into various transactions within the financial system and finally, integration, where the criminals avail the benefits of crime as untainted money.

Read report, here…

Uphaar Case

Manner in which judicial records tampered revealed well-planned & methodical attempt to subvert justice system: Suspending sentence of Ansal brothers would amount eroding faith of public? Read Del HC’s decision

Stating that the manner in which Court records tampered was insidious and revealed a well-planned and methodical attempt to subvert the justice system in order to escape conviction in the Main Uphaar CaseSubramonium Prasad, J., held that since the matter relates to tampering of judicial record, the same has to be decided expeditiously in order to ensure faith of the public in the judicial system.

Read report, here…

Law on Review

Can review be sought wherein Court has to delve into materials, apply its mind afresh after re-evaluating materials? Del HC throws light

Expressing that, Minor mistakes of inconsequential importance are insufficient to seek a review, Asha Menon, J., elaborated that, while seeking review of orders passed in a Civil Suit, the grounds mentioned in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC have to be satisfied, which would not equate the hearing with the original hearing of the case or a hearing in an appeal 

Read report, here… 


Group of leading artistes asked to vacate Government allotted premises under Discretionary Quota: Right to continue in public premises infinitely? Detailed report

Expressing that a state of indecision could not have given rise to a legitimate expectation, Yashwant Varma, J., held that, while the petitioners undisputedly were illustrious and pre-eminent exponents in their respective fields of the classical arts, the Court was not shown any material which may justify the continued retention of public premises in Delhi or that they would be unable to propagate the classical arts in any other State or city of the nation.

Read report, here… 

Shared Household

Where the residence is a shared household, would it create any embargo upon owner to claim eviction against his daughter-in-law? Read what Del HC says

Yogesh Khanna, J., held that right of residence under Section 19 of the Domestic Violence Act is not an indefeasible right of residence in a shared household, especially when the daughter-in-law is pitted against aged father-in-law and mother-in-law.

Read report, here…

Section 138 NI Act

Vicarious Liability of Directors of Company for offences committed under S. 138 NI Act: Person claiming to not being able to manage business due to his age, could this be accepted as defence? Del HC answers

Subramonium Prasad, J., addressed a matter pertaining to vicarious liability of directors of the company alleged for offences under Section 138 NI Act.

Read report, here…


Adoptive Father of a minor girl seeks issuance of her passport with details of adoptive parents so that she could write her TOEFL examination: Here’s what Del HC directed

Kameswar Rao, J., addressed a matter wherein a minor child was not able to apply for a passport either in the name of her biological parents or in the name of her adoptive parents, was unable to pursue her academics in the USA.

Read report, here…


Power under Article 227 of Constitution of India cannot be exercised to upset conclusions, howsoever erroneous they may be, unless there was something grossly wrong or unjust: Del HC

Asha Menon, J., while expressing the scope of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India dismissed the present petition. 

Read report, here…

Gujarat High Court


Opportunity of being heard needs to be granted; Court decided in matter of the Will of Guru Ranchhoddas

A.P. Thaker, J. decided over a petition wherein the case of the petitioner was that the properties in question were originaly private properties of Guru Keshavdas, and after the death of Guru Keshavdas, Guru Karsandas became the Mahant and succeeded the properties under his Will. On the death of Guru Karsandas his chela Guru Atmaram became Mahant and succeeded to the properties of Guru Karsandas under his Will dated 08.12.1941. Thereafter, Guru Atmaram died leaving his Will dated 06-05-1947, appointing Guru Ranchhodas as Chela.

Read report, here…

Himachal Pradesh High Court

Couples have to make their choice at the threshold between career prospects and family life; HP HC observes in a case where a mother seeks job transfer to be with her daughter

“…mandamus is a public remedy and this remedy lies, when a public authority fails to perform the duty entrusted to it by law.”

Read report, here…

Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court

Inherent Power

Instead of filing an appeal before the Sessions Court petitioner rushed to this Court invoking its inherent power. Can High Court exercise its inherent power? Read J&K and Ladakh HC’s decision

Mohd. Akram Chowdhury, J., reiterated the settled position of law that if an alternate efficacious remedy is available under the statute, the inherent power of this Court cannot be invoked.

Read report, here…

Jharkhand High Court


Does Lokayukta have power to pass directions upon disciplinary authority to take action against erring officials? Jharkhand HC elaborates in light of Jharkhand Lokayukta Act, 2001

Sujit Narayan Prasad, J., addresses a very pertinent question of whether the Jharkhand Lokayukta Act, 2001 provides power for issuance of direction upon the disciplinary authority to take action against erring officials or can it’s order be limited to a recommendation.

Read report, here…

Kerala High Court


Is not taking treatment for mental illness to bring out a peaceful family atmosphere a form of cruelty and thus, a ground for divorce? HC answers

In an interesting case the Division Bench of A.Muhamed Mustaque and C.R. Sophy Thomas, JJ., held that not taking treatment for mental illness in order to bring out a peaceful and harmonious family atmosphere can also be counted as cruelty to the persons at the receiving end.

Read report, here…

If Court finds that marriage failed due to incompatibility, but one of the parties withholds consent for mutual separation, would that be ‘Cruelty’? Kerala HC elaborates

Expressing that, “If the conduct and character of one party causes misery and agony to the other spouse, the element of cruelty to the spouse would surface, justifying grant of divorce”, the Division bench of A. Muhamed Mustaque and Sophy Thomas, JJ., held that, Court cannot leave the life of a spouse to the mercy of the opposite spouse.

Read report, here…

Constitutional & Statutory Obligation

Whether State empowered to reject medical reimbursement for treatment being from unrecognized department of recognized hospital? HC decides

Murali Purushothaman, J., held that there is a Constitutional as well a statutory obligation on the part of the State to bear the expenses for treatment of the government servant and his family.

Read report, here…


“Marrying a Christian man would not wipe off the benefit of reservation granted to a scheduled caste persons”, HC reiterates caste of a person is to be decided on the basis of birth

Raja Vijayaraghavan V, J., held that marrying a Christian man would not wipe off the benefit of a reservation granted to scheduled caste persons.

Read report, here…

Corporal Punishment

Teacher administering moderate and reasonable force to enforce discipline in classroom, can be exposed to criminal prosecution? Kerala HC answers 

While explaining that inflicting corporal punishment on a Child by a parent or teacher is forbidden, Dr Kauser Edappagath, J., observed that,

“Hurt of a less serious crime is not forbidden when inflicted in the reasonable chastisement of a child by a parent or by a school teacher.”

Read report, here…

Registration of Marriage

If a foreign embassy doesn’t issue ‘Single Status Certificate’ or NOC of an OCI card holder, can Declarations and Certificates be accepted for registration of marriage in India? Ker HC answers

While addressing a matter wherein an Indian Citizen intended to soleminse and register his marriage with a British Citizen, an OCI card holder, N. Nagaresh, J., held that f a foreign Embassy does not issue a Single Status Certificate or NOC due to the law, rules and regulations prevailing in that country, Declarations or Certificates evidencing the same should be accepted in India for registration of marriage.

Read report, here…

Tobacco at residence

If a person keeps tobacco at residence, would that amount to being an offence? Ker HC answers

While addressing a matter for an offence alleged under Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products Act, Juvenile Justice Act and Kerala Police Act, Dr Kauser Edappagath, J., expressed that mere keeping tobacco at residence would not amount to being an offence.

Read report, here…

Admin of WhatsApp Group

Can an Admin of a messaging service group be held criminally liable for the offensive content posted by member of a group? Kerala HC addresses

While addressing the question of whether the creator or administrator of a WhatsApp group is criminally liable for offensive content posted by a group member, Dr Kauser Edappagath, J., held that a person can be criminally liable for the acts of another if they are party to the offence.

Read report, here…

Karnataka High Court

 Hijab Case

When Karnataka High Court temporarily restrained students from wearing hijab, religious flags, saffron shawls, etc.: Read Court’s interim order

While expressing that, “Endless agitations and closure of educational institutions indefinitely are not happy things to happen”, the Bench of Ritu Raj Awasthi, CJ and Krishna S Dixit and JM Khazi, JJ., restrained all the students regardless of their religion or faith from wearing saffron shawls (Bhagwa), scarfs, hijab, religious flags or the like within the classroom, until further orders.

Read report, here…


Conviction sentence not to affect career and not be treated as a remark for employment; Kar HC confined the sentence to fine only in accordance with Ss. 279 and 337 IPC

Sreenivas Harish Kumar, J., disposed of the petition and modified the judgment of the appellate court.

Read report, here…

GST Exemption 

Whether GST exemption can be claimed for leasing out residential premises as hostel to students and working professionals? Kar HC answers 

The Division Bench of Alok Aradhe and M.I. Arun, JJ., addressed whether GST exemption can be claimed for leasing of residential premises as a hostel to students and working professionals.

Read report, here…

Madras High Court

Negotiable Instruments Act

Whether proceedings under Ss. 138 and 141 of NI Act can be initiated against corporate debtor during moratorium period? Madras HC answers

Sathish Kumar, J., while addressing a matter with regard to the dishonour of cheques under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, held that the moratorium provision contained in Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, would apply only to corporate debtor, but the natural persons mentioned in Section 141 of Negotiable Instruments Act continue to be statutorily liable under Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instrument Act.

Read report, here…

Religious Practice

“One of the basic tenets to be followed by every Hindu is tolerance. Tolerance must be his own community or religion and in particular, to also to every other religious practice”: Madras HC

“Fundamental Rights and Duties are sacrosanct and binding on the Courts which adjudicate issues relating to the religion.”

Read report, here…

Madhya Pradesh High Court

 MBBS Seat

CBI’s self-contained note cannot form basis for rejecting application for increase of MBBS Seat; HC directs NMC to consider the application afresh 

The Division Bench of Sujoy Paul and Arun Kumar Sharma, JJ., quashed the National Medical Commission’s decision rejecting L.N. Medical College & Research Centre’s application for increase of MBBS seats.

Read report, here…

Writ of Mandamus

Provision for redressal of grievance in matter of radiation by mobile tower exists; Permission for installation can’t be revoked

Nandita Dubey, J. heard a petition which was filed seeking issuance of the writ of mandamus to the respondents to take appropriate effective steps against the Reliance Telecom Services not to permit them for installation of the mobile tower in the premises of Jai Hind School, V.V. Giri Ward, Pipariya.

Read report, here…

Departmental Inquiry

Desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till conclusion of the criminal case; Court prohibits Department to continue inquiry

Atul Sreedharan, J. decided on a petition which was filed by the petitioner who was aggrieved by the departmental proceedings against him on the identical charges by the CBI in the criminal case. 

Read report, here…

Land Acquisition

What would be an appropriate factor by which market value of land was to be multiplied to assess the compensation in the case where the land was situated in the rural area? [NH- 148N land acquisition] 

The Division Bench of Vivek Rusia and Rajendra Kumar Verma, JJ. took up a bunch of petitions which had similar facts that the petitioners were owners of agricultural land that came under the acquisition for construction of 12 lanes Delhi-Mumbai Expressway i.e. NH-148N under the provisions of the National Highways Act, 1956 (‘the NH Act of 1956’). 

Read report, here…


Unless the acquittal in criminal trial is honourable/clean, the employer has enough discretion to find a candidate to be unfit for employment

The Division Bench of Sheel Nagu and Sunita Yadav, JJ. while hearing a petition under Article 227 against order the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur Bench., dismissed the petition.

Read report, here…

Meghalaya High Court

Meghalaya Civil Service and the Meghalaya Police Service

There is no question of apples and orange being put in the same basket: Court calls State’s action foolish and justification of such act real tragedy

Sanjib Banerjee, CJ. while deciding in the matter between groups of persons in the Meghalaya Civil Service and the Meghalaya Police Service, pertaining to seniority between or among them, disposed the writ petition in favour of petitioners.

Read report, here…

Rape Case | Confession

Unequivocal confession leads to dismissal of appeal in a Rape case with minor

The Division bench of Sanjib Banerjee, CJ. and W. Diengdoh, J. dismissed the appeal which was filed on behalf of the convict with counsel engaged by the Legal Services Authority.

Read report, here…

Police Service 

“It is elementary that when the law requires a certain thing to be done in a particular manner, it has to be done in such manner or not at all”; Court upholds the dismissal of police official for passing information to outlaws 

“….the appellant had links with the banned outfit and had passed on information about police movements and operations to the outlawed organisation” 

Read report, here…

Orissa High Court

Ever-growing stock of seized vehicles

PIL filed about the ever-growing stock of seized vehicles and other properties in the various police stations in the State of Odisha; Directions issued

Muralidhar, CJ. issued directions regarding the ever-growing stock of seized vehicles and other properties in the various police stations in the State of Odisha

Read report, here…

Punjab and Haryana High Court

 Drug Menace

“Drug menace has become deep rooted and is taking its toll like a slow poison for the young generation”; HC expresses anguish over callously casual approach of officers

In a case exposing callous attitude of authorities while dealing with drug menace in the State of Punjab, Meenakshi I. Mehta, J., observed that in some paras of the Statu sreports/Reply, the police officers concerned had mentioned the tablets, allegedly recovered as ‘CLAVIDOL-100 SR’ whereas in certain other paras the same had been described as ‘CLOVIDOL-100 SR’. Criticizing the lackadaisical attitude of officers, the Bench remarked…

Read report, here…

State of Punjab which was known as one of the prosperous States is now at the brink of drug-trafficking

Expressing that, State of Punjab which was known as one of the prosperous States is now at the brink of drug-trafficking, Harnaresh Singh Gill, J., held that in order to curb the menace of drug trafficking the accused person are to be dealt with stringently even at the stage of granting her/him bail in NDPS Act cases involving commercial quantity.

Read report, here…

Patna High Court

Mental Health 

Mental health of a person and/or treatment of those who are in need, more so during the time of Covid-19, is the least priority of the State Government

The Division Bench of Sanjay Karol, CJ and S. Kumar, J., directed the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar to take all steps ensuring the establishment of State Mental Health Authority as per Section 45 of the Mental Health Care Act, 2017.

Read report, here…

Rajasthan High Court

 Compensation | Motor Vehicle

Money cannot substitute a life lost but an effort has to be made for grant of just compensation having uniformity in approach; Court observes in a MV accident case demanding higher compensation 

Birendra Kumar J. allowed the appeal and enhanced the award considering the settled guidelines in the subsequent judgments to reach at “just compensation”.

Read report, here…

Customs Act 

DRI officer is not Competent Authority to issue show cause notice and adjudicate the same as “proper officer”; Show cause notice set aside 

A Division Bench of Akil Kumar, CJ and Sameer Kureshi, J. allowed the writ petition and set aside the proceedings issued by show cause notice and subsequent demands confirmed by OIO. 

Read report, here…

Rajasthan Public Service Commission

It would be open for RPSC to conduct written main examination on the rescheduled date, Single Judge bench order stayed

A Division Bench of Akil Kureshi CJ and Sudesh Bansal J. stayed the impugned judgment and left it open for RPSC to conduct a written main examination on the rescheduled date.

Read report, here…

Compassionate Appointment

“…on the ground of delay itself, the heir of the deceased employee shall not be entitled to appointment on compassionate ground.”; Raj HC observes in a case where delay is of almost 13 years 

A Division Bench of Manindra Mohan Srivastava and Anoop Kumar Dhand, JJ. dismissed the petition on the ground that the writ petition filed by the petitioners is without any substance. 

Read report, here…


Accepting requests for inter-district transfer can lead to chain reaction and at times considerable administrative difficulties; Raj HC observes while dealing a case related to inter-district transfer

A Division bench of Akil Kureshi CJ and Madan Gopal Vyas J. dismissed the petition stating that nothing would come in the way of the petitioner in seeking inter-district transfer if the Government rules and regulations recognize any such policy.

Read report, here…

 Tripura High Court

 Qualifying Examination

No grievance for non-selection; Court finds criteria fixed by ONGC clear and categorical

Indrajit Mahanty, CJ. dismissed a petition which was filed by the petitioner who was appointed as Junior Security Supervisor at (A-1 Level) in the category of Scheduled Tribe and had appeared for the computer-based test and physical standard test conducted by the ONGC. It was alleged that in the selection process the petitioner was awarded 72 marks but was not selected whereas the candidate (respondent 3) who got only 66.10 marks was wrongly and illegally selected by the respondent 2.

Read report, here…

Conjugal Rights

Whether maintenance granted to the wife under S. 125 CrPC can be cancelled in view of husband’s obtaining a decree for restitution of conjugal rights and wife’s refusal for the same?

S.G. Chattopadhyay, J., decided on a petition which was filed by the petitioner challenging order passed by the Additional Judge, Family Court which stated that the petitioner was not entitled to any maintenance allowance under section 125 Cr.P.C from her husband in view of her refusal to restore conjugal relationship with her husband pursuant to the judgment and decree passed by the District Judge for restitution of conjugal rights.

Read report, here…


Tests provided under S.37(1)(ii) of the NDPS Act should qualify in order to seek bail; Court rejects application 

S.G. Chattopadhyay, J., rejected a bail application which was filed for releasing the accused on bail who had been undergoing imprisonment since 16-09-2021 under NDPS Act, 1985. Successive applications of the accused for pre-arrest bail were rejected.

Read report, here…

Die-in-Harness Scheme

Exclusion of married daughters from the die-in-harness scheme of the State Government discriminatory? Court discusses

The Division Bench of Indrajit Mahanty, CJ. and S.G. Chattopadhyay, J. decided over a bunch of petitions which had a similar question pertaining to exclusion of married daughters from the die-in-harness scheme of the State Government. 

Read report, here…

Migratory Birds

More than 1000 ‘Rare’ Birds dead, no carcasses found; Court directs committee inspection 

The Division Bench of S.G. Chattopadhyay and Indrajit Mahanty, JJ., took up a PIL which was filed on the basis of press reports that in the Sukhsagar water body of Udaipur, Khilpara, large number of migratory birds of more than 1000 in numbers were found dead. Notices were issued and following the directions of this Court a report had come to be filed by the State wherein the State had taken note of the fact that many migratory birds come and find sanctuary in water bodies in the State of Tripura and they come all the way from Spain, Portugal, South East France, Italy and North Western Africa and have all been listed as “Rare” birds by the European Union, but it seems that the same has been detailed as localized by the State.

Read report, here…

Uttaranchal High Court

Right to Information

Husband seeking personal information such as salary of wife under Right to Information Act, 2005; Whether acceptable or not?

“….The only exception as to the information given under the Act under Section 8 of the RTI Act, is an exemption from disclosure of information.”

Read report, here…

Termination of Pregnancy

Compelling to continue pregnancy, infringement under Art. 21; Rape victim allowed to terminate Intrauterine Fetus of 28 weeks 5 days

Alok Kumar Verma, J., decided on a petition which was filed by the father of the minor petitioner to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding and directing the respondent to ensure immediate medical termination of petitioner’s pregnancy after taking all precautions as required to be taken medically and legally.

Read report, here… 


Denial of bail on sole ground of apprehension that he may commit crime again, overturned by the Court

R.C. Khulbe, J. granted bail in a criminal revision petition moved against the order of Juvenile Justice Board (JJB), Dehradun as well as a judgment by Addl. Sessions Judge (POCSO)/FTC, Dehradun against the petitioner.

Read report, here…

8 Legal Stories of the Week: From High Courts to District Courts

7 Legal Stories of the Week: From High Courts to District Courts

11 Legal Stories of the Week: From Hijab ban to a Sexual Harassment complaint from an employee in ScoopWhoop & more

8 Legal Stories of the Week: From the release of movie Gangubai Kathiawadi to WhatsApp Admin’s liability if a member of group shares objectionable content on group and many more such stories

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Rajasthan High Court: Birendra Kumar J. allowed the appeal and enhanced the award considering the settled guidelines in the subsequent judgments to reach at “just compensation”.

The instant appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, was filed by the wife, minor daughter and parents of Late Ramavatar @ Ramgopal, a victim of motor vehicle accident happened due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the offending vehicle. The appellants filed MAC Case No.134/2011 before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bharatpur. By the impugned judgment and award the Tribunal awarded Rs.3, 21,600/- against claim of Rs.80, 35,000/-. Being dissatisfied with the calculation and quantum of compensation decided by the appellants, instant appeal was filed.

Counsel for the appellants Ms. Chelsi Gangwal contends that there was overwhelming unrebutted evidence of the wife of the deceased AW-1 Asha, the father of the deceased AW-2 Pradhan Singh and a businessman dealing with AC etc. who was examined as AW-3 Lalit Kumar that the deceased had monthly earning of Rs.12,000/-. However, the learned Tribunal took a pedantic approach of the matter that since no documentary proof of income of the deceased was produced, the notional income of Rs.3, 000/- per month was taken as multiplicand.

Counsel for respondent 3 put a defense that the offending vehicle was being used in violation of the terms and conditions of the policy. It was a case of contributory negligence as has been held by the Tribunal.

The Court observed that In the present case, there is no photographs of the site plan nor the author who had prepared the site plan Ex.-2 appeared before the Court. In my view, the Tribunal has committed error of appreciation of evidence and in fact, it is not a case of contributory negligence. Therefore, only for the reason that a self-earning person could not produce the document of his income, the deposition of the witnesses conversant with the income of the deceased should not have been ignored.

The Court relied on National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680, and observed “Section 168 of the Act deals with the concept of “just compensation” and the same has to be determined on the foundation of fairness, reasonableness and equitability on acceptable legal standard because such determination can never be in arithmetical exactitude. It can never be perfect. The aim is to achieve an acceptable degree or proximity to the arithmetical precision on the basis of material brought on the record in an individual case. In a case of death, the legal heirs of the deceased cannot expect a windfall. Simultaneously, the compensation granted cannot be an apology for compensation.

The Court thus held “Thus, under the conventional head, the appellants would be entitled for Rs.1,50,000/-, the total payable compensation comes to Rs.26,71,600/- (Rupees Twenty Six lacs Seventy One Thousand and Six Hundred) The aforesaid amount minus already paid would be payable by the Insurer within three months to the claimants along with interest of 9% per annum, failing which the aforesaid interest would be payable till the realization of the whole due amount. The 1/3rd share of the minor daughter shall be deposited in some Fixed Deposit Scheme and shall be spent for education and betterment of the minor as and when occasion arises on the order of the Court only.”[Asha v. Naresh Kumar, 2022 SCC OnLine Raj 262, decided on 03-02-2022]


For Appellant(s) : Ms. Chelsi Gangwal for Mr. Prateek Sharma

For Respondent(s) : Mr. Ritesh Jain

Arunima Bose, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Karnataka High Court: A Division Bench of S.G Pandit and Anant Ramanath Hegde, JJ. allowed the appeal and modified the impugned order by enhancing the compensation. 

The facts of the case are such that the claimant  suffered 40% permanent disability around his pelvic region, (on account of injuries which are referred later) claimed compensation of Rs.11,75,000/-, the Tribunal awarded a compensation of Rs.3,73,988/-. The doctor who treated the claimant assessed permanent disability at 40%. The doctor opined that the claimant is unable to achieve a penile erection and nocturnal penile tumescence and thereby unable to copulate. According to the doctor, the condition is irreversible. Thus, the claimant who was aged 14 at the time of the accident was in appeal. The insurer having admitted the liability did not question the award but challenged the appeal for enhancement of the compensation by the instant appeal.

 The Court observed that the petitioner has suffered permanent disability in respect of his sexual organ, as well as around hip which is irreversible. The loss of the petitioner, who is deprived of marriage prospects and pleasure of marital life and having children, cannot be adequately compensated in terms of money. Nevertheless, to mitigate the pain and agony, monetary compensation is to be awarded. The quantum of compensation to be awarded by the Tribunal depends upon the gravity of the injury, the pain and agony suffered by the claimant. There should be some logical and rational nexus between the compensation awarded and the pain suffered by the claimant. The compensation should offer solace to the victim of the accident.

The Court observed that given the kind of disability suffered by the claimant, the mental trauma which the claimant has to undergo for the rest of his life, is much more painful than the physical pain that he has suffered immediately after the accident. The mental trauma of having to remain single, and answering the curious questions posed by the people around throughout life, for not getting married, are some of the things not easy to cope with. The trauma is going to be perennial and unabated. Such being the position, the duty is cast upon the Tribunals and Courts to award just compensation to ensure that the unbearable mental trauma is mitigated to the extent possible and the claimant can live with some dignity and find some solace in the monetary compensation awarded. 

The Court observed that the compensation payable under the non-pecuniary heads is not dependent on the social status, educational qualification or income of the claimant. It affects the poor and the rich alike. The rich may have some means of their own to mitigate the pain. Unfortunately for the poor, they need to depend on the compensation to be awarded to trace the silver line around the dark cloud cast by the
permanent disability.

The Court observed that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is a benevolent legislation and the duty is cast upon the Tribunal to award just and fair compensation to the victim of a Motor Vehicle Accident and thus taking into consideration the inflation and constantly depreciating purchasing power of the rupee, the court deemed deem it appropriate to enhance the compensation.

The Court held “…the judgment and award dated 04.08.2016 passed in MVC No.49/2012 on the file of the Principal Senior Civil Judge and AMACT, Ranebennur is modified and compensation of Rs.17, 68,000.00 is awarded along with interest at the rate of 6%…”

[Basavaraj v. Umesh, M.F.A. No.103473 of 2017, decided on 11-01-2022]

Arunima Bose, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.


For appellant: Adv. Hanumanthareddy Sahukar

For respondent: Adv. Suresh S Gundi

Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court
Case BriefsHigh Courts

Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court: The Division Bench comprising of Dhiraj Singh Thakur and Mohan Lal, JJ., directed the Union government to implement mandatory Vehicle Location Tracking Devices and Panic Button for all public service vehicles in the tune of Rule 125-H of Motor Vehicles Rules. The Bench remarked,

“It goes without saying that the provisions of Section 136A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the Rule 125-H have to be complied with in their letter and spirit. The exemption granted by the Government was limited in a period of time and has since expired.”

Factual Background

The issue in the instant appeal was one pertaining to implementation of the statutory provision incorporated in the Motor Vehicles Rules by way of insertion of 125-H, which makes it mandatory inter alia for all public service vehicles to have Vehicle Location Tracking Devices and Panic Button. The amendment was incorporated in the year 2016 and the same was to come into force with effect from 01-04-2018. However, by virtue of notification dated 25-10-2018, the Government in exercise of powers conferred under sub-Section (3) of Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and in supersession of the notification of the Government of India dated 18-04-2018 exempted up to 01-01-2019 all public service vehicles from the provisions of clause (k) of sub-Section 1 of Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

The Government in the UT of J&K after the period of exemption was over, issued a circular towards implementation of the rules 125-H. However, as certain organizations involved in the transport business agitated the matter, pursuant to which a decision was taken to grant exemption in issuing the fitness certificates to commercial vehicles without GPS/VTS and Panic Button, till a Committee in this behalf submitted its recommendation/report for consideration by the Government. Noticeably,  the Committee so constituted had not given any report for or against the installation of the aforementioned devices, which were stated to be installed mandatorily in view of the provisions of 125-H.

Contention of the Appellant

The petitioner-appellant, who was an authorized dealer for a company, M/s Rosmerta, which was in the business of providing Vehicle Location Tracking Device and the Panic Button etc. filed a petition claiming that it had been duly empanelled by the Transport Department and that the decision to defer the installation of the requisite tracking devices was causing prejudice to its business interest.

Findings of the Single Bench

The writ Court opined that the petitioner-appellant had only been an agent for one of the firms shortlisted for supply of the requisite equipment and no specific orders as such had been placed by any of the firms shortlisted (enlisted) for the purpose, as the Government had only shortlisted the firms as the product manufactured by them was compatible with the entire system, which was put in place for tracking the movements of commercial vehicles. It was, therefore, held that the petitioner could neither raise the claim of promissory estoppel or legitimate expectation against the State, as the State had not promised anything to the petitioner.

The writ Court, therefore, declined to interfere in the petition on the issue of locus standi of the petitioner. However, while disposing of the petition, the writ Court directed the Transport Commissioner to ensure that the issue, which was before the Committee is taken to its logical conclusion by resolving the difficulties, so that the mandate of law is implemented.

Opinion and Analysis

Considering the stand of the UT, that it was already in the process of setting up of Control Centre, wherefrom all the vehicles can be monitored and the data received and secured, the Bench reminded that the official respondents were still under the statutory obligation to ensure that the needful is done without any undue delay. As the Single Judge had already directed the respondents to ensure that the issue is taken to its logical conclusion by resolving the difficulties, so that the mandate of law is implemented, the Bench opined that there was conflict in the direction that had been issued by the Single Judge as the ultimate object of the petitioner-appellant was to highlight the issue of non-implementation of the provisions of Section 136A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the Rule 125- H and the various circulars issued by the Central Government in that regard.


In the light of the above, the Bench opined that the impugned judgment did not suffer from any illegality and deserved no interference. The appeal was declared to be without merit and was accordingly dismissed. [Rallidae Tech. Private Ltd. v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine J&K 978 , 01-12-2021]

Kamini Sharma, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.

Appearance by:

For the Appellant: Shivani Jalali, Advocate

For Union of India: Adarsh Bhagat, GA

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: With an aim to curtail the pendency before the High Courts and for speedy disposal of the appeals concerning payment of compensation to the victims of road accident, the bench of SA Nazeer* and Krishna Murari, JJ has asked the Department of Justice, Ministry of Law and Justice to consider constituting ‘Motor Vehicle Appellate Tribunals’ by amending Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act so that the appeals challenging the award of a Tribunal could be filed before the Appellate Tribunal so constituted.

The order came after the Court noticed that a large number of claim petitions, under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 are being filed before the various Claims Tribunals established thereunder throughout the country. Against the awards of the Tribunals, appeals are filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 before the relevant High Court, either by the claimants or by the insurers and owners of the offending vehicles. Large number of such appeals are pending before the various High Courts.

The Court went on to give the following suggestions:

  • The various Benches of such an Appellate Tribunal could consist of two Senior District Judges.
  • To ensure access to justice and to avoid pendency, Benches of the Appellate Tribunal in various regional cities may be set up, in addition to the capital city of each State as may be indicated by the relevant High Court. For this purpose, appropriate rules governing the procedure of the Appellate Tribunal may also be framed.
  • No further appeal against the order of the Appellate Tribunal need be provided. If any of the party is aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Tribunal, he can always invoke the writ jurisdiction of the concerned High Court for appropriate reliefs.

[Rasmita Biswal v. National Insurance Company Ltd., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1193, decided on 08.12.2021]

*Judgment by: Justice SA Nazeer

Know Thy Judge | Justice S. Abdul Nazeer

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: Reminding the Courts that the Motor Vehicles Act is in the nature of social welfare legislation and its provisions make it clear that the compensation should be justly determined, the bench of R. Subhash Reddy and Hrishikesh Roy*, JJ has held that a realistic recompense having regard to the realities of life, both in terms of assessment of the extent of disabilities and its impact including the income generating capacity of the claimant.

Brief Facts

On 13.4.2001, appellant suffered serious injuries when the motorcycle, where the appellant was riding pillion, was hit by a car. Both riders were impacted, resulting in severe head injuries to the appellant. He was bedridden, totally immobilized and initially, remained admitted in the hospital for 191 days. The appellant has also suffered severe impairment of cognitive power with hemiparesis and total aphasia and the prognosis for him is 69% permanent disability.

The claimant was 21 years old and was earning around Rs.4,500/- per month from jewellery work when he suffered the accident.

Compensation awarded by Tribunal: Rs.5,74,320/-

Compensation Awarded by Kerala High Court: 14,31,752/


On facts

“The 21 year old’s youthful dreams and future hopes were snuffedout by the serious accident. The young man’s impaired condition has certainly impacted his family members. Their resources and strength are bound to be stressed by the need to provide full time care to the claimant. For the appellant to constantly rely on them for stimulation and support is destined to cause emotional, physical and financial fatigue for all stakeholders.”

The Court noticed that while the permanent disability as certified by the doctors stands at 69%,the same by no means, adequately reflects the travails the impaired claimant will have to face all his life. A person therefore is not only to be compensated for the injury suffered due to the accident but also for the loss suffered on account of the injury and his inability to lead the life he led, prior to the life altering event.

The Court held that in cases wherein the claimant is suffering severe cognitive dysfunction and restricted mobility, the Courts should be mindful of the fact that even though the physical disability is assessed at 69%, the functional disability is 100% in so far as claimant’s loss of earning capacity is concerned.

It hence held,

“… the impact on the earning capacity for the claimant by virtue of his 69% disability must not be measured as a proportionate loss of his earning capacity. The earning life for the appellant is over and as such his income loss has to be quantified as 100%. There is no other way to assess the earning loss since the appellant is incapacitated for life and is confined to home.”

The Court, hence, enhanced the compensation to Rs. 27,67,800 to be paid within six weeks. Any amount paid earlier under these heads, may be adjusted during payment to the appellant.

On ‘just compensation’

The Court emphasized that, in cases like the one at hand, the Tribunal and the Courts must be conscious of the fact that the permanent disability suffered by the individual not only impairs his cognitive abilities and his physical facilities but there are multiple other non-quantifiable implications for the victim.

“The very fact that a healthy person turns into an invalid, being deprived of normal companionship, and incapable of leading a productive life, makes one suffer the loss of self-dignity. Such a Claimant must not be viewed as a modern day Oliver Twist, having to make entreaties as the boy in the orphanage in Charles Dickens’s classic, “Please Sir, I want some more”. The efforts must be to substantially ameliorate the misery of the claimant and recognize his actual needs by accounting for the ground realities. The measures should however be in correct proportion.”

It further noted that the plea of the victim suffering from a cruel twist of fate, when asking for some more, is not extravagant but is for seeking appropriate recompense to negotiate with the unforeseeable and the fortuitous twists is his impaired life.

“Therefore, while the money awarded by Courts can hardly redress the actual sufferings of the injured victim (who is deprived of the normal amenities of life and suffers the unease of being a burden on others), the courts can make a genuine attempt to help restore the self-dignity of such claimant, by awarding ‘just compensation’.”

[Jithendran v. The New India Assurance Co., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 983, decided on 27.10.2021]


For Claimant: Advocate A. Karthik,

For Insurance Company: Advocate JPN Shahi

*Judgment by: Justice Hrishikesh Roy

Know Thy Judge | Justice Hrishikesh Roy

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Karnataka High Court: Ashok S. Kinagi J., allowed the appeal and applied the pay and recover principle fastening the liability on the owner to pay the compensation.

The facts of the case are such that the claimant was sitting in the backside of the auto-rickshaw, the driver was driving rashly and negligently without following traffic rules and regulations and dashed the same to a motorcycle which was going in front of auto-rickshaw because of which the auto turned turtle and the claimant sustained grievous injuries in the said accident. Thus, a claim petition was filed before the Tribunal for compensation which was thereby granted by holding that the respondents are jointly and severally liable to pay it. Being aggrieved by the same, the present appeal was filed.

Counsel for the appellants submitted that the tribunal has committed an error in fastening the liability on the insurer as the vehicle was plying outside the permitted limit and hence the insurance is not liable to pay compensation.

Counsel for the respondents supported the impugned judgment and award.

The Court relied on judgment Shamanna and Divisional Manager, Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., 2018 ACJ 2163 and observed that when there is a breach of policy conditions and the policy is in force as on the date of the accident, it is for the insurance company to pay the compensation amount and recover the same from the owner.

The Court thus held that the permit disclosed that offending vehicle was permitted to ply within 16 km from Savdatti but in fact, the accident has occurred outside the limit of Savadatti i.e., outside of 16 km from the permit limit. It was further observed that on the date of the accident the insurance policy was in force but at the time of the accident, the vehicle did not have permit at the accident spot. Thus there is a clear violation of policy conditions.

In view of the above, the appeal was allowed in part directing the insurer to pay the compensation amount and recover the same from the owner.[Divisional Manager v. Riyaz Ahmed, M.F.A. No. 100275/2015 (MV), decided on 06-02-2020]

Arunima Bose, Editorial Assistant has put this story together

National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
Case BriefsTribunals/Commissions/Regulatory Bodies

National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC): C. Vishwanath (Presiding Member), held that since the Insurance Company itself insured the complainant’s vehicle and the vehicle had been stolen during the currency of the Policy and the Police were informed immediately, the Insurance Company could not repudiate the claim.

The instant revision petition was filed under Section 21(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 against the Order passed by Rajasthan State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission.

Facts of the case

Respondent obtained an Insurance Policy from the petitioner for his Car being temporary registration for a sum of Rs 6,17,800.

In the night of 28-07-2011, Complainant’s car was stolen from Geeta Guest House, Jodhpur. Police could not trace the vehicle and submitted a negative final report. Complainant submitted an insurance claim with the Opposite Party/Insurance Company. Petitioner/Opposite Party repudiated the claim, on the ground that intimation of theft of the vehicle was given to the Insurance Company with delay, which was in violation of the Policy condition and though temporary registration of the vehicle expired on 19-07-2011, the Complainant did not get the vehicle permanently registered. Thirdly, the Complainant left the vehicle unattended outside the guesthouse, in violation of the Policy condition.

District Forum dismissed the complaint stating “as at the time of the theft the vehicle is not registered, there was no deficiency in service on the part of the Opposite Party”.

Against the order of the District Forum, the Complainant preferred an Appeal before the State Commission and State Commission set aside the order of the District Forum while allowing the appeal.

Aggrieved by the State Commission’s Order, Opposite Party/Insurance Company preferred the present Revision Petition.

Analysis and Decision

Core issue for the adjudication was in regard to the registration of the vehicle after expiry of temporary registration.

Since the Petitioner/Insurance Company had received the insurance premium and there was no violation of any specific condition in the Insurance Policy, the Insurance Company was liable to indemnify the insured for the loss suffered by the insured.

Though plying a vehicle on road without registration is a violation of provisions of Motor Vehicle Act, the Competent Authority to take action against a non-registered vehicle is the Police and other Government authorities. Insurance Company after accepting the premium, cannot escape from its liability and repudiate the claim on this technical ground.

Commission in view of the instant matter stated that:

The temporary registration of the vehicle expired on 19-07-2011 and the car got stolen on 28-07-2011, mere 9 days later. The Motor Vehicle Act does provide for registration of vehicle after its expiry on payment of certain fee.

Commission held that when the Insurance Company itself insured the complainant’s vehicle and the vehicle had been stolen during the currency of the Policy and the Police was informed immediately, the Insurance Company cannot repudiate the claim of the Complainant on a technical ground.

In view of the above-discussion, State Commission’s Order was justified and the same did not suffer from any illegality, therefore revision petition was dismissed. [United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sushil Kumar Godara, 2020 SCC OnLine NCDRC 494, decided on 11-12-2020]

Advocates for the parties:

For the petitioner: Ms Suman Bagga, Advocate

For the Respondent: NEMO

Chhattisgarh High Court
Case BriefsHigh Courts

Chattisgarh High Court: A Division Bench of P. R. Ramchandra Menon and Parth Prateem Sahu JJ., allowed the appeal partly and modified the impugned award.

The facts of the case are such that on 04-07-2012, claimant while returning with his friend form Masturi to his village Tikari on Tata Magic (hereinafter referred to as ‘offending vehicle’), met with an accident and turned turtle wherein the claimant and other passengers suffered grievous injuries. An application was filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 i.e M.V. Act seeking compensation and Rs 6, 50,000 was granted vide award dated 06-01-2014 passed by the 6th Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh i.e. MACT. Aggrieved by the same, instant appeal was filed by the insurance company/ appellants under Section 173 challenging the impugned award.

Counsel for the appellants submitted that that on the date of accident, there was no valid and effective driving licence with driver of the offending vehicle, there was no valid permit, fitness and registration and thereby there was breach of conditions of insurance policy, hence, the Insurance Company is not liable to indemnity the injured. It was also submitted that MACT while deciding the issue with regard to breach of conditions of insurance policy has only taken into consideration the issue of driving licence and decided the issue but did not consider the ground of permit raised by appellant/Insurance Company specifically, though recorded in the impugned award.

Counsel for the respondents submitted that MACT after taking into consideration the entire pleading and evidence placed on record, has passed just and proper award, which does not call for any interference.

During investigations, permit was not produced and the owner of the offending vehicle did not present himself as witness before court though filed reply to the claim petition. It was further found on examination of other witnesses that insurance policy was issued for the offending vehicle and the vehicle was insured as ‘Passenger Carrying Commercial Vehicle’, for which, permit is necessary.

Section 66 (1) of the M.V. Act provides for the necessity for permits, which reads as under for easy reference:

“66. Necessity for permits.-(1) No owner of a motor vehicle shall use or permit the use of the vehicle as a transport vehicle in any public place whether or not such vehicle is actually carrying any passengers or goods save in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted or countersigned by a Regional or State Transport Authority or any prescribed authority authorising him the use of the vehicle in that place in the manner in which the vehicle is being used:

Provided that a stage carriage permit shall, subject to any conditions that may be specified in the permit, authorise the use of the vehicle as a contract carriage:

Provided further that a stage carriage permit may, subject to any conditions that may be specified in the permit, authorise the use of the vehicle as a goods carriage either when carrying passengers or not:

Provided also that a goods carriage permit shall, subject to any conditions that may be specified in the permit, authorise the holder to use the vehicle for the carriage of goods for or in connection with a trade or business carried on by him.”

The Court observed that from perusal of aforementioned provisions of Section 166 of the M.V. Act, the requirement of permit has been made mandatory for use of the vehicle as ‘Transport Vehicle’ in any public place for carrying passengers or goods.

The Court thus held that MACT erred in not considering that non-applicants 1 and 2 i.e. driver and owner of the offending vehicle failed to produce permit of the offending vehicle and in absence of it, there will be breach of conditions of insurance policy.

In view of above, appellant/Insurance Company is exonerated from its liability to satisfy the amount of compensation and the liability to satisfy the amount of compensation shall be upon non-applicants No.1 and 2 i.e. driver and owner of the offending vehicle. The Court further directed the insurance company to pay the amount as the insurance of the vehicle is not denied, it is insured as ‘Passenger Carrying Vehicle’ and later the insurance company must recover the same amount from the owner and driver of the offending vehicle.

In view of the above, appeal allowed partly and disposed off.[Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Sudhir Kumar, 2020 SCC OnLine Chh 835, decided on 23-09-2020]

Arunima Bose, Editorial Assistant has put this story together

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court:  The 3-judge bench of SA Bobde, CJ and A.S. Bopanna and V. Ramasubramanian*, JJ has reiterated that the Courts should not thwart any investigation unless no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on.

Referring to the decision in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, (1992) Supp. (1) SCC 335, the Court said,

“(…) the power of quashing should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. While examining a complaint, the quashing of which is sought, the Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or in the complaint.”

In S.M. Datta v. State of Gujarat, (2001) 7 SCC 659 the Court cautioned that criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage.

“Quashing of a complaint should rather be an exception and a rarity than an ordinary rule.  (…) if a perusal of the first information report leads to disclosure of an offence even broadly, law courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere.”

FIR against Skoda Auto Volkswagen over alleged use of cheat devices

Skoda Auto Volkswagen India Private Limited is engaged in the business of manufacture, import and sale of passenger vehicles in India. The 3rd Respondent in the case lodged an FIR, alleging that he had bought 7 Audi Brand cars from the authorised dealers of the manufacturing Companies and knowing fully well that their vehicles have been installed with cheat devices, the manufacturer had prepared wrong records and documents.

The Petitioner moved Allahabad High Court seeking quashing of the FIR alleging that the FIR is based entirely upon the order of the NGT, which is the subject matter of two civil appeals before the Supreme Court.

Allahabad High Court rejected the prayer for quashing of the FIR. However, the High Court protected the officers of the petitioner against arrest till the submission of the Report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. subject however to the condition that they shall cooperate in the investigation.

Not satisfied with a mere protection against arrest and the refusal of the Allahabad High Court to quash the FIR, the petitioner argued before the Supreme Court:

  1. That the Police cannot investigate an issue, the substratum of which is sub judice before this Court in the civil appeals arising out of the order of the NGT; and
  2. That the High Court failed to take note of the long delay on the part of the 3rd Respondent in lodging the complaint and
  3. That the VAHAN Portal of the Government shows the purchase of only 3 vehicles as against the claim of the 3rd Respondent to have purchased 7 vehicles.

Why the Supreme Court refused to quash FIR

On Issue 1

Should pendency of the Civil Appeals and the interim order passed by Supreme Court be taken as a deterrent for anyone else to lodge a police complaint and seek an investigation?

Two original applications came to be filed before the NGT in the year 2015, alleging that the manufacturers of the vehicles in question were employing deceit devices. This coincided with the issue of notice by the Automotive Research Association of India to the manufacturers. The   applicants before the NGT did not seek any relief for themselves, as purchasers of vehicles. The reliefs sought by the applicants before the NGT were broad and general. Hence,

“ (…) the order of the NGT, passed on the applications filed by certain individuals not claiming as purchasers of vehicles, cannot   be   taken   as   an   impediment   for   an   individual   who purchased cars from the manufacturers, to lodge a complaint, if he has actually suffered on account of any representation made by the manufacturers.”

Further, the interim order passed by the Supreme Court not to take any coercive steps has to be understood only in the context of the aforesaid directions of the NGT which became the subject matter of the Civil Appeals.

Can police investigate into the same set of allegations which form the subject matter of proceedings pending adjudication before Supreme Court?

The question whether such devices are installed in the cars purchased by the 3rd respondent herein and the question whether there was any representation in this regard to the petitioner, are all questions of fact, peculiar and particular to the 3rd respondent herein. NGT had no occasion to examine the cars purchased by the 3rd respondent herein.

The Court said,

“At this stage no one can presume whether the defence of the manufacturer to the police complaint will be purely on a question of fact or purely on a question of law or on mixed questions of fact and law.”

  • If the petitioner takes a defence that no such devices were installed in the cars purchased by the 3rd respondent or that there was no (mis)representation in this regard, it will be a pure question of fact, which cannot be gone into in a quash petition.
  • If the petitioner takes a defence that the installation of such devices, though true, does not violate any law, then it will be a pure question of law.

The Court said that the action initiated by the Automotive Research Association of India in November 2015 and the proceedings that went on before the National Green Tribunal from the year 2015 to the year 2019, have to be seen in the light of the Dieselgate Scandal[1]. All of them were part of the global outrage that actually concerned the damage caused to the environment by the emissions from the cars allegedly fitted with manipulative devices.

The proceedings before the NGT were not intended to address issues relating to individuals, such as

(i) whether any emissions manipulation software, called in common parlance as ‘defeat devices’ were installed in the vehicles purchased by certain individuals; and

(ii) whether any representation was made to the purchasers of the cars in which such devices had been installed, about the emission efficiency level of the cars

Hence, the Court rejected the contention that the substratum of the police complaint is something that is already the subject matter of adjudication before this Court in the appeals arising out of the order of the NGT. It held that the High Court has been fair to the petitioner, by granting protection against arrest till the filing of the report under section 173(2) of the Code.

On Issue 2

Mere delay in lodging the complaint, cannot by itself be a ground to quash the FIR. The law is too well settled on this aspect to warrant any reference to precedents.

On Issue 3

The Court did not go into the third issue as it is a question of fact which has to be established only in the course of investigation/trial.

[Skoda Auto Volkswagen India Private Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 958, decided on 26.11.2020]

*Justice V. Ramasubramanian has penned this judgment 

For Petitioner: Senior Advocate Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi

For 3rd Respondent: Senior Advocate Maninder Singh

[1] In September-2015, allegations of installation of manipulation devices by car manufacturers emerged from the US Environmental Protection Agency triggering investigations in several European Union States. After claims were lodged and legal action initiated, the German Federal Motor Transport Authority appears to have given permission in June-2016 for the recall of about 2 million vehicles across Europe. In the light of these developments, one of the manufacturers entered into an agreement with the US Environmental Protection Agency in December-2016 giving certain options to the customers. These and the subsequent developments, which attained notoriety as the diesel-gate 18 scandal, led to the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof-BGH) giving a ruling on May 25, 2020 in favour of the car owners for damages.
Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: The Division Bench of Surya Prakash Kesarwani and Dr Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, JJ., while addressing the matter with regard to the assignment of the registration number of a motor vehicle made an observation that:

Reservation of registration numbers considered attractive is only as an exception to the general procedure of assignment of registration numbers falling in serial order after the last registration mark assigned, and the same is to be made as per the procedure prescribed under sub-rule (2) of Rule 51-A.

The instant petition was filed seeking for a direction to respondent 2 to provide Registration No. U.P. 85BQ-0001 of LMV to the petitioner and extend the period of two weeks for getting the stated registration number.

Petitioner’s Counsel, Ghanshyam Dwivedi submitted that the petitioner had applied for getting a V.I.P number of the vehicle by depositing Rs 1,00,000 as a fee, however, he wasn’t able to purchase the vehicle.

Since petitioner now wanted to purchase the vehicle, therefore he sought a direction to grant two weeks time to purchase the vehicle and accordingly the V.I.P number may be allotted.

Standing Counsel, Girish Chandra Vishwakarma submitted that in view of the provisions of clauses (v) and (vi) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 51-A of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1981, neither registration number can be allotted nor reservation fee can be refunded to him.

Analysis and Decision

Section 41 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 provides the manner in which registration is to be made.

As per Section 41(6), the registering authority is to assign to the vehicle, for display thereon, a distinguishing mark, referred to as the registration mark, consisting of one of the groups of such of those letters and followed by such letters and figures as are allotted to the State by the Central Government from time to time by notification in the Official Gazette, and displayed and shown on the motor vehicle in such form and in such manner as may be provided by the Central Government.

Rule 51-A of the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicle Rules, 1998 relates to the allotment of registration marks.

Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 51-A of the above-stated rules provides that the assignment of registration mark to motor vehicles shall be as per the Central Government’s notification issued under Section 41(6) of the Act, 1988.

As per the procedure under sub-rule (2), on receipt of an application in the prescribed format under the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, the Registering Authority shall assign a registration number which falls in serial order after the last registration mark assigned subject to the provision for reservation of any registration number as considered necessary to be assigned to the vehicles of Government, as provided under clause (i) of sub-rule (2), or to reserve registration numbers considered attractive as per the procedure provided under sub-rule (2).

Bench stated that in the instant case, although the reservation of the registration number was obtained by depositing the prescribed fee but the vehicle was not purchased so far.

Since, the petitioner failed to produce the vehicle within 30 days as prescribed with an application namely Form-20 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1983, the registration number shall be cancelled, the same number hence can be allotted to any other person.

The registration fee deposited also cannot be refunded in view of the bar contained in clause (v) of Rule 51-A (2).

Assignment of Registration Number

Court observed that the assignment of registration numbers as per the statutory provisions are to be made in serial order after the last registration mark assigned, the reservation of registration numbers can be made only as are considered necessary to be assigned to the vehicles of the Government, or in case of registration number considered attractive, the reservation may be made for any person who submits an application and makes the payment as per the procedure prescribed.

The conditions prescribed in respect of reservation of registration numbers, as are considered attractive, include a clear stipulation under clause (vi) of sub-rule (2) that the reservation of registration number shall be cancelled if the vehicle is not produced within thirty days from the date of reserving the registration number and the number so cancelled can be allotted to any other person by Registering Authority who makes an application along with the fees prescribed.

Petitioner’s application for reservation of a V.I.P number is therefore subject to the conditions provided with regard to the same under sub-rule (2) of Rule 51-A of the Rules, 1998, hence no relief was granted to the petitioner.[Rajesh Gaur v. State of U.P.,   2020 SCC OnLine All 1315, decided on 15-10-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Karnataka High Court: Hemant Chandangoudar J., dismissed the appeal and upheld the impugned award and judgment regarding compensation.

The facts of the case are such that the claimants have sustained accidental injuries on 30-03-2010 due to rash and negligent driving of the Toofan Jeep, and thereby filed claim petitions under Section 166 of Motor Vehicle Act to award just and proper compensation. The Tribunal awarded compensation by judgment and award dated 27-04-2013. Aggrieved by the same the instant appeals have been filed by the Insurance Company challenging the impugned judgment and award.

Counsel for the Insurance Company submitted that the Tribunal has committed an error in fastening liability on the insurance company as the vehicle was insured for private purpose whereas during the accident it was plyed on hire and hence was in violation of the comprehensive policy and against the provisions of Section 149 (2) of MV Act.

The Court relied on judgment titled United India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Kalawathi, ILR 2001 KAR 2328 and observed that

“That apart we do not find any rationale for the insurer as a ‘State’ to discriminate between the paid inmate and the gratuitous inmate when the vehicle is a private vehicle plyed on hire, the owner may be liable for the penal and fiscal consequences under the Motor Vehicle Act for payment of penalty and taxes applicable to the commercial vehicles. But from the standpoint of the insurer, it makes no difference whether the inmate is a paid passenger or gratuitous passenger. When the policy issued is a comprehensive policy covering risk of inmates of private vehicle, the insurer cannot avoid liability on the ground that the inmate is a paid passenger. In that view, we hold that the terms in the policy, which discriminates the liability of the insurer for the paid inmate and gratuitous inmate is discriminatory and illegal.”

The Court held that no discrimination would be made between the paid inmate and gratuitous inmate when the vehicle is covered with a comprehensive policy. If the vehicle is a private vehicle, plyed on hire, the owner may be liable for the penal and fiscal consequences under the provisions of MV Act for payment of penalty and taxes but the insurer cannot avoid liability. Hence, fastening of liability on the Insurance Company to pay compensation cannot be found fault with.

In view of the above, appeals were dismissed.[United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Basavaraj, 2020 SCC OnLine Kar 1652, decided on 02-11-2020]

Arunima Bose, Editorial Assistant has put this story together

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: When a practicing advocate, had suffered in nasty accident at the young age of 18 years, in which his entire left leg was crushed, approached the Court with the plea seeking reform in the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims system, the bench of Dr. AK Sikri and SA Nazeer, JJ asked the Government to consider the feasibility of enacting Indian Mediation Act to take care of various aspects of mediation in general.

The Court also issued the following directions:

  1. The Government may examine the feasibility of setting up Motor Accidents Mediation Authority (MAMA) by making necessary amendments in the Motor Vehicles Act.
  2. In the interregnum, NALSA is directed to set up Motor Accident Mediation Cell which can function independently under the aegis of NALSA or can be handed over to MCPC. Such a project should be prepared within a period of two months and it should start functioning immediately thereafter at various levels as suggested in this judgment. We reiterate the directions contained in order dated November 6, 2017 in Jai Prakash case for implementation of the latest Modified Claims Tribunal Agreed Procedure. For ensuring such implementation, NALSA is directed to take up the same in coordination and cooperation with various High Courts. MACAD Scheme shall be implemented by all Claim Tribunals on All India basis. Banks, Members of Indian Banks Assocation, who had taken decision to implement MACAD Scheme would do the same on All India basis.
  3. The Government should look into the feasibility of framing necessary schemes and for the availability of annuity certificates. This exercise may be done within the period of six months and decision be taken thereupon.
  4. There should be programmes from time to time, in all State Judicial Academies, to sensitizing the Presiding Officers of the Claims Tribunals, Senior Police Officers of the State Police as well as Insurance Company for the implementation of the said Procedure.

The appellant had prayed for:

  • On-road safety and grant of adequate compensation to the victims without any delay. For ensuring expeditious settlement of claims, resort to alternate means which may include innovative measures.
  • Taking adequate steps including adopting innovative measures, to ensure fast track disposal of cases by MACTs.
  • Ensuring receipt of compensation in the safe hands of victims and/or kiths and kins of victims, that too over a sustained period.

[MR Krishna Murthi v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine SC 315, decided on 05.03.2019]

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: In reference relating to the computation of compensation under Sections 163-A and 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MV Act) and the methodology for computation of future prospects, giving a unanimous decision, the 5-judge bench of Dipak Misra, CJ and Dr. AK Sikri, AM Khanwilkar, Dr. DY Chandrachud and Ashok Bhushan, JJ held that the determination of income while computing compensation has to include future prospects so that the method will come within the ambit and sweep of just compensation as postulated under Section 168 of the Act. The bench said:

“To follow the doctrine of actual income at the time of death and not to add any amount with regard to future prospects to the income for the purpose of determination of multiplicand would be unjust.”

Stating that this concept is to be applied to salaried employees and self-employed persons, both, the Court explained that the purchasing capacity of a salaried person on permanent job when increases because of grant of increments and pay revision or for some other change in service conditions, there is always a competing attitude in the private sector to enhance the salary to get better efficiency from the employees. Similarly, a person who is self-employed is bound to garner his resources and raise his charges/fees so that he can live with same facilities. Regarding self-employed persons it was said:

“To have the perception that he is likely to remain static and his income to remain stagnant is contrary to the fundamental concept of human attitude which always intends to live with dynamism and move and change with the time.”

The Court, hence, laid down the following guidelines for computation of compensation:

  • While determining the income, an addition of 50% of actual salary to the income of the deceased towards future prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was below the age of 40 years, should be made. The addition should be 30%, if the age of the deceased was between 40 to 50 years. In case the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years, the addition should be 15%. Actual salary should be read as actual salary less tax.
  • In case the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed salary, an addition of 40% of the established income should be the warrant where the deceased was below the age of 40 years. An addition of 25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years and 10% where the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years should be regarded as the necessary method of computation. The established income means the income minus the tax component.
  • The age of the deceased should be the basis for applying the multiplier.
  • Reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs. 15,000/-, Rs. 40,000/- and Rs. 15,000/- respectively. The aforesaid amounts should be enhanced at the rate of 10% in every three years.
  • The decision in Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation, (2009) 6 SCC 121, is to be relied upon for determination of the multiplicand, the deduction for personal and living expenses, and the selection of multiplier. [National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi, 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1270, decided on 31.10.2017]


Case BriefsForeign Courts

High Court of Australia: In the instant case, the respondent sustained serious spinal injuries which rendered her paraplegic, when she was thrown from the back seat of a car being driven by the appellant who was drunk at the time of the accident. The issue for determination was whether the respondent was contributorily negligent  for choosing to travel in the car driven by the appellant when she ought to have known that he was intoxicated and, secondly, for failing to engage her seatbelt.

The trial Judge rejected the contention of the respondent that the appellant’s erratic driving had prevented her from fastening her seatbelt and held that failure to wear a seatbelt constitutes contributory negligence under Section 49 of the Civil Liability Act 1936. The Judge further held that the exception in Section 47(2)(b) of the Act applies in the present case as the respondent could not reasonably be expected to have avoided the risk of riding with the appellant in the circumstances. On appeal, a majority of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia dismissed the appellant’s appeal on the Section 47(2)(b) issue, and allowed the respondent’s cross-appeal on the issue of Section 49 and held that her failure to fasten her seatbelt was a result of her direct and natural response to the appellant’s erratic driving.

The appellant appealed to the High Court on both issues. A bench of French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Keane And Gordon JJ unanimously dismissed the appeal on the Section 47(2)(b) issue and held that the respondent, who suffered major injuries as a result of a motor vehicle accident, was not contributorily negligent under Section 47 of the Civil Liability Act 1936 for travelling in a car driven by an intoxicated driver, as according to the facts of the case, she could not reasonably be expected to have avoided the risk of travelling with the appellant. However, the Court allowed the appeal and affirmed the trial judge’s finding that the appellant’s driving did not prevent the respondent from fastening her seatbelt and accordingly held that the respondent was contributorily negligent under Section 49 of the Act for failing to wear the seatbelt. [Alex Allen v. Danielle Louise Chadwick, decided on 9-12-2015]

Supreme Court

Supreme Court:  While dealing with the never ending dissension regarding the compensation to be granted in Motor Vehicle Accident cases, a three Judge Bench comprising of Anil R. Dave, Madan B. Lokur and Kurian Joseph,  JJ., held that the correct multiplier to be used shall be with reference to the age of the deceased and not that of the dependents as there is certainty with regard to the age of the deceased but as far as that of dependants is concerned, there will always be room for dispute as to whether the age of the eldest or youngest or even the average, etc., is to be taken. Also, in case of a self-employed bachelor, 50% deduction shall be made towards personal and living expenses.

The present case evolved from the decision of the Motor Vehicles Claim Tribunal and the subsequent appeal in the High Court regarding the award granted for the loss of dependency wherein the claimants are the parents of the deceased, a self-employed bachelor aged 30 years.

The Court with regards to the deduction towards personal and living expenses, fixed it at 50% in cases of bachelors as they would be expected to spend more on themselves unless there is evidence of the dependents. With regards to the multiplier used, the bench altered it from 13 to 17 as the age of the deceased is to be considered while determining the multiplier and the deceased was between 26 to 30 years.  Munna Lal Jain v. Vipin Kumar Sharma2015 SCC OnLine SC 505, decided on 15.05.2015