There can be no two opinions on the view enunciated by the Supreme Court in the Tiger Global case that artificial arrangements eroding Indian tax base should not be tolerated.
Setting the context
The international taxation system rests on the pillar of tax treaties which are executed by nations to limit their taxation rights in a bid to fuel investment, trade, etc. Even though executed at the Government level, because they are interwoven with the domestic tax laws, these treaties permit the taxpayers who qualify as “residents” of the partner countries to claim benefits under these treaties. The transmigration of their treaty rights in the domestic laws, however, is not without friction. This is because the constitutional scheme, the legislative framework, and the administrative machinery must all be aligned in perfect synchronisation with the tax treaty framework for the non-resident to claim the benefit of the tax treaty. The question of domestic law stipulations overriding the treaty provisions (colloquially addressed as “treaty override”) also poses significant challenges for the non-residents in their quest to obviate double taxation by taking shelter of treaty provisions.
The 2003 decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan1 is the locus classicus in this space not just because it enlists the international tax treaty interpretation principles but also inter alia on account of the fact that the decision (1) instituted the foundational objectives sought to be achieved by the Governments through the tax treaties; and (2) unequivocally declared that “treaty shopping” by non-residents is explicitly tolerated by the Governments in pursuit of trade, investment or a wide-variety of other non-tax objectives.2 The Azadi Bachao Andolan case3 is also a primer in India’s international tax policy because it categorically declares that “tax residence certificate” (TRC) issued by the competent authority of the resident country is conclusive proof establishing the tax residence of the non-resident and thereby making it entitled to benefit of tax treaty.4 This determination in the case of Azadi Bachao Andolan5 has successfully steered the national judicial discourse barring a limited excursion in the equally famous Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of India6 decision wherein round-tripping was declared an exception to conclusiveness of TRC.7
In its recent decision in Authority for Advance Rulings (Income Tax) v. Tiger Global International II Holdings8, the Supreme Court of India has concluded that the declaration qua the overriding priority of TRC declared in the Azadi Bachao Andolan case9 is no longer good law. The decision has cited certain amendments in the domestic law to declare that “TRC alone is not sufficient to avail the benefits under the” tax treaty and the Indian tax authorities (ITA) are empowered to independently examine the correctness of the residency claim notwithstanding the TRC. The decision in the Tiger Global case10 is pedestaled on the premise that the contemporary paradigm — as shaped by the legislative enactment of the General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR) and the overwhelming priority to arrest “fraudulent or fictitious transaction” — requires the ITA to be empowered to evaluate the correctness of the residence claims, including if the taxpayers are “in fact residents of a third country on the basis of alleged control and management being exercised from that country”.
In the facts of the Tiger Global case11, the ITA concluded that even though the claim was based on the Mauritius Treaty, “the ‘head and brain’ of the companies, was not in Mauritius and, therefore, their control and management were situated outside Mauritius”, thereby debarring them from Mauritius Treaty benefit notwithstanding the TRC issued in Mauritius. Approving the determination made by the ITA, which had been interjected by the High Court, the Supreme Court held that there is nothing in the tax treaties which inhibits the dilution of the TRC’s relevance by the domestic tax law.12
Reasons compelling revisit
It is submitted that the legal position flowing from this declaration in the Tiger Global case13 needs to be revisited and greater legitimacy needs to be conferred upon TRCs issued by the foreign competent authorities (FCA) exercising their powers under their respective domestic laws in the light of the relevant tax treaty. One needs to appraise the consequences of the determination that TRC is not conclusive proof of residence of the taxpayer which reveals the implications of this determination qua TRC status in the Tiger Global case. Some of the key aspects are enumerated below:
1. Loss of authority and [ir]relevance of competent authority: It needs no reminding that (unlike tax returns which are based on self-assessment) TRC is not a self-generated document; it is instead issued by the competent authority, which is the assessing authority exercising jurisdiction over the taxpayer in question. Hence, for a person claiming to obtain benefit of an Indian tax treaty with another country because the person is an Indian tax resident, such person will require the assessing officer, i.e. a part of the ITA, to issue such certificate. It is obvious that such certificate will be issued only upon formal inquiry and due satisfaction by the ITA that the person is indeed a tax resident of India. Furthermore, such residence is not a question of guesswork; it requires appreciation of complex factual variables and statutory prescriptions which results a legally enforceable document. Put differently, a TRC issued by ITA is a certificate enforceable under law. In such circumstances, what legal and moral authority will ITA carry in the event the TRC issued by it is rejected by the FCA in the treaty country claim that ITA’s TRC is not conclusive proof of the person’s residence in India? Would the ITA’s TRC even have any meaning, other than a ceremonial record, if the FCA were to independently examine if the claim of a person of Indian tax residence? The same holds true for ITA’s refusal to take on its word the FCA’s determination by issuance of TRC to its tax resident. This is now the legal position with the Supreme Court in the Tiger Global case14; the TRC having lost its conclusive determinant of the residential status, the legal and administrative authority of the component authority (both the ITA and the FCA) has been significantly diluted as their certificates are mostly ornamental which can be disregarded by the other authority.
2. Limits of inquiry: Is there a standard checklist of questions that ITA is going to inquire before a non-resident can be declared to be resident of the treaty country claimed by it? After all, each taxpayer will have different business affairs and facts peculiar to it. Clearly an assessing officer of ITA sitting in India neither has the wherewithal nor is the administrative system equipped to process this additional workload of collecting and processing the extraterritorial information belonging to the non-resident taxpayer. Therefore, soul-searching is needed to determine — to what extent is the ITA equipped to appreciate (and more critically, validate) the submissions made by the non-resident taxpayer on its own, without having recourse to the information exchange agreement under the treaty. Thus, a question arises that if the ITA needs to invoke the treaty mechanism and rely upon the information forwarded by the FCA, why reject the TRC determination made by the FCA at all? It does not require overemphasis that the limitation on the resources and the ability of ITA to undertake the determination of non-residents’ factual status should not translate into ad hoc and erratic consequences which will destabilise the system.
3. Unilateral treaty override: The foundational element of the tax treaty is that its functioning requires bilateral commitment and enforceability. Thus, it is incumbent upon the partner countries to enforce its provisions jointly. Rejection by ITA of TRC issued by the FCA implies (a) rejection of the tax treaty provisions which create the enabling mechanism for the FCA to issue the TRC; and (b) disagreement (and unilateral denial) of tax treaty benefit certified by the FCA. Thus, even though the TRC remains valid in one of the treaty partners, it is rejected by the other, which situation is analogous to unilateral override of the tax treaty stipulations, which has otherwise not been found favour by the judiciary.15
4. Rendering treaty anti-avoidance mechanisms redundant?: It is noteworthy that the Governments world over have been mindful of the tax treaty abuse and have worked conjointly with the treaty partners by formally amending the tax treaties to instil mechanisms for addressing their abuse. Inter alia the introduction of the “principal purpose test”16, which has been enforced through domestic law framework17, is the latest increment to the otherwise “beneficial ownership”, “limitation of benefits” and other anti-avoidance clauses which are part of the tax treaties itself. By invoking domestic anti-avoidance tests and allowing ITA to disregard TRC, by implication, the presence (or absence) of tax treaty anti-avoidance mechanisms have been made inconsequential.
5. Pragmatically handicapped ITA: One needs to appreciate that modern taxation systems are outcomes of complex fiscal policy choices which are shaped under constitutional ethos and regional sentiments. Thus, whether a person qualifies as a resident requires familiarity, comprehension, and processing ability qua the taxation regime of that country. In such circumstances, how far will the ITA have the ability to appreciate that entities (coming to multiple countries) qualify as tax resident of their respective countries? With the already overwhelming environment owing to variables such as (a) strict assessment timelines; (b) multiple languages involved; (c) confidentiality and limitations on information availability, etc. how far will the ITA able to pragmatically assess and determine the residential status of an entity in a foreign country, is a serious concern. The natural consequence of an adverse determination (or for that matter even an incomplete exercise to such effect) is the loss of treaty benefits to an entity, which, if denied for procedural or pragmatic reasons, is an entirely avoidable situation given the larger objectives of the tax treaty to facilitate investment and trade. Thus, the fact that such uncertainty will deter foreign investment is implicit without requiring further elaboration.
6. Tax certainty goes for a toss: When three Judges of the Supreme Court in the Vodafone case18 annulled the ITA’s claim to tax offshore transactions, preserving “tax certainty” was one of the prime reasons assigned by it for their conclusion.19 The decision in the Tiger Global case20 turns that principle on its head; year after year the non-resident will remain unsure whether the tax treaty claims shall be available, given the depth and range of questioning that the ITA may engage before concluding on the claims. To illustrate, residence is a question which can change dynamically depending upon facts of each year, with aspects as simple as place of meeting of Board of Directors having a bearing on the determination of the country of residence. Hence, availability of benefits in a given assessment period is not assurance of their continuity in subsequent periods. Such uncertainty clouds long-term planning and thus inhibits free flow of investments. The fact that the non-resident holds a valid TRC, which shall be respected by the ITA, assuages the concerns and gives stability to the planned investments from sudden tax risks.
7. The price of unpredictability: The core foundation of international treaties is that they must be enforced by the treaty countries in “good faith”. Their continued exalted status relies upon reciprocity by the countries and trust by the stakeholders that the obligations shall be respected. However, by quelling the status of the TRC, which is the enabling mechanism for enforcement of treaty claims, the actions of the ITA cast doubts upon the treaty partners over the commitments assumed by the Government bilaterally at the international level, which has a non-descript and unquantifiable price attached to it and can even break down economic partnerships.
Way forward
There can be no two opinions on the view enunciated by the Supreme Court in the Tiger Global case21 that artificial arrangements eroding Indian tax base should not be tolerated. Having said that, one should not through the baby out with the bathwater; instead of indiscriminately rendering TRCs as a ceremonial inconsequential document, the law should provide that TRC issued by the FCA shall remain binding with the caveat that in appropriate cases where further inquiry is considered expedient, the ITA shall work together with the FCA to determine the residential status (or other factual tests requiring satisfaction) of the non-resident concerned. There are many reasons for this suggestion, which are enlisted below:
1. Mutual trust is the foundational element for the very existence of the tax treaty. Hence, if the determination of the FCA is not trusted by the ITA, the underlying premise of the tax treaty is belied. Therefore, TRC issued by the FCA must prima facie be treated as valid unless the ITA is in possession of material which casts doubts over its propriety.
2. The tax treaties itself provide avenue to the competent authorities of the two countries, to, “by mutual agreement settle the mode of application” of the treaty provisions. Thus, by jointly undertaking the investigation on the real and correct status of the non-residents’ treaty entitlement, the tax treaty provisions are effectuated which gives legitimacy and enforceability to the outcome of the investigation, including bilateral denial of rights in instances of abuse.
3. The FCA, having legal status in the resident’s country, clearly has more authority and proximity to the non-resident, which positions it better than the ITA is enquiring about the affairs of such non-resident. Unless the FCA obstructs or fails to meaningfully contribute to the ITA’s investigation, there is no reason for the ITA to singlehandedly venture into inquiry of variables which are far beyond the legal and pragmatic scope of ITA. Thus, by seeking the assistance of FCA, not just the precarious resources of the ITA are meaningfully deployed but also the formal bureaucratic process of investigating in a foreign jurisdiction is avoided and determinations are fast tracked.
4. By providing for joint-inquiry by the competent authorities of the two countries, there shall be dual verification of the non-resident’s records which shall add further credence to the outcome. There is no reason to assume that the FCA will defend tax-abusers once ITA confronts the FCA with material vindicating its position. Thus, obtaining buy-in of the FCA at the investigation stage itself will go a long way in ITA earning trust of the FCA and forging meaningful global partnerships in its quest to address tax evasion.
5. Reciprocity ensures that TRCs issued by ITA to Indian residents claiming benefit of the tax treaty in other countries are not junked by the FCA and treaty entitlement of the Indian resident taxpayers shall remain enforceable in the foreign countries.
6. Almost all treaties provide a dispute resolution mechanism, generally referred to as “mutual agreement procedure” (MAP) wherein an aggrieved taxpayer can initiate the process if the action of a competent authority will result “in taxation not in accordance with the provisions of” the tax treaty. In MAP cases, the disagreements between the two competent authorities are required to be mutually resolved, which process, by experience is agonisingly slow and often results into trade-offs between them. By involving the FCA at the investigation stage itself, ITA can successfully pre-empt MAP claims.
At a larger level, notwithstanding the change in economic dynamics since the seven decades of independence, the constitutional stipulations continue to mandate that the State shall inter alia “maintain just and honourable relations between nations” and “foster respect for international law and treaty obligations”.22 Thus, by avoiding unilateral rejection by the ITA and instead jointly investigating and concluding upon the status of the taxpayer along with the FCA, the ITA would be respecting and abiding with the constitutional ethos thereby translating idealism into practice.
Given that decisions of the Supreme Court are binding on all the authorities,23 which includes not just the ITA but also the Government, the only manner in which the aforesaid tax policy position can be legally instituted is by way of a formal amendment in the statutory scheme. It is now well settled that decisions of the Supreme Court cannot be upset except by legislatively amending the statutory provisions which were interpreted and given effect to in such decisions.24 Put differently, reinstating the validity and relevance of TRC by way of a legislative amendment to the income tax law is an overwhelming priority given the wide ramifications of the Supreme Court’s decision in the Tiger Global case25.
*Advocate, Supreme Court of India; LLM, London School of Economics; BBA, LLB (Hons.) (Double Gold Medalist), National Law University, Jodhpur. Author can be reached at: mailtotarunjain@gmail.com.
1. (2004) 10 SCC 1 : (2003) 263 ITR 706.
2. Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan, (2004) 10 SCC 1, 53-54 : (2003) 263 ITR 706, inter alia the decision states as under:
132. Based on these observations, counsel for the appellants contended that the Preamble of the Indo-Mauritius DTAC recites that it is for the “encouragement of mutual trade and investment” and this aspect of the matter cannot be lost sight of while interpreting the treaty.
133. Many developed countries tolerate or encourage treaty shopping, even if it is unintended, improper or unjustified, for other non-tax reasons, unless it leads to a significant loss of tax revenues. Moreover, several of them allow the use of their treaty network to attract foreign enterprises and offshore activities. Some of them favour treaty shopping for outbound investment to reduce the foreign taxes of their tax residents but dislike their own loss of tax revenues on inbound investment or trade of non-residents. In developing countries, treaty shopping is often regarded as a tax incentive to attract scarce foreign capital or technology. They are able to grant tax concessions exclusively to foreign investors over and above the domestic tax law provisions. In this respect, it does not differ much from other similar tax incentives given by them, such as tax holidays, grants, etc.
134. Developing countries need foreign investments, and the treaty-shopping opportunities can be an additional factor to attract them. The use of Cyprus as a treaty haven has helped capital inflows into eastern Europe. Madeira (Portugal) is attractive for investments into the European Union. Singapore is developing itself as a base for investments in South-East Asia and China. Mauritius today provides a suitable treaty conduit for South Asia and South Africa. In recent years, India has been the beneficiary of significant foreign funds through the “Mauritius conduit”.
Although the Indian economic reforms since 1991 permitted such capital transfers, the amount would have been much lower without the India-Mauritius tax treaty.
135. Overall, countries need to take, and do take, a holistic view. The developing countries allow treaty shopping to encourage capital and technology inflows, which developed countries are keen to provide to them. The loss of tax revenues could be insignificant compared to the other non-tax benefits to their economy. Many of them do not appear to be too concerned unless the revenue losses are significant compared to the other tax and non-tax benefits from the treaty, or the treaty shopping leads to other tax abuses.
136. There are many principles in fiscal economy which, though at first blush might appear to be evil, are tolerated in a developing economy, in the interest of long-term development. Deficit financing, for example, is one; treaty shopping in our view, is another. Despite the sound and fury of the respondents over the so-called “abuse” of “treaty shopping”, perhaps, it may have been intended at the time when the Indo-Mauritius DTAC was entered into. Whether it should continue, and, if so, for how long, is a matter which is best left to the discretion of the executive as it is dependent upon several economic and political considerations. This Court cannot judge the legality of treaty shopping merely because one section of thought considers it improper. A holistic view has to be taken to adjudge what is perhaps regarded in contemporary thinking as a necessary evil in a developing economy.
3. Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan, (2004) 10 SCC 1 : (2003) 263 ITR 706.
4. Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan, (2004) 10 SCC 1, 32-33 : (2003) 263 ITR 706, inter alia the decision states as under:
48. The High Court persuaded itself to hold that the circular is ultra vires the powers of the CBDT on completely erroneous grounds. The impugned circular provides that whenever a certificate of residence is issued by the Mauritian authorities, such certificate will constitute sufficient evidence for accepting the status of residence as well as beneficial ownership for applying the DTAC accordingly. It also provides that the test of residence mentioned above would also apply in respect of income from capital gains on sale of shares. Accordingly, FIIs [foreign institutional investors] etc., which are resident in Mauritius would not be taxable in India on income from capital gains arising in India on sale of shares as per para 4 of Art. 13. This, the High Court thought amounts to issuing instructions “de hors the provisions of the Act”.
49. In our view, this thinking of the High Court is erroneous. The only restriction on the power of the CBDT is to prevent it from interfering with the course of assessment of any particular assessee or the discretion of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). It would be useful to recall the background against which this circular was issued.
50. The income tax authorities were seeking to examine as to whether the assessees were actually residents of a third country on the basis of alleged control of management therefrom.
51. We have already extracted the relevant provisions of Art. 4 which provide that, for the purposes of the agreement, the term “resident of a contracting State” means any person who under the laws of that State is liable to taxation therein by reason of his domicile, residence, place of management or any other criterion of similar nature. The term “resident of India” and “resident of Mauritius” are to be construed accordingly. Art. 13 of the DTAC lays down detailed rules with regard to taxation of capital gains. As far as capital gains resulting from alienation of shares are concerned, Art. 13(4) provides that the gains derived by a “resident” of a contracting State shall be taxable only in that State. In the instant case, such capital gains derived by a resident of Mauritius shall be taxable only in Mauritius. Art. 4, which we have already referred to, declares that the term “resident of Mauritius” means any person who under the laws of Mauritius is “liable to taxation” therein by reason, inter alia, of his residence. Clause (2) of Art. 4 enumerates detailed rules as to how the residential status of an individual resident in both contracting States has to be determined for the purposes of DTAC. Clause (3) of Art. 4 provides that if, after application of the detailed rules provided in Art. 4, it is found that a person other than an individual is a resident of both the contracting States, then it shall be deemed to be a resident of the contracting State in which its place of effective management is situated. The DTAC requires the test of “place of effective management” to be applied only for the purposes of the tie-breaker clause in Art. 4(3) which could be applied only when it is found that a person other than an individual is a resident both of India and Mauritius. We see no purpose or justification in the DTAC for application of this test in any other situation.
52. The High Court has held, and the respondents so contend, that the assessing officer under the Income-tax Act is entitled to lift the corporate veil, but the circular effectively bars the exercise of this quasi-judicial function by reason of a presumption with regard to the certificate issued by the competent authority in Mauritius; conclusiveness of such a certificate of residence granted by the Mauritian tax authorities is neither contemplated under the DTAC, nor under the Income-tax Act a provision as to conclusiveness of a certificate is a matter of legislative action and cannot form the subject matter of a circular issued by a delegate of legislative power.
5. Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan, (2004) 10 SCC 1 : (2003) 263 ITR 706.
6. (2012) 6 SCC 613 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 867 : (2012) 341 ITR 1 : (2012) 170 Comp Cas 369.
7. Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 613, 730-731 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 867 : (2012) 341 ITR 1 : (2012) 170 Comp Cas 369, inter alia the decision states as under:
321. … An Indian Company, with the idea of tax evasion can also incorporate a company off-shore, say in a tax haven, and then create a WOS in Mauritius and after obtaining a TRC may invest in India. Large amounts, therefore, can be routed back to India using TRC as a defence, but once it is established that such an investment is black money or capital that is hidden, it is nothing but circular movement of capital known as round-tripping; then TRC can be ignored, since the transaction is fraudulent and against national interest.
See further, Tarun Jain, “How Vodafone International has Overruled Azadi Bachao Andolan Decision”, (2012) 250 Current Tax Reporter (Articles) 8-22, for a detailed discussion of legal position, available at <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2070444>.
9. Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan, (2004) 10 SCC 1 : (2003) 263 ITR 706.
10. Authority for Advance Rulings (Income Tax) v. Tiger Global International II Holdings, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 86.
11. Authority for Advance Rulings (Income Tax) v. Tiger Global International II Holdings, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 86.
12. Authority for Advance Rulings (Income Tax) v. Tiger Global International II Holdings, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 86, inter alia the decision states as under:
43. Undoubtedly, the mere holding of a TRC cannot, by itself, prevent an enquiry subsequent to the amendments brought into the statute, particularly by the introduction of Section 90(2-A) and Chapter XA to the Act and the Rules, if it is established that the interposed entity was a device to avoid tax. We do not find the terms of the DTAA to be contrary to the provisions of the Income-tax Act and the Rules. We also do not find the terms of the DTAA, as amended, to be contrary to the provisions of the Income-tax Act and the Rules. It is reiterated that the circulars, having since been superseded by statutory amendments, will not come to the aid of the respondents.
13. Authority for Advance Rulings (Income Tax) v. Tiger Global International II Holdings, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 86.
14. Authority for Advance Rulings (Income Tax) v. Tiger Global International II Holdings, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 86.
15. CIT v. New Skies Satellite BV, (2016) 382 ITR 114 : 2016 SCC OnLine Del 796, which has been approved by the Supreme Court in Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence (P) Ltd. v. CIT, (2022) 3 SCC 321 : (2021) 432 ITR 471 and CIT v. Telstra Singapore Pte. Ltd., (2024) 467 ITR 302 : 2024 SCC OnLine Del 5016, it has been declared that domestic law cannot unilaterally override the provisions of the tax treaty.
16. Multilateral Instrument (MLI) (2019), Art. 7 enacts a provision for “prevention of treaty abuse” to provide the following:
Notwithstanding any provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement, a benefit under the Covered Tax Agreement shall not be granted in respect of an item of income or capital if it is reasonable to conclude, having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances, that obtaining that benefit was one of the principal purposes of any arrangement or transaction that resulted directly or indirectly in that benefit, unless it is established that granting that benefit in these circumstances would be in accordance with the object and purpose of the relevant provisions of the Covered Tax Agreement.
Available at <https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/topics/policy-sub-issues/beps-mli/multilateral-convention-to-implement-tax-treaty-related-measures-to-prevent-beps.pdf>; Explanatory Statement to the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, available at <https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/topics/policy-sub-issues/beps-mli/explanatory-statement-multilateral-convention-to-implement-tax-treaty-related-measures-to-prevent-beps.pdf>. Similar provision has since been enacted in many Indian tax treaties.
17. See, Income-tax Act, 1961, S. 90(1)(b).
18. Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 613 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 867 : (2012) 341 ITR 1 : (2012) 170 Comp Cas 369.
19. Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 613, 692 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 867 : (2012) 341 ITR 1 : (2012) 170 Comp Cas 369, inter alia the decision states as under:
180. FDI flows towards location with a strong governance infrastructure which includes enactment of laws and how well the legal system works. Certainty is integral to rule of law. Certainty and stability form the basic foundation of any fiscal system. Tax policy certainty is crucial for taxpayers (including foreign investors) to make rational economic choices in the most efficient manner. Legal doctrines like “limitation of benefits” and “look through” are matters of policy. It is for the Government of the day to have them incorporated in the treaties and in the laws so as to avoid conflicting views. Investors should know where they stand. It also helps the tax administration in enforcing the provisions of the taxing laws.
20. Authority for Advance Rulings (Income Tax) v. Tiger Global International II Holdings, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 86.
21. Authority for Advance Rulings (Income Tax) v. Tiger Global International II Holdings, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 86.
22. Constitution of India, Art. 51.
23. Constitution of India, Art. 141.
24. See generally, Janapada Sabha Chhindwara v. Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd., (1970) 1 SCC 509 (5 Judges) which observes that “[i]t is open to the legislature within certain limits to amend the provisions of an Act retrospectively and to declare what the law shall be deemed to have been, but it is not open to the legislature to say that a judgment of a court properly constituted and rendered in exercise of its powers in a matter brought before it shall be deemed to be ineffective and the interpretation of the law shall be otherwise than as declared by the Court”.
25. Authority for Advance Rulings (Income Tax) v. Tiger Global International II Holdings, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 86.