Supreme Court: While considering this appeal concerning nature of the legal duty cast on the police to draw up a medical report determining the age of a victim while investigating POCSO Act offences, the Division Bench of Sanjay Karol* and N. Kotiswar Singh, JJ., held that determination of age of the victim is a matter of trial and not at the stage of bail.
Furthermore, taking note that repeated judicial notice has been taken of the misuse of POCSO Act the Court directed that a copy of the judgment be circulated to the Secretary, Law, Government of India, to consider initiation of steps as may be possible to curb this menace inter alia, the introduction of a Romeo — Juliet clause exempting genuine adolescent relationships from the stronghold of this law; enacting a mechanism enabling the prosecution of those persons who, by the use of these laws seeks to settle scores etc.
Background:
Respondent was accused of committing offences under Sections 363, 366 of the Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 7 and 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The Trial Court rejected bail.
In the proceedings for bail before the High Court in 2024, the Chief Medical Officer, Jalaun was directed to constitute a medical board for determination of the age of the victim. The Court then released the accused on interim bail, observing that there was wide inconsistency in the age of the victim as in the school records, or as stated by her in her statement under Sections 161 and 164 CrPC regarding age/intimacy with the accused among other factors. The impugned judgment had noted recurring systemic lapses wherein the police failed to obtain medical age reports, Trial Courts ignored scientifically assessed age, and consensual adolescent relationships were criminalised under the POCSO Act due to falsified age records. This systemic malfunction, according to the Court, necessitated corrective judicial directives. The Single Judge Bench of the Court had accepted the medically determined age of the prosecutrix as above 18 years and consequently, allowed bail subject to conditions. The Court had directed to mandatorily conduct a test for age verification at the inception of the investigation.
Issues for Consideration:
Whether under Section 439, CrPC the High Court could have issued directions, mandating age determination test to be conducted in all cases involving the POCSO Act. The Court pointed out that this larger question involved twin considerations, one on the aspect of jurisdiction and the other on the aspect of law i.e., the postulate of the act regarding determination of age, and how the directions issued in the impugned judgement correspond to or are in contravention of the same.
Court’s Assessment:
Upon undertaking independent examination of the issue, the Court referred to Section 439 CrPC and explained that Court’s jurisdiction, i.e., either the Court of Sessions or the High Court under Section 439 CrPC is limited to adjudicating the question of the person concerned being released into society pending trial or whether they should continue to be incarcerated. The Court explained that a statutory power is derivative and conditional, drawing its vitality from a law duly enacted by the Parliament or a State Legislature. Such power exists only within the four corners of the enabling statute and is circumscribed by its language, purpose, and legislative intent. A constitutional power is the one which emanates directly from the text and spirit of the Constitution and such powers are self-sustaining; they are not contingent upon any act of the Legislature, nor can they be abridged or extinguished except through a formal amendment under Article 368.
The constitutional power cannot overshadow the statutory power, enlarging its scope beyond what has been envisaged by the statute. While both powers rest with the High Court, one power cannot usurp the ambit of another, unless otherwise permitted by law.
Considering the sustainability of the directions in the impugned judgment to mandatorily conduct a test for age verification at the inception of the investigation, the Court noted that Section 2(d)of the POCSO Act defines a child as any person below eighteen years. So, for the provisions of this Act to be applied, the person against whom the offence in question has been perpetrated must necessarily be below 18 years of age. It was further noted that Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 provides the same hierarchy of documents as has been provided by Section 94 of the JJ Act. The Court highlighted the difference between POCSO Act and JJ Act and stated that the JJ Act is primarily focused on dealing with children in conflict with law and children in need of care and protection, rather than victims of offences who are minors.
The Court then explained that POCSO Act does not prescribe a manner for determination of the age of the victim, and it is an established position in law that the procedure under Section 94 of the JJ Act is to be applied. The consideration of the documents enumerated in Section 94, JJ Act is a matter of consideration of evidence since it may involve the examination of witnesses to prove the veracity of the documents. That can only be done by the Trial Court. Contra evidence to challenge the documents, can also be presented only before the Trial Court. Therefore, the High Court fell in error in holding that a Court in bail jurisdiction is empowered to entertain a challenge to the documents as Section 94 would not apply at the bail stage. Furthermore, a Court, at the stage of bail cannot conduct a mini trial.
The Court thus stated that a medical determination of age of a victim cannot be resorted to as a matter of course, much less mandated. It can only be employed in a given circumstance when the other stipulations of Section 94 JJ Act are not/cannot be met.
Conclusion and Observations:
Thus, the Court the High Court in bail jurisdiction was coram non judice for issuing directions mandating the investigating authorities within the State of Uttar Pradesh to necessarily have a medical examination of the victim conducted, with the particular intent to determine the age of the victim as also holding, that a bail Court would be empowered to entertain challenges to the documents produced to establish the age of the victim. The Court could not have passed directions that go against clearly stated legislative intent under Section 94 of the JJ Act. The determination of the age of the victim is a matter for trial, and the presumption which is accorded to the documents enumerated under the Section, has to be rebutted there, for that is the appropriate forum to do so, not the bail Court. Therefore, the impugned judgment was set aside.
The Court further highlighted the misuse of POCSO Act provisions and Section 498-A IPC and Dowry Act provisions and emphasised upon the responsibility of the Courts and Advocates. The Court stated that POCSO Act is one of the most solemn articulations of justice aimed at protecting the children. Yet, when this legislation is misused, misapplied and used as a tool for exacting revenge, the notion of justice itself teeters on the edge of inversion. “Misuse of the POCSO Act highlights a grim societal chasm – on the one end children are silenced by fear and their families are constrained by poverty or stigma, meaning thereby that justice remains distant and uncertain, and on the other hand, those equipped with privilege, literacy, social and monetary capital are able to manipulate the law to their advantage”.
[State of UP v. Anurudh, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 40, decided on 9-1-2026]
*Judgment by Justice Sanjay Karol
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For Petitioner(s): Ms. Ruchira Goel, AOR
For Respondent(s): Mr. D.S. Parmar, Adv. (Amicus Curiae) Mr. Saurabh Singh, Adv. Ms. Archana, Adv. Mr. Vedant Tiwari, Adv.
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