Disclaimer: This has been reported after the availability of the order of the Court and not on media reports so as to give an accurate report to our readers.
Rajasthan High Court: In a writ petition filed by the petitioner challenging the inaction of the respondent-authorities, who, despite the specific directions contained in the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal, failed to reinstate the petitioner to his post as Bus Conductor, a Single Judge Bench of Farjand Ali, J., held that the architecture of a Tribunal is not merely administrative in character but is quasi-judicial in its very constitution, thus, orders emanating from such a body are judicial in essence, endowed with authoritative efficacy, and cannot be treated as inconsequential, advisory, or optional for compliance.
Considering that petitioner’s service tenure had come to an end, the Court directed that he should be treated as reinstated in service and should be deemed to have been continuously in service for all purposes.
Background
In 1982, the petitioner was initially appointed as a Bus Conductor in the respondent-department and was subsequently confirmed in service in February 1984. In 1990, while performing his official duties on Bus, an inspection was carried out by the departmental inspectors and during the said inspection, the petitioner was alleged to have failed to issue valid tickets to 28 passengers travelling on the bus. The petitioner’s alleged that the said inspectors were harboring personal animosity against him by fabricating false allegations in retaliation to his refusal to meet their unlawful demand for “Kharcha Pani.”
Pursuant to it, the petitioner was placed under suspension and thereafter, a charge sheet was issued to him by the Divisional Manager to which he submitted comprehensive reply refuting all allegations and requesting permission to produce documentary and testimonial evidence.
Subsequently, the respondent authorities initiated disciplinary proceedings, which culminated in an order of removal from service. Thereafter, the respondents approached the Industrial Tribunal (‘Tribunal’) seeking approval of the removal order under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In 2019, the Tribunal set aside the decision of removal of the petitioner from services as the charges were not found, thus, ordered to reinstate and allow the petitioner to work.
Despite the binding and unambiguous findings of the learned Industrial Tribunal, the petitioner was not reinstated in service. He repeatedly filed representations to the respondent authorities seeking compliance with the Tribunal’s order. Aggrieved by continued inaction and deliberate non-compliance, the petitioner approached the High Court.
The respondents contended that a departmental inquiry was conducted in accordance with prevailing rules, providing the petitioner with ample opportunity to present evidence, and he was lawfully terminated.
Analysis and Decision
The Court noted that despite clear, categorical, and binding findings recorded by the Tribunal, the respondents failed to comply with its directions. Further, the Court specified that the respondents were fully empowered to challenge the said order before a competent forum within the prescribed period of limitation, however, they elected not to avail any such statutory remedy. Thus, the Tribunal’s order attained finality in the eyes of the law.
The Court held that once a judicially reasoned and statutorily empowered determination attains finality, it becomes wholly impermissible for the respondents to assail, dilute, or circumvent its operation by indirect, collateral, or extraneous means. Thus, the Court specified that the order of the Tribunal remained operative and binding between the parties to the lis unless and until it was annulled, modified, or stayed by a superior forum exercising lawful jurisdiction.
The Court held that the removal order was rightly set aside, hence, any contention advanced by the respondents alleging that the Tribunal misconceived the legal position stood wholly misconstrued and devoid of substance. The Court stated that “It was incumbent upon the respondents, as a matter of constitutional discipline and administrative propriety, to honor, implement, and give full effect to the Tribunal’s order in toto.”
The Court stated that their failure to do so coupled with their attempt to raise a belated, untenable, and legally unsound plea before the Court without first invoking any statutory remedy exhibited a contumacious disregard for the rule of law. Such conduct not only militated against judicial propriety but also warranted serious deprecation.
The Court stated that the architecture of a Tribunal is not merely administrative in character but is quasi-judicial in its very constitution being statutorily enacted, functioning within the constitutional framework, and presided over by a judicial officer or a person endowed with commensurate legal acumen. Thus, order emanating from such a body is judicial in essence, endowed with authoritative efficacy, and cannot be treated as inconsequential, advisory, or optional for compliance. If any aggrieved party believes the Tribunal’s order to be erroneous, the remedy lies strictly within the parameters of law through appeal, revision, review, or writ proceedings and not through defiance, speculative objection, or administrative inaction. The Court stressed that a party cannot claim to question the validity of such an order without first invoking the legally sanctioned remedies available under the judicial hierarchy.
The Court observed that the plea sought to be raised by the respondents that the Tribunal misconceived its jurisdiction or erred in law was not only legally unsustainable but also an affront to the well-settled principles governing the finality of judicial determinations. The Court stated that “Such conduct undermines the sanctity of institutional adjudication, erodes the authority of quasi-judicial forums, and strikes at the very foundation of judicial discipline”. Further, the Court specified that Tribunal’s order, being one passed by a competent quasi-judicial forum, commands unqualified, unconditional, and immediate obedience unless and until it is superseded by a competent judicial pronouncement.
Considering that several years had gone by and the petitioner’s service tenure had come to an end, the Court stated that being the sentinel of the Constitution and having superintending jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution rather than directing the petitioner, in the given circumstances, to resume duty for compliance of the order, it found it appropriate to issue certain directions to uphold the sanctity of the law and to ensure finality of a judicial order.
The Court disposed of the petition at hand with the following directions:
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The petitioner should be treated as reinstated in service and deemed to have been continuously in service for all purposes.
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The charge-sheet issued against the petitioner and the decision in inquiry proceeding should be treated non-existent.
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All consequential benefits, including salary, allowances, seniority, emoluments, and retiral benefits, as provided under law, should be restored.
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The respondents should ensure full compliance with the Tribunal’s order and pay all dues to the petitioner along with interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, within sixty days.
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The respondents should act with due diligence to ensure complete, faithful, and timely compliance with the aforesaid directions, thereby rectifying the prolonged injustice and restoring the petitioner’s lawful entitlements.
[Shyam Sundar Vaishnav v. Rajasthan State Road Trans. Corporation Ltd., S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 79 of 2020, decided on 12-11-2025]
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioner: Urmila Chouhan, Advocates
For the Respondent: Avin Kr. Chhangani and Shruti Rathi, Advocates