Madhya Pradesh High Court: In a suo motu case registered against two orders passed by a Coordinate Single Judge Bench (‘the Single Bench’) wherein the Single Bench had passed damning and disparaging remarks against the Trial Court, the Division Bench of Atul Sreedharan and Pradeep Mittal, JJ., directed the Registrar General, Madhya Pradesh High Court, to file a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court within 10 days from the date of this order, holding that the said orders were untouchable by the Court. It was only the discretion of the Supreme Court, if it so deems fit, to consider the said orders judicially.
Background
The suo motu wit petition was registered against two orders passed by the Single Bench in regular bail applications filed in Roop Singh Parihar v. State of Madhya Pradesh1 and Imratlal v. State of Madhya Pradesh2, which arose from a complaint registered under Sections 420, 409, 467, 468, 471, 120B and 107 of the Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’) and Section 13(1)(A) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (‘PC Act’).
The bail application was filed by accused 1, who was the computer operator in the office of the Land Acquisition Officer and allegedly embezzled money by transferring it into the accounts of persons, including himself, while being incompetent to receive such money meant for disbursal of compensation to the beneficiaries whose lands were acquired.
The Trial Court had discharged the accused 1 for all the offences and instead framed a charge under Section 406 of the IPC for criminal breach of trust. The Single Bench rejected the applications but condemned the Trial Court Judge. Hence, the present proceedings.
Analysis
At the outset, the Court noted that from the aforementioned orders, it appeared that no revision (if at all filed) by the State was pending before the Single Bench.
The Court stated that in paragraph 12 of the impugned orders, the Single Bench passed damning and disparaging remarks against the Trial Court much against the consistent law laid down by the Supreme Court stating that the High Courts must desist from passing observation which have the propensity to besmirch the fair name of the Trial Court Judge, even before he is allowed to defend his order. Further, the Single Bench had unfortunately even named the Trial Court Judge instead of referring to the Judge by the Court he occupied, and the public domain was rife with controversy.
The Court remarked that the direction in para 12 of the order was chilling because, firstly, it concluded that the order of discharge passed by the Trial Court was passed to “give undue advantage” to the accused. Secondly, it speculated an ulterior motive on the part of the Trial Court Judge by observing “it appears that the 1st Additional Sessions Judge has ulterior motives”.
“This, unfortunately, was absolutely uncalled for and a violation of the Supreme Court’s consistent direction to the High Courts to desist from such observations in judicial orders.”
In this regard, the Court referred to Sonu Agnihotri v. Chandra Shekhar, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3382, wherein the Supreme Court held that the superior courts exercising such powers can set aside erroneous orders and expunge uncalled and unwarranted observations. While doing so, the superior courts can legitimately criticise the orders passed by the Trial Courts or the Appellate Courts by giving reasons. There can be criticism of the errors committed, in some cases, by using strong language. However, such observations must always be in the context of errors in the impugned order. While doing so, the Courts have to show restraint, and adverse comments on the personal conduct and calibre of the Judicial Officer should be avoided. There is a difference between criticising erroneous orders and criticising a Judicial Officer. The first part is permissible. The second category of criticism should be best avoided. If strictures are passed personally against a Judicial Officer, it causes prejudice to the Judicial Officer, apart from the embarrassment involved.
The Court held that the observations in para 12 of the orders were in excess of the exercise of bail jurisdiction as the Single Bench was not adjudicating any revision preferred against the order passed by the Trial Court, but had yet to comment upon the order framing charge by the Trial Court.
The Court stated that, under articles 227 and 235, it exercises the power of superintendence over the District Judiciary. In that capacity, it not only has to correct the errors on the part of the District Judiciary, but also has to discharge its function as the guardian of the District Judiciary.
“The High Court becomes the sentinel protecting the District Judiciary from its (High Court’s) excesses and ensures that the independence and fearlessness of the District Judiciary is not emasculated, i.e., weakened or reduced in power and authority.”
The Court further stated that as the said orders were passed in miscellaneous criminal cases, the same were not amenable to the appellate jurisdiction of the Court. The Court noted that earlier, in similar cases, writ appeals had been entertained suo motu by the Division Benches of the Court, holding that exceeding jurisdiction in a bail order would be considered as an order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution. However, the Court disagreed with this stance. Though the High Court had extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 and inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (‘CrPC’), irrespective of the roster, the exercise of either had to be through a conscious process where the High Court, unambiguously or through inescapable inference, discloses its intention to exercise such authority. However, when the High Court exceeds its discretion and jurisdiction in a given case, the same has to be deemed an error on the part of the High Court rather than presuming the same to be an order in the exercise of its extraordinary or inherent jurisdiction.
Holding that since the said orders were untouchable by the Court and it was only the discretion of the Supreme Court, if it so deems fit, to consider the said orders judicially, the Court directed the Registrar General, Madhya Pradesh High Court, to file a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court within 10 days from the date of this order. The Court further stated that as this order was not passed in an adversarial capacity and there was no adversity suffered by the High Court on account of this order, it obviated the necessity to issue notice and call for a reply from the High Court.
[Court on its own motion v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Writ Petition No. 38432/2025, decided on 22-09-2025]
1. M. Cr. C No. 27465/2025
2. M. Cr. C No. 28265/2025
