Judicial Canopy: Defining “Forest” in India: Guide to the Article

Introduction

In India, the question of what constitutes a “forest” has long eluded definitive legal clarity, generating significant tension between environmental conservation and developmental ambitions. The recent case of Auroville Foundation v. Navroz Kersasp Mody¹ thrusts this definitional dilemma into the spotlight, as the Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether a man-made plantation within an ecologically sensitive area qualifies as a forest under the Van (Sanrakshan Evam Samvardhan) Adhiniyam, 1980².

This case³ serves as a prism through which broader issues in forest governance — such as the treatment of afforested private lands, the convoluted legal status of “deemed forests”, and the applicability of environmental statutes, being subjected to a multiplicity of inconsistent interpretations. While the courts underscored the need for legal precision over ecological perception, their judgment raises troubling questions about the adequacy of current frameworks to accommodate evolving forms of forest cover.

At the heart of these disputes lies a fundamental legal and policy questions: Who should define the term “forest”? Should Parliament legislate a clear and uniform definition, or should the judiciary continue to evolve its meaning on a case-by-case basis through precedent? This definitional uncertainty is not merely academic; it bears directly on the ability of the judiciary to exercise meaningful oversight through mechanisms like continuing mandamus, particularly in T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India⁴ line of jurisprudence. If the contours of what qualifies as a forest remain unsettled, can the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction be coherently applied across diverse factual contexts?

Thus, from the legacy of Godavarman case⁵ to the restrictive definitions introduced under the Forest (Conservation) Amendment Act, 2023⁶, this article traces the shifting judicial and legislative landscape that governs forests in India. In doing so, it reveals the growing disconnect between the ecological reality on the ground and its legal recognition — one that demands urgent policy attention if India’s environmental objectives are to remain credible and effective.

This evolving legal landscape is being tested in contemporary cases, such as Auroville Foundation case⁷ dispute, where the courts grapple with the legal status of regenerated or “man-made” forests amidst development plans.

Auroville and the Darkali dispute: Triggering the debate

The Auroville Foundation Act was passed in 1988⁸, which recognised the Auroville Foundation as a statutory body under the control of the Ministry of Human Resource Development. Standing orders were issued to establish a Town Development Council to develop a Master Plan for the area. The plan was first approved by the Governing Board of the Appellant Foundation in 1999 and subsequently by the Town and Country Planning Organisation, Ministry of Urban Development, on 15-2-2001.

The respondents (Navroz Kersasp Mody & Ors.) in this case⁹, applied the National Green Tribunal (NGT), alleging that the foundation’s work on road construction would lead to the destruction of the Darkali Forest and cause severe environmental damage. They argued that the land is a deemed forest and was entitled to protection as mandated

Furthermore, Respondents 1 and 2 approached the NGT, alleging that the Foundation’s work on road construction, including the Crown Road and Outer Ring Road, would destroy the Darkali Forest and cause severe environmental damage. According to them, the area covered by that land was deemed forest and entitled to protection as mandated in Godavarman case¹⁰.

Man-made forests and legal grey zones

Therefore, regarding the question of whether the area in question falls under the definition of a forest, the NGT referred to the judgment in Construction of Park at Noida near Okhla Bird Sanctuary, In re¹¹,¹² wherein in a similar factual scenario, the Court addressed the legality of constructing a park involving the felling of numerous trees adjacent to the Okhla Bird Sanctuary. The State of Uttar Pradesh contended that the project site was not classified as forest land and that the trees removed were planted and were not naturally occurring. The Central Empowered Committee (CEC) supported this view, noting that the area was not designated as a forest and that the removed trees were planted, not naturally regenerated.

Beyond “forest”: Categories outside the legal definition

(i) The Court also acknowledged that land could transition into “forest land” over time, and man-made forests can be treated similarly to natural forests. This interpretation is not universally applicable and must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

(ii) In this case¹³, because the land was consistently recorded as agricultural land in the revenue records, man-made plantation did not fall under the definition of “forest” under the Van (Sanrakshan Evam Samvardhan) Adhiniyam, 1980.

(iii) It was also held that trees planted in urban parks and subsequently cut down within a 12-14 year period do not constitute a “forest” under the Van (Sanrakshan Evam Samvardhan) Adhiniyam, 1980, as the trees were not planted with the intention of afforestation.

The above tests to understand “forest” may be important considering restorative and compensatory afforestation under Compensatory Afforestation Fund Management and Planning Authority (CAMPA). It is important to note here that under CAMPA, a compensatory land is transferred, and mutation is done in favour of the Forest Department. It must then be recorded as “forest land” despite or despite sufficient tree cover.

Supreme Court’s view

In the present appeal, owing to the factual scenario and based on the interpretation of the law, the Supreme Court of India overturned the NGT’s ruling and provided the following key observations:

(i) The Court noted that the Master Plan for Auroville Foundation case¹⁴ had been duly approved by the competent authority in 2001. Therefore, the activities undertaken by the Auroville Foundation, including road construction, aligned with this approved plan.

(ii) The Court observed that the area under question had not been treated or depicted as a forest in any government documents and therefore cannot be denoted as a forest. Furthermore, it was observed that the area consisted of man-made plantations of some species and consequently beyond the definition of forest as understood under the Van (Sanrakshan Evam Samvardhan) Adhiniyam, 1980.¹⁵

Legislative and judicial cartography of “forest”

In the above context, the definition of “forest” as it stands now would be useful in perusing the legislative attempts to delineate forests in India. The first enactment that subjected forests to protection and reservation and charted a course for conserving forest land was the Forest Act, 1878¹⁶. Thereafter, the Forest Act, 1927¹⁷ classified forests as reserve forests and protected forests, which make up the total “recorded forest area” of India.

(i) Subsequently, the Government of India, in pursuance of the National Forest Policy of 1952¹⁸, which sought, inter alia, to bring at least one-third of the total land area in India under forest cover, promulgated the 42nd Amendment to the Indian Constitution¹⁹. The 42nd Amendment introduced Articles 48-A, 51-A and 51-A(g) to improve forest protection and conservation.²⁰ Furthermore, the Amendment transferred the legislative entry of “forests” from the State List to the Concurrent List in Schedule 7.²¹

(ii) Furthermore, utilising the widened constitutional mandate, the Central Government enacted the Van (Sanrakshan Evam Samvardhan) Adhiniyam, 1980. However, since the definition of forests had not been explicitly provided for in the legislation itself, the Supreme Court in 1996²², opined that the provisions of the Van (Sanrakshan Evam Samvardhan) Adhiniyam, 1980 would apply to all “forests” as understood from the dictionary meaning of the word, irrespective of the nature of ownership or classification of such forest.

(iii) Moreover, it was also established that “forest land” would include “forest” and any area recorded as forest in the records of the Government. This meant that areas can be deemed to be forests notwithstanding the notification, recognition or classification as forests under any legislation and ownership rights established for the land of any forest. Furthermore, it also meant that areas that were earlier forests but had been degraded, denuded or cleared would also be deemed to be forests.

(iv) Furthermore, the concept of deemed forests emerged from the landmark Supreme Court judgment in Godavarman case²³, wherein the Court broadened the scope of the term “forest” to include not only statutorily notified forests but also any land that fits the dictionary description of a forest, regardless of ownership or legal status. Under this interpretation, lands like Devara Kadu, Baane, Kumki Land, Amrith Mahal Kaval, and others, often culturally or ecologically significant, could qualify as deemed forest.

(v) However, the term “deemed forest” is not explicitly defined in Indian law, leading to varied interpretations by agencies and courts. For example, the Karnataka High Court²⁴, rejected the concept as legally untenable, holding that land must be classified as forest or non-forest, with no middle category. Contrastingly, the Karnataka High Court, in a case²⁵ concerning the conversion of 37 acres of teak plantation into an industrial area, has also held that the forest must be protected irrespective of the ownership or classification thereof. Interestingly, the Supreme Court²⁶ reiterated that even lands not officially notified but having the characteristics of a forest (such as those under the Punjab Land Preservation Act, 1900²⁷) must comply with the Van (Sanrakshan Evam Samvardhan) Adhiniyam, 1980 framework before being diverted for non-forest use.

(vi) Thereafter, while deliberating on the definition of forests, the Supreme Court has constantly relied on the 1996 judgment²⁸, and pointed out that an extensive tract of land having dense growth of trees, thickets, mangroves, etc. would be considered a forest.²⁹ Similarly, it has also held that merely some trees and thickets in contradiction to dense outgrowth on an extensive tract of land fall beyond the purview of forests.³⁰

(vii) Beyond judicial and legislative interpretations, the executive has also strived to define forest cover by adopting an international and statistical framework. Relying on decision 19/Conference of Parties (COP) 9 to the Kyoto Protocol, countries can define “forest” based on structural parameters adapted to their domestic capacities and ecological conditions. The Indian Government has adopted the following parameters, widely accepted by both the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)³¹ and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO): minimum tree canopy cover of 10%, minimum area of land of one hectare and minimum potential tree height at maturity in situ: 2 meters.³²

(viii) In alignment with these structural criteria, India’s forest cover is officially defined in the India State of Forest Report (ISFR) as: “All land, more than one hectare in area, with a tree canopy density of more than 10 per cent, irrespective of ownership and legal status. Such land may not necessarily be a recorded forest area. It also includes orchards, bamboo and palm.”³³

(ix) This broader, capacity-based definition is used in India’s national and international environmental reporting. Importantly, forest cover in ISFR is divided into:

Inside recorded forest area: Mostly comprising natural forests and government-managed plantations.

Outside recorded forest area: Including mango orchards, coconut plantations, and block agroforestry plantations.³⁴

(x) At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that vide Section 1-A(1)³⁵ of the Forest (Conservation) Amendment Act, 2023³⁶, The definition of forest has been modified to include both: (i) land declared/notified as a forest under the Forest Act, 1927, or under any other law; and (ii) land not covered in the first category but notified as a forest on or after 25-10-1980, in a government record. Therefore, the legislative definition of forest has shrunk to exclude land recorded as forest before 25-10-1980 but not notified as a forest.³⁷

(xi) Furthermore, the proviso to Section 1-A(1) excludes areas which had been changed from forest use to non-forest use before the Supreme Court’s decision in 1996³⁸. Subsequently, Section 1-A(2)(a) of the Forest (Conservation) Amendment Act, 2023 declared that forest land situated alongside a rail line or a public road maintained by the Government which has been intended to provide access to a habitation, rail and roadside amenity, would be excluded from the definition of forest.

(xii) Similarly, Section 1-A(2)(b) excludes trees, tree plantations, or reafforestation raised on lands that are neither declared/notified as forests nor are recorded as forests in any government records. This exemption clarifies that private plantations and afforested areas will not be considered as deemed forests.³⁹ Furthermore, forest land intended for security-related infrastructure and forest land falling within 100 km of the line of control and international borders of India are also excluded from the categorisation of forests vide Section 1-A(2)(c).⁴⁰

NGT overreach? Supreme Court’s legal objections

(i) In that vein, the Supreme Court has rightly observed that the land area under the Auroville Project comprises man-made plantation of trees, which is clearly beyond the remit of the statutory definition of “forest”.

(ii) The Court also found that the NGT had misapplied the “precautionary principle”. Since the Master Plan had already received approval, the Court held that the NGT’s intervention was unwarranted.

(iii) Further, the Tribunal’s order to set up a Joint Committee for inspection was beyond the jurisdiction since no substantial environmental issue arose under Schedule I of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 (NGT Act)⁴¹, which states that the NGT can only hear cases related to laws listed in Schedule I, such as the Van (Sanrakshan Evam Samvardhan) Adhiniyam, 1980, the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974⁴², the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981⁴³ and the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986⁴⁴.

(iv) Furthermore, controversially, the Court held that since the land was not classified as forest land, no Schedule I environmental laws applied, and the NGT lacked jurisdiction over the dispute.

The Supreme Court’s critique

The Supreme Court noted that the NGT had expressly rejected the allegations raised by the respondents regarding the forest status of the area in question. Despite arriving at this clear finding, the Tribunal, somewhat paradoxically, proceeded to invoke the “precautionary principle”, constituting a Joint Committee to inspect the area and explore possible modifications to the proposed road width. It also directed the appellant Foundation to formulate a comprehensive township plan for the land presently under its possession and the area conceptualised by the “mother”.

In the Supreme Court’s considered view, the Tribunal had overstepped its jurisdiction by venturing into the narrow confines of judicial review, under the pretext of applying the “precautionary principle” in the absence of compelling circumstances.

This case controversially notes the principle that not all tree-covered lands qualify as forests under the Van (Sanrakshan Evam Samvardhan) Adhiniyam, 1980. Whether man-made plantations can be classified as forests depends on several factors, including:

(i) The original land classification in revenue records, such as agricultural land versus forest land: Land can transition into “forest land” over time if its characteristics align with the definition of a forest. However, this must be assessed on a case-by-case basis rather than presumed.

(ii) The purpose for planting the trees (e.g. afforestation versus urban beautification): In cases where land has consistently been recorded as agricultural land in revenue records, the mere presence of planted trees does not qualify it as a forest under the Van (Sanrakshan Evam Samvardhan) Adhiniyam, 1980.

(iii) The intent of the plantation efforts and the ecological impact over time: Urban parks with planted trees do not automatically acquire the status of forest land, particularly if the trees were not intended for afforestation but for aesthetic or landscaping purposes.⁴⁵

Does this case overrule the aim and purpose of Goadvarman case⁴⁶, wherein the Supreme Court grabbed the dictionary definition and later stayed the Forest (Conservation) Amendment Act, 2023, which attempted to define “forest”. The continuing mandamus forest case⁴⁷ in India created the fiction of “deemed forest”, part from declared, notified, recorded or those forest land which “use” has been changed to non-forest purpose before 12-12-1996.

The above two cases attempted to cover and include “forest” irrespective of records, ownership, categorisation and types of land. It seems so now. Whether this case was decided in the above manner because of the approval of the Master Plan in 1948 managed under the Auroville Foundation Act of 1988?

Forests in form, function or legal fiction? Unanswered questions

Since forests fall within the Concurrent List of the Constitution (Entry 17-A, List III of Schedule 7)⁴⁸ both the Union and State Legislatures have the authority to enact laws concerning forest governance. This dual authority makes it necessary to consider the regulatory landscape of individual States when attempting to delineate the scope and meaning of “deemed forests”. Karnataka offers a useful case study in this regard, as it provides a dual classification of forest land, namely, “notified forests” and “deemed forests”.⁴⁹

For private lands that are not notified as forests but are covered with plantations or tree cover, the Karnataka Preservation of Trees Act, 1976⁵⁰ becomes applicable. This Act imposes restrictions on tree felling in selected rural and semi-urban areas across nine districts, forty-seven talukas, and sixty-five municipal regions. However, there are specific exemptions under the Karnataka Preservation of Trees Act, 1976. Under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961⁵¹, agricultural land must be cultivated. If the occupant fails to cultivate the land for three consecutive years, the State has the authority to reclaim and dispose of it.⁵² However, the Act also provides a limited safeguard: the Tahsildar may condone non-cultivation if “sufficient reasons” are demonstrated. This provision introduces discretionary ambiguity for government officers in cases like the Malhotra’s sanctuary wherein abandoned agricultural land has been intentionally kept uncultivated for ecological regeneration which would otherwise come within the definition of a private “deemed forest”.⁵³

Karnataka’s forest dualism: Notified versus deemed forests

In light of the above, “notified forests” in Karnataka are those formally declared as such under the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963⁵⁴ and the Karnataka Forest Rules, 1969. These lands are strictly regulated, and the law mandates that any felling, collection, or removal of trees from such private forests must be undertaken only with a permit issued by the Karnataka Forest Department.⁵⁵ In contrast, deemed forests are not formally notified but are treated as forests based on entries in government records and the actual characteristics of the land. Such lands, although privately owned, are ecologically indistinguishable from government forests and are therefore governed under the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in environmental jurisprudence.

The Karnataka High Court has dealt with a crucial point in Indian forest jurisprudence.⁵⁶ It has unequivocally stated that there is no legal or ecological distinction between government-owned and privately-owned forests. What matters is the nature and character of the land — not who owns it. The Court was asked to intervene as the land in question lay within the ecologically sensitive Baba Budan Giri range, surrounded by State forests and near the Bhadra Wildlife Sanctuary. Though the area included residual coffee plantations, it also hosted dense natural vegetation, seasonal streams, and critical water catchments. Granting mining permission in such a landscape would have damaged Shola forests disrupted water sources and undermined the ecological stability of the region. The Court observed that:

22. … there cannot be any distinction between the government forest and private forest in the matter of forest wealth of the Nation and in the matter of environment and ecology.⁵⁷

Further, the Court emphasised that the term “forest” must be interpreted in its ordinary, dictionary sense. This encompasses officially recorded forests (reserved, protected, or otherwise designated) and any extensive tract of land covered with trees, undergrowth, shrubs, or natural vegetation, regardless of ownership.⁵⁸ Thus, the Van (Sanrakshan Evam Samvardhan) Adhiniyam, 1980, aimed at preventing deforestation and preserving ecological balance, applies uniformly to all forests, whether on public or private land.

In support of this view, the Court relied on a previous decision of the Supreme Court⁵⁹ to reaffirm that environmental protection is a shared constitutional duty. Article 48-A of the Constitution obliges the State to safeguard the environment and forests, while Article 51-A(g) imposes a fundamental duty on citizens to do the same. The judiciary, too, has a constitutional responsibility to uphold these obligations, and cannot remain passive in environmental matters.

This judicial principle finds a vivid real-world expression in the work of Pamela and Anil Malhotra, whose story demonstrates how private forests can play a vital role in ecological restoration.⁶⁰ Over the past 25 years, the Malhotra’s have transformed nearly 300 acres of abandoned and denuded agricultural land in Karnataka’s Kodagu District into the Save Animals Initiative (SAI) Sanctuary — India’s first and possibly only private wildlife sanctuary.⁶¹

However, it is pertinent to clarify that the 300 acres Save the Animal Initiative by Pamela and Anil Malhotra was set up on abandoned agricultural lands in the Western Ghats, which, despite its ecological richness, would not be considered a deemed forest under the dictionary definition adopted by the Supreme Court in Godavarman case⁶².

In the State of Karnataka, wherein deemed forests account for 3,30,186.93 hectares⁶³, plantations exist on private property that has not been formally notified as forest — fall under the regulatory framework of the Karnataka Preservation of Trees Act, 1976 rather than the Van (Sanrakshan Evam Samvardhan) Adhiniyam, 1980. Similarly, in other States, laws such as the Tamil Nadu Hill Areas (Preservation of Trees) Act, 1955⁶⁴ or the Kerala Preservation of Trees Act, 1986⁶⁵ provide a legislative mechanism to regulate felling and conservation on non-notified forested lands, particularly those under private ownership.

This regulatory ambiguity leads us to consider three critical tests:

(i) Why should the Malhotra’s private sanctuary not be considered “deemed forests” when, as much as 29.5% of land classified as forests in India’s government records does not have any forest cover, as these lands have been diverted for road building and mining, while some others are agricultural land?⁶⁶

(ii) Even if tree-covered, does such land fall within the scope of “forest land” requiring clearance under the Van (Sanrakshan Evam Samvardhan) Adhiniyam, 1980?

(iii) Has the Supreme Court, through its more recent pronouncements diluted the legal position on “deemed forests” as earlier settled in Godavarman case⁶⁷?

These questions remain open-ended and merit deeper judicial and legislative scrutiny. They serve as a food for thought in the ongoing dialogue on reconciling environmental protection with private rights over land.

Moving forward, there is a need to harmonise State-level tree preservation statutes with central forest legislation, to avoid a regulatory vacuum. Laws such as the Maharashtra Felling of Trees (Regulation) Act, 1964⁶⁸, the West Bengal Trees (Protection and Conservation in Non-Forest Areas) Act, 2006⁶⁹, and the Delhi Preservation of Trees Act, 1994⁷⁰ also exemplify region-specific efforts to regulate green cover on private or non-notified lands. While these State legislations serve an important purpose, their applicability, enforceability, and interplay with the Van (Sanrakshan Evam Samvardhan) Adhiniyam, 1980 continue to raise legal questions — particularly when land use changes are proposed.

The Supreme Court’s ruling clarifies that while conservation efforts are vital, they must be legally sound and within the framework of existing statutory definitions. Thus, Auroville Foundation case⁷¹ establishes an important precedent in land classification disputes, particularly concerning Township development, afforestation, and urban development projects.

Further, the judicial intention in Godavarman case⁷² behind the treatment of all kinds of forests, irrespective of land ownership or records, as “forest” was to protect ecological balance, regulate the timber trade, and control mining and other non-forest activities. It also signified a shift towards promoting sustainable development. The judgment introduced the concept of forest clearance, for the diversion of forest land to non-forest purposes, though several exceptions have evolved over the years. While forest clearance may appear to be an ordinary regulatory requirement, it empowered forest officers to assess diversions and ensure ecological compensation through mechanisms like CAMPA. More importantly, it helped secure ecologically sensitive areas, including core tiger reserves and critical forest habitats.

Sacred groves to private sanctuaries: Expanding the ecological lens

In this vein, the judiciary further broadened the scope of forest protection by recognising ecologically and culturally significant landscapes such as sacred groves as deserving of legal safeguards, even when not formally recorded as forests. The Supreme Court had introduced a significant shift in India’s forest jurisprudence by recognising sacred groves as “deemed forests”. while dealing with sacred groves of Rajasthan, also known as “orans”, “malvan”, “deo ghat”, and “baugh”, which number around 25,000 and cover about six lakh hectares of the State.⁷³ This extends legal protection to ecologically sensitive areas that play a vital ecological and cultural role, though sparsely wooded and undocumented under the Van (Sanrakshan Evam Samvardhan) Adhiniyam, 1980. The Court consciously moved beyond traditional metrics like forest density, embracing a broader, ecosystem-based approach that acknowledges such landscapes’ ecological functionality and cultural sanctity. Sacred groves, often protected by communities out of religious reverence, serve as grassroots conservation models rooted in tradition⁷⁴. By aligning its interpretation with Section 36(5)⁷⁵ of the Biological Diversity Act, 2002⁷⁶ — which requires respect for traditional knowledge in conservation the Court reaffirmed that community practices can have formal environmental value and deserves protection as forests under the Van (Sanrakshan Evam Samvardhan) Adhiniyam, 1980.

In this context, while examining an application concerning the conversion of forest land for commercial purposes, the Supreme Court observed that valuable forest land was diverted under the pretext of rehabilitating members of backward communities whose ancestral agricultural land had earlier been acquired for public purposes.⁷⁷ Recognising the illegality in such conversions, the Court issued a series of robust directions. It instructed the Chief Secretaries of all States and the Administrators of Union Territories to establish Special Investigation Teams (SITs) to probe whether any reserved forest land under the Revenue Department’s control had been unlawfully allotted to private individuals or institutions for non-forestry purposes. The Court further mandated that State Governments and Union Territories reclaim and return such lands to the Forest Department.⁷⁸ Where recovery of possession was deemed contrary to the larger public interest, the authorities were directed to recover the land’s value from the beneficiaries and allocate those funds towards forest development.

Additionally, the Court ordered the formation of Special Teams to ensure that all such transfers or recoveries are completed within one year from the date of the judgment. It emphasised that henceforth, all such lands must be used strictly for afforestation and no other purpose.⁷⁹

Courts as green sentinels: Compliance, recovery, and redress

Therefore, such judicial activism attempts have been centred on redefining conservation forestry as superior to production forestry and ensuring the sustainable use of forest resources. Auroville Foundation decision⁸⁰ aligns with this trajectory. Also, while Godavarman case⁸¹ relied on a broad dictionary meaning of “forest”, it paved the way for principled exceptions. The Supreme Court, by its order dated 19-2-2024, stayed the operation of the Forest (Conservation) Amendment Act, 2023, thereby reaffirming the definition of “forest” as laid down in the landmark judgment of Godavarman case.⁸² However, the terrain of forest governance and especially the definition of “forests” remains fraught with ambiguity, especially concerning afforestation, ownership, and purpose. These developments beg a deeper institutional question:

(i) Given the increasing inconsistency in interpreting and applying environmental standards, including definitions, and cases involving post-facto Environmental clearances, a dedicated Bench could ensure coherence and continuity in India’s environmental jurisprudence. Should the Supreme Court have a permanent “green bench” to address these inconsistencies and interpretation challenges?

(ii) Second, whether private or non-notified/recorded/declared lands are excluded even when ecologically forested, does this restrict the scope of the Van (Sanrakshan Evam Samvardhan) Adhiniyam, 1980? For instance, in the State of Karnataka, wherein “deemed forests” constituted 9,94,881 hectares in 2014 have been reduced to a mere 3,30,186.93 hectares by 2022.⁸³ If so, how do we distinguish such efforts from aesthetic or commercial plantations that visually resemble forests and whether the concept of deemed forests no longer exists for the application of Van (Sanrakshan Evam Samvardhan) Adhiniyam, 1980?

(iii) Third, if afforestation occurs for agricultural purposes — say, as part of agroforestry or orchard development — should it remain outside the ambit of forest conservation laws? And what happens when these areas eventually acquire ecological characteristics like forests?

(iv) Fourth, can socially-driven private afforestation efforts ever be treated as “forests” under the Van (Sanrakshan Evam Samvardhan) Adhiniyam, 1980 or do they fall into a legal vacuum — acknowledged ecologically but excluded legally?

Thereupon, the evolving forest jurisprudence in India continues to grapple with a fundamental question — what constitutes a forest, and who decides? Auroville Foundation judgment⁸⁴ and the Supreme Court’s interim stay on the Forest (Conservation) Amendment Act, 2023, suggest a cautious reaffirmation of earlier principles. Yet, they also highlight the judiciary’s dilemma: on how to balance ecological imperatives with procedural and developmental legality. The core of Godavarman case⁸⁵ — to trees and forest wealth even on private land through government regulation, remains a guiding light, but one whose illumination now seems filtered through layers of legislative exceptions, post-facto clearances, and ambiguous statutory thresholds. A fragmented legal framework raises critical concerns regarding enforceability, consistency, and long-term ecological outcomes.

In addition, inconsistent pronouncements from the Supreme Court not only erode public trust in the judiciary but also weaken the foundations of the environmental rule of law. When legal definitions and protections for forests shift with each verdict, it fosters uncertainty, emboldens regulatory evasion, and leaves enforcement authorities directionless. Such judicial vacillation places a standstill on the larger objectives of conservation, preservation, and safeguarding the environment, allowing vested interests to exploit legal ambiguities. Thus, without legislative consistency and institutional clarity, the judiciary risks transforming vital ecological safeguards into matters of interpretive discretion rather than constitutional commitment, which remains a constant concern.

Therefore, as India navigates climate imperatives and sustainable development goals, it must avoid creating ecological grey zones, wherein areas exist that are forests in character but invisible in law. The need of the hour is a harmonised, inclusive definition of forest supported by a consolidated Central-State regulatory mechanism that incentivises forest protection and conservation. Failing which, India risks allowing its most biodiverse landscapes to exist in a legal vacuum: seen by satellite, celebrated in discourse, but vanishing in reality.