Disclaimer: This has been reported after the availability of the order of the Court and not on media reports so as to give an accurate report to our readers.
Madhya Pradesh High Court: In a writ petition filed by the daughter of late Shah Bano Begum seeking stay on releasing, screening, promoting or publishing the film “Haq” or any derivative thereof and directing the Central Board of Film Certification (‘CBFC’) to withhold or revoke certification of the film pending verification of consent from legal heirs of Late Shah Bano Begum, the Single Judge Bench of Pranay Verma, J., dismissed the petition, holding that the daughter had failed to make out any case for interference because there was no violation of any fundamental rights and alternative remedy existed.
Background
As per the daughter and surviving legal heir of late Shah Bano Begum, respondents 3 to 6, who are producers and distributors, have proposed the release of a movie titled “Haq” which explicitly dramatizes the personal and matrimonial life of her late parents without her knowledge or consent. The film is set to release on 07-11-2025. She contended that the film employs fabricated, sensationalized, and false portrayals based on unverified material, which was evident from the teaser and trailer of the movie.
She stated that upon learning about the teaser’s release, she issued a legal notice to the respondents calling for an abeyance from the release of the film, but they responded by denying the allegations. Furthermore, she stated that the only authentic public record relating to the family was the Supreme Court’s judgment in Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, (1985) 2 SCC 556, which contains purely legal findings and no personal or domestic details. However, the movie teasers and trailers misappropriated the judgment’s moral legacy to weave a fictional narrative that distorted the personalities and private lives of the individuals involved. The script and dialogue of the movie were fabricated and not drawn from any legitimate or judicial source.
The daughter contended that the experiences of late Shah Bano Begum are not part of any public record and were never meant to be dramatized or commercialized for entertainment. The sole objective of the respondents was to commercialize their personal lives. The revival of late Shah Bano’s suffering has caused her daughter grave emotional trauma.
Hence, to prevent the desecration of a sacred memory, she filed this petition.
Analysis
Regarding the contention that the trailer contained various utterances and/or dialogues to malign a particular religion/community, the Court noted that the daughter had made no such averment in the petition, and the facts which were pleaded and the grounds that were raised in the petition were entirely different. Furthermore, since these grounds were not raised in the writ petition, they were replied to by the respondents. Reiterating that in the absence of pleading, no ground can be raised orally at the time of hearing, the Court refused to consider this contention.
The Court considered the primary contention that the film violated the right of privacy and reputation of Shah Bano as it intruded into her marital life and violated her posthumous dignity. In this regard, the Court referred to K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, wherein the Supreme Court held that the right to privacy of any individual extinguishes with the human being. Furthermore, in Deepa Jayakumar v. A.L. Vijay, 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 2642, wherein the Madras High Court held that privacy or reputation earned by a person during his or her lifetime extinguishes with his or her death. It cannot be inherited like movable or immovable property. Posthumous right is not an inalienable right.
Noting the aforesaid, the Court stated that since Shah Bano was no longer alive, her right of privacy and reputation ended with her. Furthermore, the Court noted that the daughter did not claim that the film had violated her privacy or reputation in any manner.
Thus, the Court rejected the contention that the film violated the right of privacy or reputation of Shah Bano.
“There was also no obligation on the part of the respondents to take prior consent from the daughter before producing and releasing the film.”
The Court noted that the respondents had produced the disclaimer, which would be shown along with a voiceover before the movie screening. It states that the film is a dramatized and fictionalized adaptation of the English book titled “Bano: Bharat ki Beti” written by Jigna Vora and is inspired by Mohd. Ahmad Khan (supra) and the events leading up to it. Further, the disclaimer stated that the film is not a biopic or documentary of any person. Any similarity or resemblance to the names and characters, etc., in the movie to any person (living or dead) is entirely and purely coincidental and unintentional.
Noting this, the Court stated that since the disclaimer itself stated that the movie was fictional, a dramatization, an adaptation of a book, and inspired by a judgment, it could not be said that the contents of the film were fabricated. The Court rejected the contention that the film distorted the personalities and private lives of individuals, holding that the film’s narrative does not claim to be true.
“Since the film is an inspiration and a fiction, some amount of leeway is certainly permissible, and merely because the same is done, it cannot be said that there has been any sensationalization or false portrayal.”
The Court further rejected the contention that the script/dialogues were fabricated and not drawn from any legitimate or judicial source, since the movie does not claim to be a true story of any individual. Noting that the material from which the film draws inspiration was all available in the public record, including Court records, and had been published, republished, and recounted for decades without any objection from Shah Bano. Hence, it cannot be said that the script/dialogues have not been drawn from any legitimate or judicial source.
“The film is not stated to be based purely upon the decision in the case of Shah Bano, hence if it contains any personal or matrimonial details for dramatization and picturization, nothing wrong can be found in the same.”
Regarding the grant of a certificate by the CBFC, the Court stated that the daughter had the alternate remedy under Section 5-E of the Cinematograph Act, 1952, to approach the Central Government for suspension and/or revocation of the certificate, but she did not avail herself of this remedy. Instead, she prayed for withholding or revoking the certification of the film in this petition directly. Thus, the Court held that in the available facts of the case, the daughter ought to have availed the said alternate remedy instead of straightaway approaching the Court.
The Court further stated that since the certificate was granted, there was a prima facie presumption that the authority concerned had considered all the guidelines as held by the Supreme Court in Viacom 18 Media (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2018) 1 SCC 761, while issuing the same.
The Court noted that the news of a film being made on the Shah Bano case was published on national, international, and digital news outlets in February 2024. Thereafter, the production and content of the film received widespread publicity and coverage. The movie teaser was released on 23-09-2025, but instead of taking any legal action, the daughter issued a legal notice to the respondents on 06-10-2025, and the respondents replied on 13-10-2025. The film was then scheduled for release on 07-11-2025. However, the daughter did not act immediately and filed this petition on 01-11-2025, i.e., less than a week before the movie’s release and after the grant of the Certificate. The Court further noted that the daughter took no steps after the teaser’s release regarding the CBFC certificate.
The Court stated that the cause of action arose at least a month ago, but the daughter waited for a considerable period of time before filing the present petition. Thus, the Court held that the daughter’s conduct was not that of a vigilant litigant, and the petition suffered from delay and latches.
Decision
Reiterating that the right of privacy was not heritable, the daughter did not inherit the right of late Shah Bano, and there was no question of violation of the same, the Court held that it could not be said that there was a violation of any fundamental rights under Article 19 or 21 of the Constitution.
In such circumstances, the Court held that none of the criteria regarding exclusion of an alternate remedy for the purpose of invoking the writ jurisdiction were available in the present case. Thus, the alternate remedy available to the daughter was certainly an efficacious remedy, which she did not avail herself of.
Accordingly, the Court dismissed the petition, holding that the daughter had failed to make out any case for interference.
[Ms. Siddiqua Begum Khan v. Union of India, Writ Petition No. 42708 of 2025, decided on 04-11-2025]
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the petitioner: Tousif Warsi
For the respondents: Deputy Solicitor General Romesh Dave, Senior Advocate Ajay Bagadia, Advocates H.Y. Mehta, Chinmay Mehta and Ritik Gupta
