Circumstantial Evidence | Inability to explain certain situations can’t be made a basis to relieve prosecution from discharging its primary burden: SC

Supreme Court: While considering a matter wherein the appellant (convict) who was convicted for murdering his friend had challenged his conviction, the Division Bench of B.V. Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma*, JJ., took note of the inconsistent version of events presented by the prosecution and opined that accused person’s inability to explain certain circumstances, could not be made the basis to relieve the prosecution from discharging its primary burden of proving the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

It was stated that in criminal jurisprudence, it is a time-tested proposition that the primary burden falls upon the shoulders of the prosecution and it is only if the prosecution succeeds in discharging its burden beyond reasonable doubt that the burden shifts upon the accused to explain the evidence against him or to present a defence

Background and Legal Trajectory:

The convict and his friend (M) were studying at Bagla Homeopathy Medical College, Arvat Chandrapur, Maharashtra. They were students of first year and often used to commute together on their two-wheelers. On the unfortunate day of 16-9-2010, the friends left for their college, by the time evening approached, M’s father discovered that his son had not reached home, he tried to find out and eventually lodged a missing report. The next day the dead body of M was found and accordingly, a criminal case came to be registered against unknown persons.

During the investigation M’s father raised suspicion on the convict and subsequently the police prepared the chargesheet wherein the convict was alleged to have caused death of deceased M by shooting him by the gun belonging to the convict’s father.

The Trial Court found that the convict had killed M using the service gun belonging to his father when he came to drop him after college. Therefore, the Trial Court held the convict guilty for the commission of the offences under Sections 302, 201 read with Section 34 of Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Section 5 read with 25(1)(a) of Arms Act, 1959.

Aggrieved with the afore-stated verdict, the convict approached Bombay High Court, however, the convict did not get any relief from the High Court. The High Court while deliberating upon the matter relied heavily on the subsequent conduct of the convict, especially removal of the dead body, concealment of clothes and eventually upheld the conviction.

Thereafter the convict approached the Supreme Court.

Court’s Assessment on Primary Burden of the Prosecution in case of accused person’s inability to explain:

Perusing the matter, the Court had to consider whether the finding of the High Court regarding the conviction is sustainable in light of the evidence on record. The Court noted that cause death of M was undisputed. It is also admitted that the convict had indeed removed the dead body of the deceased and had cleaned up the scene of crime. It is also a matter of record that the discoveries made under Section 27 of Evidence Act were not challenged by the convict as he had admitted that various articles belonging to himself and the deceased, and connected with the alleged incident, were discovered in furtherance of his disclosures. All these aspects, however, assume greater relevance for the offence under Section 201 IPC. Insofar as the offences under Section 302 IPC and Section 25 of Arms Act are concerned, the Court pointed out that the prosecution case lacks any substantiation. The deceased was shot by the pistol belonging to the father of the convict and in the house of the convict, “But the pertinent question that craves for an answer is — who pulled the trigger? Despite two rounds of litigation, the question is yet to find an answer”.

Perusing the analysis of the case as done by the Trial Court and High Court, the Supreme Court pointed out the circumstances which left missing links in the chain of the prosecution, such as- trajectory of the bullet fired at the deceased; nature of injuries in accidental/suicidal gunshot cases.

The Court further pointed out that the High Court rejected the defence of the convict by simply observing that the homicidal death of the deceased was ‘admitted’ on oath. There is no such admission qua the nature of death. Contrarily, the convict had deposed on oath that the death was ‘accidental’, a version that he has carried consistently up.

The Court further noted that on a careful reading of the impugned judgment, one would unmistakably note that the subsequent conduct of the appellant in indulging in destruction of evidence weighed heavily against him before the Court. The inability of the convict to explain certain aspects also weighed against him. Undoubtedly, in a case based on circumstantial evidence, facts indicating subsequent conduct are relevant facts under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. Equally, the inconsistencies in the version of the convict are also relevant. However, the occasion to examine the version/defence of the convict could have arisen only if the prosecution had succeeded in discharging its primary burden beyond reasonable doubt. The High Court fell in a grave error in placing greater reliance on the loopholes in the convict’s version without first determining whether the chain of circumstances sought to be proved by the prosecution was complete or not. Pertinently, the inability of an accused to offer plausible explanation on certain aspects would not automatically absolve the prosecution of its evidentiary burden, which must be discharged first and beyond doubt.

The Court further pointed out that the defence taken by the convict since the beginning of the case was not tested by the Trial Court and the High Court. Despite a specific defence taken before both the Courts, the Courts simply did not examine the same in the manner required by law. The probability of the version put across by the convict ought to have been tested against the circumstantial theory of the prosecution. In other words, it was incumbent upon the Courts below to have examined whether the defence taken by the appellant was a probable defence or not. The failure to do so has certainly resulted into a failure of justice and it is sufficient to reopen the evidence in the instant appeal.

The Court stated that it is trite law that in a case based on circumstantial evidence, motive is relevant. However, it is not conclusive of the matter. There is no rule of law that the absence of motive would ipso facto dismember the chain of evidence and would lead to automatic acquittal of the accused. In the instant case, the testimonies of prosecution witnesses have invariably revealed that the convict and the deceased were friends and there was no ill-will between them. Even the father of the deceased has testified to that effect. Since the evidence suggests that they were friends, the fact that the appellant brought him home could not be termed as per-se incriminating. Therefore, motive explains the circumstances on record and enables the Court to draw better inference in a case based on circumstantial evidence.

Vis-a-vis the convict’s subsequent conduct, the Court pointed out that that the same was consistent with the theory of accidental death. That his act of removal of the dead body and concealment of articles was a result of fear of his father – is quite natural. A young boy studying in first year of college, with no criminal background and with no motive in sight, would certainly, have become scared on seeing that his friend has accidentally shot himself in the living room of his house with the pistol belonging to his father and is lying in a pool of blood. The subsequent conduct of cleaning up the scene and restoring the living room in its original shape, although punishable in law, does not become so unnatural that it could be made the basis to convict him for the commission of murder without additional evidence to that effect.

The subsequent acts of cleaning up the crime scene and making false enquiries amount to disappearance of evidence and raise grave suspicion against the convict. However, mere suspicion, no matter how grave, cannot take the place of proof in a criminal trial. The suspicion ought to have been substantiated by undeniable, reliable, unequivocal, consistent and credible circumstantial evidence, which does not leave the probability of any other theory. In the instant case, the theory put across by the convict is fairly probable and is supported by medical evidence including the examination of the bullet injury and trajectory. Contrarily, the conclusion drawn by the Courts below is not supported by medical evidence and is not consistent with the bullet injury and trajectory.

The rigid principles underlying an examination based on circumstantial evidence are based on the premise that the very act of arriving at a finding of guilt on the basis of inferences must be performed with great caution and margin of error must be kept at a minimum. Naturally, there could be some inconsistencies in the chain of circumstances in the natural course of things and mere presence of inconsistencies does not automatically demolish the case of the prosecution. However, the prosecution must be able to explain the inconsistencies to the satisfaction of the Court. “For, the ultimate test is the judicial satisfaction of the Court. In the present case, the counter probabilities and inconsistencies in the chain of circumstances have not been explained”.

It is a time-tested proposition of law that when a Court is faced with a situation wherein two different views appear to be reasonably possible, the matter is to be decided in favour of the accused. The benefit of a counter possibility goes to the accused in such cases.

Decision:

With the afore-stated analysis, the Court held that the High Court erred in arriving at the finding of guilt and in upholding the verdict of the Trial Court. The circumstantial evidence on record was not consistent and left a reasonable possibility of an alternate outcome i.e. of innocence of the convict on the charges of murder and illegal usage of firearm. Accordingly, the impugned order and judgment were partially set aside to the extent of conviction of the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 302 IPC and Section 5 read with 25(1)(a) of Arms Act. Consequently, the convict was acquitted for the offences under Section 302 of IPC and Section 5 read with 25(1)(a) of Arms Act. His conviction under Section 201 IPC was sustained, and he was sentenced for the period already undergone by him.