Case BriefsHigh Courts

Uttaranchal High Court: Lok Pal Singh, J., allowed a writ petition which was filed seeking for a writ of certiorari to quash the impugned orders passed by respondent 2 and 3 respectively, and to issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to give the appointment to the petitioner on the post of Sub Inspector under the U.P. Recruitment of Dependents of Government Servants Dying in Harness Rules, 1974 (the 1974 Rules), as applicable in Uttarakhand.

The earlier petition was disposed of by a Coordinate Bench of this Court with a direction to the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner for appointment to the post of Sub-Inspector. By the impugned order respondent 2 had rejected the claim of the petitioner on the ground that the dependents of the deceased employee cannot claim appointment on a particular post as according to the judgment in State of Haryana v. Ankur Gupta, (2003) 7 SCC 704.

The Court observed that order passed by respondent 2 was passed by ignoring the directions issued by this Court in the earlier Writ Petition and the authority concerned had tried to sit over the judgment of this Court and had acted as an appellate authority, then the Court had directed to ensure the presence of the Inspector General of Police.

The Court while allowing the appeal held that in view of the provisions of Rule 8 of the 1974 Rules, the petitioner was entitled to appointment under the said Rules as per his qualification and the reasons shown by the respondents denying the claim for appointment to the petitioner on the post of Sub-Inspector were unsustainable in the eyes of law and as far as the criteria of age from 21 years to 28 years was concerned, it was made clear that the same was not applicable while giving appointment under the 1974 Rules.[Anuj Kumar Saini v. State of Uttarakhand,  2021 SCC OnLine Utt 129, decided on 06-01-2021]


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Case BriefsHigh Courts

Jharkhand High Court: A Division Bench of Dr Ravi Ranjan, CJ. and Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. while dismissing the present appeal, relied on settled precedents upon power of judicial review against an Award passed by Tribunal or Lower Court.

 Background

Respondent had raised a demand for regularization in service but after a failed attempt at conciliation, reference was made through a notification dated 18-09-1997 to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal, after considering the rival contention raised before it, passed an Award of regularization which was assailed before this Court by the writ petitioner-appellant by filing WP (L) No 4466 of 2016. However, the writ petition was dismissed. Assailing the order of such dismissal, the present intra-court appeal has been preferred.

 Observations

On power of judicial review/issuance of writ of Certiorari against an Award passed by the Tribunal or Lower Court

Court placed reliance on the case of;

Hari Vishnu v. Ahmad Ishaque, (1955) 1 SCR 1104, at paragraph 21, it was noted, “With regard to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be issued, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari.”

Syed Yakoob v. Radhakrishnan, (1964) 5 SCR 64, wherein the Supreme Court said, “In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the

inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court.”

General Manager, Electrical Rengali Hydro Electric Project, Orissa v. Giridhari Sahu, (2019) 10 SCC 695, the Supreme Court considered the issue about scope of issuance of writ of certiorari by the High Court and has laid down the proposition of law that if the finding recorded by the court is erroneous and based upon perversity, the order is fit to be quashed/set aside.

Court also acknowledged the findings in Sawarn Singh v. State of Punjab, (1976) 2 SCC 868, Heinz India Pvt. Ltd. v. State of UP, (2012) 5 SCC 443, Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd. v. Krishna Kant Pandey, (2015) 4 SCC 270, Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447.  

With respect to the reliance placed on Uma Devi Case

It was argued by the counsel for the appellant that there cannot be any regularisation in the service after the judgment rendered by the Constitution Bench in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi, (2006) 4 SCC 1, but the present Court does not concur with the same, as, “Before the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court, the applicability of Industrial Dispute Act 1947 was not an issue. Further, the workman has claimed regularisation, in view of the policy decision of the Management FCI dated 06-05-1987 and if the Tribunal has passed an Award after taking into consideration the policy decision of the Management FCI, the same cannot be said to be illegal.”

Decision

Refusing to interfere with the Award, Court conclusively said, “It is settled that in the matter of issuance of writ of certiorari, the perversity of finding is to be looked into by the High Court in exercise of power under Article 226 and if the issue has not been raised before the Tribunal, the same cannot be proper to be looked by the High Court at the time of looking into the legality and propriety of the Award.”[Food Corporation of India v. Ganesh Jha, 2020 SCC OnLine Jhar 1078, decided on 17-12-2020]


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Case BriefsHigh Courts

Patna High Court: In a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution for issuance of a writ of certiorari, Birendra Kumar, J., dismissed the same finding no reason warranting interference.

The instant petition has been filed by the petitioner who pleads for the quashing of the order contained in Memo No. 3751 dated 10-10-2018 passed by the respondent 3, the Secretary of Bihar Sanskrit Shiksha Board in which the petitioner was put under suspicion and departmental proceedings were initiated against him.

The facts of the case are such that in a writ petition CWJC No. 10951 of 2015, this Court by order dated 27-06-2016 had directed CBI investigation in the matter of appointment of 73 Gramin Dak Sevaks during the period 2008-13 in Muzaffarpur Postal Division on the basis of fake and forged Madhyama Marksheet. R.C.’s were registered and during investigation, it came to light that one of the schools namely, Krishnadev Niranjan Dr Jai Narayan Sharma Sanskrit High School, Patahi, Muzaffarpur in a conspiracy, accepted forms of Madhyama examination for the period 2005-09 from the students and their fee was also collected an unauthorized manner. Subsequently, R.C. 1A of 2017 was registered on 18-01-2017. The S.P., C.B.I. vide his letter dated 04-04-2018 addressed to the Chairman of Bihar Sanskrit Shiksha Board (respondent 4) reported that during investigation, sufficient material came on the record to initiate a departmental proceeding for major punishment against three persons including the petitioner who were Assistants in Bihar Sanskrit Shiksha Board as they had allowed backdoor entry of students.

The primary ground for challenging the impugned order is that Bihar Government Servant (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2005 is not applicable on the employees of the Sanskrit Shiksha Board nor there is any other Rule governing the service condition.

Other ground is that the disciplinary action has been taken by the competent authority solely based on the recommendation of the C.B.I. without any application of its own mind.

The petitioner has admitted that the Board has adopted the State Government’s Rules with respect to payment of gratuity, leave encashment and other benefits.

The Court observed that it’s not possible for an institution to run without any service rules. It is evident from the impugned order that Bihar Government Servant (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2005 and Amendment Rules 2007 are applicable and under those Rules, action has been taken. Moreover, based on petitioner’s admittance, immunity cannot be claimed from the disciplinary proceeding rule.

For the second ground of non-application of mind by the competent authority, the Court thoroughly perused the impugned order and observed that it can’t be made out from the order that action has only been taken on the recommendation of the C.B.I. rather the competent authority has applied its mind while accepting the allegations which were brought on record during the investigation of the case by the C.B.I. for initiating the departmental proceeding.

Counsel for the petitioner, Bam Bahadur Jha has relied on the case of Bipin Bihari Singh v. State of Bihar, 2014 SCC OnLine Pat 5306. The Court questioned its relevance and applicability and found it unconvincing.

In view of the above, the petition has been dismissed by the court finding absolutely no reason to interfere in the impugned order.[Raja Jha v. State of Bihar, 2020 SCC OnLine Pat 1661, decided on 16-10-2020]


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Case BriefsHigh Courts

Uttaranchal High Court: Alok Kumar Verma, J., allowed a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the impugned First Information Report dated 28-12-2019, seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the impugned FIR; and a writ of mandamus, commanding and directing the Respondents 1 & 2 not to arrest the petitioner in connection with the FIR.

The FIR stated that Respondent 3 had some conflict with her husband and the petitioner gave emotional support to her, later, they ended up in a hotel having physical relations in Dehradun, further, it stated that they again met in a hotel in Mumbai after few months. Respondent 3 stated that she wanted him to marry her or secure the future of her children.

The counsel for the petitioner Ranveer Singh Kundu and Raj Kumar Singh submitted that in the first instance given by the respondent the petitioner was detained at RVC Centre and College, Meerut Cantt. on duty, and regarding the second instance the petitioner did not go to Mumbai in the month mentioned by the respondent.

The Court while allowing the petition directed that no coercive action shall be taken against the petitioner as the respondent was an adult and had her willful consent in the physical relations. [Rajendra Kumar Swain v. State of Uttarakhand, 2020 SCC OnLine Utt 42, decided on 28-01-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Madras High Court: A Division Bench of A.P. Sahi, CJ and Subramonium Prasad, J., while deciding a petition filed in regard to declaring Section 142(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 as ultra vires Article 14 of Constitution, held by placing reliance on certain cases that,

“Parliament is competent to bring out the amendment under the Negotiable Instruments Act. The said amendment cannot be said to be ultra vires in view of the provisions of the Act or Part III of the Constitution of India.”

In the present petition, the challenge was placed upon Section 142(2) of NI Act on the ground that the said amendment is contrary to the Supreme Court case in, Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 9 SCC 129.

Counsel for the petitioner, K. Govindarajan, submitted that the above-said amendment amounts to setting at naught a judgment of the Supreme Court which is not permissible in law. Relying on the Supreme Court case in Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality, (1969) 2 SCC 283, it is well settled that,

“Legislation can take away the basis of a judgment.”

In Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 9 SCC 129, following was held with respect to the place of suing:

“…Once the cause of action accrues to the complainant, the jurisdiction of the Court to try the case will be determined by reference to the place where the cheque is dishonoured.

   (vii) The general rule stipulated under Section 177 of Cr.P.C applies to cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Prosecution in such cases can, therefore, be launched against the drawer of the cheque only before the Court within whose jurisdiction the dishonour takes place except in situations where the offence of dishonour of the cheque punishable under Section 138 is committed along with other offences in a single transaction within the meaning of Section 220(1) read with Section 184 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or is covered by the provisions of Section 182(1) read with Sections 184 and 220 thereof.”

Thus, the following was held in the above-said case by the Supreme Court,

a Complaint of dishonour of cheque can be filed only to the Court within whose local jurisdiction where the cheque is dishonoured by the bank on which it is drawn.

To resolve the concerns arising from the above-judgment, through the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2015, certain amendments in regard to challenged Section was made as follows:

“(2) The offence under section 138 shall be inquired into and tried only by a court within whose local jurisdiction,—

(a) if the cheque is delivered for collection through an account, the branch of the bank where the payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, maintains the account, is situated; or

(b) if the cheque is presented for payment by the payee or holder in due course, otherwise through an account, the branch of the drawee bank where the drawer maintains the account, is situated.

Explanation— For the purposes of clause (a), where a cheque is delivered for collection at any branch of the bank of the payee or holder in due course, then, the cheque shall be deemed to have been delivered to the branch of the bank in which the payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, maintains the account.”

Further Section 142(a) was also inserted through the Amendment Act, which is as follows:

142A.(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any judgment, decree, order or direction of any court, all cases transferred to the court having jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of section 142, as amended by the Negotiable Instruments

(Amendment) Ordinance, 2015, shall be deemed to have been transferred under this Act, as if that subsection had been in force at all material times.

 (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) of section 142 or sub-section (1), where the payee or the holder in due course, as the case may be, has filed a complaint against the drawer of a cheque in the court having jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of section 142 or the case has been transferred to that court under sub-section (1) and such complaint is pending in that court, all subsequent complaints arising out of section 138 against the same drawer shall be filed before the same court irrespective of whether those cheques were delivered for collection or presented for payment within the territorial jurisdiction of that court.

 (3) If, on the date of the commencement of the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act,

2015, more than one prosecution filed by the same payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, against the same drawer of cheques is pending before different courts, upon the said fact having been brought to the notice of the court, such court shall transfer the case to the court having jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of section 142, as amended by the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015, before which the first case was filed and is pending, as if that subsection had been in force at all material times.”

Through the above Amendment Act, entire basis of the Supreme Court case in, Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 9 SCC 129, was removed.

By placing reliance on certain Supreme Court cases such as, State of Karnataka v. Karnataka Pawn Brokers Assn., (2018) 6 SCC 363; State of Karnataka v. Pro Lab, (2015) 8 SCC 557, Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality, (1969) 2 SCC 283, following was laid down:

 “Legislature can take away the basis of the judgment of a judicial pronouncement by either Validating Act or passing amendments to the parent Act.”

Thus, on perusal of the above, no infirmity was found by the Court in the amendment. Therefore, said amendment cannot be said to be ultra vires in view of the provisions of the Act or Part III of the Constitution of India.

In view of the above, the writ petition stands dismissed. [Refex Energy Ltd. v. Union of India, 2019 SCC OnLine Mad 9941, decided on 18-12-2019]


Additional Reading:

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Patna High Court: Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, J. dismissed the writ application on the grounds that the settled proposition of law was that the writ of certiorari should not be issued only for making out a legal point.

The petitioner, aggrieved by the order dated passed by the Additional Chief Secretary, Department of Industries, Government of Bihar whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order of canceling the allotment of his industrial plot was been dismissed has challenged the same in the instant writ application.

N.K. Agrawal, senior counsel on behalf of the petitioner submitted that it was a case of violation of principles of natural justice wherein the cancellation order was not served upon the petitioner and further the appellate authority failed to decipher that the inquiries conducted by the Department during the pendency of the appeal could not be taken as a conclusive proof of the fact that the unit in question was not functioning.

The counsel on behalf of the Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority (‘BIADA’) argued that the matters related to allotment of industrial plots and were to be considered from a larger public interest purview. He further submitted that the petitioner’s allegation that the order of cancellation passed in the year 2007 was not served upon the petitioner is not correct inasmuch as ‘BIADA’ had produced the proof of service by placing on record that the said decision canceling the allotment in favor of the petitioner was sent through courier and it was not returned un-served. It was also submitted that the industrial plot was given to the petitioner for carrying industrial activity but instead the petitioner was utilizing it for some kind of residential purpose which was confirmed by the inquiry report submitted after the spot verification by the appellate authority.

Upon perusal of the records, the court found that the industrial plot was allotted to the petitioner in the year 1996, and the purpose behind the same was setting up of industry but the materials available on record showed that no industrial activities were going on for the last several years. Since no prima-facie material was brought on record to controvert the findings and no material was made available to show that the findings were perverse and required any interference.

The case being one for issuance of a writ of certiorari, the principle was well-settled that while exercising its power to issue a writ in the nature of certiorari the Court under Article 226 would not sit in appeal and could not exercise an appellate power. Such a writ of certiorari could be issued only when the Court found that the impugned order suffered from perversity. [Santosh Kumar Jalan v. State of Bihar, 2019 SCC OnLine Pat 1772, decided on 30-09-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Karnataka High Court: Alok Aradhe, J. dismissed a petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India with respect to the claim for compensation under the Victim Compensation Scheme been rejected.

In the present petition, the petitioner sought a writ of certiorari with respect to the quashing of communication through which the claim for petitioner’s compensation under the Victim Compensation Scheme was rejected. Along with the stated petitioner also sought a writ of mandamus to the Karnataka State Legal Services Authority to release an amount of Rs 7 lakhs as compensation in accordance with the revised scheme.

In accordance with the facts of the case as stated, the petitioner claimed to be a rape victim on the basis of which after the FIR and investigation were duly completed, the petitioner’s father made a representation for grant of compensation under the Victim Compensation Scheme before the District Legal Services Authority.

Further, the above-stated authority passed an award by which the petitioner was directed to pay a sum of Rs 3 lakhs as compensation. Though, during the pendency of the proceeding before the Authority, in the criminal case, the petitioner and petitioner’s father were both declared hostile.

Thus in view of the above, the Karnataka State Legal Services Authority through an order had set aside the order awarding compensation passed by the Authority on the ground of petitioner and petitioner’s father turning hostile following which the petitioner approached the High Court.

Conclusion

High Court on perusal of the facts and circumstances of the matter, stated that in the exercise of powers under Section 357-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 the State Government framed Karnataka Victim Compensation Scheme, 2007. Clause 6(3) and clause 7(10) of the scheme read as under:

“6(3) The victim/claimant shall cooperate with police and prosecution during the investigation and trial of the case.”

7(10) If a victim or his dependants have obtained an order sanctioning compensation under this scheme of false/vexatious/fabricated complaint which is so held by the Trial Court, the compensation awarded shall be recovered with 15% interest per annum.

From the perusal of the above-stated clauses of the scheme, it is evident that the victim has to cooperate with the prosecution during the investigation and trial and the complaint filed by her should not be fabricated.

High Court held that the petitioner, as well as her father, were declared hostile, they violated clause 6(3) of the scheme and therefore, were not entitles to seek compensation. Thus on finding no merits in the case, the Court dismissed the same. [XXX  v.  Karnataka State Legal Services Authority, 2019 SCC OnLine Kar 1738, decided on 16-09-2019]

Case BriefsForeign Courts

Court of Appeal of Sri Lanka: Application under Article 140 of the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka was contemplated by Yasantha Kodagoda and Arjuna Obeyesekere, JJ.  for issuance of Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus.

The factual matrix of the case was that the petitioner filed an application where he sought certiorari against the respondent- Inspector General of Police, in lieu to quash the decision of dismissal of the petitioner from the Police Department. Such dismissal order was passed because; a complaint was filed against the petitioner who was a Sub-Inspector, for the illicit relationship with a married woman. The complainant was the husband of the woman with whom the petitioner was in the alleged relationship. The complainant had detained the petitioner when he was found in his house.

A preliminary investigation was conducted and a charge sheet was filed accordingly. It was stated that in the investigations carried out by the Police Department it was revealed that the Petitioner had made an entry in the Information Book that he left the Station to attend lectures at the University of Sri Jayawardenapura. However, inquiries had revealed that, instead the Petitioner had visited the wife of the complainant on that particular day. It was further examined by the Court that all the charges were based on the petitioner who made a false entry in the information book and thereafter had engaged in an illicit relationship with the wife of the complainant and also duping her with an amount of Rs 50,000. He was charged for violating the disciplinary code and bringing the Police Service to disrepute. Eventually, he was found guilty by the Court. Although the Inquiry Officer had only recommended, by way of punishment, the suspension of salary increments and promotions due to the Petitioner, the Senior Deputy Inspector General in charge of the Petitioner had recommended that the services of the Petitioner be terminated as provided for in Section 24:3:2 of Chapter XLVIII of the Establishments Code, as the Petitioner was still under probation at the time the aforementioned incident occurred.

The Court had examined the said provision of the Establishments Code and found that the said recommendation was in terms of the Establishments Code. The Inspector-General of Police had agreed with the said recommendation and by a Disciplinary Order, petitioner to be terminated from the services.

Petitioner then appealed to the National Police Commission which had dismissed his appeal. Aggrieved by which he again appealed to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, where his appeal was dismissed. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that although the charge sheet contained seven charges, the Inquiry Officer had found the Petitioner ‘guilty’ of only three charges. He further submitted, however that the Senior Deputy Inspector General of Police, the Inspector General of Police, the National Police Commission and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal have all proceeded on the basis that the petitioner had been found guilty of all seven charges, thus, was an error on the face of the record and vitiated their finding.

The Court, observed that the Inquiry Officer had dealt with all the charges and found him guilty of the relevant ones. Thus, the Inquiry Officer has, in fact, found the Petitioner ‘guilty’ of all charges, but had grouped the charges under three heads in his conclusion. The Court further observed that, it was clear to the Court that the Inquiry Officer was satisfied with the core offence – i.e. making a false entry and engaging in conduct unbecoming of a Police officer – which was common to all charges, had been established. It was held that, “Although the Inquiry Officer was required to record his conclusions on each charge separately, no prejudice has been caused to the Petitioner by the course of action adopted by the Inquiry Officer in lumping together charges of a similar nature. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal too has proceeded on the basis that the Petitioner has been found guilty of the principal allegation made against him. In these circumstances, this Court does not see any merit with the submission of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner.”

Hence, the Court found no merits in the application of the petitioner and found him guilty of the said conduct. The application was dismissed.[Ranawana Wedaralalage v. C.D. Wickramaratne, 2019 SCC OnLine SL CA 8, decided on 17-09-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Karnataka High Court: Alok Aradhe, J. while disposing of this petition granted the petitioner the liberty to assail the order by which a fine was imposed for not supplying information.

In the instant case, the petitioner sought a writ of certiorari for the quashing of the order passed by the Karnataka Information Commission by which the petitioner was directed to provide information to respondent 1 that whether Karnataka Badminton Association is a “Public Authority” within the meaning of Section 2(h) of Right to Information Act, 2000.

Prashanthi A.L., Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the information sought by the petitioner will be supplied to the petitioner within fifteen days.

The Court observed that it is not necessary to examine the validity of the order passed by the Karnataka Information Commission and directed the petitioner to provide information within fifteen days from the date of the order. [Karnataka Badminton Association v. S. Raghu, 2019 SCC OnLine Kar 1443, decided on 23-08-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Uttaranchal High Court: A Division Bench of Ramesh Ranganathan, C.J. and Alok Kumar Verma, J. entertained a writ petition which was initially filed in the Allahabad High Court in 1994.

Factual matrix of the case was that the petitioner was appointed as a Panchayat Mantri and thereafter the Panchayat Mantries were declared to be public servants. Petitioner sought leave for 15 days during his course of employment. Respondent demanded a health certificate by the petitioner, however, he failed. The services of the petitioner were terminated on various grounds; he questioned his termination on the principle of natural justice.

State Public Services Tribunal on the sole ground that the impugned order of termination dated had been passed with retrospective effect and the State Public Services Tribunal quashed the said order of termination and held that the order of termination cannot be passed with retrospective effect.

While the Tribunal held that the petitioner had been absent from duty throughout, and had filed the Claim Petition after a period of more than 12 years, the State Public Services Tribunal observed that, since the order of termination was void, the law of limitation had no application on void orders; but no order related to the payment of salary for intervening period was passed as the petitioner was at fault.

The Court in the instant writ held that while it was debatable whether the Tribunal was entitled to grant the relief sought for in the Claim Petition, despite the employee had invoked its jurisdiction 12 years’ after the order of termination was passed. The Court felt that it was inappropriate to examine that aspect since the Government had filed a Writ Petition before the Allahabad High Court questioning the very same order passed by the Tribunal, albeit to the extent the order of termination was quashed and the petitioner was reinstated into service. Hence the examination in the Writ Petition was limited to the action of the Tribunal in denying the petitioner salary for the period between the dates of his termination till the date on which the petitioner was required to join duty.

The writ was filed challenging the order passed by the State Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow where it quashed the termination order of the petitioner and had held it illegal and void. It further directed respondents to reinstate the petitioner and pay him salary and dues. The Tribunal, however, observed that no orders were passed for payment of salary to the petitioner, for the intervening period, on account of his continued absence from duty.

The Court held that, “unlike an appellate authority which can reappreciate the evidence on record, the High Court, in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction, would not substitute its views for that of the Tribunal, nor would it reappreciate the evidence on record to arrive at a conclusion different from that of the Tribunal whose order is impugned before it.”

The Court found no error in the order of the Tribunal as to pass certiorari, hence saw no reason to interfere with the order of the Tribunal in denying the salary from the date of the termination till reinstatement. The Court observed that “Having approached the State Public Services Tribunal after a period of 12 years, the petitioner cannot be heard to contend that he should also be paid his salary for the intervening period from the year 1980 to 1992 when he approached the Tribunal, even though it was he who had slept over his rights for around 12 years.”[Naresh Kumar Jain v. State Public Services Tribunal, 2019 SCC OnLine Utt 613, decided on 16-07-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Orissa High Court: A Division Bench of S.K. Mishra and Dr A.K. Mishra, JJ., dismissed the writ petition against the judgment declining interference in the disciplinary proceeding and order imposing the punishment of compulsory retirement.

The facts of the case were that appellant-petitioner was appointed as an officer of the Indian Bank as Inspecting Manager at Kolkata. He was entrusted with the inspection of banks at different places for which the bank had to pay the bill for lodging. The Deputy Manager General, on finding the irregularity asked for the explanation which was duly submitted but was not appreciated and appellant-petitioner alleged to be dishonest under the Indian Bank Officer Employees’ (Conduct) Regulations, 1976. A disciplinary authority thus imposed a major penalty of compulsory retirement. The appeal and review petition filed before the reviewing authority was dismissed and hence, this writ.

The Judgment of the Single Judge Court after submission held that the court had the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. The court further held that the court could not interfere with the enquiry, appellate and reviewing authority in absence of the procedural irregularities. The Court further held that “The power of judicial review to scan the evidence, which had reached finality on the basis of concurrent finding, was found uncalled for in the facts placed and law analyzed.”

The matter was then called for Division Bench which observed the Judgment of Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath, (2015) 5 SCC 423 in which the court made it clear that the writ of certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. where lower courts either without jurisdiction, or in excess of jurisdiction or acting in flagrant disregard of law or rules of procedure or acting in violation of the principles of natural justice, pass an order thereby occasioning failure of justice. Thus, the impugned judgment of the learned single judge was found to have the support of law and facts. Thus, writ dismissed. [Abhiram Samal v. Indian Bank, 2019 SCC OnLine Ori 198, decided on 01-05-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Uttaranchal High Court: A Division Bench of Ramesh Ranganathan, CJ. and N.S. Dhanik, J. entertained a petition seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the order passed by Uttarakhand Environment Protection and Pollution Control Board. 

The learned counsel for the petitioner, Vikas Kumar Guglani, submitted that impugned order by the respondent of the closure of the Unit due to several deficiencies in the said unit must be quashed and the unit must be de-sealed. After the rectification of the deficiencies noted by the Pollution Control Board and complying with the stipulated norms, the unit is still closed as the authority has not given a clean chit for de-sealing. 

Further the learned counsel for the respondent, Aditya Pratap Singh, submitted that the petitioner’s representation would only be considered in accordance with law after an inspection of the unit would be caused again by the officials of the Pollution Control Board to satisfy themselves that the petitioner’s claim of having complied with the stipulated norms were valid or not. He contended that necessary orders would be passed thereafter in accordance with law with utmost expedition. 

The Court, in this regard, observed that petitioner’s unit was closed for a week, thus directing the Board to conduct and examine the unit and cause an inspection of the subject unit. It is also important that the respondent must be satisfied that the petitioner has complied with the said norms and thereafter make any decision as it is a matter related to public interest and environment. [Eurasia Door Devices v. State of Uttarakhand, 2019 SCC OnLine Utt 346, decided on 03-05-2019]