Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

Constitution of India — Art. 21 — Police atrocities/Custodial death/Armed forces/Fake encounter killings: As large number of fake encounters were alleged against Punjab Police during the period of Punjab Extremism/Terrorist/Separatism, hence, the High Court direction for expeditious commencement of trial and recording of evidence, not interfered with. [Tarsem Lal v. CBI, (2019) 7 SCC 701]

Criminal Law — Criminal Trial — Clues and Tell-Tale Signs/Forensics — Bloodmarks/Trail and Bloodstains: Effect of failure to establish origin of blood as being of human origin and/or its blood group, on prosecution case has to be ascertained in the facts of circumstances of each case, and there is no fixed formula for the same. At times, it may be very difficult for serologist to detect the origin of the blood and/or its group due to disintegration of the serum, or insufficiency of bloodstains, or haematological changes, etc. In such situations, the court, using its judicious mind, may deny the benefit of doubt to accused, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case, if other evidence of prosecution is credible and if reasonable doubt does not arise in the mind of the court about investigation but non-confirmation of blood group or origin of the blood may assume importance in cases where the accused pleads a defence or alleges mala fides on the part of prosecution, or accuses the prosecution of fabricating the evidence to wrongly implicate him in the commission of crime. [Balwan Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2019) 7 SCC 781]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 319 — Summoning of additional accused — Exercise of powers: Standard of proof employed for summoning a person as an accused person under S. 319 CrPC is higher than the standard of proof employed for framing a charge against the accused person. [Shiv Prakash Mishra v. State of U.P., (2019) 7 SCC 806]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 54-A, 53 and 482 Identification of a person by DNA test: Request for such test and direction, therefore, held, have to be based on police authorities’ satisfaction based on material collected after a substantial investigation into the matter. DNA test cannot be requested or directed as a step towards a roving or fishing inquiry on a person or his relatives. It is a serious matter which should not be lightly resorted to without there being appropriate satisfaction of the requirements of directing DNA test. [Kathi David Raju v. State of A.P., (2019) 7 SCC 769]

Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (25 of 1957) — S. 6-B r/w Ss. 2(1)(u-2) and 2(1)(v) — “Total turnover” as opposed to “taxable turnover” — Relevance of, for determination of slab/rates for levy of turnover tax: The expression “total turnover” has been referred to for purpose of identification/classification of dealers for prescribing various rates/slabs of tax leviable to the dealer and read with first and second provisos to S. 6-B(1), this makes the intention of legislature clear and unambiguous that except deductions provided for under first proviso to S. 6-B(1) nothing else can be deducted from total turnover as defined under S. 2(1)(u-2) for purpose of levy of turnover tax under S. 6-B. Thus, the contention of appellant that “total turnover” in S. 6-B(1) is to be read as “taxable turnover” and determination of rate of turnover tax is to be ascertained on “taxable turnover”, held, unsustainable and rejected. [Achal Industries v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 7 SCC 703]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302, 149 and 148 — Murder: In this case of mob violence, due to factors like conduct of eyewitness, acquittal of co-accused, previous enmity, delay in FIR and non-examination of material witnesses, false implication cannot be ruled out, hence, appellants also acquitted. [Jagdish v. State of Haryana, (2019) 7 SCC 711]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302, 376(2)(f) & (g), 377 and 201 — Rape/Sodomy and murder of minor: In this case of aggravated penetrative sexual assault by gang of two and sodomy committed on 10 yr old girl by tying her hands and murder of her 7 yr old brother along with her, first by trying to poison them and then by pushing them into canal when they were conscious, hence, death sentence was affirmed. [Manoharan v. State, (2019) 7 SCC 716]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 364-A, 201 and 302 r/w S. 34: In this case of kidnapping and murder, as chain of circumstances were not fully established against accused, hence it was held that they were entitled to benefit of doubt and appellants were acquitted. [Baiju Kumar Soni v. State of Jharkhand, (2019) 7 SCC 773]

Service Law — Departmental Enquiry — Criminal proceedings — Departmental Enquiry vis-à-vis Criminal proceedings — Relative scope: The object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on offender, while purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. Degree of proof necessary to convict offender is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. Rule relating to appreciation of evidence in two proceedings is also not similar. Further, in criminal law, burden of proof is on prosecution to prove guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, whereas in departmental enquiry, penalty can be imposed on a finding recorded on the basis of “preponderance of probability”. Moreover, an acquittal by court of competent jurisdiction in a judicial proceeding does not ipso facto absolve delinquent from liability under disciplinary jurisdiction. [Shashi Bhushan Prasad v. CISF, (2019) 7 SCC 797]

Service Law — Departmental Enquiry — Enquiry Report — If valid — Enquiry Committee, if had acted validly: Setting aside of termination order on ground of non-compliance with R. 37(6) of 1981 Rules inasmuch as allegedly there was no evidence to show that three members of Enquiry Committee had met, deliberated before submitting enquiry report, not sustainable. [Shri Yogiraj Shikshan Prasarak Mandal v. Vidya, (2019) 7 SCC 695]

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 — Ss. 38, 39 and 40 r/w Ss. 120-B and 125 IPC — Essential ingredients: Necessary ingredients for each of the offences like association/offence relating to membership of terrorist organisation (S. 38), supporting/raising funds for terrorist organisation (Ss. 39/40), clarified. Respondent A-2 in this case, held, was rightly convicted by High Court only for offence relating to membership of terrorist organisation (Islamic State/IS/ISIS) and conspiracy, and rightly acquitted of all other offences. However, the sentence of 3 yrs’ RI awarded by trial court for said offence was proper, and there was no ground for reduction of the same on the ground of sympathy in light of overall conduct and attitude of A-2 re the offence relating to membership of terrorist organization. [Union of India v. Yasmeen Mohd. Zahid, (2019) 7 SCC 790]

Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

Agricultural Produce, Livestock and Markets — Allotment of shops — Daud Committee norms for allotment of shops in new wholesale market: Due to huge competition for allotment, there was claim for one vacant large shop (gala) but four eligible claimants (viz. two appellants and R-3 and R-4), hence, instead of allotment by lottery method, offers from eligible claimants should be invited in sealed covers. Directions issued accordingly. [Hande Wavare & Co. v. Ramchandra Vitthal Dongre, (2019) 7 SCC 608]

Causation: Causation in criminal law is one area which is worth studying given the complexities that pervade the notion of causation. This article aims to reconsider the notion of causation. Revisiting Causation: “Unscrewing the Inscrutable” by Dr Birendra Pathak [(2019) 7 SCC J-39]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 37 R. 3 — Leave to defend: Principles to be followed while granting leave, unconditional or conditional, summarized. Ultimate objective of summary suit is expeditious disposal of commercial dispute. Where defendant discloses facts of prima facie fair and reasonable defence, unconditional leave may be granted. It relates to subjective satisfaction of court on basis of materials that may be placed before it. However, where court is satisfied that defence is plausible or probable and is not sham or moonshine but still it has some doubt over defence, then conditional leave may be granted to defend. In case of unconditional leave, subjective satisfaction of court is involved whereas in conditional leave element of discretion vests with court. This discretion is not absolute but required to be exercised judiciously tempered with what is just and proper in facts of particular case. While exercising discretion it is required to maintain delicate balance between respective rights and contentions by not passing an order which may ultimately impede speedy resolution of dispute. [Sudin Dilip Talaulikar v. Polycap Wires (P) Ltd., (2019) 7 SCC 577]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — S. 100 — Substantial question of law: Framing of substantial question of law, sine qua non for exercise of jurisdiction under S. 100. Whether appellate court can reverse findings recorded by trial court adverting to specific findings of trial court and whether judgment of lower appellate court was perverse and outcome of misreading of evidence, not substantial questions of law. [Gurnam Singh v. Lehna Singh, (2019) 7 SCC 641]

Constitution of India — Art. 136 — Ram Janmabhoomi/Babri Masjid suit — Dispute as to ownership of land on which stood place of worship: In this case, there was resumption of hearing of cases/appeals on failure of mediation in appeals arising out of Suits Nos. 3 and 4, hence, parties directed to indicate pleadings and evidence on which they sought to rely so that Registry can keep such documents ready for perusal of Court. [Mohd. Siddiq v. Suresh Das, (2019) 7 SCC 633]

Constitution of India — Sch. VII List II Entries 6, 8, 51(a) and 66 — State Legislature’s competence to make law or regulate or impose tax/fee/impost/levy: Noti. dt. 6-11-2012 and R. 106(Tha) issued under S. 90, Jharkhand Excise Act, 1915 (2 of 1915), held, valid as it is clear that levy concerned was on IMFL (alcohol fit for human consumption), thus within legislative competence of State under List II. [State of Jharkhand v. Ajanta Bottlers & Blenders (P) Ltd., (2019) 7 SCC 545]

Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 — S. 10(1) r/w Ss. 20(1), 13(1) and 14, Minimum Wages Act, 1948: The CLRA Act, 1970 is not applicable after issuance of prohibition notification under S. 10(1) for determining minimum wages payable to erstwhile contract labourers. Minimum wages in such circumstances could be claimed under Minimum Wages Act, 1948 in independent proceedings. [SAIL v. Jaggu, (2019) 7 SCC 658]

Criminal Law — Criminal Trial — Circumstantial Evidence — Generally: It is well settled that in the cases of circumstantial evidence, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn, should in the first instance, be fully established, and all the facts so established, should be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt of the accused. The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature, and should be such, as to exclude every hypothesis, but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a complete chain of evidence, as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused, and it must be such, as to show that within all human probability, the act must have been done by the accused and none else. [State of Rajasthan v. Mahesh Kumar, (2019) 7 SCC 678]

Determination of existence of arbitration agreement: This article deals with the settled principles laid down for determining the existence of an arbitration agreement as well as the various ways an arbitration agreement can come into existence. Determining an Arbitration Agreement — Different Scenarios And Inconsistent Application by Akkant Kumar Mittal [(2019) 7 SCC J-13]

Evidence Act, 1872 — Ss. 101 and 106 — Burden of proof in criminal case — Lies upon whom: General rule is that burden of proof is on prosecution. However, S. 106 was introduced not to relieve prosecution of their duty, but it is designed to meet situation, in which it would be impossible or difficult for prosecution to establish facts which are especially within knowledge of accused. [Ranjit Kumar Haldar v. State of Sikkim, (2019) 7 SCC 684]

Frustration of contract: This article attempts to review (and perhaps clarify) the legal principles governing frustration of contract under current Indian case law. While doing so, this article does not analyse the relevant case law from a normative perspective. It does, however, advance the proposition that Indian law recognises a distinction between frustration of a contract as a result of “internal forces” and frustration of a contract as a result of “external forces” i.e. the nature of impossibility resulting in frustration of a contract. Principles Governing Frustration of Contract under Indian Law by Gaurav Pachnanda [(2019) 7 SCC J-1]

Karnataka Sales Tax Rules, 1957 — R. 6(4)(m)(i) r/w Expln. III to R. 6(4) and S. 5-B of Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957: Condition in R. 6(4)(m)(i) restricting deduction in respect of goods which have already suffered tax, to such goods as are used in the same form in which the goods are purchased, valid. Rejecting contention that condition under R. 6(4)(m)(i) of goods that are purchased be used “in the same form” is beyond the charging section (S. 5-B) of KST Act, held, S. 5-B and R. 6(4)(m)(i) operate in different spheres. S. 5-B is a charging provision for levy of sales tax whereas R. 6(4)(m)(i) is a provision for deduction from tax and under S. 5-B, tax can be levied on transfer of property in the goods whether as goods or in some other form whereas R. 6(4)(m)(i) provides for a deduction in respect of goods which have already suffered tax and which are used in the same form. Thus, said rule is in consonance with the charging provision and does not militate against S. 5-B of KST Act, 1957. [Craft Interiors (P) Ltd. v. CCT, (2019) 7 SCC 535]

M.P. Reorganisation Act, 2000 (Central Act 28 of 2000) — Ss. 78, 79, 80, 85, 86, 3, 5, 2(e), (f), (j) & (k) and Pt. II — Deemed adoption of laws/delegated legislation of erstwhile State in successor States (S. 79): When trade is within the territorial limits of each successor State, no difficulty of regarding it as intra- State trade and said incentive available but when trade is between the successor States, it has to be regarded as inter-State trade and therefore, in view of Art. 286 of the Constitution as it applied prior to its amendment on 16-9-2016, said exemption/incentive would not be available. [State of M.P. v. Lafarge Dealers Assn., (2019) 7 SCC 584]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 302 or S. 304 [S. 300 Exception 4] — Murder or culpable homicide: In this case of sudden fight as there was unpremeditated attack, conviction was modified to one under S. 304 Pt. II in the facts and circumstances of the case. [Sita Ram v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2019) 7 SCC 531]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302, 365 and 201 r/w S. 34: In this case of kidnapping for ransom and murder of child by maternal uncles, n the basis of circumstantial evidence of last seen together, recovery of dead body and murder weapon and conduct of accused, conviction confirmed. [Munawwar v. State of U.P., (2019) 7 SCC 653]

Religious Freedom and other Fundamental Rights: This article attempts to defend and discuss the implications of the issue that the religious freedom guaranteed under Article 25(1) is inferior to and subject to other Part III provisions. Individual Religious Freedom Is Subject To Other Fundamental Rights by Shrutanjaya Bhardwaj [(2019) 7 SCC J-29]

Service Law — Reinstatement/Back Wages/Arrears — Back wages — Entitlement to: Back wages cannot be claimed for period of unauthorised absence or absence without justification. However, back wages can be claimed where employee is restrained from engaging in service. [United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Siraj Uddin Khan, (2019) 7 SCC 564]

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — S. 58(c) and proviso thereto and S. 54 — Conditional sale mortgage (CSM) or absolute sale — Determination of — Principles summarized: No transaction shall be deemed to be a conditional sale mortgage (CSM) unless condition in respect thereof is embodied in document which effects or purports to effect sale.  Therefore, any recital relating to mortgage or transaction being in nature of conditional sale should be intrinsic part of the very same sale deed. Furthermore, even in case of single document, real character of transaction is to be ascertained from provisions of deed viewed in light of surrounding circumstances and intention of parties. If sale and agreement to repurchase are embodied in separate documents then such transaction cannot be conditional sale mortgage (CSM) irrespective of whether documents are contemporaneously executed. A sale with mere condition of retransfer is not a mortgage. [Sopan v. Syed Nabi, (2019) 7 SCC 635]

Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

Assam Rifles Act, 2006 (47 of 2006) — Ss. 2(e), (h) & (r), 55, 56, 49 and 139 r/w Ss. 3, 4, 7, 25 and 28 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988: General Assam Rifles Court (GARC), held, has jurisdiction to try offences under Prevention of Corruption Act, against members of Assam Rifles. S. 4 of PC Act is not irreconcilable with S. 55 of 2006 Act to such extent that they cannot stand together. [Union of India v. Ranjit Kumar Saha, (2019) 7 SCC 505]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 9 — Dismissal for default: Ordinarily litigation is based on adjudication on merits of contentions of parties. Litigation should not be terminated by default, either of plaintiff or defendant. Cause of justice requires that as far as possible, adjudication be done on merits. [Robin Thapa v. Rohit Dora, (2019) 7 SCC 359]

 Constitution of India — Art. 190(3)(b) or Sch. X Para 2 r/w Art. 361-B and Arts. 164, 191, 212 and 208 — Conflict of Constitutional rights — Constitutional balance — Interim order: In this case, as there was one day to go for no-confidence motion, it was held that at this stage, resignation of 15 MLAs concerned of Karnataka Assembly cannot be first accepted or their disqualification under Sch. X be ordered, as it is not desirable to adjudicate said issue. As an interim measure, Speaker directed to use discretion to decide request for resignation of 15 MLAs concerned under Art. 190 r/w R. 202 of Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of Karnataka Legislative Assembly. Discretion given to decide said issue within such time-frame as Speaker considered necessary. During said period said 15 members cannot be compelled by Speaker to participate in proceedings of House. Said 15 MLAs concerned can either take part or opt to remain out of proceedings of House. [Pratap Gouda Patil v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 7 SCC 463]

Constitution of India — Art. 226 — Alternative remedy/Exhaustion of remedies: Validity of dismissal of writ petition on ground of existence of arbitration clause, affirmed. [Nirmal Software Services (P) Ltd. v. Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar Marathwada University, (2019) 7 SCC 356]

Constitution of India — Arts. 129 and 32 — Contempt jurisdiction — Scope of interference — CBI investigation — Saradha Chit Fund Scam: In case of contempt jurisdiction with particular reference to non-cooperation of State Police official (Commissioner of Police) with CBI, both parties ad idem that Supreme Court in contempt jurisdiction while examining events of 3-2-2019 cannot go into issues that arise for consideration i.e. in contempt proceedings Court could not determine whether or not police official concerned should be arrested by CBI for custodial interrogation, hence, interim protection granted to State Police official concerned, vacated and certain consequential clarifications issued. [Subrata Chattoraj v. Union of India, (2019) 7 SCC 393]

Constitution of India — Arts. 226 and 12 — Maintainability of writ petition: Writ petition challenging termination order passed by Managing Committee of private school, not maintainable since Managing Committee of private school is not “State” within meaning of Art. 12. [Trigun Chand Thakur v. State of Bihar, (2019) 7 SCC 513]

Constitution of India — Arts. 33 and 19(1)(g) & (6) — Restrictions on member of Armed Forces to leave service at will: In this case appellant Airman in IAF in breach of provisions contained in AFO 14 of 2008 applying for civilian post, participating in written test and appearing for interview without intimation or approval. Thus, held, appellant failed to comply with his obligations both in terms of his engagement as enrolled member of Force and requirements to be fulfilled in terms of AFO 14 of 2008. Further held, submission that appellant had unqualified right under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution to leave service of AF at will, liable to be rejected since member of IAF does not have such unqualified right, which would seriously impinge upon manning levels and operational preparedness of Armed Forces. [Amit Kumar Roy v. Union of India, (2019) 7 SCC 369]

Consumer Protection — Services — Medical practitioners/services — Medical negligence: Courts not to defer too readily to expert opinion and must duly apply their mind to the reasonableness of the treatment/care given to the patient and/or approach adopted in the circumstances of each case, otherwise medical standards would obviously decline. Director of Hospital, when is not the treating doctor or the referring doctor, not personally liable, even when negligence is confirmed against Hospital. Standard of care which is expected of a medical professional is the treatment which is expected of one with a reasonable degree of skill and knowledge and a medical practitioner would be liable only where the conduct falls below the standards of a reasonably competent practitioner in the field. [Arun Kumar Manglik v. Chirayu Health & Medicare (P) Ltd., (2019) 7 SCC 401]

Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 — Ss. 10(1), 7, 12, 23, 24 and 25 — Violation of prohibition notification issued under S. 10(1) — Effect: Principal employer is under no obligation to absorb contract labour on issuance of prohibition notification in absence of any such stipulation in CLRA Act providing for automatic absorption. [SAIL v. Ispat Khadan Janta Mazdoor Union, (2019) 7 SCC 440]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 239 — Discharge — Scope — Matters that may be considered: Entering into questions of evidentiary value of material adduced by prosecution at stage of, not permissible. [State of Karnataka v. M.R. Hiremath, (2019) 7 SCC 515]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 482 — Quashment: In this case as there were mala fides or animus of complainant and allegations were also there of illegal racket in State whereby some unscrupulous lawyers in connivance with court officials were procuring arrest warrants against alleged accused without following procedure prescribed by law and without verifying whether there was any truth in complaint, appellant permitted to file appropriate proceedings for quashment, on these grounds of. [Manohar M. Galani v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 7 SCC 527]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss. 378 and 386 — Appeal against acquittal: Opportunity of hearing/Proper representation a must, even if by appointment of counsel/Amicus Curiae by court. In this case, respondent complainant filed the complaint under S. 138, NI Act and Trial court acquitted appellant-accused. In the appeal preferred by respondent before High Court, there was no representation for appellant-accused. Upon hearing the respondent complainant, High Court set aside the judgment of trial court and convicted appellant-accused under S. 138, NI Act, held to be improper. [Christopher Raj v. K. Vijayakumar, (2019) 7 SCC 398]

Family and Personal Laws — Guardians and Wards — Custody of Child/Minor — Considerations for Appointment of Guardian/Welfare of Child — Paramount consideration is always of welfare of child: Provisions of Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 govern rights of parents or guardians, however they do not bar courts exercising parens patriae jurisdiction from determining rights of child considering its overall development. Purpose and object of Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 is not mere physical custody of minor but due protection of ward’s health, maintenance and education.  Power and duty of court under this Act is welfare of minor. Word “welfare” must be taken in its widest sense. Apart from physical well-being, moral and ethical welfare of child also weigh with court. Though provisions of special statute, such as the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, governing rights of parents or guardians may be taken into consideration, there is nothing which can stand in way of court exercising its parens patriae jurisdiction. No hard-and-fixed formula can be found out which can be applied in each and every case. Each case has to be examined in its own facts. Every child has right to proper health and education. It is primary duty of parents to ensure that child gets proper education. Courts exercising parens patriae jurisdiction can decide such issues in interest of minor. [Sheoli Hati v. Somnath Das, (2019) 7 SCC 490]

Government Grants, Largesse, Public Property and Public Premises — Illegal/Unauthorised Occupation/Encroachment of Government Land and Eviction/Dispossession therefrom and Demolition — Rent recovery/Mesne profit: In case of non-agreement of tenant with proposal of Estate Officer, remand order for giving opportunity of hearing before Estate Officer, affirmed with condition that tenant should pay reasonable amount of damages for delaying matter before Estate Officer. Monthly instalments of arrears and damages specified to be paid till disposal of matter by Estate Officer. On failure to deposit any of said instalments, Estate Officer directed to pass eviction order and no defence would be available to tenant. On deposit of first instalment of arrears, water supply to be resumed, which allegedly was disconnected. [Bengal Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Ajit Nain, (2019) 7 SCC 363]

M.P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960 (20 of 1960) — Ss. 46, 7, 11, 41 and 42 — Order passed by competent authority declaring surplus land: Challenge to order passed by competent authority declaring surplus land, by instituting a civil suit, is not maintainable in view of bar of jurisdiction of civil court in such matter under S. 46, M.P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960. Order of competent authority is subject to appeal and further revision as provided under the 1960 Act. [State of M.P. v. Dungaji, (2019) 7 SCC 465]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 498-A and Expln. thereto — Conviction under — Ingredients for: Conviction for an offence under S. 498-A IPC, held, can be for wilful conduct which is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide OR for dowry demand. In this case there was conviction of husband for cruelty under S. 498-A for having extra-marital relationship which allegedly drove wife to commit suicide, when neither dowry demand nor mental nor physical cruelty on the part of husband proved. Appellant husband already stood acquitted under S. 306. It was held by the Supreme Court that in such circumstances conviction under S. 498-A cannot be sustained as it would not attract either limb of definition of “cruelty” under S. 498-A Expln. [Wasim v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2019) 7 SCC 435]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302 and 392 r/w S. 34 — Robbery and murder: In this case as there was circumstantial evidence of last seen evidence, recovery of stolen articles, non-explanation of incriminating evidence and failure to conduct TIP was held inconsequential, conviction of accused, confirmed. [Ramesh Dasu Chauhan v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 7 SCC 476]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302/34 or Ss. 304 Pt. II/34 — Murder or culpable homicide: In this case of sudden fight, there was absence of premeditation. Evidence of injured witness was reliable, believable and inspire implicit confidence as well as was corroborated, hence, concurrent conviction under Ss. 304 Pt. II/34 confirmed. [Pratap Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2019) 7 SCC 424]

Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 — S. 28: In this case as there was appropriate authority for conducting inspection as to whether provisions of Act and Rules were being complied with, proceedings were restored. [State of Orissa v. Mamata Sahoo, (2019) 7 SCC 486]

Service Law — Reservation/Concession/Exemption/Relaxation and Affirmative Action — Migration of Category: Reserved category candidate availing benefit of age relaxation in selection process cannot be accommodated in or migrated to general category. [Niravkumar Dilipbhai Makwana v. Gujarat Public Service Commission, (2019) 7 SCC 383]

Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — S. 96 and Or. 41 R. 33 — First appeal: Principles summarised regarding mode of disposal of first appeal, especially where first appellate court agree with view taken by trial court. [R.S. Anjayya Gupta v. Thippaiah Setty,(2019) 7 SCC 300]

Constitution of India — Arts. 227 and 226 — Judicial Review — Scope of High Court’s Jurisdiction — Interference in findings of Rent Control Authorities — If warranted: In Vidarbha part of Maharashtra, before enactment of Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1989, there had to be two rounds of litigation to seek eviction of a tenant. First round had to be before Rent Controller seeking permission to issue a quit notice under S. 108 of TP Act. On such permission being granted, landlord issued notice of termination of tenancy and filed a civil suit seeking eviction of tenant. In this case first round before Rent Controller was gone into. Bona fide need with additional facet of comparative hardship and availability of alternative accommodation had attained finality. After permission was granted by Rent Controller and civil suit was filed in which an objection was taken that as premises were governed by the provisions of Slum Act, requisite permission of Slum Authority was mandatory.  Slum Authority granted that permission in appeal and requirements under S. 22(4) of Slum Act stood satisfied or not was also considered by appellate authority in sufficient detail. Civil suit seeking eviction also attained finality. View that weighed with High Court was not correct as respondent had opportunity at every stage to present his case and before appellate authority as well. No reason was there for High Court to interfere in its jurisdiction under Art. 227 of the Constitution. Judgment and order dt. 19-6-2014 passed by High Court set aside and order dt. 31-10-2002 passed by appellate authority restored. [Kumud v. Pandurang Narayan Gandhewar, (2019) 7 SCC 287]

Contract and Specific Relief — Contractual Obligations and Rights — Price/Escalation Clauses: In this case a Coal Mining and Delivery Agreement (CMDA) was executed between appellant and respondent on 16-7-2008 for supply of coal and the supply was to commence at the earliest within 42 months, or within 48 months from date of allotment of coal blocks i.e. by 25-6-2011. Initial date of commencement i.e. 25-6-2011 came to be extended to 25-3-2013 by mutual agreement due to force majeure as there was a delay of 21 months in obtaining the forest clearance and environmental clearance. Arbitrator interpreted the relevant clauses of the contract and held that the date of commencement of the first operating year would be 25-6-2011 and accordingly the zero year for the purpose of price escalation would be 2011-2012 and therefore appellant shall be entitled to the enhanced amount as is applicable in the year 2013-2014 (the price escalation). It was held by the Supreme Court that in this case, the interpretation by Arbitrator was both possible as well as plausible, therefore, merely because some other view could have been taken, High Court was not justified in interfering with the interpretation made by Arbitrator. Further held, it was pure and simple case of interpretation of the relevant clauses of the agreement which does not involve any public policy. Therefore, quashing and setting aside the award passed by Arbitrator with respect to Claim 1 relating to price adjustment/escalation, held unsustainable and set aside. [Parsa Kente Collieries Ltd. v. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut  Utpadan Nigam Ltd., (2019) 7 SCC 236]

 Environment Law — Environmental/Ecological Disasters — Endosulfan disaster — Compensation to victims: Affected individuals entitled to compensation as per directions of Court in Democratic Youth Federation of India, 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1901. Persons categorised as “Others” by expert medical panel for free treatment scheme for lifelong health issues and undergoing such treatment, held, are also affected individuals entitled to said compensation of Rs 5 lakhs each as determined by National Human Rights Commission. Accordingly, directions issued for release of said compensation to 4 contempt petitioners. [Remya P. v. K.M. Abraham, (2019) 7 SCC 233]

Environment Law — Water/River/Coastal Pollution — Coastal Zone Management Plan (CZMP) — Coastal Regulation Zones (CRZ) — Critically vulnerable notified CRZ-III areas: As construction activities in this case were found to be in violation of CRZ, and hence demolition/removal directed. [Kerala State Coastal Zone Management Authority v. State of Kerala, (2019) 7 SCC 248]

Family and Personal Laws — Hindu Law — Ancestral property/Joint family property: Property inherited from father (prior to coming into effect of Hindu Succession Act, 1956) becomes joint family property in hands of sons and grandsons, and all male issue, even the unborn upon their taking birth. Any conveyance or compromise regarding inherited property by some coparceners/shareholders would not affect and bind the shares of the coparceners/shareholders not a party to the conveyance/compromise in question. Further held, ancestral/joint family property which had lost this character upon a valid conveyance to stranger(s) would reacquire character of ancestral/joint family property if reconveyed back to the family/coparceners, and would thus revest in all the coparceners, including those who had been born in the meantime. [Doddamuniyappa v. Muniswamy, (2019) 7 SCC 193]

Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 — S. 9: Jurisdiction of Family Court qua petition for custody of minor children is not existent, when children are foreign citizens not ordinarily residing within jurisdiction of Family Court. Application of principle that return of child to foreign jurisdiction cannot be directed unless the same is in the best interest and welfare of the child. [Lahari Sakhamuri v. Sobhan Kodali, (2019) 7 SCC 311]

Infrastructure Laws — Acquisition for Infrastructure Projects: In case of land acquisition for development of railway project and not for purpose of development of urban area or for providing a housing scheme to residents of urban area, private respondents, held, have no right to rehabilitation or allotment of alternative site in absence of any such scheme framed by State Government. [State of T.N. v. Vasanthi Veerasekaran, (2019) 7 SCC 342]

Infrastructure Laws — Energy and Power — Alternative/Non-conventional/Renewable Energy Sources — Renewable energy projects — Determination of generic tariff: In this case there was challenge to HERC (Terms and Conditions for Determination of Tariff from Renewable Energy Sources, Renewable Purchase Obligation and Renewable Energy Certificate) Regulations, 2010 revising tariff. It was held by the Supreme Court that validity of the Regulations can be decided only in judicial review proceedings before the courts and not by way of appeal or review. High Court should have adjudicated all contentions raised by appellant but High Court adjudicated only two out of almost thirty contentions, that too, in a cryptic and cavalier manner. High Court did not analyse grounds of challenge regarding validity of the impugned amended Regulations and competency to frame such a regulation appropriately. Hence, matter was remanded for proper adjudication of all issues without expressing any opinion on merits of matter. [Star Wire (India) Vidyut (P) Ltd. v. Haryana ERC, (2019) 7 SCC 207]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Ss. 18 and 23 — Determination of market value: Every reference proceeding must be decided on evidence produced and issues raised therein. Dispute regarding competency, capability of expert to prepare valuation report and procedure adopted by him in preparing valuation report. Under such condition, mechanical acceptance of valuation report submitted by expert merely on ground that his valuation was accepted by courts in proceedings relating to some other parcel(s) of land, not permissible. [Executive Engineer, Minor Irrigation Works, Jalgaon v. Vitthal Damodar Patil, (2019) 7 SCC 225]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Ss. 166, 168 and 173 — Permanent disability: Principles summarised regarding determination of compensation on the basis of functional disability. Step-wise inquiry to be made by Tribunal, delineated. As driver of offending vehicle was driving in breach of policy conditions, Insurance company absolved of its liability but principle of “pay and recover” applied. On facts of the case, compensation enhanced. [Parminder Singh v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2019) 7 SCC 217]

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — Ss. 142 and 138 — Cognizance after prescribed period upon showing sufficient cause: Under S. 142(1), complaint has to be instituted within one month of cause of action under S. 138 proviso (c), which however stipulates that cognizance may be taken after prescribed period, if complainant satisfies court about sufficient cause. In this case, both in Paras 7 and 8 of complaint, appellant complainant, held, indicated adequate and sufficient reasons for not being able to institute complaint within stipulated period and CJM, held, rightly condoned delay. High Court had merely adverted to presumption that first notice would be deemed to have been served if it was dispatched in ordinary course. Even if that presumption applies, sufficient cause was shown by appellant for condoning delay in instituting complaint taking basis of complaint as issuance of first legal notice dt. 31-12-2015, hence, quashment of proceedings, held, was erroneous. [Birendra Prasad Sah v. State of Bihar, (2019) 7 SCC 273]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302/149 or S. 302 simpliciter — Murder: In this case, eyewitness account found to be detailed, cogent and reliable and there was recovery of bloodstained weapon and clothes, hence concurrent conviction of main assailant, appellant herein, alone under S. 302 simpliciter while all other accused were acquitted, confirmed. [Kamlakar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 7 SCC 260]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302/34: In this case, as there was reasonable doubt as to identity of one of the accused, acquittal of such accused on said basis (while the other accused stood convicted), held, proper in this case. [State of Gujarat v. Kalusinh,(2019) 7 SCC 264]

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Ss. 13(1)(d) and 13(2) r/w Ss. 120-B, 420, 467, 468, 471, 477-A and 201 IPC — Conspiracy by public servant to commit forgery, etc.: In this case of banking fraud, merely because investigation may not have been proper, cannot enure to the benefit of appellants in view of nature of evidence available against them, hence conviction confirmed. [Ram Gopal v. CBI, (2019) 7 SCC 204]

Service Law — Penalty/Punishment — Effect of acquittal in/pendency of criminal proceedings: In this case, order of compulsory retirement passed against respondents for having indulged in corrupt practices causing loss to State Exchequer, even while prosecution for the same was pending, held, justified in present case. [State of J&K v. Farid Ahmad Tak, (2019) 7 SCC 278]

Service Law — Promotion — Departmental examination: In this case, for the post of Sub-Inspector (Civil Police), there was recruitment through limited departmental examination. There was eligibility criteria in terms of U.P. Sub-Inspector and Inspector (Civil Police) Service Rules, 2008 stipulating requirement of obtaining 50% marks in each subject. Contention that requirement of securing 50% marks was to be reckoned paperwise and not subjectwise was rejected in view of express language of Rules which do not permit such interpretation. It was held that in limited departmental examination, regardless of seniority more meritorious candidate is given opportunity to reach higher levels. [Raj Bahadur v. State of U.P., (2019) 7 SCC 291]

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — Ss. 126, 122 and 123 and S. 118 — Revocation of gift/Interference with donee property by donor after gift, including interference with further transactions as to gifted property: S. 126 Pt. II says “A gift may also be revoked in any of the cases (save want or failure of consideration) in which, if it were a contract, it might be rescinded”. In case of frustration/substantial failure of purpose of gift by donees/person(s) having control over donee property, donor may take steps to ensure proper fulfillment of purpose of gift. [Randhir Kaur v. Balwinder Kaur, (2019) 7 SCC 267]

Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

Central Excise Act, 1944 — Ss. 11-A, 11-A(2), 11-A(2-B) and Expln. 2 thereto and 11-AB — Payability of interest on differential duty paid with delay: The principle that value of goods at the time of removal is to reign supreme. However, in a case of retrospective escalation of price though later agreed, being received and consequential differential duty being admittedly payable, it would result in S. 11-A r/w S. 11-AB applying to the true value. Thus, in any of the circumstances, namely, non-levy, non-payment, shortlevy and short-payment, if any duty has been determined or paid as has been provided under S. 11-A, necessarily assessee becomes liable to pay interest from the first date of the month succeeding the month in which the duty ought to have been paid. [SAIL v. CCE, (2019) 6 SCC 693]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 22 Rr. 3(2) and 11 & Or. 41 R. 33 — Death of one of the several appellants during appeal: There can be no doubt that Order 22 Rule 3 CPC is applicable also to appeals filed under Order 41 CPC. Order 22 Rule 3(1) declares that where one of two or more plaintiffs dies and the right to sue does not survive to the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs alone inter alia the court on an application can substitute the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff and proceed with the suit. Sub-rule (2) of Order 22 Rule 3 provides that if it is not so done, the suit shall abate as far as the deceased plaintiff is concerned. Order 22 Rule 3 therefore is applicable when either a suit or an appeal is filed by more than one plaintiffs or appellants as the case may be. This is no doubt apart from it applying when there is a sole plaintiff or sole appellant. In such a situation, on the death of one of the plaintiffs or appellants and the right to sue does not survive to the remaining plaintiff/plaintiffs or appellant/appellants alone, then the LRs of the deceased party can come on record. Should he not do so, ordinarily, the proceeding will abate as far as the deceased party is concerned. [Hemareddi v. Ramachandra Yallappa Hosmani, (2019) 6 SCC 756]

Constitution of India — Arts. 226 & 32 and Art. 21 and Sch. VII List II Entries 1 and 3 — Public interest litigation — Issuance of directions for CBI investigation — Principles summarized: Primary responsibility of State Police to investigate all offences which are committed within its jurisdiction, emphasized. Direction for investigation can be given only if an offence is, prima facie, found to have been committed or a person’s involvement is prima facie established, but direction to CBI, or any other authority, to investigate whether any person has committed an offence or not cannot be legally given. Such direction would be contrary to concept and philosophy of life and liberty guaranteed to a person under Art. 21 of the Constitution. [Shree Shree Ram Janki Ji Asthan Tapovan Mandir v. State of Jharkhand, (2019) 6 SCC 777]

Cooperative Societies — Cooperative Housing/Housing Society — Expulsion of members/Admission of new members in their place/Readmission of expelled members upon their expulsion being set aside: In this case, the Housing Society in a general body meeting expelled 27 members, there were also certain resignations after such expulsion and subsequently 15 new members including the alleged contemnors were inducted against the vacancies. Expulsion of those 27 members was subject-matter of challenge and finally by judgment and order dt. 18-10-2010 the claim of those who were expelled, was accepted. Alleged contemnors violated the orders passed by the Supreme Court and despite having furnished appropriate undertakings, failed to vacate and hand over possession, however, there were certain equities in their favour: in that they were inducted as members not clandestinely but against the resultant vacancies after expulsion of certain members, that they had paid all the instalments in time, that on the basis of such instalments paid by the members including the alleged contemnors the construction was completed, and that they were put in possession of the apartments soon thereafter and it was only as a result of the expulsion orders of the contempt petitioners getting set aside that the alleged contemnors were to vacate their apartments and make way for the contempt petitioners. Going by the reports made by the architect, a new building could be constructed with 18 apartments i.e. that after satisfying the requirements of all the alleged contemnors there would still be some apartments left, from the sale of which money for construction could be garnered. The Supreme Court issued directions for vacation of flats by alleged contemnors (said new members) and allocation of same to re-admitted members (said members whose expulsion was set aside). Directions issued qua construction of a new building for allotment to alleged contemnors and issues pertaining thereto, considering the interest of all. [Sant Lal Gupta v. Umesh Kumar Jain, (2019) 6 SCC 745]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss. 437 and 439 — Bail — Condition of heavy deposits for bail — Reasonableness: In this case, seven pilgrims were killed and ten were injured in a stampede outside a temple.  High Court granted bail to Chief Priest of Temple, on condition that he would pay Rs 10,00,000 each (total amount of Rs 70,00,000) to legal heirs of deceased. The Supreme Court held that bail cannot be made conditional upon heavy deposits beyond financial capacity of applicant. Incarceration of petitioner is not necessary for investigation or petitioner will evade process of law or tamper with evidence if set at liberty. Government has also paid compensation to victims. Condition of payment to family members/legal heirs for grant of bail, waived. [M.D. Dhanapal v. State, (2019) 6 SCC 743]

Debt, Financial and Monetary Laws — Debt, Debt Recovery and Relief — Wilful defaulters/Abusers of Banking and Financial System — RBI Master Circular on Wilful Defaulters i.e. Revised Circular dt. 1-7-2015 r/w RBI Circular dt. 1-7-2013 — Representation by a lawyer in the in-house proceedings — Non-requirement of: In-House Committees i.e. Committee/Review Committee qua declaring a borrower as a wilful defaulter is not a Tribunal and not vested with State’s judicial power. Thus, no lawyer has any right under S. 30 of the Advocates Act to appear before the In-House Committees. [SBI v. Jah Developers (P) Ltd., (2019) 6 SCC 787]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 302 or S. 304 Pt. I or Pt. II — Murder or culpable homicide — Free fight — Single blow: In this case deceased sustained fatal injury on his head which was caused by accused R. The Supreme Court held that merely because accused R caused injury by blunt side of farsa, High Court was not justified in altering the conviction to S. 304 Pt. II IPC. Even in a case of a single blow, but on vital part of body, the case may fall under S. 302 IPC and accused can be held guilty under S. 302 IPC. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, more particularly that it was a case of free fight, considering the fact that the weapon used by accused R was farsa and he caused fatal injury on vital part of body, High Court committed a grave error in altering the conviction of accused R from Ss. 302/149 IPC to S. 304 Pt. II IPC. Conviction of accused R, altered from S. 302 IPC to S. 304 Pt.I IPC and he was sentenced to undergo eight years’ RI with a fine of Rs 5000. [State of M.P. v. Kalicharan, (2019) 6 SCC 809]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302 and 307 — Murder: In this case injured witness turned hostile and there was also delay in recording statement under S. 161 CrPC. Co-accused in this case was acquitted. The Supreme Court held that identification by PWs 1 and 4 of appellant G as one of the perpetrators who had fired on deceased and B (PW 3) is unreliable and should not be accepted without substantial corroboration to establish involvement of appellant. Bullets recovered from body of deceased were also not sent for ballistic examination. On the whole, posecution failed to prove that the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy, hence, conviction of appellant G, also set aside. [Guman Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2019) 6 SCC 804]

Service Law — Appointment — Compassionate appointment — Entitlement to: Delay in pursuing claim/approaching court would militate against claim for compassionate appointment as very objective of providing immediate amelioration to family would stand extinguished. [Punjab State Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Nirval Singh, (2019) 6 SCC 774]

Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302/149 — Murder — Eyewitness: In this case, related witnesses clearly established case against appellant-accused. Mere fact that deceased was brother of informant PW 11, and PW 13 is husband of the niece of deceased does not impeach their evidence in any manner. Mere fact that witness is related does not lead to inference that such witness is an interested witness. Motive of retaliation by accused against deceased, was established and medical evidence was also corroborated by ocular evidence, hence, conviction was confirmed. [Shio Shankar Dubey v. State of Bihar, (2019) 6 SCC 501]

P enal Code, 1860 — Ss. 166, 167 and 201 to 204: In this case while determining the maintainability of complaint for giving of false information/intentional omission to give information/destruction of evidence to screen accused, etc. on basis of adverse remarks made by trial court in its order, it was held that the order containing such adverse remarks being sub judice, appeal having been filed there against, said complaint, to abide by result of said appeal. [Hanumant Dinkar Arjun v. Suresh R. Andhare, (2019) 6 SCC 510]

Consumer Protection — Services — Medical practitioners/services — Varying approaches to treatment available — Choice amongst: While adopting a course of treatment, the medical professional must ensure that it is not unreasonable. The threshold to prove unreasonableness is set with due regard to the risks associated with medical treatment and the conditions under which medical professionals function. This is to avoid a situation where doctors resort to “defensive medicine” to avoid claims of negligence, often to the detriment of the patient. Hence, in a specific case where unreasonableness in professional conduct has been proven with regard to the circumstances of that case, a professional cannot escape liability for medical evidence merely by relying on a body of professional opinion. [Nand Kishore Prasad v. Mohib Hamidi, (2019) 6 SCC 512]

Consumer Protection — Consumer/Consumer Dispute/Locus Standi — Class Action — Maintainability of: All persons represented in a consumer class action need not have the same cause of action so long as they have common interest or common grievance to maintain a class action under the Consumer Protection Act, this being the same principle as is applicable in respect of Or. 1 R. 8 CPC. [Anjum Hussain v. Intellicity Business Park (P) Ltd., (2019) 6 SCC 519]

Service Law — Absorption — Absorption in deputee/transferee department: In this case, appellants were appointed to post of newly created Minority Welfare Officers on deputation for period of two years or till further orders whichever was earlier, after due selection process. Appellants were not repatriated to parent department even after two years. The Supreme Court reiterated that employee sent on deputation has no right to claim absorption. However, in instant case even though as per appointment letter appellants were appointed on deputation but actually said appointment was not on deputation but by transfer of service and that too much prior to coming into force of U.P. Minority Welfare Department Gazetted Officers Service Rules, 2001. Moreover, in absence of any evidence to show that appellants were appointed only against temporary post created for a period of two years, it cannot be held that they were appointed only against temporary posts for period of only two years. Appellants having been appointed prior to enforcement of 2001 Rules, entitled to absorption in Minority Welfare Department. Employees who had retired entitled to retiral benefits and pensions as admissible to Minority Welfare Officers. [Raja Singh v. State of U.P., (2019) 6 SCC 528]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302/34 and 307/34 — Murder trial: In this case, there was death of one due to shooting and injuries to others and alleged main assailant (appellant) was alone sought to be made responsible, all others stood acquitted. Regarding identification of accused at night/darkness, there was no evidence as to any source of light. Medical evidence also not established whether fatal wounds were caused by double-barrelled or single-barrelled gun. Hence, it was held that appellant alone could not be held responsible for fatal firearm wounds on body of deceased and conviction was reversed. [Ashoksinh Jayendrasinh v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 6 SCC 535]

Rent Control and Eviction — User/Non-user/Misuser/Non-occupation of premises — Non-user of tenanted premises — Eviction of tenant on ground of: For eviction of tenant on ground of non-user of tenanted premises by him, it must be established that premises were let out for a particular purpose, there was non-user of premises for the said purpose, non-user was without reasonable cause and for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding date of suit. [Nilesh Laxmichand v. Shantaben Purushottam Kakad, (2019) 6 SCC 542]

Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Ss. 34 and 42 — Suit for declaration of decree in earlier suit as void — Decree if a collusive one — Determination of: In this case Trial court and appellate Court and High Court in second appeal concluded that judgment and decree passed in earlier Civil Suit No. 18 of 1983 was illegal and did not bind plaintiffs (respondents herein), holding it a collusive decree between plaintiffs and defendants in said suit. Affirming concurrent findings of court below, interference was declined. [Jaswant Singh v. Jaspal Singh, (2019) 6 SCC 552]

Contract and Specific Relief — Auctions/Tenders — Formation of contract by auction: Right to participate in auction, in this case a draw of lots for allotment of flat, does not create any concluded contract or contractual entitlement, and hence did not create any entitlement to allotment of flat, much less to allotment of flat at a specified price. Furthermore, provider of flats in present case being a public authority could not have been compelled to act dehors the applicable norms by NCDRC. [U.P. Housing & Development Board v. Ramesh Chandra Agarwal, (2019) 6 SCC 554]

Constitution of India — Pt. IX and Art. 243-C — Chairperson/Pramukh of Little Andaman Panchayat Samiti: Procedure for election is different from procedure for removal. Persons who may participate in election and removal, clarified. Even if for election of Pramukh, the Constitution as well as State law mandate participation of directly elected members, there is no such stipulation in respect of procedure of no-confidence motion in the Constitution. But State laws i.e. the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (Panchayats) Regulation, 1994 and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (Panchayat Administration) Rules, 1997 are not silent and expressly stipulate two-thirds of “total membership” as quorum of special meeting and expressly permits “all” members of Panchayat Samiti to participate in discussion and vote in motion of no-confidence. [Seema Sarkar v. Panchayat Samiti, (2019) 6 SCC 559]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 43 R. 1(d) and Or. 9 R. 13: In this case, Family Court, had declined to condone delay in filing application by R-2 for setting aside ex parte decree for dissolution of marriage of R-1 husband with R-2. High Court without addressing the issue of delay, disposed of appeal and directed R-2 (first wife) to live with R-1, even though R-1 was now married to appellant. The Supreme Court held that the impugned orders passed without hearing appellant and not issuing any notice of appeal to appellant yet giving directions, not capable of being carried out. Morever, necessity of such substantive directions in an appeal between respondents inter se involving procedural law was questionable. Thus, said directions were without jurisdiction and legally unsustainable and hence set aside. Case remanded to High Court for deciding miscellaneous appeal afresh on merits in accordance with law after impleading appellant as a party respondent and other directions also issued. [Karuna Kansal v. Hemant Kansal, (2019) 6 SCC 581]

Companies Act, 2013 — S. 130 r/w Ss. 211/212 and 241/242 — Recasting and reopening of accounts — Permissibility of: Considering use of the word “OR” in S. 130, if either of the conditions precedent is satisfied, NCLT would be justified in passing order under S. 130 of the Act. Further, the three provisions i.e. Ss. 130, 211/212 and 241/242 are required to be considered conjointly and thus observations made while passing order under Ss. 241/242 can be said to be relevant observations for passing order under S. 130. [Hari Sankaran v. Union of India, (2019) 6 SCC 584]

Citizens, Migrants and Aliens — National Register of Citizens for the State of Assam — Preparation and publication procedure under Paras 2 to 8 of Schedule to 2003 Rules made under S. 18, Citizenship Act, 1955 — Right of appeal under Para 8: Para 8 right of appeal to Foreigners Tribunal, held, not available to persons in respect of whom Foreigners Tribunal has already declared their citizenship status as Indian Nationals or Foreigners under the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 issued under S. 3, Foreigners Act, 1946. Right of appeal under Para 8 is only available to persons whose citizenship status has not been declared by Foreigners Tribunal. Foreigners Tribunal cannot re-determine citizenship status. Bar of res judicata would apply as Foreigners Tribunal is a quasi-judicial body.  Opinion of Foreigners Tribunal as to citizenship status or order passed by Registering Authority based on opinion of Foreigners Tribunal as to citizenship status can be challenged by way of writ proceedings under Arts. 226 and 32 of the Constitution. Expression “competent authority” in Para 3(2) of Schedule to 2003 Rules made under Citizenship Act, means Foreigners Tribunal under 1964 Order made under Foreigners Act. Foreigners Act and Citizenship Act have to read harmoniously as they are inter-related and are sister enactments. [Abdul Kuddus v. Union of India, (2019) 6 SCC 604]

Constitution of India — Arts. 32 and 142 and Arts. 19 and 21 — Maintainability: In this case, Magistrate directed 13/14 days remand of petitioner’s husband for his posts in social media. Exercising power under Arts. 142 and 32, petitioner’s husband directed to be released on bail to satisfaction of conditions of Magistrate. Technical ground that habeas corpus is not maintainable against remand order of Magistrate, held not tenable in a glaring case of deprivation of liberty as in present case. [Jagisha Arora v. State of U.P., (2019) 6 SCC 619]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 2 R. 2 and Or. 7 R. 1 — Object of Or. 2 R. 2: Cause of action in both suits must in substance be identical to attract bar of subsequent suit in respect of any of reliefs pertaining to same cause of action which had been omitted in previous suit. In view of Or. 2 R. 3 it is open to plaintiff to combine causes of action but if there is more than one cause of action, Or. 2 R. 2 will not apply. [Pramod Kumar v. Zalak Singh, (2019) 6 SCC 621]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 319 — Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence — Exercise of: As certain aspects were not clear from decided cases, including a five-Judge Bench decision, following substantial questions of law referred to larger Bench of appropriate strength: (i) Whether trial court has power under S. 319 CrPC for summoning additional accused, when trial with respect to other co-accused has ended and judgment of conviction rendered on same date before pronouncing summoning order; (ii) Whether trial court has power under S. 319 CrPC for summoning additional accused, when trial in respect of certain other absconding accused (whose presence is subsequently secured) is ongoing/ pending, having been bifurcated from main trial; and (iii) What are the guidelines that competent court must follow, while exercising power under S. 319 CrPC. [Sukhpal Singh Khaira v. State of Punjab, (2019) 6 SCC 638]

Service Law — Promotion — Criteria/Eligibility — Deemed promotion — Relevance for promotion: An employee who was assigned deemed date of promotion as per the Maharashtra Civil Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules, 1982 but has not actually worked for three years continuously on promotional post, can not be said to have completed continuous service of not less than three years in feeder cadre as per stipulated requirement under the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads District Services (Recruitment) Rules, 1967. Hence, as Appendix IX of Recruitment Rules prescribed “continuous service of not less than three years” in grade of Office Superintendent for promotion to post of Section Officer, it was held that High Court erred in finding R-3 eligible for promotion. [Girish Kumar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 6 SCC 647]

Customs — Valuation: Rejection of the transaction value declared by importer without giving cogent and good reasons in terms of S. 14(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 and R. 12 of the Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Imported Goods) Rules, 2007, not permissible. Enquiry prior to such rejection and giving of valid reasons for doing so by proper officer, is necessary. Requirement of giving reasons, both at the preliminary as well as the second stage of enquiry i.e. when doubting the truth or accuracy of the value declared, mandatory in nature. [Century Metal Recycling (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 6 SCC 655]

Service Law — Transfer of Employee/Service: When transfer of employee was found to be mala fide and with oblique motive, employee concerned who retired during pendency of challenge, held, can still claim retiral benefits in light of order in his favour, [Union of India v. S. Maadasamy, (2019) 6 SCC 674]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — S. 100 — Second appeal: Second appeal would be entertained if High Court is satisfied that case involves substantial question of law. High Court has to frame substantial question of law and then direct issuance of notice to respondent of memo of appeal along with substantial question of law so framed.  Jurisdiction of High Court confined only to such substantial question of law. Additional substantial question of law can be framed while hearing appeal by assigning reasons therefore. High Court does not have jurisdiction to frame substantial question of law while delivering final judgment. It is framing of substantial question of law which empowers High Court to decide second appeal finally. Where substantial question of law not framed at the time of admission, High Court does not get jurisdiction to decide second appeal for want of substantial question of law. Respondent in second appeal has right to raise objection that substantial question of law does not arise in the appeal. He is required only to reply substantial question of law and not beyond that. [Arulmighu Nellukadai Mariamman Tirukkoil v. Tamilarasi, (2019) 6 SCC 686]

Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

Advocates — Vakalatnama — Nature of: Vakalatnama is only a document which authorises an advocate to appear on behalf of party. By and large, it has no bearing on merits of case.  [Sasikala Pushpa v. State of T.N., (2019) 6 SCC 477]

Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulation, 1959 (as amended by Regulation 1 of 1970) — Ss. 2(g) and 3(1)(a) — Validity of transfer: In this case it was held that High Court did not examine case in context of “transfer” as defined in S. 2(g). Moreover, certain documents filed by appellants to prove legal transactions in question as being legal and not hit by S. 3 as amended w.e.f. 1-1-1970, were not considered. Inquiry on aforementioned two grounds was also necessary while deciding legality and validity of sale deeds in question along with all other issues decided by courts below. Setting aside impugned order as also order passed by Single Judge, in interest of justice, matter remanded to High Court (Single Judge writ court) for deciding appellants’ writ petition afresh on merits in accordance with law on all issues arising in case including those mentioned above, on merits strictly in accordance with law uninfluenced by any observations made by Supreme Court. [Bikkina Rama Rao v. Tahsildar (Tribal Welfare), (2019) 6 SCC 474]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 9 R. 13 vis-à-vis S. 96(2) and S. 97 — Ex parte decree — Setting aside of: Relative scope and operation of Or. 9 R. 13 and S. 96(2) and duties of court when deciding cases under these provisions, explained in detail. Delay occasioned in filing of first appeal against ex parte decree under S. 96(2) after dismissal of application under Or. 9 R. 13, due to pursing remedy under Or. 9 R. 13, can be condoned as time spent therein can be considered as sufficient cause for condonation of delay provided there is no dilatory tactic or lack of bona fides on part of appellant. Proposition “remedies provided as simultaneous and cannot be converted into consecutive remedies” cannot be applied in rigid manner. [Bhivchandra Shankar More v. Balu Gangaram More, (2019) 6 SCC 387]

Consumer Protection — Consumer Forums — Maintainability — Delay/ Laches/Limitation: In this case, NCDRC by conditional order dt. 16-11-2018 required appellants to file a rejoinder and evidence within four weeks, failing which complaint was to stand dismissed automatically. On 15-2-2019, NCDRC declined to grant any further time to appellants for delay in filing a rejoinder and evidence and dismissed complaint itself. The Supreme Court held that observation and inference of NCDRC that case might lack merit, for which there was delay, unwarranted. Orders of this nature detract from true purpose for which NCDRC has been established. NCDRC should have borne this in mind instead of rejecting complaint on a technicality. Such dismissals only add to burden of litigation and defeat purpose of ensuring justice in consumer for a. Though Consumer Protection Act, 1986 stipulates a period for disposing of a consumer complaint, it is also a sobering reflection that complaints cannot be disposed of due to non-availability of resources and infrastructure. In this background, it is harsh to penalise a bona fide litigant for marginal delays that may occur in judicial process. Consumer fora should bear this in mind so that ends of justice are not defeated. Since complaint was dismissed on a mere technicality, issued no notice to respondent, impugned order dt. 15-2-2019 set aside and Consumer Complaint No. 1432 of 2016 to file of NCDRC restored. Rejoinder and affidavit of evidence being ready, to be taken on record by NCDRC. [Vibha Bakshi Gokhale v. Gruhashilp Constructions, (2019) 6 SCC 489]

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 — S. 21(b) r/w S. 15 — Maintainability of revision petition before National Commission: Revision petition before National Commission against an order passed by the State Commission in an execution proceeding, not maintainable. The jurisdiction under S. 21(b) can be exercised by the National Commission only in case of a “consumer dispute” filed before the State Commission. Further, execution proceedings are independent proceedings and orders passed for enforcement of the final order in the consumer dispute, cannot be construed to be orders passed in the “consumer dispute”. There is no remedy provided under S. 21 to file a revision petition against an order passed in appeal by the State Commission in execution proceedings. [Karnataka Housing Board v. K.A. Nagamani, (2019) 6 SCC 424]

Contempt by advocates: There is no licence to any member of Bar to indulge in undignified conduct to lower down dignity of court. Such attempts deserve to be nipped at the earliest. [Rakesh Tiwari v. Chief Judicial Magistrate, (2019) 6 SCC 465]

Contempt of Court — Nature and Scope — Contempt by advocates: In this case, there was criminal contempt of court by advocate. He did not apologise, but maligned and scandalised subordinate court. He made bare denial and did not show any remorse for his misconduct. The Court ordered debarment from entering court premises/debarment from making appearances in court, in addition to, or in substitution of, imprisonment and fine. [Rakesh Tiwari v. Chief Judicial Magistrate, (2019) 6 SCC 465]

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 — S. 2(c) — Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 319 — Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence: Even in a case where protest-petition stage at instance of complainant urging court to summon other persons as well who were named in FIR but not implicated in charge-sheet has gone, in that case also, held, court not powerless vide S. 319, and even persons named in FIR but not implicated in charge-sheet can be summoned to face trial provided during the trial some evidence surfaces against proposed accused. [Rajesh v. State of Haryana, (2019) 6 SCC 368]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 482 — Exercise of power: While exercising powers under this section, application of mind and recording of reasons are necessary. [Jitender Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2019) 6 SCC 396]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss. 362, 353, 242 and 173(5)(a) — Scope of S. 362 — Order rejecting application under S. 242 if “judgment or final order disposing of a case” under S. 362: As rejection of application under S. 242 not having been ordered on merits, but for failure to furnish a satisfactory explanation for the delay, S. 362 CrPC has no relevance on facts. [State v. M. Subrahmanyam, (2019) 6 SCC 357]

Education Law — Employment and Service Matters re Educational Institutions —Termination/Removal/Dismissal: In this case, termination was in violation of S. 35(2), U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 as no prior approval of Vice-Chancellor mandated under S. 35(2) taken before termination, termination order was held liable to be set aside. [Lal Bahadur Gautam v. State of U.P.,(2019) 6 SCC 441]

Education Law — Haryana School Education (Group C) State Cadre Service Rules, 2012 — Rr. 3, 7, 9(5), 11 Appendix A & B r/w Rr. 3, 6, 9 Appendix B, Haryana State Education School Cadre (Group C) Service Rules, 1998: In this case, C&V teachers were to be treated as TGT to avoid anomalous situation where they, after commencement of 2012 Rules would not be governed by any set of Rules. Thus, expression that such C&V teachers stand converted to TGT was only to facilitate their service condition to be governed by 2012 Rules rather than to upgrade them as members of TGT cadre to be eligible for promotion to post of Headmaster. Feeder and promotional cadre cannot be treated on a par by virtue of said expression. Such interpretation is further reinforced by fact that C&V teacher is a dying cadre and no further recruitment is to be made to these categories. Such C&V teachers, if eligible, can seek direct recruitment but they cannot be treated en masse as members of TGT cadre. Besides, TGTs are engaged to provide elementary education and purpose of Rules is better served by ensuring education to students by trained teachers. Impugned order passed by High Court that C&V teachers became members of TGT cadre after commencement of 2012 Rules unsustainable. [State of Haryana v. Sandeep Singh, (2019) 6 SCC 453]

Family and Personal Laws — Hindu Law — Family Property, Succession and Inheritance — Karta/Manager — Alienation of Property/Legal necessity: In this case, Joint family property was mortgaged and later sold to mortgagee by father to maintain himself at old age and his family and to pay mortgage money, release mortgage and pay other dues. The Supreme Curt held that alienation made by father was for legal necessity and for paying antecedent debts. [Rengan Ambalam v. Sk. Dawood, (2019) 6 SCC 399]

Labour Law — Reinstatement/Back Wages/Arrears — Reinstatement and back wages — Daily wagers: For temporary workers like NMR respondents it is necessary to show that they had worked continuously for 240 days in a year. Further held, in this case, initial burden was upon respondent workmen to adduce evidence to prove said fact and it was only after that burden was discharged, burden shifted upon appellant Board. Single Judge, as well as Division Bench, erred in placing burden upon appellant. However, considering that respondents had attained age of superannuation and there was no question of reinstatement, in peculiar circumstances award of 50% back wages which was already paid to respondents under S. 17-B, ID Act plus Rs 2 lakhs as ordered by Supreme Court directed to be in full quit of all claims including 50% back wages and also quantum of compensation in lieu of reinstatement. It was also noted that said order not to be treated as precedent. [T.N. Water Supply & Drainage Board v. M. Natesan, (2019) 6 SCC 448]

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — S. 32-B (inserted by Act 9 of 2001) — Factors to be taken into account for imposing higher than minimum punishment: S. 32-B, from cls. (a) to (f), enumerates various factors for imposing punishment higher than minimum term of imprisonment. However, specific words used in S. 32-B, that court may, in addition to such factors as it may deem fit, clearly indicates, that court’s discretion to take such factor as it may deem fit, is not fettered by factors which are enumerated in cls. (a) to (f) of S. 32-B. Quantity of substance with which accused is charged, is a relevant factor, which can be taken into consideration while fixing quantum of punishment. Cls. (a) to (f), S. 32-B, do not enumerate any factor regarding quantity of substance as a factor for determining punishment. In the event, court takes into consideration magnitude of quantity with regard to which accused is convicted, said factor is relevant factor and court cannot be said to have committed an error, when taking into consideration any such factor, higher than the minimum term of punishment is awarded. [Rafiq Qureshi v. Narcotic Control Bureau, (2019) 6 SCC 492]

Registration Act, 1908 — Ss. 17 and 49 — Partition/Family Arrangement/Settlement: Even unregistered document of family settlement would operate as estoppel against parties to such settlement. It can be used as corroborative evidence as explaining arrangement made thereunder and conduct of parties. If partition of joint family properties took place by oral family settlement, unregistered document containing signature of all members, containing list of properties partitioned, can be used as corroborative evidence. [Thulasidhara v. Narayanappa, (2019) 6 SCC 409]

Service Law — Recruitment Process — Eligibility criteria/conditions — Prescription of — Competent authority — Scope of Judicial Review: Essential qualifications for appointment to post are for employer to decide according to needs and nature of work. He may also prescribe additional or desirable qualifications, including any grant of preference. [Maharashtra Public Service Commission v. Sandeep Shriram Warade, (2019) 6 SCC 362]

Service Law — Reservation/Concession/Exemption/Relaxation and Affirmative Action — Migration to Other State/UT: In this case for the Post of Assistant Motor Vehicle Inspector, advertisement was published stipulating that all Indian citizens were eligible for appointment but persons having “domicile” in Dadra and Nagar Haveli were to be given weightage and candidates claiming to be members of Scheduled Tribe were required to furnish attested copy of certificate issued by competent authority. Person belonging to SC/ST notified by President for Union Territory were entitled to be considered as reserved candidate provided he was resident of said Union Territory. Presidential Notification issued for UT of Dadra and Nagar Haveli extended benefit of reservation to STs mentioned therein on basis of residence and not origin. Hence it was held, submission that reservation was not available to migrant ST liable to be rejected. Moreover, contention that requirement of residence was for a period of 10 yrs for a person to claim benefit of reservation also cannot be accepted in absence of any substantiating evidence. Besides, no such averment was made in counter-affidavit, nor said issue was raised before High Court or in SLP, and hence does not merit consideration. Respondent directed to be appointed as Assistant Motor Vehicle Inspector without delay. [State (UT of Dadra & Nagar Haveli) v. Abhinav Dipakbhai Patel, (2019) 6 SCC 434]

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 — S. 43-D(2)(b) — Default bail — Denial of, and extension of detention: In this case, specific reasons for extension of detention, were given by Public Prosecutor. The order of Special Court granting further judicial detention was affirmed by the Supreme Court. However, taking note of later developments and supporting facts of this case, default bail granted by High Court, not interfered with. [State v. Shakul Hameed, (2019) 6 SCC 350]

Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 311 Summoning of material witness: The age of a case, by itself, cannot be decisive of the matter when a prayer is made for examination of a material witness. [Manju Devi v. State of Rajasthan, (2019) 6 SCC 203]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss. 386, 374 and 401 — Appeal against conviction: Principles restated regarding proper exercise of powers of appellate court therein to enhance sentence. Enhancement of sentence by High Court without giving notice to accused, not proper, hence, judgment of High Court set aside to the extent of enhancement of sentence, though conviction confirmed. [Kumar Ghimirey v. State of Sikkim, (2019) 6 SCC 166]

Family and Personal Laws — Hindu Law — Divorce — Mutual Consent Divorce — Invocation of powers under Art. 142 of Constitution — Amicable settlement: In this case, Appellant and respondent were married on 7-5-1998. A girl child was born out of said wedlock and at the time of hearing, she was aged about 18 yrs. Due to strained relationship, parties were living separately. Appellant husband filed a suit for dissolution of marriage before Family Court. Trial court dismissed divorce petition filed by appellant. Appeal preferred by appellant was also dismissed by District Court. High Court also dismissed second appeal. During pendency of appeal before Supreme Court, parties had amicably settled the matter. Parties had also filed a separate application agreeing for dissolution of marriage by mutual consent invoking the powers under Art. 142 of the Constitution. Parties had also agreed that all the pending cases between the parties shall be withdrawn or they will agree for quashing the respective cases. The Supreme Court held that since the parties had amicably settled the matter, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, in exercise of power under Art. 142 of the Constitution, marriage of appellant and respondent was dissolved in terms of compromise. [Praveen Singh Ramakant Bhadauriya v. Neelam Praveen Singh Bhadauriya, (2019) 6 SCC 259]

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 — S. 6 [as amended by Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005]: Regarding right of daughter born in Mitakshara Family before commencement of HSA, 1956, to share in family property, in the light of conflict of opinion between two-Judge Bench judgments of Supreme Court i.e. Prakash, (2016) 2 SCC 36 and Danamma, (2018) 3 SCC 343 with regard to interpretation of S. 6 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as amended by Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, matter to be heard by a Bench of three Judges. [Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, (2019) 6 SCC 162]

Insurance — Exemption/Exclusion/Restriction/Limitation/Forfeiture Clauses/Negative Covenants — Non disclosure of exclusions: When conditions of exclusion under policy document not handed over to insured by insurer and in absence of insured being made aware of terms of exclusion, held, it is not open to insurer to rely upon exclusionary clauses. In this case, District Forum and SCDRC both came to a specific finding of fact that insurer did not furnish terms and conditions of exclusion and special conditions to appellant and hence, they were not binding. [Bharat Watch Co. v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2019) 6 SCC 212]

Insurance — Repudiation/Rescission of Insurance Policy: Repudiation by insurer of the claim under a policy of life insurance, within a period of two years from the commencement of the insurance cover, on the ground of non-disclosure a material fact, as in the present case for suppressing/not disclosing a pre-existing life insurance, proper. The expression “material” in the context of an insurance policy can be defined as any contingency or event that may have an impact upon the risk appetite or willingness of the insurer to provide insurance cover. [Reliance Life Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rekhaben Nareshbhai Rathod, (2019) 6 SCC 175]

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — S. 8 r/w S. 15(c) or S. 8 r/w S. 26: Conviction under S. 8 r/w S. 15(c) for transportation of poppy straw (commercial quantity) in contravention of licence, confirmed. Furthermore, sentence cannot be reduced below the statutory minimum of 10 yrs mandated in S. 15(c). [Gangaram v. State of M.P., (2019) 6 SCC 244]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 326, 320 cls. Sixthly and Eighthly and Ss. 326-A and 326-B — Grievous hurt — Acid attack — Adequacy of punishment: In this case appellant-accused and injured victim S (PW 1) were neighbours. Appellant and victim had previous enmity due to which, on 26-11-1997 at about 6 p.m., appellant, A-1 along with his wife (A-2) poured acid, causing serious injuries over head, neck, shoulder and other parts of body of victim. Accused persons were charge-sheeted for offence under S. 326 r/w S. 34 IPC. The Supreme Court held that the basic fact that appellant poured acid on the body of victim, stood proved beyond any doubt by evidence on record, including testimony of victim PW 1 as also his mother PW 2. The fact that the victim sustained extensive acid burns on the left side of his body also stood duly proved in his testimony read with testimony of doctor PW 8. Courts below had thoroughly examined the material on record and had returned concurrent findings against appellant. The acid is undoubtedly a corrosive substance within the meaning of S. 326 IPC. The victim remained hospitalised for more than 50 days. It would be wholly unrealistic to postulate that even with such extensive acid burn injuries from head to thigh on the left portion of his body and long-drawn hospitalisation, the victim may not have been in severe bodily pain for a period of more than 20 days. Appellant was rightly been convicted under S. 326, but the punishment awarded to him, being of simple imprisonment for a term of one year and fine of Rs 5000, was rather towards the side of inadequacy. However, having regard to facts and circumstances of the case and more particularly the facts that the offence was committed in year 1997 and appellant-accused is now said to be 63 years of age, sentence not enhanced. [Omanakuttan v. State of Kerala, (2019) 6 SCC 262]

Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 — Ss. 3 to 6, 16-A, 17, 17-A and 20 to 24 and Form F of 1996 Rules: In accordance to the Act, the statutory requirement of record keeping of ultrasonography of pregnant women, is mandatory in nature and every entry is required to be made in terms of Form F of 1996 Rules. Validity of presumption of guilt against person conducting such ultrasonography under S. 4(3) proviso for offences under Ss. 5 and 6 and penalty under Ss. 23(1) and (2), in case of deficiency and inaccuracy in record keeping, upheld. It is not arbitrary or unconstitutional. Maintenance of such record, that is, the requirements of filling name and address of laboratory, name and age of patient, etc., and other details in Form F of 1996 Rules, is mandatory. [Federation of Obstetrics & Gynaecological Societies of India v. Union of India, (2019) 6 SCC 283]

Rent Control and Eviction — Tenancy/Tenant — Statutory tenant: Even after death of landlord having life interest and termination of contractual tenancy, held, under the E.P. Rent Act, tenant remains protected and continues in possession as statuary tenant till his/her eviction under Rent Control Act. [R.S. Grewal v. Chander Parkash Soni, (2019) 6 SCC 216]

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — S. 3(1)(x) — Ingredients of offence: Abuse without reference to caste or tribe will not bring the matter within umbrage of S. 3(1)(x), though the same may be punishable under S. 294 IPC. [Narad Patel v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2019) 6 SCC 268]

Service Law — Contractual post/Contractual engagment — Termination of service in terms of contract of service — Legality of: In this case, Respondent was contractually appointed for a period of one year or until shortage of drivers was met, whichever was earlier. Contract of service stipulated that his services could be dispensed with without any notice. Hence held, action of appellant in terminating services of respondent without notice cannot be faulted with. [Rajasthan SRTC v. Paramjeet Singh, (2019) 6 SCC 250]

Service Law — Promotion — Norms/Principles/Rules applicable: In this case, Letter dt. 28-4-2008 was issued by appellant State inviting recommendations for appointment by way of promotion to Orissa Administrative Service, Class II (Recruitment) Rules, 1978 cadre against 150 vacancies. Extant rules and regulations occupying field then were OAS Class II Rules, 1978 and Orissa Administrative Service, Class II (Appointment by Promotion and Selection) Regulations, 1978. The names of 559 candidates, including contesting respondents were merely recommended and recruitment process had not proceeded any further. Thus, contesting respondents had not acquired any accrued or vested right of selection or promotion to OAS Class II posts. Meanwhile, in 2009 State had restructured cadre and in place of OAS Class II cadre, Orissa Revenue Service Group ‘B’ cadre had come into existence. Contesting respondents had neither challenged abolition of old posts not creation of new cadre, but rather some of them had participated in proceedings of DPC convened for recruitment to newly created cadre. The Supreme Court held that, respondents cannot claim any lien over abolished OAS Class-II posts which were governed by 1978 Rules and Regulations. Impugned judgment directing appointment of respondents against vacancies in abolished cadre in accordance with repealed Rules was held contrary to law and liable to be set aside. [State of Orissa v. Dhirendra Sundar Das, (2019) 6 SCC 270]

Service Law — Retirement/Superannuation — Age of superannuation — Respondent Drivers of appellant Corporation — Whether fell in Category ‘C’ or ‘D’ — Implications of pay revision: In terms of Service Regulations, 1981 prevailing at relevant time in this case, employees earning less than Rs 200 salary would fall in Group ‘D’ category and retire at 60 yrs of age while employees earning more than Rs 200 were to fall in Group ‘C’ category and retire at 58 yrs of age. Respondent Drivers when appointed earning less than Rs 200. However, their pay scale revised to Rs 335 in the year 1982 w.e.f. date of their initial appointment and they also paid arrears from that date, which was again revised in the year 1985 to Rs 335-8-415-10-495 and above. Further, pursuant to resolution passed by Board of Directors, which was also notified, they were placed in Group ‘C’ category. The Supreme Court held that Labour Court as well as High Court erred in holding respondent Drivers in Group ‘D’ category and consequently their age of superannuation to be 60 yrs. Having taken advantage of revised pay retrospectively and also accepted arrears, not open to respondent Drivers to contend that as per their original pay scale, their salary was less than Rs 200 and they would retire at 60 yrs of age. Appellant Corporation rightly retired/superannuated respective respondent Drivers on attaining 58 yrs of age. [U.P. SRTC v. Maslahuddin, (2019) 6 SCC 196]

Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Ss. 10, 16 and 20 — Decree for specific performance — Readiness and willingness of plaintiff: Whether plaintiff possessed sufficient funds to pay balance consideration is inconsequential where defendant himself failed to perform his part of contract. Whether plaintiff demonstrated his bona fides when called upon by court to deposit balance consideration is needed to be considered. Furthermore, insistence by vendee on measurement of land, and production of all documents (including litigation documents) making out a complete chain of title by vendor, before paying balance consideration do not militate against readiness and willingness of vendee to perform its part of the contract. Plea of hardship to defendant if decree for specific performance is passed long after execution of agreement to sell raised for first time before Supreme Court without taking that plea in written statement, not permissible. [Beemaneni Maha Lakshmi v. Gangumalla Appa Rao, (2019) 6 SCC 233]

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 — Ss. 43-D(2)(b), 16 and 18: In this case, statutory bail in default was granted to respondent-accused by High Court, after setting aside order of Special Court, holding that remand of respondent by Special Court for a further period of 90 days, was not in compliance with mandate of S. 43-D(2)(b), UAP Act. The Supreme Court held that the conclusions of High Court in impugned judgment were not correct. But, considering later developments and supporting facts, no interference was warranted with bail. Prosecution was given liberty to apply for cancellation of bail, if any exigency arises in future. [Union of India v. Mubarak, (2019) 6 SCC 252]

Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Ss. 12(5) (w.e.f. 23-10-2015), 12 & 13, 14 & 15 and Sch. 7 Item 5 — Application for termination of mandate of a de jure ineligible arbitrator by a party which itself had appointed such arbitrator: De jure ineligibility of arbitrator appointed by person who is himself de jure ineligible to be arbitrator vide S. 12(5) r/w Sch. 7, reiterated. Appointment of such arbitrator is void ab initio and arbitration proceedings conducted by such arbitrator/awards passed by such arbitrator, held, are also void. [Bharat Broadband Network Ltd. v. United Telecoms Ltd., (2019) 5 SCC 755]

Constitution of India — Art. 226 — Exercise of power under Art. 226 by High Court — Relief: Framing of any scheme is no function of Court but sole prerogative of Government. High Court in exercise of its extraordinary power under Art. 226 can only direct Government to frame appropriate scheme. It is only in exceptional case where Court considers it proper to issue appropriate mandatory directions it may do so. [Union of India v. All India Trade Union Congress, (2019) 5 SCC 773]

Constitution of India — Art. 227 — Proper exercise of power under — Need to pass reasoned order: In this case, reversal of eviction decree by appellate court was challenged in writ petition. High Court dismissed it with unreasoned order. Case was remanded back to High Court for deciding appellant’s writ petition afresh on merits in accordance with law. [Kushuma Devi v. Sheopati Devi, (2019) 5 SCC 744]

Consumer Protection — Services — Banking/Shares/Securities and other Financial Services: In this case personal was loan advanced by respondent lending company to husband of appellant. There was delay in obtaining loan insurance policy by the respondent lending company, which was considered as deficiency of service. It was held that loan insurance policy, had come into force as assured had done all that was required on its part and requirements of S. 64-VB(2) of Insurance Act, 1938 stood satisfied in present case. [Ashatai v. Shriram City Union Finance Ltd., (2019) 5 SCC 719]

Consumer Protection — Services — Housing — Possession — Delay — Deficiency of service on part of builder: Buyer cannot be compelled to take delivery of flat when there is delay in delivery of possession by builder. Buyer is also entitled to refund along with compensation/interest, for such delay. [Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd. v. Govindan Raghavan, (2019) 5 SCC 725]

Cooperative Societies — Cooperative Housing/Housing Society: Allotment of plot to appellant member and permissible relief in case of non-availability of particular allotted plot, discussed. [Nisha Singla v. Adarsh Colony Coop. House Building Society Ltd., (2019) 5 SCC 748]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 482 — Review/Recall — Proper exercise of power under: While recalling order by which quashment petitions were allowed, High Court dismissed the said quashment petitions as well. It was held to be not proper. [S. Ramesh v. State, (2019) 5 SCC 715]

Income Tax Act, 1961 — S. 260-A — Exercise of power under — Essentialities of, enumerated: Deciding appeal without formulating substantial question of law, not permissible. Incorrect noting of questions proposed by parties is also not proper. [Ryatar Sahakari Sakkare Karkhane Niyamit v. CIT, (2019) 5 SCC 706]

Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 — Ss. 20(1)(i)(a), 20(1)(i)(b) and 20(1)(ii) — Lok Adalat ordering removal of unauthorised construction — Scope of the award: Award of Lok Adalat, held, confined to removal of unauthorised structure. Subsequent construction after complying with legal requirements, valid. Demolition order passed by executing court, on facts, held, unsustainable. [Cheriyath Jyothi v. Sainudeen, (2019) 5 SCC 779]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 302 — Murder trial: In this case, deceased was shot dead by two accused at night because of previous enmity. Prosecution proved the case beyond reasonable doubt, hence, conviction under S. 302, confirmed. [Kali Prasad Singh v. State of U.P., (2019) 5 SCC 709]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302, 324 and 96 to 106 [S. 300 Exceptions 2 and 4]: In this case of murder by stabbing with spears, right of private defence, not established as appellants inflicted multiple injuries on vital parts of deceased, thus, it cannot be said that appellants acted on spur of moment without premeditation nor that appellants have not taken any advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Thus, S. 300 Exception 4 also not attracted. Hence, conviction for murder, confirmed. [Nagji Odhavji Kumbhar v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 5 SCC 802]

Service Law — Absorption — Canteen workers: In this case as there were conflicting decisions of Single Judge and Division Bench of High Court without examination of relevant material placed for first time before Supreme Court in appeal, matter remanded for decision afresh. [Democratic Staff Union v. Tuticorin Port Trust, (2019) 5 SCC 787]

Service Law — Appointment — Eligibility conditions/criteria: In this case, there was denial of appointment to respondent-petitioner on the post of Asstt. Grade II (Hindi) on ground that she did not produce certificate of one year’s experience of translation from English to Hindi and vice versa along with application and/or even at time of verification of documents, which held to be not proper as requirement that one year’s translation experience certificate was required for eligibility, contended by appellant FCI for first time before Single Judge whereafter respondent-petitioner produced certificates dt. 14-1-2015 and 18-7-2016, which were not disputed by appellant. Advertisement not specifically stated requirement of producing experience certificate along with application. Further, submission that letter dt. 27-8-2014 produced at time of verification was relieving-cum-experience certificate on basis of which it could not be inferred that respondent had necessary experience of translation liable to be rejected since though in terms of Cl. 33 of advertisement management had right to call for additional documentary evidence it did not call upon respondent to do so. It was held that there is distinction between fact and proof i.e. essential requirements and proof/mode of proof. Hence, High Court was justified in setting aside appellant’s action in rejecting respondent’s candidature on said ground and directing it to consider her case on merit. [Food Corpn. of India v. Rimjhim, (2019) 5 SCC 793]

Service Law — Promotion — Criteria/Eligibility — Seniority-cum-merit: Prescription of benchmark merit criterion based on aggregate performance in written test, interview and performance appraisal report, besides criteria fixed by rules for grant of promotion on seniority-cum-merit basis, permissible. [Shriram Tomar v. Praveen Kumar Jaggi, (2019) 5 SCC 736]

 Service Law — Reinstatement/Back Wages/Arrears — Back Wages: There is no difference between initiation of criminal proceedings by Employer Department vis-à-vis criminal case lodged by police, for determining employee’s entitlement to back wages, unless it is found that initiation of criminal proceedings was mala fide or with vexatious intent. [Raj Narain v. Union of India, (2019) 5 SCC 809]

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — Ss. 53-A and 67: Doctrine of part performance is applicable in case of sale agreement between mortgagor and mortgagee in respect of mortgaged property. [Ramesh Chand v. Nand Lal, (2019) 5 SCC 807]

 U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (5 of 1954) — S. 9-A(2): In this case, two branches of same family claiming to be recorded owners. Revenue Authorities held that name of R i.e. predecessor-in-title of original appellant herein, could not have been entered in revenue records for want of any right, title and interest in land and was accordingly directed to be deleted from revenue records. Said order was affirmed by first appellate authority, second appellate authority and lastly, in High Court. The Supreme Court held that no interference was called for. [Chandrika v. Sudama, (2019) 5 SCC 790]

Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

Constitution of India — Arts. 16(4), 341, 342, 14, 15(1) and 15(4) — State/UT benefits or concessions allowed to SCs/STs in matter of employment or education in a particular State/UT: Person belonging to SC/ST in one State cannot be deemed to be SC/ST person in State of his migration for purpose of employment or education. Expressions “in relation to State or Union Territory” and “for the purpose of this Constitution” used in Arts. 341 and 342 mean that benefits of reservation stand confined to geographical territories of State/UT in respect of which lists of SCs/STs have been notified by Presidential Orders under Arts. 341 and 342. Further held, any expansion/deletion of list of SCs/STs notified by President by any authority except Parliament would be against constitutional mandate. Furthermore, unquestionable principle of interpretation is that interrelated statutory as well as constitutional provisions must be harmoniously construed to avoid making any provisions nugatory or redundant. Enabling provision under Art. 16(4) is available only to provide reservation to classes or categories of SCs/STs enumerated in Presidential Orders for a particular State/UT within its geographical area and cannot be extended beyond those categories within that State/UT. [Bir Singh v. Delhi Jal Board, (2018) 10 SCC 312]

Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

Penal Code,1860 — S. 377 — Constitutional validity: Section 377, insofar as it criminalizes/penalizes any consensual sexual conduct/relationship between two adults, be it homosexuals (man and a man), heterosexuals (man and a woman) or lesbians (woman and a woman), cannot be regarded as constitutional. However, if anyone, i.e. both a man and a woman, engages in any kind of sexual activity with an animal, the said aspect of Section 377 is constitutional and it shall remain a penal offence under the said section. Any act of the description covered under Section 377 IPC done between two individuals without the consent of any one of them would invite penal liability under the said section, Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation, (2014) 1 SCC 1, is overruled. [Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1]

Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Ss. 7 and 11(5) — Arbitration agreement/clause — Existence of: Agreement between the parties giving an option to the parties to choose dispute resolution by “arbitration” or “court”, can be considered as a valid arbitration agreement. [Zhejiang Bonly Elevator Guide Rail Manufacture Co. Ltd. v. Jade Elevator Components, (2018) 9 SCC 774]

Constitution of India — Art. 226 — Appeal against order of Single Judge under Art. 226 (Writ Appeal/Letters Patent Appeal): Once legal and factual issues are raised in intra-court appeal challenging order passed by Single Judge, it is incumbent upon Division Bench to deal with all such issues raised. Then record its finding on such issues keeping in view the submissions urged and applicability of legal provisions. [BDA v. B.N. Ramalingaswamy, (2018) 9 SCC 778]

Constitution of India — Art. 32 — CBI Investigation: Prayer for CBI investigation into degradation of forest due to illegal mining activities declined as requisite steps has been taken by State Government. [T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, (2018) 9 SCC 760]

Constitution of India — Art. 32 — Public Interest Litigation — Frivolous or vexatious PIL: In PIL filed seeking guidelines for conducting Caesarean deliveries, it was alleged that there was flagrant violation of health norms and C-sections performed without there being medical necessity. Through this PIL, constitution of Medical Board for supervising such activities was prayed for. Treating this writ petition as abuse of process of court, Supreme Court dismissed it by imposing costs of Rs 25,000. [Reepak Kansal v. Union of India, (2018) 9 SCC 744]

Constitution of India — Arts. 19(1)(a) and 19(2) — Restrictions upon free speech, expression, creativity and imagination of poets and authors: Meesha published in the weekly Mathrubhumi is not derogatory to women nor obscene, thus does not require intervention of the Court. Creative voices cannot be stifled or silenced and intellectual freedom cannot be annihilated and the culture of banning books directly impacts the free flow of ideas and is an affront to the freedom of speech, thought and expression. Further, a creative work has to be read with a matured spirit, catholicity of approach, objective tolerance and a sense of acceptability founded on reality that is differently projected but not with the obsessed idea of perversity that immediately connects one with the passion of didacticism or, for that matter, perception of puritanical attitude. The freedom enjoyed by an author is not absolute, but before imposition of any restriction, the duty of the Court is to see whether there is really something that comes within the ambit and sweep of Art. 19(2) of the Constitution. Also, a book should not be read in a fragmented manner and has to be read as a whole. The language used, the ideas developed, the style adopted, the manner in which the characters are portrayed, the type of imagery taken aid of for depiction, the thematic subsidiary concepts projected and the nature of delineation of situations have to be understood from an objective point of view. Further, there may be subjective perception of a book as regards its worth and evaluation but the said subjectivity cannot be allowed to enter into the legal arena for censorship or ban of a book. The craftsmanship of a writer deserves respect by acceptation of the concept of objective perceptibility. [N. Radhakrishnan v. Union of India, (2018) 9 SCC 725]

Constitution of India — Arts. 226, 32, 21 and 22(2) — Habeas corpus petition — Maintainability: When no challenge has been made to remand order in force, writ petition filed restricting it to relief of habeas corpus with respect to a person who is in police custody pursuant to the said remand order passed by the jurisdictional Magistrate in connection with the offence under investigation is not maintainable in such a case. [State of Maharashtra v. Tasneem Rizwan Siddiquee, (2018) 9 SCC 745]

Education Law — Medical and Dental Colleges — New College/Courses/Upgradation of College/Increase in capacity/seats: Medical Council of India (MCI) conducting surprise inspection in spite of observation of Hearing Committee (of Central Government) that deficiencies detected earlier had been prima facie removed, held, permissible and valid. In case where actual physical verification is required, it is within discretion of MCI to cause such physical verification. MCI can conduct compliance verification in manner in which it decides. It can look for additional deficiencies and if deficiencies detected earlier are not removed or additional deficiencies detected, college is not entitled for renewal of permission. [Medical Council of India v. KMCT Medical College, (2018) 9 SCC 766]

Election — Election Petition/Trial — Maintainability — Limitation/Delay/Laches: The Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 is a complete code for presentation of election petitions. It mandates that an election petition must be filed within 30 days from the date of declaration of results of election. Under the Act, there is no provision for condoning delay or extending the period of limitation. Hence, extension of that period of limitation by virtue of provisions under Limitation Act, 1963 (i.e. S. 14, Limitation Act, 1963 herein), not permissible. Legislature having prescribed a specific period for filing an election petition, any petition which fails to comply therewith is liable to be dismissed. [Suman Devi v. Manisha Devi, (2018) 9 SCC 808]

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — S. 15 — Interpretation of: Restriction placed on second marriage under S. 15 till dismissal of appeal, held, would not apply to such cases, where the facts establish, that the parties have decided not to pursue appeal. [Anurag Mittal v. Shaily Mishra Mittal, (2018) 9 SCC 691]

Income Tax Act, 1961 — S. 80-IC (as inserted by virtue of the Finance Act, 2003, applicable w.e.f. 1-4-2004): Availing of 100% deduction from sixth year onwards, in lieu of 25% deduction otherwise available, on the premise of having made substantial expansion is not permissible when the assessee had already claimed deduction under S. 80-IC @ 100% for five years. [CIT v. Classic Binding Industries, (2018) 9 SCC 753]

Insurance — Repudiation/Rescission of Insurance Policy — Repudiation of claim on ground of delay — When permissible: It is the duty of insured to inform insurer of loss forthwith so that insurer may make a meaningful investigation into cause of damage and nature of loss. This is of crucial importance in insurance claims. Breach of policy term stipulating such condition, given the crucial importance of such term, held, is a material breach. It is not a technical matter but sine qua non for a valid claim to be pursued by the insured. [Sonell Clocks & Gifts Ltd. v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2018) 9 SCC 784]

Insurance — Repudiation/Rescission of Insurance Policy — Repudiation of claim on ground of delay — When permissible: As per terms of insurance policy insured is duty-bound to inform insurer about the loss immediately after the incident. On account of delayed intimation, insurer was deprived of its legitimate right to get an inquiry conducted into cause and nature of the loss, hence, held, repudiation of claim on ground of delay, was proper. [Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Parvesh Chander Chadha, (2018) 9 SCC 798]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Ss. 166 and 147: When death of owner-cum-driver of motor vehicle has been caused due to his own negligence, claim for compensation is not maintainable. [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ashalata Bhowmik, (2018) 9 SCC 801]

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Ss. 42, 43 and 20(b)(ii)(C) — Search and seizure: In case of search and seizure in public place, when contraband has been recovered from bag carried by accused, compliance with S. 42 is not mandatory in such circumstances. Rather it is S. 43 which would apply. [Raju v. State of W.B., (2018) 9 SCC 708]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 304 Pt. II/34, 323/34 & 324/34 or 307/34: In this case regarding dispute between neighbours with regard to cattle which had strayed and resulted in assault by accused persons which led to death of one and injuries to others, it was held by the Supreme Court that as occurrence took place on the spur of the moment without premeditation and assault was not made on vital part of body and no common intention was found to kill or knowledge that death was likely to ensue, conviction under Ss. 307/34 set aside, but under Ss. 304 Pt. II/34, 323/324/34, confirmed. [Lakshmi Chand v. State of U.P., (2018) 9 SCC 704]

Practice and Procedure — Appeal — Locus standi/Standing — Appeal at the instance of stranger to proceedings: A stranger to proceedings does not have locus standi to question legality of order passed in those proceedings. [Ashok Singh v. State of U.P., (2018) 9 SCC 723]

Service Law — Promotion — Ad hoc promotion: Ad hoc promotions in excess of eligible quota, not permissible. [Abdul Jawad M.F. v. R. Raj Pradeep, (2018) 9 SCC 781]

Specific Relief Act, 1963 — S. 16(c) — Readiness and willingness on part of plaintiff as condition precedent: Plaintiff must always plead and prove that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of contract — It must be established that he was ready and willing and has had capacity to perform his part of contract from date of contract up to date of filing of suit. If case of failure of plaintiff to establish readiness and willingness on his part, he is disentitled to specific performance of contract. [Jagjit Singh v. Amarjit Singh, (2018) 9 SCC 805]

Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

Armed Forces — Pension — Computation: Cl. 4(a) of Navy Instruction No. 2/S/74 defined “basic pay” to denote pay “actually drawn” in scale prescribed for rank and group, which was issued to give effect to recommendations of Third Pay Commission and remained in force till 1-1-1986. It was held that appellants’ case was governed by said Instructions as they retired on 1-1-1983. Submission of respondents that submarine pay was excluded from ambit of basic pay as per Special Navy Instructions Nos. 1/S/86, 1/S/9-W and 1/S/08 liable to be rejected, since these notifications came into force subsequent to date of superannuation of appellants. Thus, submarine pay was includible in “pay” for purposes of computing Service Pension of appellants. [N.N. Godfred v. Union of India, (2018) 9 SCC 666]

Associations, Societies and Clubs — Body discharging public function but not amounting to “State” — BCCI: Draft Constitution prepared by Committee of Administrators of BCCI keeping in view recommendations of Justice Lodha Committee Report, approved. [BCCI v. Cricket Assn. of Bihar, (2018) 9 SCC 624]

Constitution of India — Art. 226 — Writs —Habeas corpus: In a habeas corpus petition the High Court must examine at the threshold whether the minor is in lawful or unlawful custody of another person. The Court must take into account the totality of the facts and circumstances whilst ensuring the best interest of the minor child. Further, the fact that the minor child will have better prospects upon return to his/her native country, may be a relevant aspect in a substantive proceedings for grant of custody of the minor child but will not be decisive to examine the threshold issues in a habeas corpus petition. For the purpose of habeas corpus petition, the Court ought to focus on the obtaining circumstances of the minor child having been removed from the native country and taken to a place to encounter alien environment, language, custom, etc. interfering with his/her overall growth and grooming and whether continuance there will be harmful. [Kanika Goel v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 9 SCC 578]

Constitution of India — Arts. 25 and 26 r/w Art. 145(3) — Freedom to follow faith and manage religious affairs: 1934 Constitution of Malankara Orthodox Syrian Church, cannot be said to be in violation of Arts. 25 and 26. [Mathews Mar Koorilos v. M. Pappy, (2018) 9 SCC 672]

Constitution of India — Arts. 27, 19(1)(g), 19(6) and 14 — Haj Policy of Private Tour Operators, 2018, Annexure-A — Rejection of claim of petitioner for registration of PTO for Haj 2018: In this case petitioner applied for quota as private limited company but turnover relied upon was of proprietorship firm without offering any satisfactory explanation therefor nor submitting any relevant documents including conversion of proprietorship firm into private limited company with transfer of its assets and liabilities as alleged. Hence it was held that there was no infirmity in order dt. 31-5-2018 refusing registration for non-compliance with Clause (iv), Appendix A, Haj Policy, 2018. [Ruby Tour Services (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2018) 9 SCC 537]

Crimes Against Women and Children — Sexual Abuse and Rape of Minor Girls in Shelter Homes/Child Homes: Repeated interrogation, questioning, visiting/interviewing of victims regarding incident by officials and journalist is hardly conducive for the welfare and well-being of minor victims of sexual abuse and rape in Shelter Homes/Child Homes. Media must be restrained from publishing images of victims even in morphed or blurred form. Media directed to keep interests of victims in mind while dissemination of news. Process to be followed by investigating agencies dealing with case, set out. Various Authorities/Institutions directed to submit reports, for further directions. [Sampurna Behura v. Union of India, (2018) 9 SCC 555]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss. 320 and 482 — Compounding of offences with permission of Court: In this case related to offences under Ss. 406 and 420 IPC, as complainant was satisfied that his amount was received as per direction of Supreme Court, parties were relegated to trial court for compounding. Trial court directed to pass appropriate orders and coercive orders passed against accused withdrawn. [Raj Sharma v. State of U.P., (2018) 9 SCC 660]

Criminal Trial — Confession — Extra-judicial confession/Hearsay — Evidentiary value of: Extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence. It cannot form basis for conviction, unless supported by other substantive evidence. [State of Karnataka v. P. Ravikumar, (2018) 9 SCC 614]

Family and Personal Laws — Hindu Law — Adoption — Proof of — Principles summarized: Factum of adoption and its validity has to be duly proved. Though formal ceremony of giving and taking is essential ingredient for valid adoption, long duration of time during which a person is treated as adopted cannot be ignored. Such fact by itself may carry a presumption in favour of adoption. [Kamla Rani v. Ram Lalit Rai, (2018) 9 SCC 663]

Government Grants, Largesse, Public Property and Public Premises — Recovery of possession/Re-entry by State upon Termination/Cancellation/Resumption/Lapse: In this case lease was expired a long time ago, and was not renewed, but tenants continued to be in possession. Eviction order was passed in such without opportunity of hearing. Tenant cannot claim indefeasible right to continue in premises. Balancing of this principle with fact that rights of tenants under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution might be affected, open auction of such premises in bidding and allotment to highest bidder, directed. On facts, balancing rights of both parties, occupation of premises by tenant, directed not to be disturbed till bidding process is completed. [Bharmal Medical Store v. State of M.P., (2018) 9 SCC 617]

Hindu Law — Marriage and Divorce — Grounds for Divorce — Irretrievable breakdown of marriage: In this case divorce was granted ex parte by impugned judgment, thus prejudicing rights of appellant wife. It was held that logical consequence would normally be to set aside impugned judgment and remit matter for fresh consideration. However, considering that parties were willing to part company on mutually acceptable terms, appellant husband was directed to pay Rs 30 lakhs towards permanent alimony plus Rs 5 lakhs by way of gesture of goodwill towards her medical expenses finding that parties were living separately for more than a decade and there was absolutely no chance of reconciliation, no issue was born from wedlock, appellant wife ailing for long time and staying with her relatives having no independent income while respondent husband was quite resourceful residing in independent bungalow in posh colony in Pune. [Usha Uday Khiwansara v. Uday Kumar Jethamal Khiwansara, (2018) 9 SCC 569]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Ss. 149, 147 and 168 — Third-party insurance: When award has been passed against insured owner, it is to be paid by insurer and recovered from owner. Insurer is not required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before executing court concerned as if dispute between insurer and owner was subject-matter of determination before Tribunal and issue is decided against owner and in favour of insurer. [Shamanna v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2018) 9 SCC 650]

National Security Act, 1980 — Ss. 3(4) and 8 — Requirement of reporting detention to State Government “forthwith” — “Forthwith” — Connotation of: “Forthwith” does not mean instantaneous, but without undue delay and within reasonable time at the earliest possible. Further held, fact whether detention order was reported to State Government within reasonable time and without undue delay is to be ascertained from facts of each case. Delay between date of detention and date of submitting report to State Government must be due to unavoidable circumstances beyond control of authority and not because of administrative laxity. [Hetchin Haokip v. State of Manipur, (2018) 9 SCC 562]

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 — Ss. 4(5) and (6) — Forfeiture of gratuity — When permissible: Forfeiture of gratuity on the ground of misconduct which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude, is permissible only if the person is convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction for the said offence. [Union Bank of India v. C.G. Ajay Babu, (2018) 9 SCC 529]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 304 Pt. I — Culpable homicide not amounting to murder — Inference of, from nature of injury inflicted: In this case death of one was due to gunshot injury on thigh, and injuries to one other using other weapons. Conviction of accused for firing said gunshot alone, for culpable homicide not amounting to murder, and acquittal of the rest of the accused, confirmed. [State of M.P. v. Gangabishan, (2018) 9 SCC 574]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302, 201, 392 and 397 — Murder trial: High Court reversed conviction of all respondent-accused due to inconsistencies and material contradiction present in this case, hence, acquittal confirmed. [State of Karnataka v. A.B. Mahesha, (2018) 9 SCC 612]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 498-A and 306 — Bride committing suicide: In this case harassment due to alleged dowry demand and cruelty meted out to deceased by appellant-accused husband, having illicit relationship with another woman, were established as causes of suicide. It was held that High Court rightly maintained conviction of appellant under Ss. 498-A and 306 IPC, with RI for 2 and 5 years, respectively. Furthermore, held, there were no grounds for reduction of sentence. [Siddaling v. State, (2018) 9 SCC 621]

Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — S. 34(5) and Ss. 34(6), 34(3) and 29-A: Requirement of issuance of prior notice to the other party and filing of an affidavit endorsing compliance with the said requirement under S. 34(5), is directory and not mandatory. Considerations of convenience and justice are uppermost, and if general inconvenience or injustice results, without promoting the real aim and object of the enactment, the provision must be declared to be directory. Subsection (5) is not a condition precedent, but a procedural provision which seeks to reduce the delay in deciding applications under S. 34. Further, to construe such a provision as being mandatory would defeat the advancement of justice as it would provide the consequence of dismissing an application filed without adhering to the requirements of S. 34(5), thereby scuttling the process of justice by burying the element of fairness. However, it shall be the endeavour of every court in which a S. 34 application is filed, to stick to the time-limit of one year from the date of service of notice to the opposite party by the applicant, or by the court, as the case may be. Further, in case the court issues notice after the period mentioned in S. 34(3) has elapsed, every court shall endeavour to dispose of the S. 34 application within a period of one year from the date of filing of the said application similar to what has been provided in S. 14 of Commercial Courts Act, 2015. Also, in cases covered by S. 10 r/w S. 14 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, the Commercial Appellate Division shall endeavour to dispose of appeals filed before it within six months, as stipulated and appeals which are not so covered will also be disposed of as expeditiously as possible, preferably within one year from the date on which the appeal is filed. [State of Bihar v. Bihar Rajya Bhumi Vikas Bank Samiti, (2018) 9 SCC 472]

 Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 39 Rr. 1 & 2 — Interim stay — Grant or refusal: While passing an order on interim stay application, justifiable reason(s) to support grant or rejection of prayer as to stay must be stated in the order keeping in view the facts and law applicable to the controversy involved. [Birwati Chaudhary v. State of Haryana, (2018) 9 SCC 458]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 41 R. 27, Or. 41 R. 23-A & Or. 41 R. 25 and Ss. 96 & 100 — Procedure to be followed by appellate courts after receiving additional evidence: Once additional evidence is permitted at appellate stage, other side must be given opportunity to lead rebuttal evidence to counter additional evidence. Appellate courts have two options (i) to take recourse remanding entire matter under Or. 41 R. 23-A for retrial, or (ii) to make limited remand under Or. 41 R. 25 by retaining main appeal with itself so that parties can lead evidence on particular issues in light of additional evidence and then to decide main appeal on merits. [Corpn. of Madras v. M. Parthasarathy, (2018) 9 SCC 445]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Ss. 96(3), 100, 114 & Or. 23 R. 3-A: Challenge to compromise decree is not permissible except on ground of fraud. Such challenge can be by way of fresh suit, or review petition. [Ved Pal v. Prem Devi, (2018) 9 SCC 496]

Constitution of India — Arts. 21, 25, 19 and 29 and Preamble — Cow vigilantism and incidents of lynching solely based on perception: There is necessity of strengthening police administration. Pluralism and tolerance is essential values constituting building blocks of free and democratic society. It is the duty of State to promote fraternity amongst all citizens so that dignity of every citizen is protected, nourished and promoted, and to prevent crime and untoward incidents. Lynching affront to rule of law and exalted values of Constitution itself while vigilantism for whatever purpose or borne out of whatever cause undermines legal institutions of State. Such extrajudicial attempts under guise of law required to be nipped in bud lest it leads to anarchy and lawlessness corroding nation. It is the primary responsibility of State to foster secular, pluralistic and multicultural social order so as to allow free play to ideas and beliefs and coexistence of mutually contradictory perspectives. Directions covering areas of preventive, remedial and punitive measures, issued. [Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India, (2018) 9 SCC 501]

Contempt of Court — Civil Contempt — Purging of contempt/Opportunity to comply: Once the order dt. 8-3-2001 passed by Single Judge directing appellant FCI to frame scheme or to find ways to absorb respondent workmen within one year had attained finality it was required to be complied with in pith and substance. [Food Corpn. of India v. W.B. FCI Workmen’s Union, (2018) 9 SCC 469]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 378(3) — Application for grant of leave to appeal under — Parameters which High Court should keep in mind while deciding — Principles reiterated: In this case Trial court acquitted respondent-accused of charge of offences punishable under Ss. 363, 366, 376 and 120-B IPC. Application was filed by State for leave to appeal against such acquittal before High Court and High Court rejected it without assigning any reasons. Such casual approach of High Court, disapproved by the Supreme Court and matter was remanded back to it for decision afresh on merits, keeping in view law laid down by Supreme Court in Sujay Mangesh Poyarekar, (2008) 9 SCC 475. [State of U.P. v. Anil Kumar, (2018) 9 SCC 492]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 482: Quashment of subsequent criminal proceedings based on new set of facts merely because earlier criminal proceedings related to present matter were quashed, not proper. [Om Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar, (2018) 9 SCC 440]

Criminal Trial — Practice and Procedure — Abatement — Abatement of appeal: As there was report by High Court along with copy of death certificate regarding death of sole respondent in appeal, appeal stood abated against deceased and was dismissed as having abated. [State of Karnataka v. Srinivasa, (2018) 9 SCC 463]

Environment Law — Vehicular Pollution: NGT passed an order of plying of only CNG buses/coaches and other vehicles at Delhi Airport. Due to incompatibility of other vehicles to CNG mode, direction issued by NGT restricted to only buses and coaches. [Narangs International Hotels (P) Ltd. v. Society for Protection of CHETNA, (2018) 9 SCC 499]

Income Tax Act, 1961 — S. 10(20) (as amended by the Finance Act, 2002) — Noida Authority: After omission of S. 10(20-A) the only provision under which a body or authority can claim exemption was S. 10(20) and further, local authority having been exhaustively defined in the Explanation to S. 10(20), an entity has to fall under S. 10(20) to claim exemption. Further, the Explanation now containing the exhaustive definition of local authority, the definition of local authority as contained in S. 3(31) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 no more applicable. Also, the Explanatory Note to Finance Act, 2002 clearly indicate that by the Finance Act, 2002 the exemption under S. 10(20) had been restricted to Panchayats and Municipalities as referred to in Arts. 243-P(d) and 243-P(e) of the Constitution, and further by deletion of clause (20-A), the income of the Housing Boards of the States and of Development Authorities became taxable. Noti. dt. 24-12-2001 was issued by the Governor in exercise of the power under the proviso to clause (1) of Art. 243-Q of the Constitution of India specifying the appellant Authority to be an “industrial township” with effect from the date of the notification in the Official Gazette. The proviso did not contemplate constitution of an industrial establishment as a Municipality, rather clarified that an exception where Municipality under clause (1) of Art. 243-Q may not be constituted in an urban area. Further, the object of issuance of notification was to relieve the mandatory requirement of constitution of a Municipality in a State in the circumstances as mentioned in the proviso but exemption from constituting Municipality does not lead to mean that the industrial establishment which is providing municipal services to an industrial township is same as Municipality as defined in Art. 243-P(e).  Thus, held, industrial township as specified under Noti. dt. 24-12-2001 was not akin to Municipality as contemplated under Art. 243-Q. Hence, held, appellant Authority is not covered by the definition of “local authority” as contained in the Explanation to S. 10(20). [NOIDA v. CIT, (2018) 9 SCC 351]

Income Tax Act, 1961 — S. 194-A(3)(iii)(f) — Benefit of exemption given under Noti. No. S.O. 3489 dt. 22-10-1970 — Tax deduction at source on payment of interest by bank to Noida Authority: There is a well-marked distinction between a body which is created by the statute, on the one hand, and a body which after having come into existence is governed in accordance with the provisions of the statute, on the other. For instance, a company incorporated under the Companies Act is not a statutory body because it is not created by the statute but it is a body created in accordance with the provisions of the statute. When the words “by and under an Act” are preceded by the words “established”, the reference is to a corporation established, that it is brought into existence, by an Act or under an Act i.e. the term refers to a statutory corporation as contrasted from a non-statutory corporation incorporated or registered under the Companies Act. The preamble of that Act reads “an Act to provide for the constitution of an Authority for the development of certain areas in the State into industrial and urban township and for matters connected therewith”. Thus, the Act itself provided for constitution of an authority. Further, “the Authority” had been constituted by a Noti. dt. 17-4-1976 issued under S. 3 of the 1976 Act. Further, following the ruling in Satish Prabhakar Padhye, (2010) 4 SCC 378, wherein the State Financial Corporation was stated to be a corporation established under a Central Act, held, the Authority was covered by the Noti. dt. 22-10-1970. [CIT v. Canara Bank, (2018) 9 SCC 322]

Income Tax Act, 1961 — S. 194-I r/w S. 10(20) (as amended by the Finance Act, 2002) — Circular dt. 30-1-1995 — Deduction of income tax at source on payment of lease rent to Noida/Greater Noida Authority: The definition of rent as contained in the Explanation to S. 194-I is a very wide definition and payment to be made as annual rent is rent within the meaning of S. 194-I. Further, Circular dt. 30-1-1995 granting exemption from deduction of income tax at source, was issued on the strength of Ss. 10(20-A) and 10(20) as it existed at the relevant time and the very basis of the circular has been knocked out by the amendments made by the Finance Act, 2002. Thus, the circular could not be relied on by Noida/Greater Noida Authorities to contend that there was no requirement of deduction of tax at source. Therefore, tax is required to be deducted at source on payment of lease rent to Greater Noida Authority, as per S. 194-I. [NOIDA v. CIT, (2018) 9 SCC 342]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Ss. 166 & 173 and Sch. II — Compensation: Award of lump sum compensation without following multiplier method is not permissible. Compensation has to be just compensation. Mode of award in cases of permanent disability has to be based on functional disability or actual loss of income/income-earning capacity. Due to changed scenario in view of cost of living and current rate of inflation, Second Schedule provided under Motor Vehicles Act became redundant. [Anant v. Pratap, (2018) 9 SCC 450]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 302 — Accused allegedly strangulated his wife to death: A-1(respondent-accused) was allegedly having illicit relationship with A-2 (since dead) and on account of which, there was altercation between A-1 and his wife, and he allegedly strangulated her to death. However, conviction of A-1 under S. 302, was held to be rightly reversed by High Court. [State of Karnataka v. Srinivasa, (2018) 9 SCC 460]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302, 147 and 148 r/w S. 149 — Murder trial — Appeal against acquittal: Re-appreciation of evidence was done by High Court as Trial court did not properly appreciate evidence and approach of trial court was found perverse. Testimony of eyewitnesses was also found credible. FIR was lodged promptly. Evidence of eyewitnesses was corroborated by medical evidence. Prosecution case was further corroborated by recovery of weapons from accused. Bloodstains found on weapons recovered from accused, were of blood group of deceased, which was yet another piece of evidence corroborating evidence of eyewitnesses and strengthening prosecution case. Hence, reversal of acquittal by High Court, confirmed. [Motiram Padu Joshi v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 9 SCC 429]

Public Accountability, Vigilance and Prevention of Corruption — Vigilance Authorities: Validity of appointments to post of Central Vigilance Commissioner (CVC) and Vigilance Commissioner (VC), affirmed. Ground of violation of principle of impeccable integrity and institutional integrity, rejected as aspersions were based on false, vague, non-specific, unsubstantiated and/or baseless allegations/representations/complaints. [Common Cause v. Union of India, (2018) 9 SCC 382]

Service Law — Regularisation — Entitlement to regularization: The issue raised in this case was whether the employees employed to carry out appellant FCI’s business operations at its branch offices are contractual employees or employees of appellant. Findings of Tribunal to effect that (i) Agreement with contract labourers for doing work had ended in 1991 and thereafter it was not renewed; (ii) All 955 workers were paid wages directly by appellant; (iii) Nature of work which these workers were doing was of perennial nature in the set-up of FCI; (iv) All 955 workmen were performing their duties as permanent workmen; and (v) No evidence was adduced by appellant to rebut claim of respondent Union; were affirmed by the Single Judge as well as Division Bench. The Supreme Court held that the findings of fact recorded against appellant by Tribunal were based on sufficient evidence. Besides, said findings being concurrent in nature were binding on Supreme Court while hearing appeals under Art. 136 of the Constitution. Furthermore, very fact that appellant FCI failed to adduce any evidence to prove their case, Tribunal was justified in drawing adverse inference against them. Respondent employees were entitled to regularisation in services of appellant FCI. [Food Corpn. of India v. Employees Union, (2018) 9 SCC 464]

Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

Arbitration Act, 1940 — S. 29 — Award of pre-reference, pendente lite and future interest by arbitrator — Permissibility of: Under the 1940 Act, an arbitrator has power to grant pre-reference interest under the Interest Act as well as pendente lite and future interest, however, he is constricted only by the fact that an agreement between the parties may contain an express bar to the award of pre-reference and/or pendente lite interest. Further, the Court has evolved the test of strict construction of such clauses, and unless there is a clear and express bar to the payment of interest that can be awarded by an arbitrator, clauses which do not refer to claims before the arbitrators or disputes between parties and clearly bar payment of interest, cannot stand in the way of an arbitrator awarding pre-reference or pendente lite interest. Further, unless a contractor agrees that no claim for interest will either be entertained or payable by the other party owing to dispute, difference, or misunderstandings between the parties or in respect of delay on the part of the engineer or in any other respect whatsoever, leading the Court to find an express bar against payment of interest, a clause which merely states that no interest will be payable upon amounts payable to the contractor under the contract would not be sufficient to bar an arbitrator from awarding pendente lite interest. Further, the grant of pendente lite interest depends upon the phraseology used in the agreement, clauses conferring power relating to arbitration, the nature of claim and dispute referred to the arbitrator, and on what items the power to award interest has been taken away and for which period. Also, the position under S. 31(7) of the 1996 Act, is wholly different, inasmuch as S. 31(7) of the 1996 Act sanctifies agreements between the parties and states that the moment the agreement says otherwise, no interest becomes payable right from the date of the cause of action until the award is delivered. [Reliance Cellulose Products Ltd. v. ONGC Ltd., (2018) 9 SCC 266]

Citizens, Migrants and Aliens — National Register of Citizens of India (NRC): Complete draft prepared after claims/objections cannot be basis for any action by authorities. Authorities must grant reasonable opportunity to each concerned. Statements made by authorities before media touching upon matters pending before Supreme Court, strongly deprecated. [Assam Public Works v. Union of India, (2018) 9 SCC 229]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 2 and Or. 6 R. 17, Or. 14 R. 5 and Or. 18 R. 17 — Suit to include whole claim: When family property dispute resulted in two different civil suits before two different courts, respective claims of parties are required to be decided in one suit rather than in two different suits. [P.K. Narayanan Raja v. Ambika, (2018) 9 SCC 164]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Ss. 96 and 100 — Appeal — Locus standi to file appeal: Appeal by person who was not a party to the civil suit or in first appeal is not maintainable when the judgment in appeal is not adverse to any party in the suit. [Lakshmi Sreenivasa Coop. Building Society Ltd. v. Puvvada Rama, (2018) 9 SCC 251]

Education Law — Fee Structure/Capitation Fee/Fee Regulatory Committee — Statutory prohibition of fees in excess of that prescribed by Fee Fixation Committee constituted under T.N. Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Collection of Capitation Fee) Act, 1992 — Institutions covered by: T.N. Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Collection of Capitation Fee) Act, 1992 is applicable to medical and engineering courses in Annamalai University deemed to be constituted under Annamalai University Act, 2013. For this it is not necessary to notify a statutory university like present one as an “educational institution” under S. 2(b) of 1992 Act. In relation to imparting of education leading to a degree in Medicine or Engineering, S. 4(2-A) of 1992 Act has been given an overriding effect by incorporating non obstante provision. S. 4(2-A), unlike S. 4(1) of 1992 Act does not require any notification by the Government. [M. Aamira Fathima v. Annamalai University, (2018) 9 SCC 171]

Government Contracts and Tenders Termination/Discharge/Repudiation/ Cancellation/Suspension of Contract — Generally — Proper exercise of power by State: In this case dealership of petroleum products was terminated as factum of breach of conditions of dealership agreement was established. Division Bench of High Court issued mandamus in favour of party who breached standard requirements by overturning Single Judge order. The Supreme Court held that writ court is not appellate court nor can it substitute its decision in administrative matters where there is no case of arbitrariness. Consequently, termination of dealership was upheld. [Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. T. Natarajan, (2018) 9 SCC 235]

Information Technology Act, 2000 — S. 70(1) as existing prior to Amendment Act 10 of 2009 r/w S. 17 r/w Ss. 2(o) and 2(k) of Copyright Act, 1957 — Power to declare “protected system” in respect of “government work” — Permissibility of: The provisions of S. 70(1) of the IT Act have to be read conjointly with Ss. 2(k) and 17 of the Copyright Act, 1957 in order to give due effect to related provisions of the two different enactments made by the legislature. Further, plainly read, the power of declaration of a “protected system” may invade a copyright which may be vested in a private owner, however, such a situation is taken care of by the provisions contained in S. 2(k) of the Copyright Act, 1957 which defines “government work” and S. 17(d) of the Copyright Act, 1957 which vests in the Government, copyright in a government work as defined by S. 2(k). The balance is struck by S. 17 between copyright pertaining to any other person and copyright vested in the Government in a “government work”. Therefore, S. 70 cannot be construed independent of the provisions of the Copyright Act. If S. 70 of the IT Act has to be read in conjunction with Ss. 2(k) and 17 of the Copyright Act, 1957 the rigours that would control the operation of S. 70(1) of the IT Act are clearly manifested. [B.N. Firos v. State of Kerala, (2018) 9 SCC 220]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — S. 23 — Market Value — Compensation — Determination of — Particular class of land — Wet lands vis-à-vis dry and chira lands: Award of Rs 2000 per cent for wet land appears is just, proper and reasonable keeping in view nature of land, its surroundings and location and similarity with land owned by other landowners to whom compensation was awarded at Rs 2000 per cent. [K.S. Rajan v. State of Kerala, (2018) 9 SCC 167]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 326, 331, 343 and 346: In this case of illegal detention and custodial torture of one B, by appellant-accused (police officials), High Court reversed their acquittal, convicting them under Ss. 326, 331, 343 and 346 IPC and imposing 2 yrs’, imprisonment upon them. Occurrence was of year 1992 and appellants, after acquittal by trial court, also attained age of superannuation. One was 80 yrs old and the other was more than 70 yrs. Appellants have already undergone about 15 months’ imprisonment and victim was also given government job and is presently working. Hence, considering facts and circumstance of case, imprisonment of appellants was reduced by the Supreme Court to period already undergone. However, reduction of sentence was in peculiar facts and circumstances of instant case and the same may not be treated as precedent. [Bhagwan Dass v. State of Haryana, (2018) 9 SCC 227]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 363, 366 and 376 — Abduction and rape — Age of prosecutrix — Relevance: In this case, appellant-accused was convicted by High Court under Ss. 363, 366 and 376. Evidence of PW 6 (prosecutrix) regarding incident was contradicted by her previous statement under S. 161 CrPC. Materials on record indicated that PW 6 remained in company of appellant for about 12 days until she was recovered and she had freely moved around with appellant, in course of which movement, she came across many people at different points of time, yet, she did not complain of any criminal act on part of appellant. The Supreme Court held that in view of above, age of prosecutrix becomes relevant for determining whether she was a major so as to give her consent. Herein, prosecution had not succeeded in proving that prosecutrix was a minor on date of alleged occurrence. Possibility of prosecutrix being a consenting party cannot be altogether ruled out. Hence, order of High Court was set aside and appellant was acquitted on benefit of doubt. [Rajak Mohammad v. State of H.P., (2018) 9 SCC 248]

Police — Police Atrocities/Inaction/Custodial Death/Custodial Violence/ Illegal Detention: In this case involving allegation of custodial torture, parties relegated to High Court permitted to seek appropriate remedy. It was, however, clarified that grant of such liberty should not be construed as expression of any doubt regarding investigation process. [Sahil Sharma v. Union of India, (2018) 9 SCC 234]

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Ss. 7, 13(1)(d) and 20 — Illegal gratification: Demand and acceptance of illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute offence under Ss. 7 and 13(1)(d). In this case demand of money by first accused and acceptance of bribe amount by second accused at the behest of first accused, was proved by evidence of complainant and trap witness. The Supreme Court held that findings of trial court did not suffer from any infirmity and High Court was not justified in setting aside conviction of both accused. No explanation was also offered by accused to rebut presumption under S. 20, hence, conviction under Ss. 7 and 13(1)(d), restored. [State of Gujarat v. Navinbhai Chandrakant Joshi, (2018) 9 SCC 242]

Service Law — Judiciary — Appointment — Nature of appointment: Appointments on ad-hoc basis are not “contractual appointment” when against sanctioned posts or on pay scale. Hence, appointment of appellants as Fast Track Court Judges for five years which was extended against sanctioned posts on ad hoc basis on pay scale, not contractual appointment. [K. Anbazhagan v. High Court of Madras, (2018) 9 SCC 293]

Service Law — Recruitment Process — Eligibility criteria/conditions — Relaxation of norms/conditions: In this case, for recruitment to posts of Assistant Traffic Inspectors, 75% was by promotion and 25% by direct recruitment, however, due to existence of large number of vacancies and dire need of Assistant Traffic Inspectors but absence of qualified people for promotion, relaxation of requirement of experience of 5 yrs was given, which was notified as part of educational qualifications in terms of Kolhapur Municipal Corporation Regulation No. 119 dt. 14-5-1991, and appellants (15 candidates) were appointed by direct recruitment. It was held by the Supreme Court that interest of justice would be served if appellants and others recruited along with them who had worked for over 23 yrs now are allowed to continue as having been regularly recruited and appointed since in case their appointments are quashed there would only be 1 Asstt. Traffic Inspector actually working and 2 Assistant Traffic Inspectors eligible for promotion against 25 available posts. It was also noted that notification relaxing criteria was also challenged by respondent Trade Union only after appointments were made. [Sunil Shamrao Jadhav v. Kolhapur Municipal Corpn., (2018) 9 SCC 215]

Trade Marks Act, 1999 — Ss. 9, 11 and 18 — Registration of the phonetically similar mark “NANDHINI” to the earlier registered/in use mark “NANDINI” — Test of deceptiveness/confusion — Application of: Registration is permissible when such latter mark is used for different goods/nature of business and visual appearance of two marks is so different that average person of ordinary intelligence would not be deceived or confused between goods concerned. Further, registration of trade mark qua certain goods falling under one class does not vest monopoly over the entire class of goods with the proprietor of registered mark. [Nandhini Deluxe v. Karnataka Coop. Milk Producers Federation Ltd., (2018) 9 SCC 183]

Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — S. 34 and S. 13(6) — Practice and procedure qua applications made for setting aside an award under S. 34: An application for setting aside an arbitral award will not ordinarily require anything beyond the record that was before the arbitrator. However, if there are matters not contained in such record, and are relevant to the determination of issues arising under S. 34(2)(a), they may be brought to the notice of the Court by way of affidavits filed by both parties. Further, cross-examination of persons swearing to the affidavits should not be allowed unless absolutely necessary. [Emkay Global Financial Services Ltd. v. Girdhar Sondhi, (2018) 9 SCC 49]

Armed Forces — Appointment — Criteria/Eligibility — Post of DGMS (Army): Word “inter se” in Para (i) of Administrative Instructions dt. 10-7-1992, issued by Government of India, Ministry of Defence, inter alia, stipulating “inter se seniority and suitability of officers in rank of Lieutenant General (and equivalent) … shall be assessed in light of their earlier experience of serving in particular services …” applies both to seniority as well as suitability. As far as inter se seniority is concerned, person who is senior gets precedence. Further held, while assessing “suitability” fitness of the incumbent to post is to be measured and “inter se suitability” has reference to assessing suitability of all eligible officers. Respondent was senior-most Lieutenant General fulfilling eligibility criteria for appointment to post of DGMS (Army). Finding in Para 7 of Note dt. 23-1-2018 issued by DGAFMS that since respondent was newly promoted from rank of Major General, he did not have “previous exposure to working and environs of IHQ of MoD” and hence proposing him to be appointed as DGMS (AF) instead of DGMS (Army) not fair and objective consideration of his suitability to post as it is not necessary to have work experience in IHQ alone. While affirming conclusion of AFT quashing appointment one S as DGMS (Army), but disagreeing with its direction to appoint respondent straightaway to said post, matter remitted to Raksha Mantri for fair, dispassionate and objective consideration. [Union of India v. Manomoy Ganguly, (2018) 9 SCC 65]

Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 (12 of 1976) — Ss. 27, 17, 36, 52, 18, 19 and 15 — Benevolent development scheme in public interest — Delay in implementation of, after issuance of preliminary notification under S. 17, BDA Act: Time constraints under S. 11-A, LA Act not applicable to scheme under BDA Act. Shock expressed at non-consideration of precise law required to adjudicate matter, laid down by Constitution Bench in Offshore Holdings (P) Ltd., (2011) 3 SCC 139. With regard to limitation of 5 years under S. 27 of BDA Act, it was clarified that there is a vast difference between provisions and action taken pursuant to preliminary notification (S. 17) and final notification (S. 19) under BDA Act. [BDA v. State of Karnataka, (2018) 9 SCC 122]

Constitution of India — Art. 136: Permission to file SLPs against High Court order was granted to informant. Subsequently, petitions for withdrawal of SLPs filed by informant. It was held that proceedings of criminal case, specially of instant nature i.e. case under S. 396 IPC, cannot depend on whims of informant, hence, prayer for withdrawal of SLPs rejected. [Amar Nath Jha v. Nand Kishore Singh, (2018) 9 SCC 144]

Constitution of India — Art. 21 — Right to Proper Legal Representation on part of accused lodged in jail: To facilitate dialogue between counsel and his client, which would further cause of justice and make legal aid meaningful, videoconferencing between counsel for accused on one hand and accused lodged in jail or anybody knowing the matter on the other, was made mandatory as per directions of Supreme Court Legal Services Committee (SCLSC). Said directions affirmed, and directed to be extended nationwide. [Imtiyaz Ramzan Khan v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 9 SCC 160]

Constitution of India — Arts. 233 to 235 and 32 — Public Interest Litigation (PIL): Directions were sought for immediate filling of unfilled vacancies in subordinate judiciary leading to pendency of matters but Supreme Court declined to interfere as steps to fill up vacancies had already been taken by High Courts. [Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India, (2018) 9 SCC 64]

Constitution of India — Arts. 80(4), 81, 158 and 171 — Elections to Council of States (Rajya Sabha): Introduction of NOTA in election to Council of States (Rajya Sabha) by Election Commission is not permissible, as it is in opposition to discipline of political parties. Votes polled in election to Council of States being of transferable nature, NOTA would alter value of vote. Introduction of NOTA is anathema to free and fair election to Rajya Sabha and brings in likelihood of promoting defection. Distinctions between elections to Council of States (Rajya Sabha)/Legislative Council and House of People (Lok Sabha)/Legislative Assembly (Vidhan Sabha), summarized. [Shailesh Manubhai Parmar v. Election Commission of India, (2018) 9 SCC 100]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — S. 166 — Compensation — Computation of income: Deceased was aged 38 yrs at the time of death and in business of selling desi ghee and namkin bhujia, with monthly income of Rs 3500. Tribunal however, held that deceased had an unnamed shop in a small village not paying tax, assessed income at Rs 1200 p.m. and awarded Rs 1,15,200 after applying a multiplier of 12, with interest at 15 per cent p.a. It was held by the Supreme Court that income should have been assessed at Rs 2500 p.m. having due regard to nature of business, date of accident and all circumstances of case. Following Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680, quantum of compensation recomputed as monthly income: Rs 2500, and annual income: Rs 30,000, deduction of one-third for personal expenses: Rs 10,000, net annual income: Rs 20,000, future prospects at 40 per cent: Rs 8000, total income: Rs 28,000, using appropriate multiplier 16, total compensation for loss of dependency: Rs 4,48,000. For conventional heads Rs 75,000, total compensation: Rs 5,23,000, appellants entitled to interest @ 9 per cent p.a. from date of petition until payment. [Santosh Devi v. Mahaveer Singh, (2018) 9 SCC 146]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 363 and 366 — Conviction under: Appellant-accused was sentenced to 7 years’ imprisonment with Rs 1000 fine but there was subsequent compromise between parties. De facto complainant, since married to another person and living happily, had no complaint against appellant. In such circumstances, conviction confirmed, but, sentence modified, being limited to period already undergone. [Sajid v. State of Uttarakhand, (2018) 9 SCC 159]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 396 and 412 — Dacoity with murder: High Court appreciated every aspect of matter on facts and considered entire material on record, while acquitting two accused and remanded appeal of third accused for consideration by Juvenile Justice Board on finding arrived at by High Court, that he was a juvenile at the time of commission of said offence and as no material was present, to disagree with reasons assigned and conclusions arrived at by High Court, High Court judgment affirmed. [Amar Nath Jha v. Nand Kishore Singh, (2018) 9 SCC 137]

Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 — Ss. 3(b), 4 and 7(3) — Jurisdiction of Estate Officer with respect to proceedings relating to public premises: An Estate Officer has to exercise his jurisdiction in relation to public premises falling in local limits specified in notification issued under S. 3 of PP Act, 1971 for exercise of that jurisdiction. [Savatram Rampratap Mills v. Radheyshyam, (2018) 9 SCC 154]

SCs, STs OBCs and Minorities — Caste/Tribe Certificate — Remand — When warranted — Non-consideration of entire evidence: When a party relies upon any evidence in support of his case, the Court/Committee/authority, as the case may be, especially original court is under obligation to apply its mind to entire evidence produced and record its reasoned findings. Consideration of entire evidence in accordance with law is important. [Vilas Dinkar Bhat v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 9 SCC 89]

Service Law — Pay — Pay fixation — Pay protection — Entitlement to — Resolution dt. 27-11-1991 granting benefit of pay scale of Rs 700-1600 from their initial appointment date in Senior College to “rest category” Teachers: Security of tenure for teacher, who dedicates her life for education of students is of utmost importance and insecurity should not be created, more so when they are through a process of really subterfuge of giving artificial breaks. But for artificial break of one day which was due to change in curriculum, appellant was in continuous service for two decades and that was how it was really understood by the college as well as the State Government since they had given pension to her which is admissible only after 20 years of service. Appellant is entitled to be treated in pay scale of Rs 700-1600 and all benefits of Resolution dt. 27-11-1991. Respondents directed to calculate emoluments due to appellant and disburse the same within stipulated time failing which it would carry simple interest @ 12% p.a. [Ahalya A. Samtaney v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 9 SCC 92]

Taxation — Concession/Exemption/Incentive/Rebate/Subsidy — Exemption notification or exemption clause: General principle that in case of ambiguity, a taxing statute should be construed in favour of the assessee, is not applicable to an exempting provision. Every taxing statute including, charging, computation and exemption clauses, at the threshold stage should be interpreted strictly. Further, though in case of ambiguity in charging provisions, the benefit necessarily goes in favour of assessee, but for an exemption notification or exemption clause the benefit of ambiguity must be strictly interpreted in favour of the Revenue/State. [Commr. of Customs v. Dilip Kumar & Co., (2018) 9 SCC 1]

W.B. Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 (37 of 1997) — S. 5(8) (as incorporated by Amendment Act 14 of 2001) — Statutory liability to pay municipal taxes on tenants as occupiers, post amendment — Supersession of contractual liability to pay municipal taxes and enhancements in municipal taxes as part of rent — Effect of: Liability to pay enhanced municipal taxes by tenant as occupier, held, having become a statutory liability, there was no requirement on part of landlord of obtaining formal order of enhancement of rent from Rent Controller. [Popat & Kotecha Property v. Ashim Kumar Dey, (2018) 9 SCC 149]

Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Ss. 7 and 11(6) — Agreement to settle disputes by arbitration — Inference of — When warranted: Cl. 12 of the MoU between the parties provided that any decision to be taken by the specified mediators/arbitrators during the period of entire transaction in the event of any breaches committed by either of the parties shall be final and binding on all the parties. On analysing the various clauses of the MoU, held, that the specified persons though styled as mediators/arbitrators, were escrow agents who had been appointed to keep certain vital documents in escrow, and to ensure a successful completion of the transaction contained in the MoU. Further, the very fact that they were referred to as “mediators/arbitrators” and as “mediators and arbitrators” showed that the language used was loose. Also, the expression “decision” used in Cl. 12 was only a pro tem decision. Namely, that the two escrow agents were to make decisions only during the period of the transaction and not thereafter. Thus, when viewed as a whole, the two escrow agents were not persons who had to decide disputes after hearing the parties and observing the principles of natural justice, in order to arrive at their decision. In the present case, held, the wording of the agreement, was inconsistent with the view that the agreement intended that disputes be decided by arbitration. [Shyam Sunder Agarwal v. P. Narotham Rao, (2018) 8 SCC 230]

Constitution of India — Art. 137 — Review under — Ambit and scope of power to review in criminal proceedings — Review when maintainable — Principles reiterated: Application to review a judgment is not to be lightly entertained and Supreme Court could exercise its review jurisdiction only when grounds are made out as provided in Or. XLVII R. 1, Supreme Court Rules, 2013. Review is not rehearing of original matter. Power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate court.  A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. Normally in a criminal proceeding, review applications cannot be entertained except on ground of error apparent on face of record. Further, power given to Supreme Court under Art. 137, is wider, and in an appropriate case, can be exercised to mitigate a manifest injustice. By review application, applicant cannot be allowed to re-argue appeal on grounds which were urged at the time of hearing of appeal. Even if applicant succeeds in establishing that there may be another view possible on conviction or sentence of accused, that is not a sufficient ground for review. Supreme Court shall exercise its jurisdiction to review only when a glaring omission or patent mistake has crept in earlier decision, due to judicial fallibility. [Vinay Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 8 SCC 186]

Evidence Act, 1872 — Ss. 30 and 3 — Scope — Confession of co-accused — Admissibility against other accused: As a result of provisions contained in S. 30, confession has no doubt to be regarded as amounting to evidence in a general way, because whatever is considered by court is evidence; circumstances which are considered by court as well as probabilities do amount to evidence in that generic sense. Thus, though confession may be regarded as evidence in that generic sense because of provisions of S. 30, fact remains that it is not evidence as defined by S. 3. Result, therefore is, that in dealing with a case against an accused person, court cannot start with confession of a co-accused person; it must begin with other evidence adduced by prosecution and after it has formed its opinion with regard to quality and effect of said evidence, then it is permissible to turn to confession in order to receive assurance to the conclusion of guilt which the judicial mind is about to reach on the said other evidence. Law so laid down has always been followed except in cases where there is a specific provision in law making such confession of a co-accused admissible against another accused. [Surinder Kumar Khanna v. Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, (2018) 8 SCC 271]

Government Contracts and Tenders — Award/Non-award of contract — Conduct of auction/Evaluation/Acceptance/Rejection of Bid/Tender/Scope of judicial review: Right of First Refusal(ROFR)/right to match the lowest bid, granted to claimant/contractor by Arbitral Tribunal qua tender for completion of the balance unfinished works originally awarded to the claimant, is inconsequential, when such original awardee/contractor does not participate in the subsequent tender. Tender documents for balance work making it obligatory for the respondent/contractor to participate in the tender process. Tacit or implied exemption from participating in tender process is not permissible in matters of tender process. [NHAI v. Gwalior-Jhansi Expressway Ltd., (2018) 8 SCC 243]

Infrastructure Laws — Water and Water Resources — Canals, Dams and Irrigation — Multipurpose hydroelectricity projects — Tariff determination under the provision of the 1948 Act: The latter part of the fourth proviso to S. 14 of Electricity Act i.e. “… and the provisions of the Damodar Valley Corporation Act, 1948 insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall continue to apply to that Corporation…”, is a substantive provision to lay down something more than what a proviso generally deals with and is to bring in the continued application of some of the provisions of the 1948 Act which are not inconsistent with the provisions of the 2003 Act. Also, a comparative reading of the third and the fourth provisos to S. 14 of Electricity Act indicates the intention of the legislature that the second part of the fourth proviso is to bring in the continued application of some of the provisions of the 1948 Act which were not inconsistent with the provisions of the 2003 Act. [Bhaskar Shrachi Alloys Ltd. v. Damodar Valley Corpn., (2018) 8 SCC 281]

Insurance — Fees payable to Investigators/Advocates: Direction to the insurance companies to adhere to fees schedule issued by GIPSA dt. 21-2-2005 qua advocates/investigators by High Court is not warranted, particularly when they were already adhering to the fee structure enforced from 2009 and 2014. [United India Insurance Company Limited, In Re, (2018) 8 SCC 177]

Labour Law — Wages — Overtime Wages — Claim to — Sustainability: Respondents (total 17), employees of appellant’s printing press claimed overtime wages for work allegedly done for period 1986 to 1990. Claim was allowed on following grounds: (i) Respondents no longer in service and either retired or died; (ii) Amount involved not very sizeable; (iii) Relates to period from 1986-1990; (iv) Amount, pursuant to impugned order paid long back; and (v) It relates to overtime work admittedly done by respondents. [Currency Note Press v. N.N. Sardesai, (2018) 8 SCC175]

Labour Law — Wages: Directions issued to pay unpaid wages of workers who had worked for about 20 yrs in tea estates which were later abandoned by tea companies in States of Assam, W.B., T.N. and Kerala. [IUF Workers’ Assn. v. Union of India, (2018) 8 SCC 201]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Ss. 18(2)(b), 18(1), 12(2) and 11 — Limitation for filing reference application under S. 18(2)(b): Since notice dt. 4-12-1987 was not accompanied by award, it was not a valid notice as envisaged under S. 12(2). It was only after appellant received certified copy of award on 3-2-1988, there was valid notice. Thus, reference for enhancement was not barred by limitation. Matter remanded to High Court for consideration on merits. [Vijay Mahadeorao Kubade v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 8 SCC 266]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Ss. 48 and 16: Release of land from acquisition proceedings is not permissible after possession of land has been taken by State. State is at liberty to withdraw from acquisition of any land “of which possession has not been taken” except in cases falling under S. 36 since acquired land vests in State absolutely free from all encumbrances. In instant case, since possession of land in question was taken by State in accordance with law on 30-5-2004, provisions of S. 48 were inapplicable, disentitling State to release land from acquisition proceedings by taking recourse to S. 48. The then Revenue Minister had no power to deal with land in question in any manner whatsoever after possession was taken. [Pimpri Chinchwad New Township Development Authority v. Vishnudev Cooperative Housing Society, (2018) 8 SCC 215]

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — S. 139 — Presumption under — When may fail — Ingredients and scope of S. 139 — Principles summarized: Accused may adduce evidence to rebut presumption under S. 139, but mere denial regarding existence of debt shall not serve any purpose. In the event accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubt with regard to existence of a debt or liability, the presumption may fail. [Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 302 or S. 304 Pt. II — Appellant-accused caused death of deceased by a single sword-blow in the rib-cage area of deceased — Offence committed — Determination of: Irked by loud noise of tape recorder being played by deceased in his house, appellant had verbal altercation with deceased, which culminated in the incident. High Court, upon reappreciation of evidence, correctly held, that evidence of PW 4 (injured witness) stands corroborated by PWs 1 to 3 (eyewitnesses), hence, reversed acquittal of appellant, convicting him under S. 302. However, held, occurrence took place in the heat of moment. Assault was made without premeditation on the spur of time. Entire episode lasted for 1½ to 2 minutes. There was no intention to kill and no second assault was made by appellant to ensure death of deceased, but, in the nature of weapon used and position of assault, knowledge that death was likely to ensue, is attributable to appellant. Therefore, conviction of appellant altered from S. 302 to S. 304 Pt. II and sentence altered from life imprisonment to period of custody already undergone. [Deepak v. State of U.P., (2018) 8 SCC 228]

Service Law — Regularisation — Entitlement to regularisation — Daily wagers/Contractual Employees — Benefit of 2015 Regularisation Rules to employees who had not completed 10 yrs of service on cut-off date of 10-4-2006 on ground that the same was not permitted by Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1: Supreme Court in Umadevi (3) case(2006) 4 SCC 1 granted, as one time measure, benefit of regularisation of services to irregularly appointed employees who had put in more than 10 yrs of service on cut-off date of 10-4-2006. High Court by impugned judgment denied benefit of regularisation to appellants in terms of Regularisation Rules of 2015 holding that Umadevi (3) case did not permit regularisation of services of appellants since they had not put in 10 yrs of service on cut-off date of 10-4-2006 when Constitution Bench rendered its decision. The Supreme Court held, intention of Umadevi (3) case was to prevent irregular/illegal appointments and to confer benefit on those who were irregularly appointed in past. Fact that State of Jharkhand continued with irregular appointments for almost a decade after decision in Umadevi (3) case was rendered strongly deprecated, which was nothing but exploitation of employees concerned and which Umadevi (3) case and M.L. Kesari, (2010) 9 SCC 247 precisely sought to avoid. If a strict and literal interpretation, forgetting spirit of decision in Umadevi (3) case is taken into consideration, then no irregularly appointed employee can ever be regularised in State of Jharkhand since it came into existence on 15-11-2000, and the cut-off date was 10-4-2006. High Court as well as the State ought to have considered entire issue in contextual perspective from point of view of interest of State, financial or otherwise, and also the employees. Regularisation Rules of 2015 should be given pragmatic interpretation and in case appellants have completed 10 yrs of service on date of promulgation of Rules, their services should be regularized. State of Jharkhand directed, henceforth, to consider making regular appointments only. [Narendra Kumar Tiwari v. State of Jharkhand, (2018) 8 SCC 238]

T.N. Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (18 of 1960) — Ss. 10(2)(ii)(a) and 10(3)(c): Eviction by court on the basis of compromise arrived at between landlord and tenant, not permissible when statutory grounds for seeking eviction are not made out. Where protection under a Rent Act is available, no eviction can be ordered unless ground seeking eviction is made out, even if parties had entered into a compromise. [Alagu Pharmacy v. N. Magudeswari, (2018) 8 SCC 311]

Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Ss. 85, 7 and 8: Even if an arbitration agreement entered into after the 1996 Act had come into force were to make a reference to the applicable provisions of those under Indian Arbitration Act or the 1940 Act, such stipulation would be of no consequence and the matter must be governed under provisions of the 1996 Act. Further, an incorrect reference or recital regarding applicability of the 1940 Act would not render the entire arbitration agreement invalid and such stipulation will have to be read in the light of S. 85 of the 1996 Act and principles governing such relationship have to be under and in tune with the 1996 Act. [Purushottam v. Anil, (2018) 8 SCC 95]

Armed Forces — Promotion — Empanelment for Promotion — Entitlement to: In this case chances of being considered for promotion/empanelment for promotion were lost by respondent due to wrongful punishment imposed by GCM. Central Government by Order dt. 20-11-2013 annulled proceedings of GCM and setting aside punishment imposed with all “consequential benefits”. While determining the connotation of “consequential benefits”, it was held that matter which was directly in issue was correctness and validity of GCM proceedings. While annulling findings and effect of proceedings idea was to confer those benefits which were directly denied to officer. Said expression cannot be construed to mean that even promotions which were strictly on basis of comparative merit and selection must also stand conferred upon officer. Further held, though it is true that as result of pendency of GCM proceedings respondent was kept out of service for nearly nine years and as such his profile would show inadequacy to some extent but even Department was denied opportunity of properly assessing his profile. Impugned judgment directing appellants to take decision in view of opinion expressed by Law Officer for promotion of respondent to rank of Brigadier was held to be unsustainable. Besides, opinion of Law Officer was not consistent with provisions of relevant rules and law declared by Supreme Court in K.D. Gupta, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 416. The contention that respondent must be granted those promotions which his batchmates or juniors received and that he must also be considered for selection-based promotions unacceptable. Furthermore, though prejudice was caused to respondent by wrongly proceeding against him in GCM consequent to which he lost 9 yrs of service is apparent but sympathy cannot outweigh considerations on merit since respondent was found unfit for selection as “Colonel” by Selection Board (though he was granted time-scale promotion to rank of Colonel after putting in required service). [Union of India v. Ran Singh Dudee, (2018) 8 SCC 53]

Constitution of India — Art. 14 — Compensation for infringement of Art. 14 — When warranted: State is vicariously liable for public wrongs committed by its officials. Hence, payment of compensation to sufferers o public wrong, awarded. [United Air Travel Services v. Union of India, (2018) 8 SCC 141]

Constitution of India — Arts. 137 and 145 — Review under Art. 137: Power of review by Supreme Court as envisaged under Art. 137, is no doubt wider than review jurisdiction conferred by other statutes on Court. Art. 137 empowers Supreme Court to review any judgment pronounced or made, subject to provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rule made under Art. 145. However, application to review a judgment is not to be lightly entertained and Supreme Court could exercise its review jurisdiction only when grounds are made out as provided in Or. 47 R. 1, Supreme Court Rules, 2013. Review in a criminal proceeding is permissible only on ground of error apparent on face of record. Review is not rehearing of appeal all over again and is not appeal in disguise. In a review petition, it is not open to Court to reappreciate evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is possible. Conclusion arrived at on appreciation of evidence cannot be assailed in review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on face of record or for some reason akin thereto. Review is not rehearing of original matter. Power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. Power of review can be exercised with extreme care, caution and circumspection and only in exceptional cases. [Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 8 SCC 149]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 401 — Revision against conviction: Condition imposed while admitting is not warranted in facts of case, hence, vacated. [M.V. Amreeth v. K. Venkata Krishna, (2018) 8 SCC 118]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss. 386 and 374 — Appeal against conviction: Passing of impugned order without considering defence evidence due to absence of appellant-defendant or his counsel on various dates posted for final disposal, not proper. [K.S. Kalinga Rayan v. State, (2018) 8 SCC 125]

Election — Panchayat Samiti — Disqualification — “Office of profit”— What is: Candidate holding post of Assistant Government Advocate is not in service of State Government within meaning of S. 139(1)(c) of Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1993, hence not disqualified from contesting Panchayat election. [State Election Commr. v. Janakdhari Prasad, (2018) 8 SCC 1]

Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920 — Ss. 3 to 5, 2(a) and 8 and Statement of Objects and Reasons: Magistrate’s permission is not mandatory for obtaining a specimen of fingerprints of the accused under S. 5 of Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920. [Sonvir v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 8 SCC 24]

Income Tax Act, 1961 — Ss. 153-A, 158-BB and 158-BH r/w Ss. 132 and 132-A — Block assessment: In order to add any income in the block assessment, evidence of such income must be found in the course of the search under S. 132 or in any proceedings simultaneously conducted in the premises of the assessee, relatives and/or persons who are connected with the assessee and are having transaction/ dealings with such assessee. Further, any material or evidence found/collected in a survey which has been simultaneously made at the premises of a connected person can be utilised while making the block assessment in respect of an assessee under S. 158-BB r/w S. 158-BH and the same would fall under the words “and such other materials or information as are available with the assessing officer and relatable to such evidence” occurring in S. 158-BB. [CIT v. S. Ajit Kumar, (2018) 8 SCC 107]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302/149 — Murder trial — Unlawful assembly: In this case deceased was shot to death at night and involvement of appellant-accused along with four others was established. Conviction of appellant under Ss. 302/149 was upheld by High Court. The Supreme Court observed that any member of unlawful assembly can be convicted for criminal act with the aid of S. 149. It need not to be proved that he had committed an overt act. Hence, courts below were justified in concluding that appellant is liable to be convicted under S. 149 IPC, inasmuch as he is one of the members of unlawful assembly who had come to the scene of occurrence with common object of committing murder of deceased. Therefore, conviction of appellant under Ss. 302/149 was confirmed. [Prabhu Dayal v. State of Rajasthan, (2018) 8 SCC 127]

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 — Ss. 13 and 34 — Civil suit in respect of a matter which DRT or DRAT is empowered to determine — Non-maintainability of: Mandate of S. 13 and, in particular, S. 34, bars filing of a civil suit and no civil court can exercise jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which DRT or DRAT is empowered by or under the 2002 Act to determine. Further, no injunction can be granted by any court or authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under the 2002 Act. [SBI v. Allwyn Alloys (P) Ltd., (2018) 8 SCC 120]

Service Law — Recruitment Process — Examination — Posts of School Lecturers for various subjects under Secondary Education Department — Examination: Assumption that key answers published is correct unless proved clearly wrong. Publication of key answers is good to achieve transparency. Furthermore, objections to key answers are to be examined by experts and thereafter corrective measures, if required, to be taken by examining body. [Richal v. Rajasthan Public Service Commission, (2018) 8 SCC 81]

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — Ss. 8, 7 and 54 — Nemo dat quod non habet: Person is competent to transfer any property only if he has subsisting right, title or interest in it. If on date of transfer, right, title or interest of transferor stood extinguished (in this case under S. 27 of Limitation Act, 1963 by operation of law of adverse possession) transfer would be illegal and void. Right once extinguished by operation of law cannot be revived unless law itself provides therefore. [Eureka Builders v. Gulabchand, (2018) 8 SCC 67]

Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 — S. 39(1)(c) [as inserted by Act 44 of 1991 w.e.f. 2-10-1991]: Illegally obtained/procured elephant tusk is property of Government. Once it is treated to be property of Government, presumption under S. 69 of Kerala Forest Act, 1961 attracted. [Wildlife Warden v. Komarrikkal Elias, (2018) 8 SCC 114]

Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

Arbitration Act, 1940 — Ss. 29 and 13 — Pendente lite interest: An arbitrator has the power to award interest unless specifically barred from awarding it; and the bar must be clear and specific. [Raveechee & Co. v. Union of India, (2018) 7 SCC 664]

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — S. 34 r/w S. 5 — Award — Interference with, when the same causes injustice to either of the parties, contrary to terms of contract — When permissible: The parties are free to decide their own terms and conditions in case of a contract. Once respondent voluntarily agreed that no escalation would be reimbursed even in case of regulation before accepting the contract, respondent could not claim reimbursement of excess of minimum wages on account of hike due to the notification of Government. Further, any departure from the terms and conditions of the contract, unless such condition is arbitrary, would destroy the basic purpose of the contract. [Union of India v. Varindera Constructions Ltd., (2018) 7 SCC 794]

Companies Act, 2013 — S. 59 — RTI Circular No. 1 dt. 9-5-2001: Rectification of register, as opposed to filing of a civil suit to prove title over shares, permissible when fraud is perpetuated on the shareholder in possession of original share certificates by issuance of duplicate shares, without following proper procedure, in favour of impersonator. [Adesh Kaur v. Eicher Motors Ltd., (2018) 7 SCC 709]

Constitution of India — Arts. 26, 32, 35, 38, 49 and 51-A(f) & (g) — Jagannath Temple, Puri — Mismanagement and difficulties by visitors — Directions: Interim directions issued for management and upkeep of Shri Jagannath Temple at Puri. [Mrinalini Padhi v. Union of India, (2018) 7 SCC 785]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 438 — Anticipatory bail — Whether should be for a limited period of time: Due to conflicting opinions of different Benches of Supreme Court, matter referred to larger Bench of Supreme Court for authoritative decision. [Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 7 SCC 731]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss. 211 to 213 — Framing of charge — Proper framing of charge — Cardinality and necessity of — Explained: Accused persons are entitled to know with precision what charge they are required to defend. [Vinubhai Ranchhodbhai Patel v. Rajivbhai Dudabhai Patel, (2018) 7 SCC 743]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss. 482 and 245: Rejection of application under S. 482 CrPC for quashment, when discharge application already stood rejected, proper. [Nayan Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2018) 7 SCC 713]

Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923 — Ss. 3 and 4 — Accident arising out of and in course of employment: As deceased driver was treated as employee and his death treated on duty and there was consistency in statement of dependants and there were no contradictions, compensation awarded to claimants. [Tebha Bai v. Raj Kumar Keshwani, (2018) 7 SCC 705]

Family and Personal Laws — Hindu Law — Joint Hindu Family/Hindu Undivided Family (HUF)/Coparcenary/Co-owner/Survivorship: Property inherited by a male Hindu from his father, father’s father or father’s father’s father is an ancestral property. Essential feature of ancestral property, according to Mitakshara Law, is that the sons, grandsons, and great grandsons of the person who inherits it, acquire an interest and rights attached to such property at the moment of their birth. Share which a coparcener obtains on partition of ancestral property is ancestral property as regards his male issue. After partition, property in hands of a son continues to be ancestral property and son of that son (whether natural or adopted) takes interest in it and is entitled to it by survivorship. [Shyam Narayan Prasad v. Krishna Prasad, (2018) 7 SCC 646]

Government Contracts and Tenders — Conduct of auction/Evaluation/Acceptance/ Rejection of Bid/Tender/Scope of judicial review: Directions to Evaluation Committee qua valuation and bids and conditions required to be met by bidders for revival of Super Bazar at New Delhi, issued. [Super Bazar Karamchari Dalit Sangh v. Union of India, (2018) 7 SCC 617]

Importance of maintaining sanctity of DNA samples: This article is primarily intended to emphasise upon the importance of maintaining sanctity of forensic samples by timely conducting forensic medical examination (FME) of individuals or relevant spots to maintain sanctity and reliability of samples. [Management of DNA Sampling in Rape Incidents by G.K. Goswami and Siddhartha Goswami, (2018) 7 SCC (J-4)]

Income Tax Act, 1961 — S. 11 [as existing prior to amendment made in S. 11(6) of the Act vide Finance Act 2 of 2014]: Regarding grant of depreciation claimed by charitable institutions on capital assets, even when the expenditure on acquisition of the assets had been treated earlier as application of income for charitable purposes, approving the ruling in Institute of Banking, Personnel Selection, 2003 SCC OnLine Bom 642, wherein the Court rejecting the view that S. 32 was the only section granting benefit of deduction on account of depreciation, had inter alia held that the income of the Trust is required to be computed under S. 11 on commercial principles after providing for allowance for normal depreciation and deduction thereof from gross income of the Trust, in the present case, orders of the High Courts granting benefit of depreciation on the assets acquired by the respondents assessees/charitable institutions upheld. Further held, the amendment made in S. 11(6) of the Act vide Finance Act 2 of 2014 effective from Assessment Year 2015-16, was prospective in nature. Also, held, that once the assessee is allowed depreciation, he shall be entitled to carry forward the depreciation as well. [CIT v. Rajasthani and Gujarati Charitable Foundation, (2018) 7 SCC 810]

Income Tax Act, 1961 — S. 194-H (w.e.f. 1-6-2001) r/w S. 201 — Tax at source — Deduction of, on payments made by appellants (Prasar Bharati Doordarshan Kendra) to advertising agencies: Payments made by appellants (Prasar Bharati Doordarshan Kendra) to advertising agencies is to be construed as commission to agents not as payments between principal-to- principal. [Prasar Bharati v. CIT, (2018) 7 SCC 800]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — S. 11-A — Object of — Re-emphasised: Exclusion of time spent in stay has to be considered based on facts of each case. [Raj Kumar Gandhi v. Chandigarh Administration, (2018) 7 SCC 763]

Language of the Law: In this article the author emphasis the need to simplify the language of the law in India. [Whereof They’re Ipso Facto Words: India Needs to Simplify the “Language of the Law” by Jyoti Sagar, (2018) 7 SCC (J-1)]

Limitation Act, 1963 — S. 5 — Sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing appeal — What is: Aggrieved persons not made a party before court against whose order they had appealed, is sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing appeal. [Hetal Chirag Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2018) 7 SCC 703]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — S. 166 — Fatal accident — Compensation of — Income of deceased: There is nothing in law which requires Tribunal to assess income of deceased only on basis of a salary certificate for arriving at a just and fair compensation to be paid to claimants for loss of life. [United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Indiro Devi, (2018) 7 SCC 715]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Ss. 166 and 165, 2(28), 2(44) and Statement of Objects and Reasons — Compensation claims under the Act — Maintainability: “Use of motor vehicle”, includes non-traffic use. However, causal relationship should exist between the violation and the accident caused. There has to be some act done by the person concerned in causing the accident. The commission or omission must have some nexus with the accident, though the “use” of the motor vehicle concerned need not have an intimate and direct nexus with the accident. [Kalim Khan v. Fimidabee, (2018) 7 SCC 687]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 302 or S. 304 Pt. II [S. 300 Exception 4]: As ingredients of S. 300 Exception 4 were present, conviction converted from S. 302 to S. 304 Pt. II. [Tularam v. State Of M.P., (2018) 7 SCC 777]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 306 — Abetment of suicide — Ingredients for invoking of S. 306 — Not made out: As allegations in FIR, relating to mental torture of deceased at the hands of his higher officers, in this case, were completely inadequate not satisfying requirements under S. 306, proceedings initiated against accused quashed. [Vaijnath Kondiba Khandke v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 7 SCC 781]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302, 498-A and 506: In this case appellant-accused was convicted for murder of his wife. It was held by the Supreme Court that the due to some extenuating circumstances like, after killing his wife, appellant tried to kill himself, etc., portion of impugned order, prescribing life sentence for minimum period of 30 yrs, deleted, making it a case of life imprisonment simpliciter. [Nitin Balkisan Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 7 SCC 685]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302/149 — Murder trial: In this case due to rivalry between two factions in village led to attack using country-made bombs, hunting sickles and iron pipes and there was death of four persons but all respondent-accused were acquitted by High Court. It was held by the Supreme Court that the High Court erred in eschewing testimonies of witnesses in toto. Minor contradictions and omissions in evidence of witnesses were to be ignored. All eyewitnesses including one who turned hostile consistently spoke about attack on one deceased and his supporters. Witness who gave vivid description of incident was corroborated by other witnesses. However, on oral evidence of witnesses and medical evidence, High Court rightly acquitted some respondents giving them benefit of doubt but acquittal of other respondents by High Court, set aside, convicting them under S. 302 IPC and sentencing them to undergo life imprisonment. [State of A.P. v. Pullagummi Kasi Reddy Krishna Reddy, (2018) 7 SCC 623]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 84, 302 and 324 — Murder trial — Applicability of S. 84: Reasonable doubt regarding mental condition of accused at the time of incident was created in the mind of court from materials and evidence available. As prosecution failed to lead any evidence in rebuttal and was not able to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt, conviction of accused under Ss. 302 and 324 IPC, reversed. [Devidas Loka Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 7 SCC 718]

Registration Act, 1908 — Ss. 17(1-A) and 49 proviso — Requirement of registration: If document containing contract to transfer right, title or interest in immovable property for consideration is not registered but exhibited, it will bear an endorsement that it is admissible only as evidence of agreement to sell in suit for specific performance under Specific Relief Act and shall not have any effect for purposes of S. 53-A of TP Act. Genuineness, validity and binding nature of document or whether it is hit by any provisions of TP Act or Stamp Act, will have to be adjudicated at appropriate stage after parties adduce oral and documentary evidence. [Ameer Minhaj v. Dierdre Elizabeth (Wright) Issar, (2018) 7 SCC 639]

Service Law — Allowances — Special (duty) allowance — Entitlement to — Special duty allowance to CRPF personnel posted in North-Eastern region — Date of reckoning: Respondents are entitled to special (duty) allowance for period during which they were posted in North-Eastern region not w.e.f. 3-8-2005 when office memorandum was issued by Government to that effect. [CRPF v. Janardan Singh, (2018) 7 SCC 656]

Service Law — Departmental Enquiry — Natural justice — Noncompliance — Inference — When warranted: There is no requirement of appointment of Presenting Officer in each and every case, whether statutory rules enable authorities to make appointment or are silent. When statutory rules are silent with regard to applicability of any facet of principles of natural justice, applicability of principles of natural justice which are not specifically excluded in statutory scheme are not prohibited and can be made applicable in given case to advance cause of justice. Furthermore, Enquiry Officer has to be independent and not representative of disciplinary authority. If he starts acting in any other capacity and proceeds to act in manner as if he is interested in eliciting evidence to punish employee, principle of bias comes into play. [Union of India v. Ram Lakhan Sharma,, (2018) 7 SCC 670]

Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 1992 — Regns. 2(c), 2(e)(i), 2(e)(ii), 2(h), 2(ha) and 3 — Insider trading: Regn. 2(e)(i) is in two parts; first part has reference to any person who is connected with company or is deemed to be connected with company and the second part being that such person must reasonably be expected to have access to unpublished price sensitive information by virtue of such connection in respect of securities of a company. Giving the word “and” its ordinary meaning and in a conjunctive sense, second limb of Regn. 2(e)(i) is also to be satisfied. Further, under second part of Regn. 2(e)(i), connected person must be “reasonably expected” to have access to unpublished price sensitive information and expression “reasonably expected” cannot be a mere ipse dixit. There must be material to show that such person can reasonably be so expected to have access to unpublished price sensitive information. [Chintalapati Srinivasa Raju v. SEBI, (2018) 7 SCC 443]

Insurance — Payment of claim — Currency exchange rate — Relevant date for conversion of currency in an action to recover an amount payable in foreign currency — Determination of, as per insurance contract: Six dates compete for fixing rate of exchange at which foreign currency amount has to be converted into currency of the country in which action for recovery has been commenced and decided, namely, (1) date when amount became due and payable; (2) date of commencement of action; (3) date of decree; (4) date when Court orders execution to issue; (5) date when the decretal amount is paid or realised; and (6) where decree is passed in terms of award made in a foreign currency, then date of the award. [Meenakshi Saxena v. ECGC Ltd., (2018) 7 SCC 479]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — S. 23 — Compensation — Computation of — Exemplar sales deeds — When to be relied on: In this case, Reference Court, as well as High Court, have not considered sale deeds produced on behalf of State, which reveals prima facie value of certain lands as being in middle of acquired land, in close proximity to and adjoining land acquired under notification of present case. No reason was given as to why High Court, while coming to its conclusion, has not referred to sale statistics. If sale statistics are to be ignored, High Court should have furnished reasons for doing so. Method of granting compensation on basis of cumulative increase as done in Ashrafi case was not permissible on facts, in view of sale deeds produced. Compensation without considering evidence on record cannot be said to be justifiable. Land in Ashrafi case was acquired in 1995 and was very small and was for a commercial purpose, however, land in question now was acquired in 2005. There being a gap of about 10 yrs between two acquisitions, relying on such an acquisition of a decade ago may be unsafe. Present case involves more than 229 acres of land. Court cannot lose sight of facts and documents. Moreover, land in question is acquired mainly for a residential colony, and about 5% commercial area to cater to needs of such residential colony will also be built. Since reasons assigned by High Court while coming to conclusion were assigned solely based on Ashrafi case, and as evidence on record adduced by both parties was not considered, much less properly considered, matter, needs reconsideration by High Court inasmuch as High Court in such matters would be last Court to decide matter on facts. Impugned judgment passed by High Court set aside, and matter remitted to High Court for fresh consideration in accordance with law, to decide first appeals on merits as early as possible, keeping in mind that land was acquired in 2005. [Loveleen Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2018) 7 SCC 492]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 228-A, 376 and 342 — Rape case: Use of name of victim all through in judgments of both trial court and High Court is not consistent with S. 228-A, though Expln. makes exception in favour of superior court judgments. Nonetheless, every attempt should be made by all courts not to disclose identity of victim in terms of S. 228-A. [Lalit Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2018) 7 SCC 499]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Ss. 100, 99, 104 and Chs. V and VI — State Transport Undertaking (STUs) — State monopoly of notified routes in public Interest: A temporary permit cannot be issued to a private stage carriage operator to traverse on the notified route which is being served by the State Transport Undertaking, in excess of the permissible distance provided under the scheme. [Kerala SRTC v. Baby P.P., (2018) 7 SCC 501]

U.P. Kshettra Panchayats and Zila Panchayats Adhiniyam, 1961 (32 of 1961) — S. 15(12) r/w S. 15(1) — Notice of no-confidence motion against Pramukh — Validity of: The conditions precedent for stipulation of the period of one year after the expiration from the date of the meeting are dependent on three situations, namely, (i) if the motion is not carried out as contemplated under S. 15(11), (ii) if the meeting would not be held for want of the quorum, and (iii) the notice of no-confidence motion should be in respect of the same Pramukh. [Kiran Pal Singh v. State of U.P., (2018) 7 SCC 521]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Ss. 23 and 54 — Compensation — Computation of — Capitalisation method: In this case it was held that High Court, while discussing material on record to arrive at conclusion based on a capitalisation method, had overlooked ample material on record. Though, High Court, while observing that plantation of about 325 orange trees was done in 1981-1982, as was apparent from Ext. 27, as well as relying upon report of Tahsildar, disclosing about 300 to 325 plants of oranges, had strangely refused to grant compensation for orange trees solely on ground that these orange trees were not fruit-bearing trees. Except referring to aforementioned factor, no other factor was discussed by High Court while erroneously coming to conclusion on grant of compensation based on capitalisation method. [Bilquis v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 7 SCC 530]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302 and 324 — Murder trial: In this case there was fight between accused and deceased and assault was alleged by appellant-accused on head of deceased with a wooden log, resulted in his death. As there were material variations/ contradictions in testimonies of witnesses and serious lacunae in prosecution case, accused was entitled to benefit of doubt. Hence, conviction of accused reversed. [Kumar v. State, (2018) 7 SCC 536]

Income Tax Act, 1961 — S. 11: Setting off, of excess expenditure incurred by the trust/charitable institution in earlier assessment year against income of subsequent years. [CIT v. Subros Educational Society, (2018) 7 SCC 548]

Representation of the People Act, 1951 — S. 151-A proviso (a) — Holding of bye-election within six months from date of occurrence of vacancy — Conditions for: When election petition is pending against election of Member then even if he/she tenders resignation and same accepted by Speaker, bye-election cannot be held. [Pramod Laxman Gudadhe v. Election Commission of India, (2018) 7 SCC 550]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Ss. 149(2), (1), 66(1), (3), 2(28), (31), (47) and 166 — Defences available to insurer: Having regard to S. 66(1) of MV Act, 1988 which prescribes that no owner of a motor vehicle shall use or permit the use of the vehicle as a transport vehicle in any public place whether or not such vehicle is actually carrying any passengers or goods save in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted or countersigned by a Regional or State Transport Authority or any prescribed authority, held, use of a vehicle as a transport vehicle in public place without a permit is a fundamental statutory infraction. Though S. 66(3) of MV Act, 1988 carves out certain exceptions to S. 66(1), in order to invoke those exceptions the same must be pleaded and proved. Said exceptions cannot be taken aid of in the course of argument to seek absolution from liability. [Amrit Paul Singh v. Tata AIG General Insurance Co Ltd., (2018) 7 SCC 558]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss. 154 and 460 — General Diary: Non-maintenance of General Diary prior to preliminary enquiry not per se illegal though an irregularity. Consequences of non-maintenance depend on merits of case, a matter of trial. It is for trial court to decide effect and find out whether it causes any prejudice and not High Court. Moreover, aim of preliminary enquiry is to check false prosecution against public servants by misusing process of law for personal vengeance. [State v. H. Srinivas, (2018) 7 SCC 572]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 463, 465 & 464 and Expln. 2 to S. 464 — Conviction for making of false document — When sustainable: S. 463 defines offence of forgery, while S. 464 substantiates the same by providing answer as to when a false document could be said to have been made for the purpose of committing offence of forgery under S. 463. Therefore, S. 464 defines one of ingredients of forgery i.e. making of false document. Charge of forgery cannot be imposed on/sustained against a person who is not the maker of false document in question. Making of a document is different than causing it to be made. As Expln. 2 to S. 464 further clarifies, for constituting offence under S. 464, it is imperative that a false document is made and accused person is maker of the same, otherwise accused person is not liable for offence of forgery. [Sheila Sebastian v. R. Jawaharaj, (2018) 7 SCC 581]

Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005 — Ss. 3, 4, 13, 14, 15 Sch. II Para 29 — Object — Socio-economic legislation: As delay in payment of wages and compensation to beneficiaries; and reduction in person days and consequent reduction in allocation of funds from projections made by State Governments and UTs have been alleged, directions issued to remedy the situation. [Swaraj Abhiyan (VI) v. Union of India, (2018) 7 SCC 591]

Government Contracts and Tenders — Remedies/Relief — Restitutionary remedies — Recompense for benefit conferred — Recovery of Money Paid/Interest/Profit Earned — Revival of Super Bazar at New Delhi: In this case there was termination of arrangement of revival and the investment made by the bidder (WPL) was refunded along with interest at the rate of 6% p.a. Denial of interest on investment brought in by way of share capital by bidder and adjustment of losses incurred in Super Bazar from the amount to be refunded to bidder, not proper. [Writers And Publisher (P) Ltd. v. A.K. Mishra, (2018) 7 SCC 608]