Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

In Andhra Pradesh Dairy Development Corporation Federation v. B. Narasimha Reddy, (2011) 9 SCC 286 explained the principle of promissory estoppel that binds the succeeding Government to carry on the unfinished job of the previous Government. The bench of P. Sathasivam and B.S. Chauhan, JJ held,

“40. In the matter of the Government of a State, the succeeding Government is dutybound to continue and carry on the unfinished job of the previous Government, for the reason that the action is that of the “State”, within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, which continues to subsist and therefore, it is not required that the new Government can plead contrary to the State action taken by the previous Government in respect of a particular subject. The State, being a continuing body can be stopped from changing its stand in a given case, but where after holding enquiry it came to the conclusion that action was not in conformity with law, the doctrine of estoppel would not apply. Thus, unless the act done by the previous Government is found to be contrary to the statutory provisions, unreasonable or against policy, the State should not change its stand merely because the other political party has come into power. “Political agenda of an individual or a political party should not be subversive of rule of law.” The Government has to rise above the nexus of vested interest and nepotism, etc. as the principles of governance have to be tested on the touchstone of  justice, equity and fair play.”

Read more… 

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: In a case where process of cancellation of a tender was initiated without affording a chance to be heard to the lessees and the tender was cancelled “because of the possibility of larger profits”, the 3-judge bench of NV Ramana*, CJ and Vineet Saran and Surya Kant, JJ has held that when a contract is being evaluated, the mere possibility of more money in the public coffers, does not in itself serve public interest.

Invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the respondents, in the case at hand, had argued that the authorities could not have walked out of the bargain, merely because of the possibility of larger profits. The Court, hence, took the opportunity to explain the principle of promissory estoppel and the responsibility of the Government while entering into a Government Contract.

Stating that Courts need to have a broader understanding of public interest, while reviewing such contracts, the Court explained that,

“A blanket claim by the State claiming loss of public money cannot be used to forgo contractual obligations, especially when it is not based on any evidence or examination. The larger public interest of upholding contracts and the fairness of public authorities is also in play.”

In Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1979) 2 SCC 409, the Court laid down the necessity of the government being bound by the principles of promissory estoppel and held that it would not be enough for the Government to merely state that public interest requires that the Government should not be compelled to carry out the promise. It is imperative that the Government   when seeking exoneration from liability of enforcing contract, must satisfy the Court as to how public interest overrides the necessity of enforcing the contract.

The Court stressed that, by merely using grounds of public interest or loss to the treasury, the successor public authority cannot undo the work undertaken by the previous authority. Such a claim must be proven using material facts, evidence and figures. If it were otherwise, then there will remain no sanctity in the words and undertaking of the Government.

“Businessmen will be hesitant to enter Government contract or make any investment in furtherance of the same. Such a practice is counter-productive to the economy and the business environment in general.”

The Court explained that though the constitutional guarantee against arbitrariness as provided under Article 14, demands the State to act in a fair and reasonable manner unless public interest demands otherwise, however, the degree of compromise of any private legitimate interest must correspond proportionately to the public interest, so claimed.

“Governmental bodies being public authorities are expected to uphold fairness, equality and rule of law even while dealing with contractual matters. It is a settled principle that right to equality under Article 14 abhors arbitrariness. Public authorities have to ensure that no bias, favouritism or arbitrariness are shown during the bidding process. A transparent bidding process is much favoured by this Court to ensure that constitutional requirements are satisfied.”

[City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd v. Shishir Realty Private Limited, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1141, decided on 29.11.2021]


For CIDCO: Senior Advocate Rakesh Dwivedi

For State: Senior Advocate Atmaram Nadkarni

For PIL petitioner­-appellant: Advocate Harinder Toor

For respondents: Senior Advocates Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi and Mukul Rohatgi

*Judgment by: Chief Justice NV Ramana

Know Thy Judge| Justice N.V. Ramana


Lessee learns of cancellation of tender from Newspaper Report. SC holds authority can’t circumvent the requirement of providing effective hearing

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: Prathiba M. Singh, J., while quoting that ‘Promises are meant to be broken’ stated that the law has evolved the doctrines of legitimate expectation and promissory estoppel to ensure that promises made by the Government, its officials and other authorities are not broken and are, in fact, judicially enforceable, subject to certain conditions.

Promise by Chief Minister of Delhi

Petitioners filed the instant petition seeking enforcement of CM of Delhi’s promise.

Petitioners sought the recovery/payment/refund of the monthly rental amount, as per the promise made by the CM.

What was the promise?

CM, Delhi in a press conference on 29-3-2020, amidst the pandemic requested all the landlords to postpone the demand/collection of rent from those tenants who were poor and poverty-stricken.

CM, in the press conference, had made a clear promise that if any tenant is unable to pay the rent due to poverty, the Government would pay his/her rent on their behalf.

“…a solemn assurance was given that the Government would take care of the tenants.”

Analysis, Law and Decision

Bench on perusal of various decisions of the Courts laid down the salient principles of the doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation:

Principles from decisions in India:

In India, the two doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation have been moulded and expanded further, in order to suit the economic and social conditions prevalent in India. Some of the principles that emerge are:

i)  If a representation is made by the Government, the question is whether it should be allowed to go back on it and whether such an act of resiling from the said assurance would constitute legal fraud.

ii)  It is necessary to promote honesty and good faith in governance. Therefore, if a promise has been made, the Government has a duty to fulfil the same.

iii)  Executive necessity does not constitute an adequate reason to not give effect to a representation.

iv)  If the promise made is clear and unequivocal then the Court can enforce it.

v)  If the promise is acted upon by the promisee, the need to enforce the said promise becomes stronger. There need not be any detriment caused. Mere action on the promise is sufficient for cause of action to arise.

vi)  Under the traditional law of contracts, unless and until, the terms are agreed upon, there would be no contract. However, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is an exception, i.e., no contract is required to enforce a promise made by the Government, if the Government made the same consciously, with an intention for it to be acted upon by the citizen.

vii)  It is important to bridge the gap between law and morality and these two doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation are judicial contributions in the said direction.

viii)  Relief based on legitimate expectation or promissory estoppel can be refused only if it is unequitable to hold the Government to its promise.

ix)  If public interest would be prejudiced by enforcing the said promise, only then, relief may be refused. The only exception is overriding public interest or when enforcement is unfair or contrary to public interest. However, the Government would have to disclose the facts that would exempt it from enforcing the said promise and a mere claim in respect of the same would not be sufficient to establish overriding public interest.

x)  A mere ipse dixit would not work, and the Government cannot presume a self-exemption. Only a Court can grant exemption from liability for not adhering to the assurance, provided the Government shows proper justification.

xi)  High ranking officials who may have made representations or given assurances or promises, can, due to the position they hold, bind the Government to their statements.

xii)  It is presumed that once a representation is made by a high- ranking official, the same is within the scope of its authority.

xiii)  If the representation or promise made or is prohibited by law then it cannot be enforced.

xiv)  The relief that may be given by the Court, in the case of an unconscionable departure from a promise is flexible, so as to remedy the injustice caused.

xv)  The mere non-issuance of a notification would not stand in the way of granting relief, if the facts justify the same, as the same would only be a ministerial act.

xvi)  Both these doctrines have to be expansively interpreted, as a recognition of the doctrine of fairness and non-arbitrariness.

xvii)  The legitimate expectation of a citizen ought to be considered and given due weight in decision making. It is a relevant factor for consideration in the decision-making process.

xviii)  Failure to adhere to a promise without adequate justification violates the trust between the Government and the citizen.

xix)  The broad exceptions to not grant relief on the basis of these principles would be – mistake, or if the same is unfair and contrary to public interest.

xx)  The doctrine of legitimate expectation is broader in its scope than the doctrine of promissory estoppel, and it may be based on past practice of the authorities. It need not involve a specific statement and is meant to ensure non-arbitrariness in State action.

xxi)  The doctrine of legitimate expectation and its enforcement is an integral part of non-arbitrariness and non-abuse of power as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution.

Now, moving on to analysing the facts, Bench noted that the address by the CM in the press conference has three dimensions:

  • The first dimension is an appeal to the landlords.
  • Second is a promise to landlords that it would pay on behalf of the tenants, if they are unable to due to lack of means and poverty, and
  • thirdly, it has a warning to landlords to not coerce the tenants.

Whether the said statements given by the CM were enforceable by applying either the doctrine of legitimate expectation or promissory estoppel?

Further, Bench stated that the promise made by the CM was under the premise that COVID-19 may be over within two-three months, as the words used were  आश्वासन (assurance or promise) and भुगतान (reimbursement) for the landlords, on behalf of the tenants.

High Court expressed that the principles governing the doctrines of legitimate expectation and promissory estoppel primarily recognize the role of the State of the Governmental authorities vis-à-vis the public.

Adding to the above, High Court stated that the said doctrines are a reflection of the legal recognition being accorded to the trust that citizens repose on promises/assurances/representations which are made by Constitutional functionaries and governmental authorities, especially in times of distress.

The raison d’être for granting recognition to such assurances/promises/representations, is that such functionaries and authorities, who are either elected to public positions or who hold positions of power, are answerable to the people, especially once they undertake or agree to do or not to do a particular thing.

Legal Enforceability

Bench expressed that the question as to whether a promise/assurance/representation results in a legally enforceable right and if so, what would be the relief that a Court can grant, depends upon the factual circumstances of each case and the context in which the said promises/assurance or representations have been made by the Governmental authorities.

Judicial Enforceability

The assurance given or the promise made in the present case was obviously with a view to stop or curb the migration of people from Delhi to the extent possible.

The actual effect of the promise or the assurance was beyond the scope of the present writ petition, inasmuch as there was no clarity as to whether the assurance resulted in tenants staying back.

However, this Court cannot be dismissive of the fact that the Petitioners, who are before the Court, claim to have acted on the promise or the assurance made by the CM. It would not be unreasonable to presume that some tenants and landlords may have altered their positions based upon the assurance given by the CM.

The salient facts and features of the present case were:

(1) Exceptional circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic.

(2) Extreme distress being faced by migrant labourers and blue-collar workers and employees.

(3) A clear promise/assurance made by the CM.

(4) No positive policy to implement the said promise/assurance given by the GNCTD.

(5) No contrary policy implemented by the government, placed before the Court.

(6) No decision taken to not implement the said promise/assurance that was given by the CM.

(7) The exception of public interest having not been invoked for the non-implementation of the promise/assurance.

What should be the conduct of the Government, in the context when a senior functionary like the CM gives a promise/assurance to the public, which is categorical, unequivocal and unambiguous?

Court opined that such inaction would not be permissible when clearly the making of the promise/assurance by the CM was not in doubt, and was in fact admitted by the GNCTD.

Doctrines of Promissory Estoppel and Legitimate Expectation

The said doctrines are based on the axiom that the people trust the government.

In a democratic setup, persons who hold an elected office, and especially heads of government, heads of State and those holding responsible positions are expected to make responsible assurances/promises to their citizens, especially in times of crisis and distress. On behalf of the citizens, there would obviously be a reasonable expectation, that an assurance or a promise made by a senior Constitutional functionary, not less than the CM himself, would be give effect to.

If the GNCTD had actually come out with a policy either deciding to not implement the said promise or assurance on grounds which are legally sustainable, obviously the Courts cannot interfere. However, even applying the basic Wednesbury principles, the decision making, after the promise was made, ought not to be an arbitrary one.

 Bench held that in the backdrop of the commitment made, it is not the positive decision making which is arbitrary, but the lack of decision making or indecision, which this Court holds to be contrary to law.

Once the CM had made a solemn assurance, there was a duty cast on the GNCTD to take a stand as to whether to enforce the said promise or not, and if so on what grounds or on the basis of what reasons.

In the context of upholding Fundamental Rights, the principles of legitimate expectation have to be accorded a higher pedestal and the burden on the authority concerned not to honour the same, is even higher.


A statement given in a consciously held press conference, in the background of the lockdown announced due to the pandemic and the mass exodus of migrant labourers, cannot be simply overlooked. Proper governance requires the Government to take a decision on the assurance given by the CM, and inaction on the same cannot be the answer.

The expectation of the citizens could be that the Government would implement the promise, however, when this Court is examining this promise and the expectation that comes with it, the question is whether there is any reason as to why the Government did not even take a decision in this regard.

To that extent, insofar as the indecision is concerned, the GNCTD needed to answer the question, which it has failed to answer. 

Elaborating more, Court stated that the said promise was to act as a balm on the wounds of landlords and tenants, who were severely affected as a class of citizens in Delhi. However, the lack of any decision to implement, or a conscious reasoned decision not to implement, has resulted in non decisionem factionem in respect of the legitimate expectation of its citizens. The statements made by persons in power are trusted by the public who repose faith and believe in the same.

Thus, “puffing” which may be permissible in commercial advertising, ought not to be recognisable and permissible in governance.

Whether the statement made by the CM can be completely ignored and can be held to be not binding on the GNCTD?

In Court’s view, the promise/assurance/representation given by the CM clearly amounts to an enforceable promise, the implementation of which ought to be considered by the Government. Good governance requires that promises made to citizens, by those who govern, are not broken, without valid and justifiable reasons.

Lastly, the Court concluded by laying down the following directions:

  1. The GNCTD would, having regard to the statement made by the CM on 29th March, 2020, to landlords and tenants, take a decision as to the implementation of the same within a period of 6 weeks;
  2. The said decision would be taken, bearing in mind the larger interest of the persons to whom the benefits were intended to be extended in the said statement, as also any overriding public interest concerns.
  3. Upon the said decision being taken, the GNCTD would frame a clear policy in this regard.
  4. Upon the said decision being taken, if a Scheme or Policy is announced, the Petitioners’ case be considered under the said Scheme/Policy as per the procedure prescribed therein, if any.

Petition was disposed of in the above terms. [Najma v. GNCTD, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 3775, decided on 22-07-2021]

Advocates before the Court:

For the Petitioner: Gaurav Jain, Advocate

For the Respondent: Rahul Mehra, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Gautam Narayan, ASC, GNCTD and Mr. Adithya Nair, Advocate.

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: In the case where the Jharkhand Government had failed to give effect to the Industrial Policy and subsequent Notification that promised 50% rebate to Industrial Units on electricity duty, the Dr. DY Chandrachud* and Indu Malhotra, JJ took the opportunity to explain the evolution and application of the doctrines of Promissory Estoppel and Legitimate Expectations over the years.

Here is a summary of the discussion by the Court:

Origin and evolution of Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel

Under English Law, judicial decisions have in the past postulated that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be used as a ‘sword’, to give rise to a cause of action for the enforcement of a promise lacking any consideration. Its use in those decisions has been limited as a ‘shield’, where the promisor is estopped from claiming enforcement of its strict legal rights, when a representation by words or conduct has been made to suspend such rights.

However, in the absence of a definitive pronouncement by the House of Lords holding that promissory estoppel can be a cause of action, a difficulty was expressed in stating with certainty that English Law has evolved from the traditional approach of treating promissory estoppel as a ‘shield’ instead of a ‘sword’. By contrast, the law in the United States and Australia is less restrictive in this regard.

India adopted a more expansive statement of the doctrine in order to remedy the injustice being done to a party who has relied on a promise.

In Motilal Padampat Sagar Mills Co. Ltd. v State of UP, (1979) 2 SCC 409, the Supreme Court viewed promissory estoppel as a principle in equity, which was not hampered by the doctrine of consideration as was the case under English Law. The judgment that was penned by Justice P N Bhagwati stated:

“… having regard to the general opprobrium to which the doctrine of consideration has been subjected by eminent jurists, we need not be unduly anxious to project this doctrine against assault or erosion nor allow it to dwarf or stultify the full development of the equity of promissory estoppel or inhibit or curtail its operational efficacy as a justice device for preventing injustice…We do not see any valid reason why promissory estoppel should not be allowed to found a cause of action where, in order to satisfy the equity, it is necessary to do so.”

Doctrine of Legitimate Expectations vis-à-vis Promissory Estoppel

Under English Law, the doctrine of promissory estoppel has developed parallel to the doctrine of legitimate expectations. The doctrine of legitimate expectation initially developed in the context of public law as an analogy to the doctrine of promissory estoppel found in private law. However, since then, English Law has distinguished between the doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation as distinct remedies under private law and public law, respectively.

The doctrine of legitimate expectations is founded on the principles of fairness in government dealings. It comes into play if a public body leads an individual to believe that they will be a recipient of a substantive benefit.”

Another difference between the doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation under English Law is that the latter can constitute a cause of action. The scope of the doctrine of legitimate expectation is wider than promissory estoppel because it not only takes into consideration a promise made by a public body but also official practice, as well.

Under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, there may be a requirement to show a detriment suffered by a party due to the reliance placed on the promise. Although typically it is sufficient to show that the promisee has altered its position by placing reliance on the promise, the fact that no prejudice has been caused to the promisee may be relevant to hold that it would not be “inequitable” for the promisor to go back on their promise. However, no such requirement is present under the doctrine of legitimate expectation.

Further, while the basis of the doctrine of promissory estoppel in private law is a promise made between two parties, the basis of the doctrine of legitimate expectation in public law is premised on the principles of fairness and non-arbitrariness surrounding the conduct of public authorities.

“This is not to suggest that the doctrine of promissory estoppel has no application in circumstances when a State entity has entered into a private contract with another private party. Rather, in English law, it is inapplicable in circumstances when the State has made representation to a private party, in furtherance of its public functions.”

Indian Law and the doctrine of legitimate expectations

Under Indian Law, there is often a conflation between the doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectations. While this doctrinal confusion has the unfortunate consequence of making the law unclear, citizens have been the victims. Representations by public authorities need to be held to scrupulous standards, since citizens continue to live their lives based on the trust they repose in the State. In the commercial world also, certainty and consistency are essential to planning the affairs of business.

“When public authorities fail to adhere to their representations without providing an adequate reason to the citizens for this failure, it violates the trust reposed by citizens in the State. The generation of a business-friendly climate for investment and trade is conditioned by the faith which can be reposed in government to fulfil the expectations which it generates.”

In National Buildings Construction Corporation vs S. Raghunathan, (1998) 7 SCC 66, a three Judge bench, speaking through Justice S. Saghir Ahmad, held that:

“The doctrine of “legitimate expectation” has its genesis in the field of administrative law. The Government and its departments, in administering the affairs of the country, are expected to honour their statements of policy or intention and treat the citizens with full personal consideration without any iota of abuse of discretion. The policy statements cannot be disregarded unfairly or applied selectively. Unfairness in the form of unreasonableness is akin to violation of natural justice. It was in this context that the doctrine of “legitimate expectation” was evolved which has today become a source of substantive as well as procedural rights. But claims based on “legitimate expectation” have been held to require reliance on representations and resulting detriment to the claimant in the same way as claims based on promissory estoppel.”

However, it is important to note that this observation was made by this Court while discussing the ambit of the doctrine of legitimate expectation under English Law, as it stood then. Since then and since the judgment in National Buildings Construction Corporation, the English Law in relation to the doctrine of legitimate expectation has evolved. More specifically, it has actively tried to separate the two doctrines and to situate the doctrine of legitimate expectations on a broader footing.

In a concurring opinion in Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd. vs Union of India, (2012) 11 SCC 1, Justice H L Gokhale highlighted the different considerations that underlie the doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation. He said:

“… for the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, there has to be a promise, based on which the promise has acted to its prejudice. In contrast, while applying the doctrine of legitimate expectation, the primary considerations are reasonableness and fairness of the State action.”

In Union of India vs Lt. Col. P.K. Choudhary, (2016) 4 SCC 236, speaking through Chief Justice T S Thakur, the Court discussed the decision in Monnet Ispat and held:

“… the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot be claimed as a right in itself, but can be used only when the denial of a legitimate expectation leads to the violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.”


Hence, in an attempt to provide a cogent basis for the doctrine of legitimate expectation, which is not merely grounded on analogy with the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the Court, in the present case, concluded:

“… the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot be claimed as a right in itself, but can be used only when the denial of a legitimate expectation leads to the violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation is one of the ways in which the guarantee of non-arbitrariness enshrined under Article 14 finds concrete expression.”

[State of Jharkhand v. Brahmputra Metallics Ltd.,  2020 SCC OnLine SC 968, decided on 01.12.2020]

*Justice Dr. DY Chandrachud has penned this judgment. Read more about him here

Counsels heard:

For the State of Jharkhand: Additional Advocate General Tapesh Kumar Singh, appearing for the State of Jharkhand

For Respondent: Advocate Devashish Bharuka

Also read: ‘Administrative lethargy of State will discourage entrepreneurship’; SC calls out Jharkhand Govt for not giving 50% electricity rebate to Industrial Units as promised

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: The 3-judge bench of Arun Mishra, MR Shah and BR Gavai, JJ has held that by invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the Union of India cannot be estopped from withdrawing the exemption from payment of Excise Duty in respect of certain products, which exemption is granted by an earlier notification; when the  Union of India finds that such a withdrawal is necessary in the public interest. The bench said that the larger public interest would outweigh an individual loss, if any.

In the present case the withdrawal of the exemption to the pan masala with tobacco and pan masala sans tobacco in the State of Assam was under challenge before the Court. The Court, however, said that it had no hesitation to hold that the withdrawal of the exemption to the pan masala with tobacco and pan masala sans tobacco is in the larger public interest. As such, the doctrine of promissory estoppel could not have been invoked in the present matter.

Noticing that by a scientific research conducted by Experts in the field, it has been found that the consumption of pan masala with tobacco as well as pan masala sans tobacco is hazardous to health and that the percentage of teenagers consuming the hazardous product was very high and as such exposing a large chunk of young population of this Country to the risk of oral cancer, the Court said,

“if the State has decided to withdraw the exemption granted for manufacture of such products, we fail to understand as to how it can be said to be not in the public interest.”

The Sikkim High Court had observed that the appellant herein has been unable to establish any overriding public interest, which would make the doctrine of promissory estoppel inapplicable. It has further observed that, the pan masala has not been declared as hazardous to health by any notification or order of the Government of India or the State Government. It found that, no material or scientific report had been placed on record to demonstrate that the pan masala is a health hazard. The Supreme Court, however, held that the reasoning arrived at by the Sikkim High Court was totally erroneous.

The Court said that the legislative policy as reflected in Section 154 of the Finance Act was to withdraw the exemption granted to the manufacturers of cigarettes as well as pan masala with tobacco and that too with retrospective effect. Apart from the fact that, it is a common knowledge that tobacco is highly hazardous, the legislative intent was also unambiguous. It, hence, said,

“In these circumstances, the finding of the High Court that the withdrawal of exemption for tobacco products was not in the public interest, to say the least is shocking.”

[Union of India v. Unicorn Industries, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1231, decided on 19.09.2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Sikkim High Court: A Single Judge Bench of Meenakshi Madan Rai, J. addressed an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Facts of the case were that the petitioners had a shop on the first floor of “non-veg” building for the purpose of selling fish, dressed chicken and mutton. The petitioners were aggrieved by the fact that the respondents were opening a shop on the ground floor with same products having the same price. The ground on which respondents’ license was challenged was that it would hamper similar business being run by the petitioner on the first floor as a customer would prefer to buy from the ground floor then go to the first floor for the same product at the same price.

The petitioners contended that the stalls allotted to the respondents had been earmarked for construction of toilets for use of the vendors, workers and the customers of the said building but had instead been allotted to the respondents without adherence to the tender process. In furtherance of their contention, the petitioners added that the government had assured the construction of toilets which estopped the State from allotting stalls and license to private respondents.

The High Court was of the view that the petitioners could not seek to restrain private respondents from carrying business for their livelihood. The doctrine of promissory estoppel was not applicable as any document to show assurance of government to build toilets was not found. If requisite conditions were fulfilled then the respondents could not be stopped from getting licenses for selling meat. Therefore, the writ petition was dismissed. [Dawa Phuti Bhutia v. State of Sikkim, 2018 SCC OnLine Sikk 226, dated 02-11-2018]