Case BriefsHigh Courts

Orissa High Court: S. K. Panigrahi, J. disposed of the petition and refused to terminate 24+ week pregnancy of a rape victim.

The facts of the case are such that the petitioner is a rape victim assailing the order dated 09-07-2021 passed by the Ld. S.D.J.M. under Section 3 of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as “the
MTP Act” for brevity). Being aggrieved by the order, the present petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has been filed in the instant court.

Counsel for petitioner submitted that the petitioner has been pregnant for more than 4 months and feels morally insecure to step out of her house due to horrendous social stigma attached to such crime. The social relations between men and women in which violence against women is often taken for granted, especially in cases like these the judge do decide their fate in the decision to abort or not to abort the pregnancy.

The Court observed that in the cases of this genre, the medical practice of abortion,  legal and illegal, has expanded but the Psycho-physiological and  social condition of the rape survivors form the essential aspects of  medical judgment especially in therapeutic abortion case.

In the absence of any report by medical team ascertaining the actual  period of pregnancy, the Court directed the office of the Advocate General in  order to facilitate the petitioner for testing of the period of  pregnancy accurately by a team of doctors as prescribed under the  Act. Accordingly, the test was conducted and report submitted which suggests it may be unsafe for getting the termination done at this stage. In fact, allowing the termination at  this stage could endanger the mother’s life or even lead to  substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function.

The Court relied on judgment Suchitra Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration (2009) 9 SCC 1 wherein it was observed that perusal of the provisions of the MTP Act makes it clear  that ordinarily a pregnancy can be terminated only when a medical  practitioner is satisfied that a ‘continuance of the pregnancy would  involve a risk to the life of the pregnant woman or of grave injury  to her physical or mental health’ [as per Section 3(2)(i)] or when  ‘there is a substantial risk that if the child were born, it would suffer  from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped’ [as per Section 3(2) (ii)]. While the satisfaction of one medical practitioner is required for terminating a pregnancy within twelve weeks of the gestation period, two medical practitioners must be satisfied about either of these grounds in order to terminate a pregnancy between twelve to twenty weeks of the gestation period.

The explanations to this provision have also contemplated  the termination of pregnancy when the same is the result of a rape  or a failure of birth-control methods since both of these  eventualities have been equated with a ‘grave injury to the mental  health’ of a woman. In all such circumstances, the consent of the pregnant woman is an essential requirement for proceeding with the termination of pregnancy. This position has been unambiguously stated in Section 3(4)(b) of the MTP Act, 1971.  The exceptions to this rule of consent have been laid down in Section 3(4)(a) of the Act. Section 3(4)(a) lays down that when the  pregnant woman is below eighteen years of age or is a ‘mentally ill’  person, the pregnancy can be terminated if the guardian of the  pregnant woman gives consent for the same. The only other exception is found in Section 5(1) of the MTP Act which permits a registered medical practitioner to proceed with a termination of pregnancy when he/she is of an opinion formed in good faith that the same is ‘immediately necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman.

The Court observed that in the present case, there is no opinion of any registered medical practitioner regarding risk to life due to continuance of pregnancy of the petitioner or her physical and mental health. Further in the present case, the pregnancy exceeds 24 weeks and as per the requirement of the statute, the medical opinion of not less than two medical
practitioners was not obtained and no  medical opinion regarding termination of pregnancy, if, immediately  necessary to save the life of the petitioner as per Section 5 of MTP  Act. Therefore MTP Act does not permit the termination of pregnancy of the petitioner.

The Court further stated that the victim is being forced to bear and care for the unwanted child is bound to severely impact her personality and womanhood. Thus the court observed that her request should have been acceded to over and above the right to life of the child yet to be born. Though this issue has, time and again, knocks at the judicial threshold it is still crying for an unperplexed solution by way of suitable amendment in the statute governing the field.

The Court feels that the Police officers could have acted more sensibly and, at the very least, guided them to approach District Legal Service Authority or Legal Services Units at Taluk Level or to any para legal volunteers. This would have, perhaps, helped the victim to get timely legal advice and may have saved her from suffering the forced delivery, imposed on her due to medico- legal compulsions.

The Court issued following directions keeping in mind rape victims and their unborn child:

1).The District Collector, Cuttack shall ensure that arrangements are made to provide proper diet, medical supervision and medicines as may be necessary, to the  victim throughout the remaining part of her journey of  pregnancy. When the time for delivery arrives, proper medical facilities be made available for a safe delivery of  the child.

2).The State Legal Services Authority shall ensure that the State Government shall pay an amount of Rs.10, 00,000/- (rupees ten lakhs only) as compensation to the victim. This amount shall be over and above the compensation amount, if any, the learned Trial Court may direct to be paid to the victim and/or her child at conclusion of the trial in the underlying proceedings.

The Court held that it does feel that her welfare is of, paramount consideration for this court. “However, as regards the legal position, the above discussion and the mandate of Section 3 of the MTP Act, in particular, lead only to one conclusion i.e., since the length of the pregnancy of the victim is over twenty-six weeks, this Court cannot permit its termination.”

[X v. State of Odisha, 2021 SCC OnLine Ori 1964, decided on 16-11-2021]

Arunima bose, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.


For Petitioner: Mr Sarathi Jyoti Mohanty
For Opp. Parties: Mr L. Samantaray

Op EdsOP. ED.


 Postmodernism is a movement that began mid-late 20th century and was characterised by skepticism, suspicion of reason and acute sensitivity towards the role of ideologies in politics and economic power. Postmodernism provided an excellent structure for feminists to present their arguments. While explaining postmodernism’s impact on gender, Judith Butler defines it as a subversion of modernist projections of “women as a gender”.[1] Postmodernism helps deconstruct the relationship between gender and sex as a juridical category where the sexed body is perceived as gendered, preceding the emergence of the order of discourse.[2] This paper will present Judith Butler’s theory on gender performativity and analyse its application to abortion laws in India.

I. Butler’s Theory on Performativity

Butler employs her concept of performativity to bring forth the limitations of identity politics that presumed a universal and unified subject of feminism.[3] Performativity allows us to “reconceive the gendered body as a legacy of sedimented acts rather than predetermined or foreclosed structure, essence, or fact, whether natural, cultural, or linguistic”.[4]

 Butler’s problem is with accepting the category of women as a universal presupposition, existing in the cultural experience and society. She believes that gender is performed and constitutes a series of acts. It has a well-defined script that was devised and regulated by society. [5]  There exists immense pressure to maintain this set of gendered roles, and all deviations are strictly punished.[6]

Butler draws our attention towards how the legal system produces and then conceals the notion of a “subject before the law” to invoke the discursive formation as a naturalised foundational premise that subsequently legitimates that law’s regulatory hegemony.[7] She proposes the inclusion of cultural diversity to proliferate within discourses to expose the binarism of sex and the unnaturalness of fundamentals of ontology.[8] Therefore, according to Butler, subjects of feminism should be women who are culturally and politically positioned and constituted as “women”.[9]

Butler implies the importance of deconstructing these socialised norms that manifest through regulatory structures of the judicial system for they create a regulatory fiction of pre-existing identity as natural gender identity.[10] To break free of this script, one has to use the postmodern critique of gender identity. Through such an approach, one understands that a woman is not born but becomes a woman and hence, a woman is a social construct.[11]  Therefore, community discourses involving the category of “women” should be open to intervention.[12]  For in postmodern thought, the community determines the facts they will accept as beliefs. If one can successfully alter the network of beliefs of the community regarding “women” and hence alter the language and conventions, women stand a chance at gaining their agency and improving women’s political and socio-economical position in society.[13]

Conceptual Basis of Butler’s Postmodernist Deconstruction of Gender

Butler’s theory of performativity is based on Foucault’s inquiry into the connection between subject, knowledge and power and Austin’s idea on constative.

Foucault introduces three modes of objectification through which a person is produced by systems of power as subjects. This subjects’ objectification happens through “those (who) categorise, distribute, and manipulate; those through which we have come to understand ourselves scientifically; and those that we have used to form ourselves into meaning – giving selves”.[14]  According to him, the system acts as a disciplinary power in society to maintain and produce docile, passive, subjugated and productive individuals.[15] Hence when regressive judgments are delivered, the system creates a hegemonic structure that constructs bodies that the system represents.[16]

Further, she relies on J.L. Austin’s concept of performatives which includes “speech acts” and “speech does”.[17]  Austin argues that constatives are propositions that are stated positively or negatively.[18] These statements can be true or false. The speaker of such constatives deliver such a speech expressing their own beliefs and with an intention that the audience can also form a similar belief. [19] Butler proposes that there “need not be a ‘doer behind the deed’,” but the “doer” is variably constructed in and through the deed.  Butler argues that one should deconstruct the constative terms that supported their understanding of gender to reveal its performative character.[20]  These are usually constative elements of the sexed body that feed into the idea that gender is natural. These elements are drawn from various sources, including religious, medical, psychological, and biological conceptions of truth.[21] To undermine the success of the constative, Butler proposes one should show that the constative itself is merely a performative.[22]

II. Abortion Laws in India

 Due to the prevailing Covid-19 pandemic, close to 18.5 lakh women across India have had no access to abortion facilities, despite abortion being an essential service.[23] Coupled with the current lockdown situation that increases the cases of domestic violence and marital rape (which is not criminalised in India), women are forced to continue with unwanted pregnancies.[24] Many of them are worried that they will surpass the statutory limit of 12 weeks of legally terminating a pregnancy (now increased to 24 weeks in some instances)[25] due to the continuing crisis and will be denied an abortion. Limits imposed on abortion continue to harm the vulnerable sections of uneducated women, in abusive households, and women from low-income backgrounds where they have no access to ultrasound facilities and often face barriers before they can access abortion services. Hence, it is pertinent to revisit abortion laws in India to assess their relevance from a postmodern framework.

Legal provisions

The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 ( “the Act”) was introduced as an exception to Sections 312 and 313 of the Penal Code, 1860[26], which penalised “intentionally causing miscarriage”, irrespective of the women’s consent.[27] The Act imposed a limit of twelve weeks within which a woman had to decide to terminate her pregnancy to prevent sex-selective abortions that led to female foeticides, which were common in Haryana and Rajasthan.[28]  However, technology has advanced since then, and identifying the sex of a child before twelve weeks is also possible, making the limit imposed redundantly.[29]  An additional extension up to twenty weeks was allowed, but only after consultation with two registered medical practitioners and only in case the pregnancy involved a risk to the life of the pregnant woman or child born would have congenital abnormalities.[30]

 III. Critical Analysis of the Application of Abortion Laws in India

Abortion law in India is riddled with various attempts to control women’s right over her reproductive functions. The problem is twofold, (i) the legal text of the Act itself enforces a gender script that deprives women of meaningful reproductive choice; and (ii) the interpretations adopted in abortion cases have oscillated between strictly applying the law or breaking the moulds of these norms and amplifying women’s reproductive choice.

i. The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971

As Butler points out, a law produces specific subjects and decides whose body will be monitored, regulated, and controlled.[31]  In this case, the Act primarily deals with four main subjects – women (married/unmarried), women with fetus abnormalities, rape victims and women of unsound mind or minors.

Each of these subjects has a varying degree of agency over their bodily integrity and reproductive choice. A married woman is allowed abortion even in cases of contraceptive failures. In contrast, an unmarried woman is allowed abortion only if it poses a severe risk to her well being or there exists a fetal abnormality.  Butler would argue that such segregation would result in diminishing the subject’s social intelligibility and ongoing repetition of such culturally acceptable norms under duress; punitive social or legal consequences would result in specific gendered performances.[32] Here, it induces the idea that only a married woman in consultation with her husband can decide on her abortion. Whereas, an unmarried woman will not receive the same privilege for she chose to engage in sexual intercourse outside of marriage and should face social sanctions. Hence, Butler would propose that to ensure a society where women’s right to bodily integrity and reproductive choice is valued, the Act should remove the word “married” and “husband” from the legal text.

To change the way society perceives them, one ought to change the way laws are drafted for they provide the premise in the form of “constatives”. Austin proposes that these constatives lead the audience to develop the same beliefs as the speaker; here, the speaker is the Government; the audience is the citizens of India.[33]  Butler’s solution is to deconstruct the premise itself by publically advocating for reproductive rights that would provide all women with the reproductive choice to abortion at any time during their pregnancy. Advocating for their reproductive rights is an opportunity to reconfigure the hegemonic gender identities.[34]

ii. Case Laws on Abortion and Reproductive Rights in India

In India, Judges have had contrasting views on women’s reproductive rights. A few cases like Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh[35], the courts have undermined a woman’s right to terminate the pregnancy by making abortion an act amounting to mental cruelty and hence a ground for divorce. Butler would argue that this amounts to dilution of a women’s right to bodily integrity as this promotes cultural hegemonies that imply a wife to be subordinate to her husband. [36]

Foucault proposes that the subjects should recognise the possibility of opposing the power that subjects them and create an alternative discourse that would amplify the subversive repetitions of who is a “woman”.  A few judgments like Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Admn.[37] and Laxmi Mandal v. Deen Dayal Harinagar Hospital[38], the courts affirmed women’s right to choose in the context of continuing her pregnancy. They read this as a fundamental right to privacy and bodily integrity as enshrined in the Constitution under Article 21.[39] Such an unusual interpretation of reproductive rights under Article 21 is what Foucault refers to as an alternative discourse. Butler would argue that such subversive repetitions can occur through the process of claiming rights.  Hence, the process of rights claiming can be viewed as performative contradictions that would open up the space for increased subversive performativity in general society.

Thus, Butler’s performativity theory allows one to understand the social implications of abortion laws and provides for sustainable solutions to circumvent the hegemonic gender identities through strategies of rights claiming and publically challenging how a woman and her reproductive experiences are perceived in the society.


Butler provides an excellent structure for analysing gender identity through a postmodernist lens. The Indian legal system is plagued by archaic laws that propagate the community beliefs that result in the ostracisation of women from public places by making them docile and submissive subjects. Butler proposes we should deconstruct these performances and language scripts to expose these primitive beliefs. The deconstruction of gender will be the first step in regaining women’s agency in society. However, Butler is often criticised by new materialists for the theory of performativity delves in abstract and ignores the practical impact these laws create on the physical body.  New material feminism tries to combine the discursive and the material body and its social construction to gain agency of the matter. [40] Butler’s theory can be coupled with new materialists’ understanding of body to improve abortion laws in India.

* Fourth year law student, Jindal Global Law School. Author can be reached at

[1] Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/ Feminism/Law, 77 Cornell LR 255, 271-275 (1992).

[2] Id., 260-262.

[3] Patterson, supra Note 2, 260-262.

[4] Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex, New York: Routledge (2011).

[5] Ibid.

[6] Santa Barbara & Peter Digeser, Performativity Trouble: Postmodern Feminism and Essential Subjects, 47 Sage Publications, Incat 655 (1994).

[7] Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, 1990.

[8] Digeser, supra Note 6 at 657.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Butler, supra Note 7 at 75.

[11] Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, New York: Vintage Books (1989).

[12] Patterson, supra Note 1 at 272.

[13] Santa Barbara & Peter Digeser, Performativity Trouble: Postmodern Feminism and Essential Subjects, 47 Sage Publications, Inc. at 655 (1994).

[14] Michel Foucault, The Subject and Power, Critical Inquiry 8 (4) 777-795 (1982).

[15] Ibid.

[16] Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, 62 (1990).

[17] John A. Dinneen, What Austin does with Words, 32  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 514-523, 1972.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Jacobsen H. Klaus, The Philosophical Quarterly 21, No. 85 (October 1971), pp. 357-360 (1971).

[20] Butler, supra Note 16, 78.

[21] Klaus, supra Note 19, 358.

[22] Butler, supra Note 16, 78.

[23] Chetana Belagere, 18.5 lakh in india didn’t get access to abortion facilities in lockdown, Indian Express, June 2020.  <> (last visited June 2020).

[24] Roli Srivastava, India has Listed Abortion as an Essential Service, but Problems of Access Persist under Lockdown,, 2020.

[25] Vrinda Grover, The Amendments in the MTP Act Bill are Flawed| Analysis, Hindustan Times, 28-2-2020.

[26]Penal Code, 1860, No. 45, Imperial Legislative Council, 1860.

[27] The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 (No. 34) Acts of Parliament of India, 1971.

[28] Siddhivinayak S. Hirve, Abortion Law, Policy, and Services in India: A Critical Review, Reproductive Health Matters, 12 Taylor & Francis, 114-121 (2004).

[29] Ibid.

[30]The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971, No. 34, Acts of the Parliament of India, 1971 (India).

[31] Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (1990).

[32] Kathryn McNeilly, Framing Wrongs and Performing Rights in North Ireland: Towards a Butlerian Approach to Life in Abortion Strategisiing, 14 Journal of International Women’s Studies (2013).

[33] Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, 62 (1990).

[34] Supra Note 32.

[35] (2007) 4 SCC 511

[36] Supra Note 32.

[37] (2009) 9 SCC 1

[38] 2010 SCC OnLine Del 2234

[39] Constitution of India, Article 21

[40]Donna Haraway, Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective, Feminist Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3 pp. 575-599 (1988).

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court: A Division Bench of R.M. Borde and N.J. Jamadar, JJ. allowed a petition for termination of pregnancy of the petitioner who was 24-weeks pregnant. The termination of pregnancy was allowed in view of fetal anomalies.

The petitioner was examined by Sonologist and certain congenital anomalies were reported. According to the petitioner and her husband, the continuation of pregnancy was not desirable since there was a substantial risk of the child to be born being seriously handicapped. The Court directed the Medical Board at B.J. Medical College, Pune to examine the case and file a report. In its report, the Committee opined that the “baby has fatal complex cardiac anomaly.”

Relying on its earlier decisions, the High Court observed: “Although, sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 put a cap of 20 weeks for permitting the pregnant woman  to terminate the pregnancy, on consideration of Section 5, it would be logical to conclude that the contingencies referred in clauses (i) (ii) of sub-section 2(b) of Section 3 will have to be read in Section 5 of the Act and as such in an exceptional case, the request of a pregnant woman seeking permission to terminate the pregnancy beyond 20 weeks can be considered.” In such view of the matter, the Court allowed the petition. HoD of Obstetrics and Gynaecology at B.J. Medical College was directed to carry out the termination of pregnancy forthwith.

Also, it was clarified that the doctors who had put their opinions on record shall have the immunity in the event of the occurrence of any litigation arising out of the instant petition.

It was also directed that in the event the child is born alive, the medical experts and the hospital concerned will have to assume full responsibility to ensure that child is offered the best medical treatment available in the circumstances, in order that it develops into a healthy child.

Further still, the Court directed that if parents of child are not willing to or are not in a position to assume the responsibility for child, then, the State and its agencies will have to assume full responsibility for such child and offer such child medical support and facilities, as may be reasonably feasible, adhering always to the principle of best interests of such child as well as the Statutory provisions in the Juvenile Justice Act.[Vaishali Pramod Sonawane v. Union of India, 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 932, decided on 07-06-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

High Court of Himachal Pradesh: While deciding a writ petition, a Division Bench comprising of Dharam Chand Chaudhary, J. and Vivek Singh Thakur, J. allowed the abortion of a 32 week developed foetus on the ground that it was risky for the petitioner to complete the normal period of pregnancy and deliver child on the due date.

The petitioner, aged 19 years, having mild to moderate mental retardation, approached the Court for seeking a direction to the Medical Superintendent, Kamla Nehru Hospital for Mother and Child, Shimla to arrange for abortion of a foetus in her womb. The Court gave a direction for conducting medical examination of the petitioner by a medical board. The report of the medical board revealed that there were major complications in the growth of the foetus in petitioner’s womb and the vaginal delivery of the same would cause danger to the life of petitioner as well as the baby. The medical board was of the opinion that the petitioner should go for premature delivery with surgical intervention because if pregnancy is allowed to continue up to its normal tenure, the head size of the foetus will increase further and in that event the surgery is going to become more complicated, besides causing more risk to petitioner’s life.

The Court perused the material available on record including the medical opinion of the board constituted and relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in WP (Civil) No. 17 of 2017, (decided 16-01-2017). The Court was of the view that the continuation of pregnancy would endanger the physical and mental health of the petitioner. The risk of termination of her pregnancy was within the acceptable limits. The relief sought in this writ petition, was also covered by Section 3(2)(i) of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971. Although the pregnancy was at an advance stage of 32 weeks, however, having regard to the danger to the life of the petitioner and expert opinion that the foetus may not survive to extra uterine life, the Court granted permission to the petitioner to terminate the pregnancy. The petitioner had every right to take all steps necessary to preserve her own life against the avoidable dangers to it. Accordingly, the petition was allowed and directions were given to the respondent to arrange for the termination of pregnancy of the petitioner. [Geeta Devi v. State o f H.P., 2017 SCC OnLine HP 1574, order dated 17.10.2017]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court: A Division Bench comprising of Ranjit More and Prakash D. Naik, JJ. heard a petition requesting termination of pregnancy of the petitioner’s daughter who was a victim of rape and was running into 27 weeks of pregnancy on the grounds that continuation of pregnancy would cause grave injury to the victim.

Relying on the medical report submitted by the Assistant Public Prosecutor which stated that “the petitioner’s daughter should be directed to continue pregnancy with medical and psychological support” and also on Section 3 of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971, the Court refused to interfere and dismissed the petition.

Section 3 of the MTP Act, 1971 states that a pregnancy may be terminated where the length of a pregnancy exceeds 12 weeks (before which a medical practitioner is permitted to terminate a pregnancy) but not 20 weeks, and at least two registered medical practitioners must be of the opinion, formed in good faith, that the continuation of the pregnancy would gravely injure the woman’s physical or emotional health. The Explanation provides that if the pregnancy has been caused by rape, the anguish caused by such a pregnancy would constitute grave injury to mental health of the woman. [Danbahadur Rajkaram Yadav v. State of Maharashtra, 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 8900, order dated 13.10.2017]



Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: The 3-judge bench of Dipak Misra, CJ and AM Khanwilkar and Dr. DY Chandrachud, JJ issued notice to the Central Government on the petition seeking framing of appropriate medico legal guidelines for urgent and safe termination of pregnancy under safe medical facilities including termination of pregnancies beyond 20 weeks in the exceptional cases.

The petition also sought for constitution of a committee for framing of appropriate medico legal guidelines for setting up a permanent mechanism for expedient termination of pregnancies beyond 20 weeks in the exceptional cases particularly involving rape survivors and women and abnormal foetus’s under safe medical facilities and with adequate inputs from an association of professionals & experts.

The Court, however, refused to entertain the payer where the petitioner had sought directions for urgent amendment of Section 3 of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971, so as to permit termination of pregnancies of more than 20 weeks for expedient termination of pregnancies beyond 20 weeks in the cases particularly involving rape survivors and women with abnormal foetus’s under safe medical facilities. The Court said that the said prayer was in the legislative realm and hence, it will not interfere. [Anusha Ravindra v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No.934/2017, order dated 13.10.2017]

Hot Off The PressNews

Supreme Court: The 3-judge bench of Dipak Misra, CJ and Amitava Roy and AM Khanwilkar, JJ  allowed a 13-year-old rape survivor to terminate her 32-week-old pregnancy after considering the medical report filed by the board of doctors of J J hospital Mumbai constituted by the Court.

The Mumbai-based rape survivor, a student of class seven had sought permission to abort the foetus. The Court directed the hospital authorities to terminate her pregnancy on September 8, 2017.

The Medical Termination of Pregnancy (MTP) Act prohibits abortion of a foetus after 20 weeks of pregnancy.

Source: PTI

Hot Off The PressNews

Supreme Court: The 10-year-old girl, who’s plea to terminate her pregnancy was refused by the Supreme Court on 28.07.2017, will receive Rs. 10 Lakh compensation from the Chandigarh Administration as directed by the Court. The Court asked the Chandigarh administration to release Rs. 1 Lakh to the family of the girl and keep the remaining Rs. 9 Lakh in Fixed Deposit.

On 28.07.2017, the Court had held that allowing the termination of her pregnancy might be dangerous for the girl’s health, based on the medical report of the 10-year-old rape survivor who was repeatedly raped by her uncle. The Medical Board of PGI, Chandigarh said in it’s report that  it would neither be in the interest of the girl child nor the alive foetus, which is approximately 32-weeks-old, to order abortion.

Source: ANI

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: In the case where a 35-year-old woman was not allowed to abort her foetus by the Patna High Court as her foetus was 24-weeks-old at the time when the High Court was deciding the matter, the 3-judge bench of Dipak Misra, Amitava Roy and AM Khanwilkar, JJ directed the State of Bihar to pay a compensation of Rs. 10, 00, 000 to the appellant as it was due to the laxity of the authorities in terminating her pregnancy as she was 18 weeks pregnant when she expressed her desire to terminate her pregnancy. The Court said that the appellant has to be compensated so that she lives her life with dignity and the authorities of the State who were negligent would understand that truancy has no space in a situation of the present kind.

As per the facts of the case, the woman, a rape survivor who was living on the streets of Patna after being rejected by her husband and family, was brought to a shelter home from footpath. The functionaries of the home found her to be 13 weeks pregnant and took her to Patna Medical College Hospital to terminate her pregnancy with her consent. Her father and brother were called and made to sign a consent form. The appellant was also found to be HIV+. However, the hospital did not terminate her pregnancy and by that time she had entered into 20th week of pregnancy. When the woman approached the High Court, the single judge impleaded the husband and father of the woman. However, the notice was not served to the husband as his name was wrongly mentioned that caused further delay. Director of Indira Gandhi Institute of Medical Sciences was also directed to constitute a Multi-Disciplinary Medical Board to examine the victim with regard to physical and mental state and the condition of the foetus. The Court, after, going through the Medical report, thought is fit to reject the woman’s plea to abort her foetus as the foetus was 23-24 weeks old and the termination of the same would be hazardous to the life of the woman.

Considering the facts of the case, the Court said that it was luminescent that the appellant has suffered grave injury to her mental health and the said injury is in continuance. The bench said that one may have courage or cultivate courage to face a situation, but the shock of rape is bound to chain and enslave her with the trauma she has faced and cataclysm that she has to go through. Her condition cannot be reversed.

The bench also stated that the singe Judge should have been more alive to the provisions of the Medical termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 and the necessity of consent only of the appellant in the facts of the case. There was no reason whatsoever to implead the husband and father of the appellant. The appellant was a destitute, a victim of rape and further she was staying in a shelter home. Calling for a medical report was justified but to delay it further was not at all warranted. The Court said that the High Courts are required to be more sensitive while dealing with matters of the present nature.

The Court directed that the compensation from the State be kept in a fixed deposit in the appellant’s name so that she may enjoy the interest. It was also directed that the child to be born, shall be given proper treatment and nutrition by the State and if any medical aid is necessary, it shall also be provided. If there will be any future grievance, liberty is granted to the appellant to approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India after the birth of the child. [Ms. Z v. State of Bihar, 2017 SCC OnLine SC 943, decided on 17.08.2017]

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: The bench of SA Bobde and L Nageswara Rao, JJ allowed a 26-year-old woman, who is in 25th week of pregnancy, to terminate her pregnancy after her fetus was diagnosed with Anencephaly, a defect that leaves foetal skull bones unformed and is both untreatable and certain to cause the infant’s death during or shortly after birth. The medical board’s report said that the condition of the foetus was also dangerous for the mother’s life.

Noticing that the fetus is without a skull and would, therefore, not be in a position to survive, the Medical Board said that the continuation of pregnancy can pose severe mental injury to the petitioner and no additional risk to the petitioner’s life is involved if she is allowed to undergo termination of her pregnancy. The Court, hence, said that it was in the interests of justice and particularly, to permit the petitioner to undergo medical termination of her pregnancy under the provisions of Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971. [Mamta Verma v. UOI, WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.627 OF 2017, decided on 09.08.2017]

Hot Off The PressNews

Supreme Court: Based on the medical report of the 10-year-old rape survivor who was repeatedly raped by her uncle, the Court said that allowing the termination of her pregnancy might be dangerous for the girl’s health. The Medical Board of PGI, Chandigarh said in it’s report that  it would neither be in the interest of the girl child nor the alive foetus, which is approximately 32-weeks-old, to order abortion.

The Bench of J S Khehar, CJ and Dr. D Y Chandrachud, J  also asked Solicitor General Ranjit Kumar to convey its suggestion to the Centre that a permanent medical board be set up in each state to take prompt decisions in cases where women and girls seek nod for abortion. It said that such matters were coming more to the Supreme Court and precious time was being lost in setting up of a medical board for examination.

On 24.07.2017, the Court had issued notice to the Centre and asked the Chandigarh Legal Service authority to get the girl examined at PGI Chandigarh after the girl’s plea for termination of her  was refused by a Chandigarh Court.

Source: PTI

Hot Off The PressNews

Supreme Court: Hearing the appeal of a 10 year old rape survivor aggrieved by the order of a Chandigarh Court that refused to allow her to terminate her 26 week old foetus, the Court issued notice to the Centre and asked the Chandigarh Legal Service authority to get the girl examined at PGI Chandigarh.

The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971, allows the termination of a foetus no more that 20 week old. The girl who was repeatedly raped by her uncle, is in her 26th week of pregnancy. In such cases the Court, based on the medical report, weighs the risks on the life of the woman/girl if the pregnancy is allowed to be terminated or ordered to be continued.

The Court will take up the matter on 28.07.2017, after the Medical team at PGI Chandigarh has submitted it’s report.

Source: ANI


Op EdsOP. ED.


Women living in every country, irrespective of its development status, are susceptible to the problems of unintended pregnancy. Lawful abortion is an important public health issue because of its negative association with the social, economic and health outcomes for both women and families. The question of abortion in India brings up a debate which is multilayered with medical, legal, moral and social arguments. It has always been a struggle to understand on whose side the rights fall heavier in order to tip the balance — the issues of whose life is to be given more value, and when life actually begins. That being said, there are several possible and perhaps viable solutions to the abortion debate, which only means that lawmakers and courts are required to deal with them in a sensitive manner, and any resolution, if it must last, must stem from a comprehensive consideration of all the facets involved. The cases arising have been decided by courts only on the basis of extreme emergency viz. of the likelihood of mental and physical damage to both the mother and the foetus/child[1], or to the trauma caused to survivors of rape, otherwise being staved off as a personal debate.

High Court on its Own Motion v. State of Maharashtra[2]

One such case which required urgent and developed consideration was recently before the Bombay High Court. In a public interest litigation under the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as “the MTP Act”), the High Court discussed the issues relating to termination of pregnancy unfortunately didn’t bring its findings to much needed closure.

A brief excursus of the matter before the High Court is necessary. Upon a direction from the High Court, a Judge of the City Civil and Sessions Court made a visit to a district women’s prison in Mumbai. During the visit, it was found that one of the female inmates had made an application seeking permission to terminate her four-month-old pregnancy, on conditions of ill-health, as well as having to already tend to a five-month-old infant. Her application in the said circumstances was supported by the Medical Officer. The matter was taken up by the High Court as a suo motu PIL. The particular inmate’s case which triggered this PIL was finally able to medically terminate her pregnancy on 3-5-2016. The Court considered similar circumstances in which several other female prison inmates were unable to obtain the requisite permission to medically terminate their pregnancies, despite being in dire conditions.

In this factual background, the Court considered the framework laid down under the MTP Act, and considered Sections 3, 4 and 5. Section 3 is set out as follows:

  1. When pregnancies may be terminated by registered medical practitioners.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), a registered medical practitioner shall not be guilty of any offence under that Code or under any other law for the time being in force, if any pregnancy is terminated by him in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

(2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (4), a pregnancy may be terminated by a registered medical practitioner,—

(a) where the length of the pregnancy does not exceed twelve weeks, if such medical practitioner is; or

(b) where the length of the pregnancy exceeds twelve weeks but does not exceed twenty weeks, if not less than two registered medical practitioners are, of opinion, formed in good faith, that—

(i) the continuance of the pregnancy would involve a risk to the life of the pregnant woman or of grave injury to her physical or mental health; or

(ii) there is a substantial risk that if the child were born, it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped.

Explanation I.—Where any pregnancy is alleged by the pregnant woman to have been caused by rape, the anguish caused by such pregnancy shall be presumed to constitute a grave injury to the mental health of the pregnant woman.

Explanation II.—Where any pregnancy occurs as a result of failure of any device or method used by any married woman or her husband for the purpose of limiting the number of children, the anguish caused by such unwanted pregnancy may be presumed to constitute a grave injury to the mental health of the pregnant woman.

(3) In determining whether the continuance of a pregnancy would involve such risk of injury to the health as is mentioned in sub-section (2), account may be taken of the pregnant woman’s actual or reasonably foreseeable environment.

(4)(a) No pregnancy of a woman, who has not attained the age of eighteen years, or, who, having attained the age of eighteen years, is a mentally ill person, shall be terminated except with the consent in writing of her guardian.

(b) Save as otherwise provided in clause (a), no pregnancy shall be terminated except with the consent of the pregnant woman.

                                                                       (emphasis supplied)

Section 4 provides for the place at which a pregnancy may be medically terminated, and Section 5 excludes the application of Sections 3 and 4 in certain situations, inter alia, namely, termination of pregnancy will save the life of the pregnant woman regardless of whether the length of the pregnancy brings her within the ambit of Section 3(2). Section 5, further, also provides for the criminalisation of non-adherence to Section 4.

Due nod was given by the Bombay High Court to the legislative expansion of the term “injury” to include “injury to the mental health of the pregnant woman”. The Court then concerned itself directly with the interpretation of Explanation II as set out hereinbelow:

12. … We need to interpret Explanation II which is restricted only to a married couple. However, today a man and a woman who are in live-in relationship, cannot be covered under Explanation II whereas Explanation II should be read to mean any couple living together like a married couple.[3]

                                                                          (emphasis supplied)

Surprisingly, the Court has given no argumentation for the interpretation it has given to Explanation II. The bare finding, though in itself a clarification which was long overdue, is not supported with any form of logical or legal exposition. Even the term “living together like a married couple” has not been referenced, explained, or elucidated.

It may safely be assumed that the conclusion reached by the Court is based on the prevalent position in other statutes which were enacted to empower women in different spheres. One may consider the following definitions provided in the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (“the DV Act”):

2. Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—

(a) “aggrieved person” means any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent;

(f) “domestic relationship” means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family;

(q) “respondent” means any adult male person who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and against whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief under this Act:

Provided that an aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of marriage may also file a complaint against a relative of the husband or the male partner.

                                                          (all emphasis supplied)

The Supreme Court[4], while interpreting the DV Act, gave recognition to the rights of unmarried couples living “in the state of marriage”. Recognising that Indian society is changing, and that the change was legislatively recognised by Parliament in the enactment of the DV Act, the Court set out certain parameters, adherence to which would bring a woman within the scope of the protection afforded by the DV Act. The Court likened a “relationship in the nature of marriage” to a common law marriage.[5]

The High Court however, does not provide any argumentation or even reference, based on the DV Act, D. Velusamy case[6], or otherwise, in support of its extension of Explanation II to couples in live-in relationships.

Justification for medical termination of pregnancy

The High Court has provided a fairly extensive, albeit general context for the reasons behind aborting a pregnancy, and the predicaments women are put in when faced with an unwanted pregnancy. The Court correctly recognised that pregnancy and marital status are unconnected:

  1.  A woman irrespective of her marital status can be pregnant either by choice or it can be an unwanted pregnancy.[7]

(emphasis supplied)

Significantly, the High Court seems to subscribe to the view that a woman’s pregnancy is regardless of her marital status — which in itself is a bold step forward, considering the social and cultural fabric of India, a country which largely perceives premarital sex as taboo.

The Court went further to provide restricted reasoning for termination of pregnancy, by envisaging a case of a woman who already has a child and does not want a second one, or a woman who has resources not large enough to permit rearing a child:

14. A woman’s decision to terminate a pregnancy is not a frivolous one. Abortion is often the only way out of a very difficult situation for a woman. An abortion is a carefully considered decision taken by a woman who fears that the welfare of the child she already has, and of other members of the household that she is obliged to care for with limited financial and other resources, may be compromised by the birth of another child.[8]

                                                                          (emphasis supplied)

The Court then went on to propound the right of a woman to autonomy over her body, and bodily integrity, and commented on how a forced pregnancy will do great harm to the expecting woman’s rights, rather than opting out of it:

14. … If a woman does not want to continue with the pregnancy, then forcing her to do so represents a violation of the woman’s bodily integrity and aggravates her mental trauma which would be deleterious to her mental health.[9]

(emphasis supplied)

A reading of the judgment’s wavering reasons thus reveals at the very least that the opinion of the Court is that any woman, her marital status notwithstanding, has the right to decide how her body is to be treated. This can be traced back to the rulings of the Supreme Court which has time and again dealt with the inquiry of whether Article 21 includes within its ambit the right to privacy, and what exactly this privacy would entail.

In Kharak Singh v. State of U.P.[10], the Court unanimously struck down a regulation which imposed grave restrictions on certain persons, on the basis that they had a criminal record, or were likely to become habitual criminals or abet such criminals, as being violative of Article 21. Subba Rao, J. opined that Article 21 and the right of personal liberty provided thereby is a right to be free from restrictions or encroachments on one’s person. While dealing with a similar surveillance regulation in Gobind v. State of M.P.[11], the Court recognised that the right to privacy is perhaps too vague to be explicitly defined or demarcated. It suggested that privacy interest in autonomy must be placed in the context of other rights and values. The Court opined that the right to privacy must include “the personal intimacies” of inter alia marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child-rearing, but also cautioned that a catalogue approach was unlikely to provide an answer.

In the celebrated case of the death row prisoner, Auto Shankar, the Supreme Court while dealing with the question of the release of his autobiography, referred to the aforesaid two decisions, and then summarised the position as follows[12]:

26(1). The right to privacy is implicit in the right to life and liberty guaranteed to the citizens of this country by Article 21. It is a “right to be let alone”. A citizen has a right to safeguard the privacy of his own, his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, child-bearing and education among other matters. None can publish anything concerning the above matters without his consent — whether truthful or otherwise and whether laudatory or critical. If he does so, he would be violating the right to privacy of the person concerned and would be liable in an action for damages. Position may, however, be different, if a person voluntarily thrusts himself into controversy or voluntarily invites or raises a controversy.

                                                                             (emphasis supplied)

A three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India dealt with the rights of a woman over her body in a matter dealing with the issue of abortion directed by the High Court concerned in the case of a mentally disabled, pregnant woman.[13] The Supreme Court incorporated the right of a woman to make reproductive choices into the ambit of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, and said that “It is important to recognise that reproductive choices can be exercised to procreate as well as to abstain from procreating.”[14] However, despite observations in this tone, the Supreme Court has refrained from commenting on the validity of Explanation II, perhaps, choosing to stay clear of controversy thereby.

Thus, it is clear that the aspects of procreation and motherhood have been opined by the Supreme Court to be within the ambit of the right to privacy, which, arguably, is recognised within Article 21. It is also clear the Bombay High Court has emphasised that every woman has a right to bodily integrity, and to decide whether to embark on motherhood. A Hohfeldian rights — duties analysis will enable the balancing of the right of the woman over her own body on one hand with the “compelling interest” or duty of the State in protecting the life of the unborn child on the other. This juxtaposition of right and duty is what is reflected in Section 3 of the MTP Act, and there is no larger compelling interest of the State in cases of unmarried pregnant women.

With this background, it is apposite now to examine whether it would be meaningful to propose striking off the word “married” from Section 3 of the MTP Act, and expand the applicability of the MTP Act to all women, regardless of their marital status.

Need to expand the scope of the MTP Act

In the High Court judgment under consideration, the Court adverts to the international law position as follows:

  1. According to international human rights law, a person is vested with human rights only at birth; an unborn foetus is not an entity with human rights. The pregnancy takes place within the body of a woman and has profound effects on her health, mental well-being and life.… The right to control their own body and fertility and motherhood choices should be left to the women alone. Let us not lose sight of the basic right of women: the right to autonomy and to decide what to do with their own bodies, including whether or not to get pregnant and stay pregnant.[15]

                                                                       (emphasis supplied)

This one paragraph lays down the bare essence of the raging worldwide debate more commonly referred to as “pro-choice v. pro-life”, and which basically pits the rights of women to have full autonomy over their bodies, against the rights of a foetus in the womb. This debate has its roots in the conflict among human rights law, religious principles, and social and cultural beliefs.

The Preamble to the MTP Act, another aid to statutory interpretation, is as follows:

An Act to provide for the termination of certain pregnancies by registered medical practitioners and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

  (emphasis supplied)

From the Preamble it is evident that the MTP Act was enacted to exculpate the commission of abortion in certain pregnancies. The kind of pregnancies which may be terminated are traceable back to Section 3 itself i.e. where continuing the pregnancy would pose a life-threatening risk to the life of the pregnant woman or grave injury to her physical or mental health, or where there is risk that the child, if born, would suffer from serious handicap owing to either physical or mental abnormalities.

The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the MTP Act, as is relevant, sets out as follows:

*                      *                      *

(3) There is thus avoidable wastage of the mother’s health, strength and, sometimes, life. The proposed measure which seeks to liberalise certain existing provisions relating to termination of pregnancy has been received (1) as a health measure—when there is danger to the life or risk to physical or mental health of the woman; (2) on humanitarian grounds—such as when pregnancy arises from a sex crime like rape or intercourse with a lunatic woman, etc.; and (3) eugenic grounds—where there is substantial risk that the child, if born, would suffer from deformities and diseases.

Once again, it must be highlighted that the framers of the MTP Act were fully cognizant of the fact that unwanted and unplanned pregnancies have a deleterious effect on not only the physical but also the mental health of a woman — this has been reinforced by the language of Explanation II to Section 3. The Act was brought into force to liberalise the existing legal framework which, prior to the Act, punished[16] the commission of any kind of abortion. Reading the two scenarios set out in Section 3, along with the Preamble and the Statement of Objects and Reasons, points out that certain kinds of pregnancies are to be terminated, and not that certain women only may terminate their pregnancies.

Foreign law

The Supreme Court has adverted to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the MTP Act[17], and held that the provisions pertaining to abortion contained in the Penal Code, 1860 were subservient to Section 3. A reading of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the MTP Act also reveals that the provisions relating to abortion in the Penal Code were enacted based on the relevant British law at the time.[18] It is pertinent therefore to notice the advances made in British law thereafter on the subject of abortion.

The Abortion Act, 1967[19], was in force at the time of the enactment of the MTP Act, and it is trite to mention that the Abortion Act, 1967 has no qualification in respect of marital status of a woman in order to be entitled to medical termination of pregnancy — the only qualifications are provided in Section 1 of the 1967 Act, which is similar in import to Section 3 of the MTP Act, in that it lays down the time period within which and the conditions under which medical termination of pregnancy may be carried out. Despite this, our law contains the controversial explanation which limits the option of abortion on the ground of contraceptive failure to only married women.

No mention of the abortion debate is considered holistic without a reference to the celebrated judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States of America in Roe v. Wade[20], where the Court, by a 7:2 split, deemed abortion a fundamental right under the United States Constitution, thereby subjecting all laws attempting to restrict it to the standard of strict scrutiny. The Court asserted that the right of privacy is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether to terminate her pregnancy, and rejected the fetal “right to life” argument outright. Thus, regulations of abortion had to be justified by a “compelling State interest”, and legislative enactments regulating abortion had to be narrowly tailored to meet the compelling interests — i.e. strict scrutiny.

The Court in Roe[21] created the trimester framework (reflected in Section 3) to balance the fundamental right to abortion with the Government’s two legitimate interests: protecting the mother’s health and protecting the “potentiality of human life”. The trimester framework addresses when a woman’s fundamental right to abortion would be absolute, and when the State’s interests would become compelling.

In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. P. Casey[22] the US Supreme Court confirmed a woman’s right to abortion, and further, upholding the “essential holding” of Roe[23], stated that women had a right to choose abortion before viability and that this right could not be unduly interfered with by the State. They asserted that this right was rooted in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Amendment to the law

In view of the need to grant recognition to the right of a woman to terminate her pregnancy, set out hereinbelow is Explanation (ii) to Section 3, as contained in the Draft Medical Termination of Pregnancy (Amendment) Bill, 2014, which was notified over 2 years ago i.e. on 29-10-2014, inviting suggestions from all stakeholders.

Explanation (ii).—Where any pregnancy occurs as a result of failure of any device or method used by any woman or her partner for the purpose of limiting the number of children or preventing pregnancy, the anguish caused by such pregnancy may be presumed to constitute a grace injury to the mental health of the pregnant woman.                                                            (emphasis supplied)

The Draft Amendment Bill is also unambiguous on the change to be made to Explanation II by making the Act available to all women, regardless of marital status, as long as the nature of the pregnancy falls within Section 3. The Draft Bill, however, has not yet been introduced in Parliament, and will take its own course.[24] To that end, urgency is needed in view of recent research which unsettlingly suggests that a death is caused due to unsafe abortion every two hours — and this is likely to get worse in view of the US Government’s withdrawal of funding not only from reproductive health services but from an organisation’s entire health budget if they provide or offer information about abortion.[25] This would inevitably cause detriment to any kind of awareness sought to be roused regarding safe and sanitised abortion.

In any event, the Government too seems to have recognised that Explanation II requires overhauling to keep up with the prevailing social setup as well as the framework of rights accorded to women.


The gender equality movement in India has come a long way, and Indian women are today enjoying access to services and amenities at par with men in various sectors and spheres. But nobody talks about abortion, and nobody wants to consider the autonomy of a woman over her body, using the shield of “foetal rights” to cover the more deep-seated reason, being that Indian society still harshly frowns upon premarital sex, and still retains the opinion that women indulging in premarital sex are unchaste or unclean. This causes women to resort to surreptitious, and most likely harmful, methods of aborting pregnancies.

A step forward would therefore be the much-needed amendment to the MTP Act, to delete the offending portion of Explanation II to Section 3 i.e. the word “married” preceding “woman” in the said Explanation — as correctly envisaged in the Draft Amendment Bill of 2014. Giving legal recognition to every woman’s right to abortion will lead to greater awareness on the issue, and thus promote the need for a safe and medically secure atmosphere for the termination of pregnancy.

    *  Law Clerk-cum-Research Assistant, Chamber of Justice R.F. Nariman, Supreme Court of India (July 2015 — present).

[1]  X v. Union of India, 2016 SCC OnLine SC 745; Meera Santosh Pal v. Union of India, 2017 SCC OnLine SC 39;

X v. Union of India, 2017 SCC OnLine SC 124.

[2]  2016 SCC OnLine Bom 8426 : 2017 Cri LJ 218.

[3]  2016 SCC OnLine Bom 8426 : 2017 Cri LJ 218, 223.

[4]  D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal, (2010) 10 SCC 469.

[5]  D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal, (2010) 10 SCC 469.

[6]  (2010) 10 SCC 469.

[7]  2016 SCC OnLine Bom 8426 : 2017 Cri LJ 218, 224.

[8]  2016 SCC OnLine Bom 8426 : 2017 Cri LJ 218, 224.

[9]  2016 SCC OnLine Bom 8426 : 2017 Cri LJ 218, 224.

[10]  AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1964) 1 SCR 332.

[11]  (1975) 2 SCC 148.

[12]  R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N., (1994) 6 SCC 632, 649, 650 at para 26(1).

[13]  Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Admn., (2009) 9 SCC 1.

[14]  Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Admn., (2009) 9 SCC 1, 15 at para 11.

[15]  2016 SCC OnLine Bom 8426 : 2017 Cri LJ 218, 224.

[16]  Relevant provisions of the Penal Code:

  1. Causing miscarriage.—Whoever voluntarily causes a woman with child to miscarry, shall if such miscarriage be not caused in good faith for the purpose of saving the life of the woman, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both; and, if the woman be quick with child, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation.—A woman who causes herself to miscarry, is within the meaning of this section.

  1. Causing death of quick unborn child by act amounting to culpable homicide.Whoever does any act under such circumstances, that if he thereby caused death he would be guilty of culpable homicide, and does by such act cause the death of a quick unborn child, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.

[17]  Jacob George v. State of Kerala, (1994) 3 SCC 430.

[18]  Statement of Objects and Reasons.—(1) The provisions regarding the termination of pregnancy in the Indian Penal Code which were enacted about a century ago were drawn up in keeping with the then British law on the subject.


[20] 1973 SCC OnLine US SC 20 :  35 L Ed 2d 147 : 410 US 113 (1973).

[21]  1973 SCC OnLine US SC 20 : 35 L Ed 2d 147 : 410 US 113 (1973).

[22] 1992 SCC OnLine US SC 102 : 120 L Ed 2d 674 : 505 US 833 (1992).

[23] 1973 SCC OnLine US SC 20:  35 L Ed 2d 147 : 410 US 113 (1973).



Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: The Bench of S.A. Bobde and L. Nageswara Rao, JJ allowed a woman to undergo medical termination of her 24 weeks pregnancy in the light of the apprehended danger to her physical and mental health in case of continuance of pregnancy.

The petitioner apprehended danger to her life, having discovered that her fetus was diagnosed with Anencephaly, a defect that leaves foetal skull bones unformed and is both untreatable and certain to cause the infant’s death during or shortly after birth. The medical examination showed that the fetus is without a skull and would, therefore, not be in a position to survive.

Deciding the question as to whether the right to bodily integrity calls for a permission to allow her to terminate her pregnancy, the Court said that the report of the Medical Board clearly warrants the inference that the continuance of the pregnancy involves the risk to the life of the pregnant woman and a possible grave injury to her physical or mental health as required by Section 3 (2)(i) of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971. Though, the pregnancy is into the 24th week, having regard to the danger to the life and the certain inability of the fetus to survive extra uterine life, the Court permitted the petitioner to terminate her pregnancy. [Meera Santosh Pal v. Union of India, 2017 SCC OnLine SC 39, decided on 16.01.2017]