Fact ChecksNews

On June 14th 2022, a leading newspaper had published an article with the headline Illegitimate child of cohabiting couple to get assets share: Supreme Court”. The first paragraph of the article stated

“In an important judgment relating to partition of property among Hindus, the SC on Monday ruled that an illegitimate child of a couple cohabiting for long without marriage would be entitled to a share in the family property.”

A screenshot of the article can be seen below:

The full article can be read here. On the face of it, it appeared to be a landmark judgement. We searched for the original judgment and read it to analyse it further. 

What we found: 

The case in question is Kattukandi Edathil Krishnan v. Kattukandi Edathil Valsan, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 737, decided on 13.06.2022. It was a family property dispute wherein the legitimacy of one of the contenders was questioned.  

The suit property belonged to a family governed by the Mitakshara Law of Inheritance. The said property originally belonged to one Kattukandi Edathil Kanaran Vaidyar who had   four sons, namely Damodaran, Achuthan, Sekharan and Narayanan. Achuthan had a son. Sekharan and Narayanan did not marry. Damodaran married one Chiruthakutty and they had a son by the name of Krishnan. However, the defendants contended that Damodaran never married Chiruthakutty and hence, by virtue of illegitimacy, Krishnan, the first plaintiff, cannot claim share in the property. The case has been analysed in detail here.

In the judgment, the Court reiterated the settled law that if a man and a woman live together for long years as husband and wife, there would be a presumption in favour of wedlock. Such a presumption could be drawn under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. Although, the presumption is rebuttable, a heavy burden lies on him who seek to deprive the relationship of legal origin to prove that no marriage took place.

Selected extracts from the judgment have been mentioned below:

Mr. V. Chitambaresh submits that the voluminous documents produced by the plaintiffs would show that Damodaran was the father of the first plaintiff and Chiruthakutty was the wife of Damodaran. Since their marriage took place more than 50 years prior to filing of the suit (now 90 years), there is no possibility of having any documentary evidence of their marriage. He has taken us through the various documents produced by the plaintiffs wherein there are references to periodical payments made to Chiruthakutty from the husband’s house. He has also taken us through the evidence of plaintiffs and, the witnesses examined on behalf of the plaintiffs in support of his contention. It is further argued that the documents produced by the plaintiffs were in existence long before any controversies between the parties arose. These documents would conclusively show that the first plaintiff was the son of Damodaran and Chiruthakutty and the contention of the defendants that Damodaran died as a bachelor or without any legitimate son, cannot be believed at all. It is further submitted that the law is in favour of declaring legitimacy, as against bastardy. Long course of living together between a male and female will raise a presumption of marriage between them and the children born in such relationship are considered to be legitimate children. It is further argued that while such presumption, made under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, is a rebuttable one, as rightly held by the Trial Court that the defendants have not produced any worthwhile evidence to rebut this presumption in the present case.

 It is well settled that if a man and a woman live together for long years as husband and wife, there would be a presumption in favour of wedlock. Such a presumption could be drawn under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. Although, the presumption is rebuttable, a heavy burden lies on him who seek to deprive the relationship of legal origin to prove that no marriage took place.

  1. In Andrahennedige Dinohamy v. Wijetunge Liyanapatabendige Balahamy 1927 SCC OnLine PC 51, the Privy Council laid down the general proposition as under:

“…where a man and woman are proved to have lived together as man and wife, the law will presume, unless the contrary be clearly proved, that they were living together in consequence of a valid marriage and not in a state of concubinage.”

Therefore, the judgment in this case, bore out of the fact that the defence could not rebut the presumption of marriage between the couple and therefore the question of legitimacy of child did not arise. This is not a landmark case on rights of illegitimate children but a reiteration of a well settled law that a long cohabiting couple will be assumed to be married unless those who question the marriage can prove it otherwise.  The headline and the excerpt mentioned in the screenshot above, is misleading as in this case, the judge merely held that the marriage between the cohabitating people could not be disapproved by the defendants. The Court upheld the Trial Court position that defendants have not produced any worthwhile evidence to rebut the presumption of marriage under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872. Hence, neither the couple was held to be cohabitating “without marriage” nor was the son considered to be “illegitimate”. 

High Court Round UpLegal RoundUpTribunals/Regulatory Bodies/Commissions Monthly Roundup

Interesting picks from this week’s legal stories from High Courts to District Courts


Alimony


Whether husband is entitled to claim alimony under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955? Bom HC decides

A conjoint reading of Sections 24 and 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 would reveal that both the sections in the Act of 1955 are enabling provisions and confer a right on the indigent spouse to claim maintenance either pendente lite or in the nature of permanent alimony and maintenance.

Read full report here…


 Karta


 Daughters and widow of a deceased would inherit properties of deceased as tenants in common or joint tenants? Bom HC explains 

Mangesh S. Patil, J., expressed that, by virtue of Section 19 of the Hindu Succession Act, it has been explicitly made clear that if two and more heirs succeed together to the property and in the estate, they take the property as tenants in common and not as joint tenants.

Read full report here…


Compassionate Appointment


Illegitimate child’s right to be considered for Compassionate appointment: Read what Chh HC says

Sanjay K. Agarwal, J., held that an illegitimate son would be entitled to consideration on compassionate ground and cannot be denied consideration on the ground that he is the illegitimate son of the deceased Government servant.

Read full report here…


Marriage Expenses


Can unmarried daughters claim expenses of marriage from their parents under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956? Chh HC addresses

While stating that, in Indian society, normally expenses are required to be incurred for pre-marriage and also at the time of marriagethe Division Bench of Goutam Bhaduri and Sanjay S. Agrawal, JJ., held that unmarried daughters have a right to claim expenses of marriage from their parents under the Hindu Adoptions & Maintenance Act, 1956.

Read full report here…


Maternity Leave


Can maternity leave benefits extend beyond the period when contractual period of an ad hoc employee comes to an end? Del HC analyses

In a claim of maternity benefit by a contractual employee, the Division Bench of Rajiv Shakdher and Talwant Singh, JJ., expressed that, The Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 Act is a social legislation that should be worked in a manner that progresses not only the best interest of the women-employee but also of the child, both at the pre-natal and post-natal stage.

Read full report here…


Strikes


Bar on Government servants to engage in strikes? Ker HC elaborates

While expressing that, it is the duty of the welfare Government to protect not only the citizens but to continue with, all the Government work as expected, the Division Bench of S. Manikumar, CJ and Shaji P. Chaly, J., directed that Government servants should be prevented from engaging in a strike.

Read full report here…


Evidentiary Value of Newspaper Reports


Newspaper reports are of no evidentiary value and Courts would be transgressing their well-settled limitation if cognizance were to be taken of such unsubstantiated and unverified reports

In a matter wherein, details were sought with regard to Supreme Court Collegium meeting held on 12-12-2018, Yashwant Varma, J., expressed that, newspaper reports are of no evidentiary value and Courts would be clearly transgressing their well-settled limitation if cognizance were to be taken of such unsubstantiated and unverified reports.

Read full report here…


Anand Marriage Act


State directed to take steps to frame and notify Rules for Registration of Sikh Marriages

The Division Bench of Sanjaya Kumar Mishra, ACJ. and Ramesh Chandra Khulbe, J. took up a PIL filed by the petitioner commanding the respondent State to notify the Rules under Anand Marriage Act, 1909 and also to issue guidelines to register the marriage of people of Sikh Community under the Anand Marriage Act, 1909.

Read full report here…


Bribes


Every Advocate is a Court officer and part & parcel of the justice delivery system: Madras HC found a Govt. Advocate demanding bribes at the cost of justice

The Division Bench of K. Kalyanasundaram and R. Hemalatha, JJ., expressed that, the Government advocate being the representative of the Government has to act in an honest manner. If he/she goes around with the intention to make money at the cost of justice, only chaos will prevail.

Read full report here…


Insolvency


Logix Insolvent? NCLT initiates insolvency proceedings against Logix City Developers

The Coram of Bachu Venkat Balaram Das (Judicial Member) and Narender Kumar Bhola (Technical Member) initiates insolvency proceedings against Logix City Developers due to default in payment.

Read full report here…


Custody Parole


Merely because an accused is a Muslim, governed by personal laws, can be debarred from availing rights under Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000? Delhi Court answers

In a matter for grant of custody parole, Dharmender Rana, ASJ-02, held that, merely because the accused is Muslim and governed by personal laws, he cannot be debarred from availing rights conferred upon him by Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000.

Read full report here…

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: Holding that the condition imposed by the Railway Board circular that compassionate appointment cannot be granted to children born from the second wife of a deceased employee is discriminatory, the 3-judge bench of UU Lalit, S. Ravindra Bhat and PS Narsimha*, JJ has held that an applicant cannot be denied consideration under the scheme of compassionate appointments only because he is the son of the second wife of his father.

The Court applied the law laid down by the Court in Union of India v. V.R. Tripathi, (2019) 14 SCC 646, wherein it was held that such a denial is discriminatory, being only on the ground of descent under Article 16(2) of the Constitution.

The Court, in the said judgment, had held that the scheme and the rules of compassionate appointment cannot violate the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution. Once Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act regards a child born from a marriage entered into while the earlier marriage is subsisting to be legitimate, it would violate Article 14 if the policy or rule excludes such a child from seeking the benefit of compassionate appointment. The circular creates two categories between one class, and it has no nexus to the objects sought to be achieved. Once the law has deemed them legitimate, it would be impermissible to exclude them from being considered under the policy.

“Exclusion of one class of legitimate children would fail to meet the test of nexus with the object, and it would defeat the purpose of ensuring the dignity of the family of the deceased employee.”

Relying on a number of Supreme Court rulings, the Court observed that compassionate appointment is an exception to the constitutional guarantee under Article 16, a policy for compassionate appointment must be consistent with the mandate of Articles 14 and 16. That is to say, a policy for compassionate appointment, which has the force of law, must not discriminate on any of the grounds mentioned in Article 16(2), including that of descent. Hence, in this regard, ‘descent’ must be understood to encompass the familial origins of a person.

“Familial origins include the validity of the marriage of the parents of a claimant of compassionate appointment and the claimant’s legitimacy as their child. The policy cannot discriminate against a person only on the ground of descent by classifying children of the deceased employee as legitimate and illegitimate and recognizing only the right of legitimate descendant.”

[Mukesh Kumar v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 229, decided on 24.02.2022]


*Judgment by: Justice PS Narsimha


Counsels

For Appellant: Advocate Manish Kumar Saran

For Respondent: Advocate Meera Patel

Case BriefsForeign Courts

Constitutional Court of South Africa: While deciding the constitutional validity of S. 10 of the Births and Deaths Registration Act of 1992, the bench of the Court comprising of Mogoeng CJ, Jafta J, Khampepe J, Madlanga J, Majiedt J, Mathopo AJ, Mhlantla J, Theron J, Tshiqi J and Victor AJ., with a ratio of 8:2 declared S.10 of the 1992 Act unconstitutional in its entirety and therefore severed it from the Statute on the ground that the provision limited the ability of an unmarried father to confer his surname on his child. The Court further noted that there is no justification for differentiating between married and unmarried fathers in relation to conferring a surname on a child; thus S. 10 amounted to unfair discrimination on the listed grounds of marital status, sex and gender, which is prohibited by the South African Constitution.

Background

 In 2016, Menzile Lawrence Naki, (South African citizen) and Dimitrila Marie Ndovya, (a citizen of the Democratic Republic of Congo [hereinafter DRC]) sought to register the birth of their daughter, born in Grahamstown on 01-02-2016, with the Department of Home Affairs (Department) in Grahamstown. Before the child’s birth, Dimitrila travelled to and from South Africa to the DRC on a visitor’s visa. However, shortly before their daughter was born, her visa expired and due to her pregnancy, she could not renew the visa or travel back to the DRC.

Department of Home Affairs refused to register the child’s birth on the ground that the mother lacked a valid visa or permit and could not comply with certain Regulations on the Registration of Births and Deaths, 2014.

Legal Trajectory

 The couple brought an application to the High Court to review and set aside the Department’s refusal to register their daughter’s birth, and challenged the constitutionality of the relevant Regulations. The Centre for Child Law upon being admitted as an intervening applicant, sought orders declaring Ss. 9 and 10 of the 1992 Act and sub-regulations (3) and (5) of Regulations 3, 4 and 5 and Regulation 12(1) of the Regulations on the Registration of Births and Deaths, as unconstitutional.

The High Court held that, the first reference to “mother” in S.10(2) was intended to be “father”, and on their current formulation, Ss. 9 and 10 do not prohibit unmarried fathers from, registering the births of their children in the absence of the mother who gave birth to such children.

The Centre for Child Law appealed to the Full Court on the question of the constitutional validity of S. 10. The Full Court disagreed with the interpretation of the High Court and noted that even though S. 9 empowers an unmarried father to give notice of his child’s birth, the exercise by an unmarried father of his right under S. 9(1) is contingent on either the mother’s presence or her consent, in terms of S.10; thus the impugned provision prohibits a father giving notice of the birth of his child under his surname in the mother’s absence. The Full Court thus declared section 10 invalid and incompatible with the Constitution.

Submissions

The Centre for Child Law submitted that the differentiation between standards applicable to children born within or outside of wedlock is arbitrary; S.10 thus unlawfully discriminates against both unmarried fathers and children born out of wedlock on various grounds. As a result children born out of wedlock are not able to fully realise certain constitutionally guaranteed rights.

Department of Home Affairs and the Minister of Home Affairs did not oppose the confirmation of the constitutional invalidity of S.10. The Department further put forth before the Court that that S. 10 places restrictions on parents who are not married to each other, thereby unfairly discriminating against and impermissibly infringing the rights of both unmarried parents and the rights of children born to parents out of wedlock.

Significant Observations

Majority Opinion: The majority opinion was authored by Victor AJ (with Jafta J, Khampepe J, Madlanga J, Majiedt J, Mhlantla J, Theron J and Tshiqi J concurring). It was noted that the bifurcated procedures of Sections 9 and 10 of the Births and Deaths Registration Act, presents an range of difficulties – firstly, which are faced by unmarried fathers in registering the births of their children in their own surnames, if the consent of the mothers has not been obtained or if the mothers are unavailable; and secondly the problem of undocumented mothers who live and give birth to children in South Africa and are unable to register the births of these children; and thirdly, another difficulty arises (as a result of the requirement) that parents who are non- South African citizens must produce a certified copy of a valid passport or visa.

Applying the test laid out in Harksen v Lane N.O. 1997 SCC OnLine ZACC 12 (Harksen Test), the majority noted that, the impugned law differentiates between married and unmarried fathers in relation to their capacity to confer their surname onto their new-born child when giving notice of their child’s birth. In addition, the impugned law differentiates between mothers (irrespective of their marital status) and unmarried fathers (as a category). It was stated in clear terms that, “No legitimate government purpose is advanced by distinguishing between married and unmarried fathers, at least not in respect of their capacity to register their new-born child’s birth and confer their surname on him or her. Nor is there any legitimate basis for this gendered differentiation of the conferral of a surname where a child automatically bears the mother’s surname but cannot assume their father’s surname.

The majority also deliberated that whether “marital supremacy is a necessity for the registration process for the surname of his child? Should the concept of marriage even factor in the registration process?” – as an answer to which the majority observed that  a marital neutral approach would better give effect to substantive equality as envisioned in the Constitution. The Court also noted that S. 10 impairs the dignity of both unmarried fathers, whose bonds with their children are deemed less worthy, and the children of unmarried parents- Section 10 is problematic because it perpetuates stereotypical gender roles and the assumption that child-care is inherently a mother’s duty.

Vis-à-vis the child, the Majority held that the concept of “illegitimacy” and differential rights for children born in and out of wedlock is inconsistent with the principle in S. 28(2) of the Constitution that the rights of the child are paramount.

It was further noted that S.10 also infringes a child’s right to not to be discriminated against on the grounds of social origin or birth. Thus the majority concluded that S.10 of the Act is contradictory with the rights to equality, dignity and the best interests of the child and invalid to the extent that it limits the rights of unmarried fathers to give notice of the birth of their child in their surname. The majority also declared that the proviso in S. 9(2) of the Act stating that the provision is “subject to the provisions of S.10” is severed from S. 9(2) by reason of the declaration of constitutional invalidity of section 10.

Dissenting Opinion: Mogoeng CJ, with Mathopo AJ (concurring) delivered a dissenting opinion on the matter. They observed that even though S. 10 of the 1992 Act discriminates against unmarried fathers on the basis of marital status, however the discrimination is reasonable, justifiable and fair -“The differentiation between married and unmarried fathers is not about stereotyping women as those who should bear the primary or sole responsibility for raising children, but about confronting the practical realities that unmarried South African mothers and children have to contend with most of the time”.

They observed that the provisions in question are grounded in the lived experiences of South Africans relating to some men who are happy to claim and give their surnames to children without any regard for a concomitant duty of care for them. “A child’s mother must therefore necessarily be asked to say: (i) whether the man claiming to be the father is indeed the father; and (ii) even if he is, whether he is the kind that would help advance the best interests of the child and give expression to the paramountcy of those interests or one whose somewhat formalised association with the child would be prejudicial to the child’s best interests”.

It was noted that declaring Sections 10 and 9 as unconstitutional will pose serious risks to the best interests of a child. They reasoned that, “This is not a case of needless, unfair discrimination on the basis of marital status, sex or gender. The impugned provisions are predicated on the need to give practical expression to the best interests of a child and their paramount importance”.

[Center for Child Law v. Director-General: Dept. of Home Affairs, [2021] ZACC 31, decided on 22-09-2021]


Sucheta Sarkar, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Madras High Court: B. Pugalendhi, J., while addressing an issue observed and reiterated the established position of the Supreme Court that, under Section 125 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 an illegitimate child is entitled to maintenance.

Present criminal revision case was filed against the Judicial Magistrate’s order.

Petitioner’s second wife i.e. respondent 2 states that she got married to the petitioner as per the Hindu Customs and with the consent of his first wife Jeyalakshi and the family members.

Further, she added that she gave birth to a female child i.e. respondent 1.

After some time, the petitioner started harassing the respondent-wife and respondents which resulted in the respondent-wife leaving the house.

On filing a complaint before the All Women Police Station wherein the petitioner agreed to pay maintenance to the respondents but later he denied to pay the same.

In view of the above, the respondent-wife sought maintenance before the Magistrate.

Aggrieved with the magistrate’s decision, the petitioner/husband filed the revision case.

Petitioner raised the ground that the respondent-wife did not elicit through any evidence that the petitioner had sufficient means to pay the maintenance to respondents.

Not Entitled to Maintenance | Magistrate

Trial Court held that the second respondent was not entitled to any maintenance as she was not the legally wedded wife as per the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 when the first marriage of the petitioner was still in force.

Avoidance to maintain the child

It appeared that the revision petitioner used to run the shop in his first wife’s name, however, he claimed that he was working as an employee for a salary of Rs 3,500. Thus the respondent took such a plea only to avoid the payment of maintenance of the child.

For the petitioner’s plea that he had no means to pay the maintenance, Supreme Court’s decision in Sumitra Devi v. Bhikan Choudhary, (1985) 1 SCC 637 was referred, wherein following was held:

“…under Section 125 of the CrPC even an illegitimate minor child is entitled to maintenance. Even if the fact of marriage is discarded, the minor child being found to be an illegitimate daughter of the respondent would be entitled to maintenance.”

Even in Supreme Court’s decision of Bakulbhai v. Gangaram, (1988) 1 SCC 537, it was held that,

“…even an illegitimate child is entitled for maintenance.”

Bench also referred to Section 125 of CrPC which provides that an illegitimate child is entitled to maintenance and the same has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in a number of cases.

Hence,

Husband is duty bound to maintain his dependendants, regardless of his job and income.

Adding to the above, Court held that as a father of the child, it is the petitioner’s responsibility and moral duty to take care of his own daughter by paying the maintenance.[Pachaimuthu v. Minor Vishanthini, 2020 SCC OnLine Mad 2677, decided on 01-10-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court: While deciding the instant custody matter, S.C. Gupte, J., held that as per the provisions of Section 6 of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, it is a mother who is the natural guardian of an illegitimate child (whether boy or girl) and a father’s claim only comes in second to mother’s.

As per the facts of the instant case, the dispute revolved around the custody of a minor son of the petitioner and the respondent, born out of wedlock. The petitioner (biological father) via his counsel Aditya Pratap, challenged the Order passed by the Family Court, Pune which had awarded the custody to the respondent (biological mother). The petitioner contended that the respondent has cut-off his access to the child and that she is mentally and emotionally unfit to take custody of the child. The petitioner further submitted that the respondent intends to take away the boy to New Zealand; hence she has applied for visa. The respondent via her counsel Abhishek Pungliya, contended that the petitioner had abandoned her during her pregnancy; refused to acknowledge their marriage which allegedly took place in 2009. The respondent also claimed that the petitioner inflicted physical and mental torture upon her so that the child may get miscarried. The respondent further submitted that since his birth and till date, it is the respondent alone who has brought up the child. It was pointed out that the child suffers from autism spectrum disorder; hence he has always been under exclusive care of the respondent whereas the petitioner never had any affection or association with the child. Regarding the respondent’s relocation to New Zealand, it was submitted that both the mother and the child are the citizens of New Zealand and since the country is free from the current Covid-19 pandemic, hence it is a safe haven for her son.

Perusing the contentions of the parties and the Order given by the Family Court, the Court observed that the petitioner could not sufficiently establish the mental instability of the respondent, as the materials presented by him does not establish the respondent’s unsoundness of mind, prima facie. Deliberating upon the validity of the Order passed by the Family Court, the Bench noted that the Family Court had correctly taken into account all the relevant circumstances and materials on record; its view is certainly a possible view, which a Court of law might well take.

The impugned Order has fairly and adequately addressed prima facie merits of the case as also the question of balance of convenience. Regarding the petitioner’s claims, the Court noted that he denied any matrimonial relationship between himself and the respondent, and thereby, legitimacy to the minor child. The child, who is a special child, has been taken care of and looked after by the respondent mother ever since his birth. It is therefore the mother who has an indefeasible legal right to his natural guardianship over the petitioner. [Dharmesh Vasantrai Shah v. Renuka Prakash Tiwari, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 697 , decided on 09-06-2020]

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: The bench of NV Ramana and MM Shantanagoudar, JJ, on the issue relating to legality of the marriage of a Muslim man with an idolater or fireworshipper, said that such marriage “is neither a valid (sahih) nor a void (batil) marriage, but is merely an irregular (fasid) marriage.”

In the present case, the plaintiff had claimed his share in property of his Muslim father, who had married his Hindu mother. However, the defendants argued that the plaintiff’s mother was not the legally wedded wife of Mohammed Ilias and that she was a Hindu by religion at the time of marriage. She had not converted to Islam at the time of her marriage, and thus the plaintiff was not entitled to any share in the property in question.

The Court, however, after considering that the marriage in question was an irregular marriage, noticed:

“the legal effect of a  fasid marriage is that in case of consummation, though the wife is entitled to get dower, she is not entitled to inherit the properties of the husband.  But the child born in that marriage is legitimate just like in the case of a valid marriage, and is entitled to inherit the property of the father.”

Based on the finding that any child born out of a fasid  marriage is   entitled   to   claim   a   share   in   his   father’s property, the Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to his share in his father’s property. [Mohammed Salim v. Shamsudeen, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 52, decided on 22.01.2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: The Bench of Sunil Gaur, J. upheld the order of the trial court directing DNA testing of the petitioner.

DNA testing was ordered to ascertain paternity of minor child whose right to claim maintenance was disputed by petitioner on the ground that he was not the natural father of the child in question.

Shalini Sharma, Advocate for the petitioner submitted that he disputed that he was married to Respondent 1 and there was no proof that the child in question was born from their wedlock.

The High Court relied on Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik v. Lata Nandlal Badwaik, (2014) 2 SCC 576 where Supreme Court reiterated that DNA is an accurate test. In the present case, the Court noted that occasion to pass the impugned order arose while considering an application under Section 125 CrPC which requires payment of maintenance even to an illegitimate minor child. It was held that in such situation, conclusive proof of marriage could not be made the basis to repel the impugned order. The impugned order did not suffer from any infirmity and thus, the petition was dismissed. [Vijay Kumar v. Renu, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 6458, Order dated 08-01-2019]