Supreme Court: While considering this petition challenging administrative notification issued by Bombay High Court appointing Kolhapur as a place at which the Judges and Division Courts of the said High Court may sit; the Division Bench of Aravind Kumar and N.V. Anjaria, JJ., upheld that validity of the impugned notification designating Kolhapur as additional Bench of Bombay High Court.
The Court reiterated that the power under Section 51(3) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 is an independent and continuing power vested in the Chief Justice of a High Court to appoint additional places of sitting for the more convenient transaction of judicial business, subject to the approval of the Governor. The exercise of this power is not dependent upon the establishment of a permanent Bench under Section 51(2), nor is it constrained by administrative decisions taken in the past under different circumstances. Judicial review of such decisions is correspondingly limited and extends only to examining whether the action is within jurisdiction, bona fide, and consistent with constitutional requirements.
Background:
After administrative consideration on feasibility and availability of infrastructure, a proposal was formulated by the High Court for appointing Kolhapur as an additional place of sitting. The proposal contemplated that cases arising from the districts of Kolhapur, Sangli, Satara, Ratnagiri and Sindhudurg would be assigned to the Kolhapur sitting in accordance with administrative directions of the Chief Justice. As per the Respondents, the proposal received approval of the Governor of Maharashtra on 30-07-2025, following which Notification No. P.0108/2025 dated 01-08-2025 was issued.
This writ petition was filed questioning the legality and constitutional validity of this administrative decision with a prayer for quashing of the notification and for a restraint on the High Court from holding sittings at Kolhapur.
Court’s Assessment:
Perusing the matter the Court observed that the writ petition could well have been dismissed in limine, as it does not disclose any clear infringement of a fundamental right warranting interference under Article 32 of the Constitution. However, having regard to the nature of the issues raised, which touch upon the scope of Section 51(3) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 (the Act) and the broader contours of judicial administration, Court considered it appropriate to examine the challenge on merits.
The Court pointed out that Section 51(1) of the Act empowers the President to appoint the principal seat of the High Court for a new State. Section 51(2) contemplates the establishment of permanent Benches by Presidential order after consultation with constitutional authorities, a process that necessarily entails a formal allocation of territorial jurisdiction. Section 51(3), however, stands on a distinct footing. It opens with a non obstante clause and authorises the Chief Justice, with the approval of the Governor, to appoint “such other place or places” at which the Judges and Division Courts of the High Court may also sit. The Court explained that presence of the non obstante clause is not accidental. It reflects a conscious legislative choice to preserve, in the Chief Justice, a residuary and overriding authority to organise the sittings of the High Court in a manner that best subserves the “more convenient transaction of judicial business”.
The Court further explained that the longevity or continuity of a place of sitting appointed under Section 51(3) does not, by itself, convert the exercise of power into one under Section 51(2). “Permanence, in the sense urged by the petitioner, is not a statutory criterion under sub-section (3). What is determinative is not the duration of the sitting, but the absence of territorial bifurcation and the retention of administrative control with the Chief Justice”.
Courts cannot import into the statute a limitation which the legislature has consciously chosen not to enact. To do so would be to substitute judicial apprehension for legislative judgment, a course impermissible in constitutional adjudication.
The Court pointed out that Section 51(3) has been designed to confer functional and administrative flexibility upon the High Court, acting through its Chief Justice, to organise the sittings of Judges for the more convenient transaction of judicial business, without effecting any territorial bifurcation or altering the constitutional character of the Court. The power under Section 51(3) neither supplants nor dilutes the roles envisaged under sub-sections (1) and (2); it complements them by addressing a separate category of decisions rooted in considerations of access, convenience and institutional responsiveness. Even where a place of sitting appointed under sub-section (3) continues over a long period, it does not, by that fact alone, acquire the attributes of a permanent Bench under sub-section (2), for it remains subject to administrative control, does not confer exclusive territorial jurisdiction, and does not alter the High Court’s jurisdictional identity. Read as a whole, Section 51 represents a coherent statutory scheme in which constitutional authority, structural oversight and administrative discretion are deliberately distributed across different constitutional actors. “The recognition of the Chief Justice’s power under Section 51(3) thus preserves, rather than undermines, the relevance and purpose of sub-sections (1) and (2)”.
The Court stated that a Chief Justice, while exercising administrative powers of this nature, would take into account the views of his puisne judges, the needs of the Bar, and the logistical realities of the institution. Such deliberation enriches decision-making and reflects collective wisdom. However, the crucial distinction that must be borne in mind is between what is desirable as a matter of prudence and what is mandated as a matter of law. Section 51(3) expressly requires only the approval of the Governor. It does not stipulate consultation with the Full Court, nor does it prescribe any particular consultative mechanism. Where Parliament has intended consultation to be mandatory, as in Section 51(2), it has said so in explicit terms. The deliberate absence of such a requirement in sub-section (3) cannot be supplied by judicial interpretation. To judicially impose a requirement of Full Court approval or to insist upon a particular form of internal consultation would be to transgress the limits of interpretation and to trench upon legislative prerogative. Courts must be cautious not to elevate norms of good governance into inflexible legal commands, lest the flexibility essential to effective judicial administration be unduly constrained.
The Court found that in the present case, there is no material to suggest that the Chief Justice acted unilaterally in disregard of institutional inputs or relevant considerations. Even assuming that the consultative process did not conform to the petitioner’s expectations, that circumstance by itself would not vitiate the exercise of power under Section 51(3). Ultimately, the statute entrusts the decision to the Chief Justice, subject to the approval of the Governor, and once those requirements are satisfied, the Court would be slow to interfere in the absence of mala fides or manifest illegality.
Deliberating over the issue of judicial review in matters of judicial administration, the Court stated that interference by this Court is warranted only in limited situations, such as where the action is shown to be beyond statutory authority, tainted by mala fides, influenced by extraneous considerations, or so unreasonable as to warrant judicial correction. In the absence of such circumstances prevalent, the Court would exercise restraint. Any other approach would risk trenching upon the autonomy necessary for the effective functioning of the High Court. In the present case, no such infirmity could be demonstrated before the Court by the petitioner.
The Court further explained that the material on record revealed that the districts proposed to be served by the Kolhapur sitting constitute a contiguous region, with Kolhapur emerging as a central and convenient location for that cluster of districts. These districts are situated at a substantial distance from the principal seat of the High Court. The decision to appoint Kolhapur as an additional place of sitting thus bore a clear and reasonable nexus with the object of facilitating access to justice for litigants from that region. Once such a rational basis is evident, the Court would be slow to characterise the decision as arbitrary or discriminatory merely because other regions may also aspire to similar arrangements. On this touchstone, the challenge under Article 14 cannot be sustained.
The Court thus upheld the validity of the impugned notification stating that it had been issued in exercise of the statutory power expressly conferred by Section 51(3) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956. The authority competent to exercise such power, namely the Chief Justice of the High Court, has acted within the bounds of the statute and has obtained the approval of the Governor, as required by law.
The Court thus stated that decision facilitates access to justice for litigants from a region which is geographically distant from the principal seat of the High Court. The Constitution does not prescribe a single model for judicial administration; it permits institutional discretion to be exercised, within the framework of law, to meet practical and regional needs.
[Ranjeet Baburao Nimbalkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2855, decided on 18-12-2025]
*Judgment by Justice Aravind Kumar
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