Recycling Section 295-AA: Punjab’s Misguided Attempt to Recriminalise Sacrilege

The proposed Bill prescribing life imprisonment for sacrilege radically exceeds the punishments set by existing criminal laws, raising serious concerns about proportionality.

Introduction

Starting from the 2015 Faridkot Incident¹ of desecration of the Guru Granth Sahib, sacrilege or beadbi, has now become a mainstay in legislations introduced in Punjab’s State Assembly. This issue is particularly emotive as Sikhs considers the Guru Granth Sahib as the 11th living Guru and any attack on it is viewed with utmost seriousness and reverence. Such desecration not only wounds the religious sentiments of the Sikh community but also has historically sparked widespread outrage, protests, and social unrest, compelling successive Punjab Governments to introduce stringent laws aimed at deterring and punishing sacrilege. These acts of beadbi were pivotal in shaping the legislative responses that sought to protect sacred texts through harsher criminal sanctions.

In response to repeated incidents, the Akali Dal-BJP Government in 2016 enacted Section 295-AA of the Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) which provided for imprisonment for life for desecrating religious texts, but the same was returned by the Home Ministry. Subsequent attempts by the Congress Government also resulted in failure, as the Central Government returned their bills in 2024 after enactment of the Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS).

Presently, the Punjab Prevention of Offences Against Holy Scriptures Bill, 2025 (the Bill) is tabled before a Select Committee of Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) of the present Aam Aadmi Party Government. This Bill seeks to protect the Guru Granth Sahib, including its pothis and Gutka Sahib, as well as the Bhagavad Gita, Quran Sharif and the Holy Bible. Further, it also envisages a minimum punishment of imprisonment for 10 years and which may extend to life imprisonment for acts of sacrilege.

This comes at an alarming time as it also seeks to revive Punjab’s complicated history with sacrilege laws dating back to the 1927 Rangila Rasul controversy, where a pamphlet satirising the Islamic Prophet Muhammad ignited communal tensions and protests across Punjab in British India. The publisher of the same controversially acquitted but was later assassinated by a Muslim carpenter, who received a death sentence. In response to which, the British Colonial Government enacted Section 295-A IPC. Therefore, this complex history of communal strife and legal overreach should caution the present Bill from reopening old wounds and replicating past mistakes.

Constitutional unsoundness through vagueness and overbreadth

The proposed Bill prescribing life imprisonment for sacrilege radically exceeds the punishments set by existing criminal laws, raising serious concerns about proportionality. For comparison, under IPC, offences such as murder or terrorism carry sentences that are typically for life or even death, yet they are justified as gravely serious crimes impacting public order and safety. In contrast, the act of sacrilege, though deeply sensitive and emotionally charged, is generally addressed with shorter sentences, often up to three years under existing laws like Section 299 BNS. The proposed minimum of 10 years, extending to life imprisonment, thus appears disproportionately harsh relative to the nature of the offence. Such a penalty exceeds the severity of other serious crimes and violates the constitutional principle of proportionality, which mandates that the punishment must fit the crime, ensuring it is neither excessive nor arbitrary. This overreach undermines fundamental criminal jurisprudence and risks unjustly penalising individuals for acts that may not warrant such extreme punishment.

The Supreme Court in Vikram Singh v. Union of India² laid down critical criteria for constitutional proportionality of punishment in criminal statutes. It held that while legislatures are generally best placed to determine punishments, courts must intervene if a penalty is “outrageously disproportionate” to the offence or so inhuman and brutal that it offends standards of decency. The test incorporates a rational legislative judgment wherein the punishment must bear a reasonable relation to the gravity and nature of the crime. Additionally, the Court emphasised the need for objective standards guiding sentencing to prevent arbitrary and excessive punishments. The present Bill fails these criteria by prescribing life imprisonment, a penalty that is disproportionately severe compared to the offence of sacrilege, especially in light of existing laws like Section 299 BNS. The Bill lacks an objective standard for sentencing, offering no calibrated gradation of punishment for different degrees or contexts of sacrilege. Thus, its harsh mandatory sentences go beyond legislative rationality and violate the constitutional safeguard of proportionality articulated in Vikram Singh case, rendering the law constitutionally unsound.

There is very little scope of deference in the applicability of Article 254(1) as criminal law is in the Concurrent List under the Seventh Schedule. Thus, it’s provisions are likely to be void to the effect of its repugnancy due to definitions and the prescribed punishment provided in the BNS for acts intending to outrage religious beliefs. Further, even if the Punjab Government were to seek the President’s assent under Article 254(2), the outcome is likely to mirror the previous attempts such as that of Section 295-AA, as there is no fundamental difference between the old provisions and the new tabled ones.

In addition to this, the Bill’s prescription of life imprisonment also raises serious concerns about federal legislative competence under Article 254 of the Constitution as, criminal law falls under the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule, allowing both Parliament and State Legislatures to enact laws on the subject. However, Article 254(1) provides that if a State law is repugnant to a Central law on the same subject, the Central law prevails and the conflicting State law is void to the extent of repugnancy. Though Article 254(2) allows a repugnant State law to prevail upon receiving the President’s assent, past efforts, including the Akali Government’s Section 295-AA, failed this test due to lack of fundamental differences with existing Central provisions like IPC of the time. Therefore, the present Bill is vulnerable to invalidation on grounds of repugnancy and federal overreach, compounding its constitutional unsoundness alongside issues of vagueness and overbreadth.

Religious bias and violation of equality

The Bill restricts the definition of sacrilege only to Sikhism, Hinduism, Islam and Christianity. In addition to this, it also uses the expression “means and includes”, which is settled in law to be exhaustive in nature.³ This selective protection excludes adherents of other faiths and violates Article 15 by privileging certain beliefs over others. However, State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar⁴ established that any classification under law must not be arbitrary and must have a rational nexus with the object of legislation. The law thereby risks creating a class conflict among different religions in Punjab, where certain religions enjoy more protection in contrast to other religions.

Further, this Bill would have the effect of embedding the orthodox Khalsa Sikh interpretation of Sikhism as law, while sidelining beliefs that other Sikh denominations like the Nirankari might hold with respect to the Guru Granth Sahib. By specifically including associated texts like panths and gutkas, which are distinct supplementary Sikh scriptures but not part of the Guru Granth Sahib itself, the Bill confers an expanded scope of protection to Sikh religious literature, thereby elevating the legal status of Sikh texts over those of other religions which lack such extended protection.

In addition to this, the present Bill seeks to misapply the precedent laid down in Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee v. Som Nath Dass⁵. This is because while the Supreme Court had recognised the Guru Granth Sahib’s distinct juristic status, it did so with careful delineation, by affirming its legal personality to hold property and manage endowments without equating this recognition to accepting it as the 11th living Guru. Further, the Supreme Court specifically refrained and was very careful not to judicially endorse the religious belief that elevates the Guru Granth Sahib beyond a sacred scripture to a living Guru, emphasising that such reverence is grounded in Sikh tradition rather than legal fact. Therefore, the present bill has the potential to undo what the precedent of the Som Nath Dass case delineated.

If Punjab passes this Bill, it raises significant political science and public policy concerns by potentially encouraging other States to enact similar laws to protect their dominant religious groups, such as Nagaland for Christians or Assam for the Bathouism faith adhered to by the Bodo’s. Such a trend could lead to the creation of disparate and overlapping criminal statutes that cater to regional religious majorities, thereby fostering legal fragmentation. This balkanisation threatens the coherence and uniformity of India’s criminal justice system, undermining national integration and complicating governance by intertwining law enforcement with sectarian interests.

Lacunas in safeguards in our present criminal laws

India’s present criminal law framework through Section 299 BNS essentially replicates the substance of Section 295-A IPC, with changes mainly in wording rather than underlying principles. Both provisions criminalise deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings, imposing similar punishments. The present Bill also echoes the same shortcomings found in these sections, by continuing to emphasise protection of religious sentiments while lacking clear boundaries to safeguard genuine freedom of speech.

Further, the burden of proof under these sacrilege laws often falls unfairly on writers, journalists and critics who must demonstrate that their work did not intend to offend religious sentiments. This creates a chilling effect on legitimate debate and artistic expression, as the presumption tends to favour those claiming offence. In this regard, S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram⁶ had clearly clarified that it is the State’s responsibility to maintain public order and manage any hostile backlash, rather than requiring writers to pre-emptively prove their intent not to offend. Persisting with this reversal effectively hands majority groups a veto over dissenting voices, thereby stifling open discourse and enabling censorship under the guise of protecting religious feelings.

It also becomes concerning that the present Bill also introduces a dangerously vague definition of sacrilege that includes acts like “damage, destruction, defacing, decolouring, decomposing, breaking, and tearing” without any precise criteria for intent or context behind the act. This ambiguous language invites arbitrary enforcement and prosecution of acts not inherently malicious, thereby making it ripe for rampant misuse. Further, compounding these flaws is the investigation mechanism provided in the proposed Bill which delegates investigations of cases of sacrilege to a Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) level officer. However, this does not remove the potential for political bias and slow inquiry usurping the investigation and paving the way for mob justice to pre-empt legal processes. This allows those accused of sacrilege, particularly with mental illnesses, to face summary violence, as illustrated in high-profile incidents in Ferozepur⁷ and Kapurthala⁸. Therefore, it becomes clear that laws like the proposed Bill foment cycles of vigilante reprisals rather than deter violence.

In Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P.⁹ and Mahendra Singh Dhoni v. Yerraguntla Shyamsundar¹⁰ emphasise the necessity of deliberate and malicious intent for prosecuting sacrilege. In the Ramji Lal Modi case, the Court upheld Section 295-A’s constitutionality, clarifying that the provision applies only to acts intentionally and maliciously aimed at outraging religious feelings, thereby excluding unintentional or careless insults. Similarly, in the Mahendra Singh Dhoni case, the Supreme Court reiterated that only those acts done with deliberate malice qualify for punishment under the relevant penal provision. These rulings underscore the importance of mens rea to prevent wrongful convictions based on accidental or benign expressions. However, the current legislative momentum in Punjab, overlooks these critical judicial safeguards, risking grave miscarriages of justice by failing to incorporate the requirement of deliberate and malicious intent in prosecuting sacrilege.

Neighbouring Pakistan’s blasphemy laws also serve as a cautionary tale in how such legislations devastate civil society and minority communities. The infamous Section 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 has a clear history of fostering fear and State-backed injustice, by punishing by death individuals who have insulted Prophet Muhammed. This is epitomised by Asia Bibi case¹¹ and the international attention it received, as a Christian woman in Punjab, Pakistan was falsely victimised through Section 295-C¹² in order to settle a personal score in an agricultural dispute.

Critics argue that truth, genuine criticism and academic inquiry into religion must remain protected, even when it is uncomfortable to face for religious groups. Such discourse is essential for societal progress and eradicating discriminatory practices cloaked in religious orthodoxy. The existing sacrilege framework in India, both through the present BNS and the proposed Punjab Bill fails to nurture this balance, by suppressing critical voices and empowering mob rule through legal sanction. Without urgent reforms to clearly define sacrilege, retain strict mens rea requirements and strengthen procedural safeguards, these laws threaten to erode constitutional freedoms and undermine the very social harmony they claim to protect by not clearly delineating and expressly delineating a difference between hate speech and academic criticism of religion.

Conclusion

The Bill, marks a regression in constitutional values and legislative prudence. Despite lessons from Punjab’s past State Governments failed attempts to legislate on matters relating to sacrilege, the current administration repeats similar errors by proposing a law with broad, vague definitions that fail constitutional tests of reasonableness and proportionality. Its draconian life imprisonment penalties and selective protections exacerbate the social divisions it purports to resolve.

Constitutionally, the Bill disregards the principle of proportionality by imposing harsher punishments for sacrilege than for far graver offences, violating established criminal jurisprudence as highlighted in the Vikram Singh case¹³. Its ambiguous wording invites misuse, and by conflicting with existing central laws under Article 254, it risks invalidation for repugnancy and federal overreach.

The Bill institutionalises religious bias by protecting only select faiths and elevating certain Sikh texts beyond others, misapplying the careful precedent from the Som Nath Dass case¹⁴. It undermines the constitutional mandate of equality and threatens the delicate balance of India’s pluralistic legal framework.

Politically and socially, the Bill risks encouraging similar sectarian laws in other States, fragmenting the Nation’s criminal law and weakening integration. This balkanisation damages governance, promotes competitive victimhood, and threatens National unity.

In addition, the Bill neglects crucial safeguards enshrined in Indian criminal law, such as the requirement of deliberate and malicious intent for sacrilege prosecutions, established by courts in the Ramji Lal Modi case¹⁵ and Mahendra Singh Dhoni case¹⁶. Further, its vagueness, the reversal of burden of proof and lax investigatory mechanisms risk miscarriages of justice and encourage vigilante violence, as witnessed in recent high profile incidents.

Therefore, the moment remains critical for Punjab to reject this regressive law. Instead, what Punjab deserves is governance rooted in constitutionalism, inclusiveness, and courage, which ensuring social harmony and individual freedoms rather than recycling majoritarian excess and legal imprudence.