Judicial Review and Public Recruitment: A Constitutional Perspective on the Scope of Court Interference

Introduction

Recruitment to public offices in India must reflect the values enshrined in the Constitution, particularly the guarantee of equality under Article 14¹ and equal opportunity in public employment under Article 16²,³ to give effect to these rights, a system of open selection and transparent recruitment has been institutionalised. The objective is not only to select meritorious candidates but also to ensure public confidence in the integrity of the selection process.

However, challenges arise when courts are invited to exercise judicial review over academic or technical decisions made by expert bodies in such processes. Recent decisions by the Supreme Court in Reetesh Kumar Singh v. State of U.P.⁴ and Siddhi Sandeep Ladda v. Consortium of National Law Universities⁵ have brought these issues into focus.

This article examines the constitutional limits of judicial review in public recruitment, arguing that while courts must intervene to rectify manifest arbitrariness, they must also respect institutional competence. The erosion of this balance risks transforming courts into “Examination Appellate Tribunals”, diluting both the integrity of competitive exams and the separation of powers envisioned by the Constitution.

The constitutional conversation on recruitment begins, naturally, with first principles. If courts are to decide when intervention is justified, they must anchor their approach in the text and spirit of the Constitution⁶.

Constitutional imperative

The bedrock of recruitment to public posts is Article 14⁷, which prohibits arbitrary State action, and Article 16(1)⁸, which mandates equality of opportunity in public employment. Together, they obligate the State to design recruitment procedures that are fair, objective and free from arbitrariness.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that transparency and equal opportunity are not mere administrative best practices but constitutional necessities.⁹ However, systemic challenges such as nepotism and favouritism continue to erode public faith in the recruitment process. These practices strike at the heart of constitutional morality, which demands governance rooted in integrity, fairness, and adherence to constitutional values rather than personal loyalties or informal networks.¹⁰

Open competitive examinations and merit-based selections are among the key mechanisms through which the principles of constitutional morality and the rule of law are realised. In the mid-1800s, public services were dominated by the patronage or “spoils” system, where appointments were often awarded on the basis of political connections.¹¹ The British introduced the concept of open competitive examinations in India through the Charter Act of 1853¹², followed by Lord Macaulay’s seminal report in 1854.¹³ Such examinations reduce discretion, standardise evaluation, and provide a level playing field. While the system has its limitations, it remains the most effective method devised so far for ensuring fairness and merit in public recruitment.

The constitutional principles, however, do not implement themselves. They require independent institutions to translate the principles of equality, fairness, and transparency into actual recruitment processes. This is where Public Service Commissions (PSCs) play a pivotal role.

Role and duty of Public Service Commissions

Articles 315 to 323¹⁴ of the Constitution of India provide for the establishment of PSCs for the Union and the States. These bodies are entrusted with the task of conducting examinations and advising on matters related to recruitment, promotions and disciplinary actions. Article 320¹⁵, in particular, places the responsibility of conducting examinations for appointments in the hands of these Commissions.

The Supreme Court in Jatinder Kumar v. State of Punjab¹⁶, held that:

11. Article 320 of the Constitution enumerates the duties to be performed by the Union or the State Public Service Commissions:

(i) to conduct examinations for appointments to the services of the Union and the services of the State respectively;

(ii) if requested by any two or more States so to do, to assist those States in framing and operating schemes of joint recruitment for any services for which candidates possessing special qualifications are required;

(iii) to advise on matters enumerated under clause (3) of Article 320; and

(iv) to advise on any matters so referred to them and any other matter which the President, or as the case may be, the Governor of the State may refer to them.

In J&K Public Service Commission v. Narinder Mohan¹⁷, the Supreme Court while dealing with role of PSCs held that:

8. … Whenever the Government is required to make an appointment to a high public office, it is required to consult the PSC. The selection has to be made by the PSC and the Government has to fill up posts by appointing those selected and recommended by the Commission, adhering to the order of merit in the list of candidates sent by the PSC. The selection by the Commission, however, is only a recommendation of the Commission and the final authority for appointment is the Government.

Although the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava¹⁸ held that consultation with the PSCs is not mandatory and are mere directory in nature, which was reiterated in Jatinder Kumar case¹⁹, but as constitutional or statutory bodies, PSCs are expected to function independently and with a high degree of institutional expertise. They are not only facilitators of fair recruitment but also constitutional watchdogs that ensure the process remains insulated from political or extraneous interference.²⁰

It is also pertinent to mention here that not all posts are required to go through the PSC. As per the proviso to Article 320(3) of the Constitution²¹, the President/Governor, as the case may be, may make regulations specifying the matters in which it shall not be necessary for a PSC to be consulted. This exception allows certain posts, especially those involving urgency, temporary appointments, or specific categories, to be validly taken outside the purview of the Commission, provided such exclusion is done in accordance with law and prescribed procedure.

In Ashok Kumar Shrivastava v. Ram Lal²², the Supreme Court confirmed that:

77. … the proviso to clause (3) of Article 320 of the Constitution empowers the Governor of a State to withdraw from the purview of the PSC services and posts in connection with the affairs of a State and to make regulations in support thereof.

However, such deviations must not become a tool for bypassing constitutional safeguards or undermining merit-based selection.

The PSCs’ constitutional responsibility is fulfilled through the work of specialised expert bodies. These Committees, comprised of subject specialists, are the main centres of public examinations, designing questions, preparing answer keys, and setting evaluation parameters.

Expert bodies and assessment methodology

PSC typically entrust the task of designing public examinations to Expert Committees comprising subject specialists. These experts are responsible for designing multiple choice questions (MCQs) framing answer keys, and setting evaluation benchmarks. The Constitution does not mandate infallibility,²³ indeed, human fallibility is an implicit aspect of any institutional process, especially in matters involving human judgment and discretion.

While occasional errors in question-setting or key formulation may occur, courts have consistently held that such mistakes do not warrant judicial interference unless they cross a constitutionally cognizable threshold.²⁴

Judicial review is attracted where the decision-making process suffers from manifest arbitrariness i.e. when it is not fair, not reasonable, discriminatory, not transparent, capricious, biased, with favouritism or nepotism and not in pursuit of promotion of healthy competition and equitable treatment [see, Union of India v. Ganpati Dealcom (P) Ltd.²⁵] or perversity i.e. unreasonableness is of such a dimension that no authority vested with the jurisdiction would have come to such a conclusion (see, Mayawati v. Markandeya Chand²⁶).

The mere presence of debatable or ambiguous questions, especially in disciplines like general studies, law, or current affairs, where two views exist, does not suffice to invalidate the examination process. The jurisprudence has consistently emphasised that while judicial review is a constitutional safeguard against arbitrariness, it is not a licence to reassess technical determinations.

Scope of judicial review: The caution of the courts

The courts in India have consistently held that judicial review in academic and expert matters is limited. Courts are not appellate authorities over expert opinion. The primary concern is to check for procedural illegality, irrationality or mala fide intent.

In H.P. Public Service Commission v. Mukesh Thakur²⁷ the Supreme Court criticised the High Court for examining the question itself and held at para 20 that:

20. … it was not permissible for the High Court to examine the question papers and answer sheets itself, particularly, when the Commission had assessed the inter se merit of the candidates … we are of the considered opinion that such a course was not permissible to the High Court.

This deference was further solidified in Ran Vijay Singh v. State of U.P.²⁸ (affirmed in Vikesh Kumar Gupta v. State of Rajasthan²⁹) where the Supreme Court held that courts should be extremely reluctant to interfere in academic matters, particularly re-evaluation or re-checking of answers. The Court stated:

30. The law on the subject is, therefore, quite clear and we only propose to highlight a few significant conclusions. They are:

30.1. if a statute, rule or regulation governing an examination permits the re-evaluation of an answer sheet or scrutiny of an answer sheet as a matter of right, then the authority conducting the examination may permit it;

30.2. if a statute, rule or regulation governing an examination does not permit re-evaluation or scrutiny of an answer sheet (as distinct from prohibiting it) then the Court may permit re-evaluation or scrutiny only if it is demonstrated very clearly, without any “inferential process of reasoning or by a process of rationalisation” and only in rare or exceptional cases that a material error has been committed;

30.3. the Court should not at all re-evaluate or scrutinise the answer sheets of a candidate — it has no expertise in the matter and academic matters are best left to academics;

30.4. the Court should presume the correctness of the key answers and proceed on that assumption; and

30.5. in the event of a doubt, the benefit should go to the examination authority rather than to the candidate.³⁰ (emphasis added)

Thus, the constitutional principle of institutional competence mandates respect for the domain of expert bodies. The principle of institutional competence, rooted in the constitutional design of separation of powers and functional specialisation, mandates that each branch or organ of the State must operate within its constitutionally assigned domain. In matters involving specialised knowledge, especially academic, scientific, or technical determinations, courts are required to exhibit deference to expert bodies, which are presumed to possess the institutional capacity, technical skill, and subject-matter familiarity necessary for sound decision-making.

In this regard, Prof. Aharon Barak, former President of the Israeli Supreme Court, in his book “The Judge in a Democracy” observed that courts must respect the roles of specialised institutions established by the legislature or executive. He contends that judicial intervention is warranted only when decisions are arbitrary or exceed legal authority (ultra vires).³¹

In India, the judiciary has implicitly acknowledged this principle in cases involving educational and recruitment bodies, emphasising that courts are not equipped to second-guess technical determinations made by statutory or constitutional authorities such as PSCs, Examination Boards and Expert Committees. This principle of judicial restraint is not unique to recruitment law. A similar jurisprudence governs the courts’ approach to disciplinary proceedings in service law as well.

Parallels from disciplinary proceedings in service law

It is pertinent to note that the principle of limited judicial intervention in not confined to recruitment examinations alone. It also finds a close parallel in the field of disciplinary proceedings against public servants, where the competent authority, whether a departmental disciplinary authority or a statutory body, is vested with the power and responsibility of assessing evidence, determining misconduct and imposing penalties.³²

It is a well-settled law as held by the Supreme Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India³³ and reiterated in State of Karnataka v. N. Gangaraj³⁴ that courts and tribunals while empowered to review decisions of these authorities, are not appellate forums to reappreciate evidence or substitute their own conclusions for that of disciplinary authority.

The judicial review in this sphere is confined to:

(a) Compliance with principles of natural justice: Example, adequate notice of charges, supply of relevant documents to the delinquent, a fair opportunity to be heard by fixing a date, time and place, and absence of bias (see, State of U.P. v. Saroj Kumar Sinha³⁵).

(b) Procedural legality: Adherence to the prescribed inquiry process and relevant statutory provisions (see, State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao³⁶; State of A.P. v. Chitra Venkata Rao³⁷).

(c) Findings based on evidence: Interference is warranted if the conclusion is based on “no evidence” (see, B.C. Chaturvedi case³⁸; Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan Tewari³⁹).

(d) Proportionality of penalty: If the punishment shocks the conscience of the Court (see, Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran⁴⁰).

These principles highlight a judicial philosophy rooted in institutional competence. The fact-finding and merit evaluation are primarily the domain of the designated or competent authority. The Court’s role is supervisory, ensuring legality and fairness but avoiding intrusion into the merits of the decision.

This analogy between recruitment examinations and disciplinary inquiries highlights a broader constitutional theme i.e. decision-making by specialised bodies, whether in selecting candidates or adjudicating misconduct, is entitled to judicial deference in matters of fact and technical evaluation. This is also true in the context of competitive examinations, where PSCs and their Expert Committees are entrusted with designing question papers, preparing answer keys, and setting evaluation standards.

Yet, in practice, judicial restraint has not been applied evenly. In certain subject areas, especially law, the courts have shown a greater willingness to reassess disputed question-answers than they have in technical sciences. This inconsistency raises constitutional questions about equality of treatment in judicial review.

Uneven deference: The lived experience

Courts, being primarily composed of persons trained in law, are naturally inclined to scrutinise answer keys more closely when the subject involves law or general studies. This tendency is less pronounced in disciplines like, Mathematics, Physics, or Chemistry where the answers are often binary and objective.

For instances, in Kanpur University v. Samir Gupta⁴¹, the Supreme Court (rightly) declined to independently answer disputed questions from Chemistry and Zoology such as, “The theory of electrolytic dissociation was given by:” and “Which one of the following was not present in free form at the time life originated?” and rightly relied on authoritative textbooks and expert opinion. Whereas, in a recent decision in Siddhi Sandeep Ladda case⁴², wherein the questions in dispute pertain to law e.g. “An agreement made by an adult but involving a minor child where the signatory is a minor child himself, this agreement would be?”, the Court proceeded to interpret and answer the question itself.

Such differential standards are constitutionally problematic. Equality before the law demands a uniform standard of judicial review regardless of the subject-matter. If the judiciary claims limited jurisdiction in Physics or Chemistry, the same restraint must be observed in legal questions unless the error is demonstrably egregious or violative of the candidate’s right to fair evaluation.

Courts like human may want to solve the crossword or a puzzle, but this is precisely the restraint imposed by Ran Vijay Singh case⁴³, where it was held that judicial interference is permissible only in rare and exceptional cases. Even if questions are vague, the courts have to let it be. Attempting a vague question and dealing with — are part of examination’s exigencies — and situations that any public official may need to deal with. Therefore, the courts should not strive to judicially create a public examination.

These concerns are not theoretical. Some recent Supreme Court interventions in recruitment examinations highlights how uneven deference operates in practice.

Some recent events

On 24-4-2025, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment in Reetesh Kumar Singh v. State of U.P.⁴⁴ The matter arose out of the recruitment examination for the post of Revenue Lekhpal in Uttar Pradesh, the Court engaged in an exercise it had previously declared off-limits: re-evaluating MCQs and declaring what the “correct answers” ought to be.

A similar development occurred in the CLAT UG 2025 Examination. On 7-5-2025, the Supreme Court in Siddhi Sandeep Ladda case⁴⁵, scrutinised the question paper and answer key, identifying errors and ambiguities. The Court directed the Consortium of National Law Universities to amend the answer key, revise the marksheet and republish/notify the final list of candidates.

However, these are not just isolated irregularities, rather it reveals a deep inconsistency within the Court’s own legal reasoning. For Lekhpals and budding law students, the Court took on the role of examiner, interpreter, and evaluator all at once, determining how candidates should have answered specific questions.

The message seems to be: Courts like human may want to solve the crossword.

Reetesh Kumar case

The first example comes from the Revenue Lekhpal recruitment in Uttar Pradesh in Reetesh Kumar case⁴⁶. The case involved disputes over three questions. For these three i.e. Questions 58, 63 and 90, the Supreme Court overruled the Commission’s (Expert’s) answer key and held that multiple options were equally acceptable. For example:

(a) In Question 58, which asked where Gandhi started the Salt Satyagraha, the Court observed that although the act of defiance occurred in Dandi (Option A), the march began from Sabarmati (Option C). Hence, both were treated as correct.

(b) In Question 63, about the longest highway passing through Uttar Pradesh, both NH2 and “none of these” were accepted due to changes in highway numbering.

(c) In Question 90, concerning solar pump subsidies, both 30% and 45% were accepted due to updates in government policy.

The Court directed the Commission to re-evaluate answer sheets only for the appellants/applicants, while leaving the results of already selected candidates untouched.

To its credit, the Court attempts to limit the fallout by stating that its directions will apply only to the appellants and will not disturb already selected candidates. It also adds the familiar refrain: “this shall not be treated as a precedent”. But such disclaimers ring hollow. The fact remains that the highest court of the land has resolved academic questions through judicial fiat, thereby undermining the Commission’s role and inviting future litigants to ask for the same special treatment.

Even more interestingly, the Court contradicts itself by acknowledging that: “questions framed were ambiguous or having more than one answers as correct”.

This is an implicit admission that the expert bodies failed, but instead of remanding the matter back to them or allowing the High Court to assess whether expert consultation was properly undertaken, the Supreme Court directly undertook the role of examiner.

It is worth noting that the High Court had already examined and dismissed the petitions regarding these answer key disputes relying on settled precedent and the principle of limited judicial interference. The Supreme Court, however, intervened, overruled, and revaluated answers, not because of proven perversity or manifest arbitrariness, but because the Bench felt the questions were unclear.

Siddhi Sandeep Ladda case

The Court’s willingness to directly answer disputed questions was not confined to Reetesh Kumar case⁴⁷. Another case of Siddhi Sandeep Ladda case⁴⁸ involved disputes over six questions. For these six i.e. Questions 56, 77, 78, 88, 115 and 116, the Supreme Court while noting that in academic matters, the Courts are generally reluctant to interfere, inasmuch as they do not possess the requisite expertise for the same, goes on to answer some of the questions again overruling the expert’s answer key and holding that multiple options were equally acceptable. For example:

(a) In Question 56, related to protect and preserve the natural resources, the Court held both options (C) and (d) as correct, since the Supreme Court has time and again held that it is the duty of both the State and its citizens to protect and preserve the natural resources.

Thus, despite reiterating the principle of judicial restraint, the Court proceeded to answer questions as if sitting in an academic review panel. Taken together, these decisions suggest an emerging judicial tendency to substitute its own academic judgment for that of expert bodies.

A troubling pattern

Now by choosing to interfere in such cases, the Supreme Court sends mixed signals to High Courts across the country. Should they now feel emboldened to act as answer key revision panels too?

While the Bench’s intentions may have been guided by equity, ensuring that candidates are not punished for ambiguous questions, the route taken dilutes the principle of institutional competence. Sympathy for deserving candidates should not come at the cost of systemic integrity.

Recently the Supreme Court in Mohit Kumar v. State of U.P.⁴⁹, while dealing with the similar issued observed that:

19. … Once an advertisement is issued inviting applications for public employment, it is the responsibility, nay duty, of an aspirant to read and note the terms and understand what its requirements are. If any aspirant finds any of the terms ambiguous and there is scope for an inquiry inbuilt in the advertisement or is provided by any rule/regulation, an effort ought to be first made to obtain clarity for understanding the requirements accurately. If no such scope is available, nothing prevents the aspirant from seeking clarity by making a representation. Should such clarity be not provided, the aspirant may participate in the process without prejudice to his rights and may question the term even after he is not selected. However, if the aspirant does not make any such effort and takes a calculated chance of selection based on his own understanding of the disputed term in the advertisement and later, he emerges unsuccessful, ordinarily, it would not be open to him to challenge the selection on the ground that the disputed term is capable of being understood differently….

If this continues, the consequences will be far-reaching. Recruitment processes must have finality as well as predictability. Otherwise, every candidate with a doubt about an answer key will flood the courts.

This kind of judicial equity is likely to generate more litigation, not less. Candidates who missed the cut-off by a single mark due to these very questions now have a strong incentive to knock on the Court’s doors, despite the order and judgment’s purported finality clause. The Supreme Court in Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth⁵⁰, aptly observed that:

27. … it is in the public interest that the results of public examinations when published should have some finality attached to them. If inspection, verification in the presence of the candidates and revaluation are to be allowed as of right, it may lead to gross and indefinite uncertainty, particularly in regard to the relative ranking, etc. of the candidates, besides leading to utter confusion on account of the enormity of the labour and time involved in the process.

In Reetesh Kumar case⁵¹, the Court’s assertion that “Registry shall not entertain any further application(s)” is aspirational at best. If justice is denied to similarly placed candidates, the Court will be forced to revisit its own limitations.

Therefore, the Supreme Court should not become the “highest examination appeals tribunal”. It is time for the judiciary to step back from the examination hall and let the expert bodies do their job, even if that sometimes means living with imperfect answers.