Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh HC: The present application was filed by the State challenging the judgment of the Fast Track Court, Doda (‘Trial Court’), and seeking condonation of delay in filing an appeal against acquittal. Through a separate application, the State also prayed for leave to file the acquittal appeal. The Trial Court, by its order dated 30-07-2022, had acquitted the accused persons of offences under Sections 366, 376, 344, 147, and 109 of the Ranbir Penal Code, 1989 (‘RPC’).
The Division Bench of Sanjeev Kumar and Sanjay Parihar*, JJ., dismissed the prayer for condonation of delay and declined to grant the leave to file acquittal appeal, observing that the State could not demonstrate any compelling circumstance warranting the grant of leave to appeal against the acquittal after the prosecutrix turned hostile and there was lack of further evidence.
Background:
The accused persons were alleged to commit the said offences during the intervening night of 5-9-2017 and 6-9-2017. They formed an unlawful assembly and entered the victim’s Dhera, forcibly abducted her, and confined her in a room for three days during which rape was committed upon her. Thereafter, when her brother reported the matter to the police, she was brought back and upon her husband’s written complaint, an FIR was registered.
During the trial, the prosecutrix turned hostile and failed to identify the accused persons as the perpetrators of the alleged crime. An application came to be filed by the accused persons on 18-07-2022, seeking truncation of the proceedings. Alongside, the State also moved an application under Section 479-B of the J&K Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (‘J&K CrPC’), praying for initiation of proceedings against the prosecutrix on the ground that she had made a false deposition.
Once the victim was declared hostile, the State sought permission to re-examine her. However, even upon re-examination, she did not support the prosecution’s version, asserting that the accused persons’ names were disclosed by her at the instance of the police, and that she had neither seen them nor had they subjected her to any unlawful act. Therefore, the Trial Court concluded that even if the remaining evidence on record was taken at its highest degree of face value, it would still be insufficient to secure accused persons’ conviction. The Trial Court not only dismissed the charge-sheet but also declined to initiate proceedings against the prosecutrix under Section 479-B of the J&K CrPC.
The State urged that the Trial Court’s judgment was unsustainable in law as judicial mind was not applied. It was contended that there was sufficient evidence against the accused persons to warrant the continuation of the trial even though the victim had recanted her statement. There was a 94-days delay in filing the appeal and the State tried to justify the condonation of such delay and to seek leave to appeal on the ground that there existed credible evidence against the accused persons. The State emphasised that the Trial Court, being a Court of Sessions, could not have truncated the proceedings against the accused persons midway merely because the prosecutrix did not support the prosecution’s case.
Analysis and Decision:
The Court relied on State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) 1 SCC 568, wherein the Supreme Court held that the accused had no right to produce documents at the stage of charge or discharge to prove his defence, and that the Court was only required to consider the material placed and relied upon by the prosecution for determining whether a charge was made out. The Court thus opined that once charges were framed, the prosecution should present evidence. After examining the accused and hearing both sides, the Trial Court must assess whether any evidence supported the charge. If none existed, it must acquit the accused under Section 273 of the J&K CrPC, else, he must be asked to present a defence.
The Court clarified that in cases of sexual assault, it was equally well-settled that the testimony of the prosecutrix, if found to be credible and trustworthy, could form the sole basis for conviction. She was not an accomplice to the crime but rather the victim and the sole injured witness of the assault, and thus her evidence assumed great evidentiary value. But where she declined to identify the perpetrators, she was either a consenting party to the incident, or the persons who stood trial were not the actual perpetrators.
The Court observed that although there was no specific provision in law empowering the ‘Sessions Court’ to truncate the proceedings mid-way, the Trial Court, faced with the prosecutrix’s categorical denial of involvement of the accused persons and in absence of any incriminating material emerging even in cross-examination, was justified in holding that continuation of the trial would be nothing but a futile exercise.
The Court affirmed the Trial Court’s view that the State had failed to point out any clinching material-on-record which could warrant the conclusion that the prosecutrix had been subjected to sexual assault at the instance of the accused persons. The Trial Courl had also examined the matter in the context of Section 479-B of the J&K CrPC, concluding that there was nothing to suggest that the prosecutrix had deliberately or wilfully given a false version or fabricated evidence. The Court noted that while the prosecutrix did not deny the occurrence of the incident, her consistent stand was that she was not abducted or sexually assaulted by the accused persons.
It was further contended that the Trial Court should not have concluded the matter but instead should have confronted the Investigating Officer (‘IO’) to test the veracity of the victim’s testimony. But the Court observed that considering the nature of the charges levelled against the accused persons and the fact that the prosecutrix had categorically recanted from the prosecution case, putting the IO on notice would not have materially altered the situation.
Thus, the Court found no justifiable grounds to interfere with the reasoning adopted by the Trial Court and observed that the State could not demonstrate any compelling circumstance warranting the grant of leave to appeal and nothing was placed before the Court to show that the acquittal of the accused persons had in any manner undermined the majesty of law.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court declined the prayer for condonation of delay and for the grant of leave to file an acquittal appeal.
[State (UT of J&K) v. Shah Din, 2025 SCC OnLine J&K 987, decided on 30-09-2025]
*Judgment authored by: Justice Sanjay Parihar
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Appellant: Raman Sharma, Sr. Advocate (AAG) with Kartikay Sharma, Advocate.