Kerala High Court: The present set of appeals were filed under Section 14-A of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (‘SC/ST Act’), by Accused 1 and 2, challenging the dismissal of their anticipatory bail application by the Special Judge vide order dated 27-08-2025, in relation to a crime registered under Sections 376(2)(n) and 506 of the Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’) and Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act. A Single Judge Bench of Gopinath P., J., while setting aside the dismissal order, held that the bar under Section 18 of the SC/ST Act would only be applicable, if prima facie the alleged offence was established, but since in the present case, the prosecution could not do so, the Court directed the accused to be released on anticipatory bail.
Background:
Accused 1 had established a relationship with the de facto complainant (‘victim’) after promising to marry her and they were together from 2023 to July 2025. He had initially forced the victim to have sexual intercourse with him despite her objection, and thereafter, continued to maintain his relationship with her. After living with her for some time in a rented house, he withdrew from the promise of marriage, thereby committing the alleged offences. Accused 2 was the brother of Accused 1, who had allegedly threatened the victim and had warned her against maintaining a relationship with Accused 1. It was also alleged that Accused 2 had not caused any harm to the victim only because she was the mother of a minor child.
The accused’s counsel submitted that the investigation revealed that the victim had purposefully suppressed the fact that she was earlier married during 2009, and thereafter, she married another person whose name was mentioned as her husband in the FIR and had a minor child, and even though the application for divorce was pending in the Family Court, she was living together with Accused 1 as husband and wife.
However, the respondents’ counsel submitted that the initial relationship was not consensual, and the victim was forced to succumb to the demand for sexual intercourse by Accused 1. They contended that if the anticipatory bail was granted at this stage, it would affect the investigation adversely. Accused 2 was charged with criminal intimidation which was a scheduled offence under the provisions of the SC/ST Act. During investigation, it was revealed that Accused 2 did not contact the victim and his telephone was being used by Accused 1 frequently. It was also submitted that the accused’s mother had issued a legal notice to the victim and after receiving it, the victim had set the criminal law in motion.
Analysis and Decision:
The Court referred to Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 11 SCC 398, and Hiran Das Murali v. State of Kerala, 2025 SCC OnLine Ker 6693, wherein it was observed that where a relationship between two individuals lasted for a considerably long period and later they broke up, the same could not be a ground to allege rape on the false promise of marriage.
The Court noted that the victim’s marriage was not dissolved when she started living with Accused 1. The Court referred to Anilkumar v. State of Kerala, 2020 SCC OnLine Ker 7699, where it was held that where one of the parties to a relationship was in a subsisting marriage, there could not be an allegation of rape on the false promise of marriage. The Court thus concluded that Accused 1 had made out a case that he could not be accused of committing an offence punishable under Section 376(2)(n) IPC.
Regarding the allegations against Accused 2 for threatening the victim, the Court noted that the two calls made from the Accused 2’s phone lasted for 111 seconds and 37 mins, respectively, and it was quite possible that Accused 1 was using the telephone of Accused 2 to talk to the victim since these calls were related to a period when there was a healthy relationship between them. Thus, the Court opined that it was at least doubtful as to whether the alleged offence under Section 506 IPC was committed by Accused 2.
In relation to the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act, the Court observed that though Section 506 IPC was a scheduled offence for the purposes of Section 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act, but since the maximum term of punishment under Section 506 IPC was seven years, the provisions of Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act were not attracted. The Court also held that prima facie no offence under Section 506 was made out. The Court referred to Shahul Ameer v. State of Kerala, 2025 SCC OnLine Ker 1562, where it was held that where the Court reached a finding that there was no false promise of marriage, the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act could not be attracted.
The Court clarified that in cases where the allegation was that an offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act was committed and the Court concluded that the substantive offence punishable with imprisonment for a period of 10 years or more was not committed, the said prima facie conclusion was sufficient to hold that the bar under Section 18 of the SC/ST Act against the grant of anticipatory bail would not apply. Thus, the Court observed that the prima facie conclusion that the accused had not committed any offence under Sections 376(2)(n) and 506 IPC, automatically lead to a conclusion that they had not committed an offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act.
The Court relied on Kiran v. Rajkumar Jivraj Jain, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1886, wherein it was held that “as Section 18 of the SC/ST Act with express language excluded the applicability of Section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (‘CrPC’), it created a bar against the grant of anticipatory bail in absolute terms in relation to the arrest of a person who faced specific accusations of having committed the offence under the SC/ST Act. The absolute nature of bar, however, could be read and had to be applied with a rider. If the accusations relating to the commission of an offence under Section 3 were devoid of prima facie merits, the Court had room to exercise the discretion to grant anticipatory bail to the accused under Section 438 CrPC”.
Consequently, the Court, while allowing the appeals, set aside the Special Judge’s order and observed that the accused persons were entitled to anticipatory bail as they made out a prima facie case that they had not committed any offence under the SC/ST Act. The Court further clarified that the accused would be deemed to be in custody for the purposes of recovery, etc., even if they were released on anticipatory bail, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1.
[Rahul M.R. v. State of Kerala, CRL.A NO. 1685 OF 2025, decided on 17-09-2025]
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Accused: S. Rajeev, V. Vinay, M.S. Aneer, Sarath K.P., Anilkumar C.R., K.S. Kiran Krishnan, Azad Sunil, Dipa V., Akash Cherian Thomas, Advocates.
For the Respondents: George Sebastian, Dhanesh Mathew Manjooran, Advocates.
