Introduction: Emergence of doctrine of patent illegality
To begin with the jurisprudence pertaining public policy vis-à-vis arbitral awards in India have emerged from a number of Supreme Court cases, Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co.1 being a pioneer in this regard, where for the first time the Supreme Court refused the enforcement of an arbitral award if it is against:
(i) fundamental policy of the Indian law;
(ii) interest of India; or
(iii) justice of morality.
The Supreme Court then in ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd.2 interpreted public policy in a wider manner and introduced one more novel ground for the setting aside of an arbitral award, terming it as patent illegality. The Presiding Judge, Justice M.B. Shah elaborated that an arbitral award would be patently illegal, if:
(i) if it contravenes the substantive provisions of law; or
(ii) if it contravenes the terms of the contract; or
(iii) if it contravenes the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 19963.
This novel concept marked a departure from the prescribed norms of multilateral conventions and established practices of developed countries. Patent illegality as a ground gained statutory recognition by the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 20154, upon its insertion under Section 345. There have been interpretations and developments in this regard that have been followed through by different cases and recommendations, which would be explored in the upcoming sections.
The development of jurisprudence: Aligning with international norms
In a Note left by the Secretariat of the UNCITRAL Model Law titled “Background of the Model Law”6 the Secretariat expressly called for the need of betterment and harmonisation of trade laws, a special mention of inefficiency of the arbitral procedures was attributed to mainly two things: (i) inadequacy of the domestic laws; and (ii) disparity between national laws. This reasoning of the Secretariat is much realised in the case of India, an illustration is Phulchand Exports Ltd. v. O.O.O. Patriot7, where O.O.O. Patriot a Russian entity, sought enforcement under Section 488 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for an arbitral award passed in its favour in a foreign jurisdiction, the same, upon appeal by Indian entity Phulchand, was denied by the Supreme Court of India on grounds of patent illegality. Since the award was inconsistent with contractual terms and Indian principles. This wide interpretation of public policy and its application to foreign arbitral awards was a glaring divergence from the pro-arbitration stance of UNCITRAL Model Law and the UN Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards9.
This particular stance was then corrected in Shri Lal Mahal Ltd. v. Progetto Grano SpA10, where a foreign award was passed in favour of Italian company Progetto Grano SpA case11 by the Grain and Feed Trade Association (GAFTA) seated in London. The seller, an Indian entity made an unsuccessful appeal to the Board of Appeal of GAFTA, thereafter, made another unsuccessful appeal to the High Court of Justice in London under Section 6812 of the English Arbitration Act, 199613. Upon suit for the enforcement of the arbitral award before the Delhi High Court by the buyer, the seller contended that GAFTA has decided in accordance with the quality reports of agencies not mentioned in the contract rather than the one originally mentioned in the agreement entered by the parties, therefore the award is liable to be set aside on grounds of patent illegality since it contravenes express provisions of the contract.
Interestingly, Justice R.M. Lodha, the same Judge who decided Phulchand case14 was presiding over this matter, took a different view and held public policy to be narrowly interpreted, it was also held that foreign arbitral awards would not be vitiated by patent illegality. This marked the first step towards the international standards set by UNCITRAL and New York Convention15.
Despite the aforementioned, confusion resurfaced when the Supreme Court again in ONGC Ltd. v. Western Geco International Ltd.16 expanded the scope of patent illegality and went contrary to the international established principles of non-interference by courts. It is important to take note of Govt. of the Republic of the Philippines v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co. Inc.17, where the Singapore High Court reasoned that Section 34 (in pari materia with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996) does not give the Court a power to hear an issue in appeal and ruled that an arbitral award cannot be set aside for being incorrect in law.18 Moreover, Article 3419 of the UNCITRAL Model Law also does not allow court’s reconsideration of an award on the grounds of merits.20 The US Supreme Court took a corresponding approach in Hall Street Associates LLC v. Mattel Inc.21 In relation to understanding what is public policy, the Indian Supreme Court in Associate Builders v. DDA22 provided with three standards for understanding the fundamental policy of India, the principles are: (i) correct judicial approach; (ii) principle of natural justice; and (iii) absence of perversity and irrationality.
The 246th Law Commission’s Report (2014)23 which highlighted the delays and inefficiencies in arbitration enforcement, eventually culminated in the 2015 Amendment to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act which gave statutory recognition to patent illegality with the insertion of new Section 34(2-A), furthermore, the Act granted statutory protection to foreign arbitral awards from challenges based on patent illegality. The Supreme Court further in Ssangyong Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI24 clarified that foreign awards are outside the scope of patent illegality.
(i) Formation of B.N. Srikrishna Committee 2017
Though this was a step forward, there were still cases of stakeholders voicing their concerns due to absence confidentiality, institutionalisation and uniform professional standards. It was observed that Indian arbitrators followed and replicated the procedural and evidentiary provisions from the domestic civil procedure into the arbitral process.25 Considering this a High-Level Committee26 under Justice (Retd.) B.N. Srikrishna was formed in the year 2017 and was tasked to review the existing arbitration mechanism.
The Committee divided its report in three parts, the first part focused on the overall quality and performance of the arbitral process in India, focusing mainly on setting up an independent body called Arbitration Promotion Council of India (APCI). In the second part, the Committee focused on making the International Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolution (ICADR) a global competitive institution by introducing reforms for functioning and suggesting its takeover by a statute. In third part, the Committee called for creating post of International Law Advisor (ILA) who shall be advising the Government on dispute resolution strategy for its international law obligations, particularly disputes arising out of bilateral investment treaties (BITs).27
(ii) 2019 Amendment to the Act; Set up ACI
The Parliament, in light of the recommendations of the Committee, amended the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 in 201928 and set up Arbitration Council of India (ACI) which will be accrediting professional recognition to the arbitrators. It also introduced the Eighth Schedule to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 199629, prescribing an exhaustive list of requisite qualifications and experience for being appointed as arbitrators.30 However, there existed some fallacies, for example, Entry (i) to the Eighth Schedule permitted the appointment of an advocate within the meaning of the Advocates Act, 196131 having ten years of experience which implied the exclusion of foreign arbitrators, this went against the doctrine of party autonomy in arbitration32, which the Supreme Court has referred to as “guiding spirit of arbitration”33 and provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 since Sections 11(1)34 and (9) permit appointment of an arbitrator of any nationality in an international commercial matter. The Supreme Court in Pasl Wind Solutions (P) Ltd. v. GE Power Conversion India (P) Ltd.35 referred to travaux préparatoires of the New York Convention36, and observed “ultimately the New York Convention was based only on the principle of the situs or seat of arbitration, and thus, was party-neutral”.37
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in the year 2022 has also introduced a standard language in its model to encourage diversity in selection of arbitrators.38 The Supreme Court itself has in BCI v. A.K. Balaji39 has allowed foreign lawyers conducting international commercial arbitrations in India on a fly-in and fly-out basis. Emphasising upon these established precedents, and following widespread criticism for the Eighth Schedule, the same was removed by the President’s Ordinance and presently it is ACI that regulates appointment of arbitrators.40
(iii) 2021 Amendment to the Act; Removal of erstwhile 8th Schedule
These changes paved the way to the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act of 202141, which made two significant changes; Firstly, it added proviso to Section 3642 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 under which the courts are now empowered to grant an unconditional stay to the enforcement of arbitral award, if the contract or the constitution of the award has been induced or effected by fraud or corruption. And second change being the removal of erstwhile 8th Schedule and its replacement by Section 43-J43 under which ACI shall be deciding the merits of being accredited as arbitrators. While the second change has been commended for upholding the doctrine of party autonomy. The first change has been criticised for lingering the process.
Uniqueness of the concept vis-à-vis UNCITRAL and New York Convention
It is to be understood that no other regime in the world has this principle of patent illegality as an additional ground to set aside arbitral awards, making it a variation from the practices of most pro-arbitration jurisdictions worldwide, who limit the scope of public policy challenges to narrowly defined parameters, like procedural fairness, illegality, and public morality.
Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention (1958)44 allows refusal of enforcement of an arbitral award, if it violates the public policy of the enforcing country. Similarly, Articles 34(2)(b)(ii)45 and 36(1)(b)(ii)46 of the UNCITRAL Model Law provide for the annulment or refusal of enforcement of an award if it is in conflict with the public policy of the State. The UNCITRAL Analytical Commentary (1985)47 also clarified that “public policy” should be interpreted narrowly, focusing on international public policy rather than domestic policies of the enforcing States. In furtherance, the UNCITRAL Guide to New York Convention (2016)48 confirms that public policy is meant to address only serious violations of international public policy not domestic policy considerations. International public policy as referred here mainly includes fraud, corruption, breach of natural justice and procedural irregularity.49 The description given by the above two Conventions hold precedential value since, considering their status of being pioneers development of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) worldwide and India’s variation to their prescribed norms has emerged as a peculiarity in its own.
(i) Uniqueness vis-à-vis foreign cases
If the interpretation of the developed pro-ADR jurisdictions is observed. A trend of minimal intervention by the judiciary can be noticed. Following are some of the illustrations; the US Court of Appeal in the landmark case of Parsons v. Société Générale50 observed “The Convention’s public policy defence should be construed narrowly to prevent it from becoming a backdoor route to relitigate disputes.” The House of Lords (United Kingdom) in Deutsche Schachtbau-und Tiefbohrgesellschaft mbH v. Shell International Petroleum Co. Ltd.51 held public policy for setting aside an arbitral award under the New York Convention, has to be interpreted with the international standard of justice and morality not domestic ones. Similarly, in Westacre Investments Inc. v. Jugoimport-SPDR Holding Co. Ltd.52 the England and Wales, Court of Appeal, interpreted public policy in a narrow manner focusing on allegations of corruption in international trade and rejecting expansive domestic notions of public policy. The Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in Hebei Import & Export Corpn. v. Polytek Engg. Co. Ltd.53 reasoned public policy exception to be construed narrowly. And lastly, the Singapore High Court in landmark case of AJU v. AJT54 emphasised the minimal intervention by the courts with arbitral awards unless there is compelling evidence of fundamental breach of justice and that public policy vis-à-vis arbitration should be limited to international public policy.
The previous mentioned jurisdictions have international reputation for ease of doing business, which in this context is, ease of enforcement, a crucial factor that the Indian framework currently falls short of. High profile cases such as, Amazon.Com NV Investment Holdings LLC v. Future Retail Ltd.55, White Industries Australia Ltd. v. Republic of India56, Cairen Energy v. Republic of India57 are illustrations of the same.
For instance, in Amazon case58 the Supreme Court of India aligning with Singapore International Arbitration Centre, held that emergency awards would be enforceable, however the same did not met with practicality since the award in question died due to the multiple enforcement technicalities. The Supreme Court in Avitel Post Studioz Ltd. v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Ltd.59 regretted the decade’s delay in execution of the award and emphasised the need for foreign awards by competent forum. A further exacerbating factor was when the Ministry of Finance, Government of India on June 2024 issued guidelines, urging stakeholders towards litigation and mediation instead of arbitration as dispute resolution for claims over 10 crores.60 This further served as discouraging factor for the commercial industry to operate with Indian seated arbitration owing to its faltering position.
(ii) Draft Amendment Bill, 2024; The looming setback?
The recently released Draft of Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Bill, 202461 (Bill) by the Department of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Law and Justice sought suggestions on the proposed changes to the Act, which among other things are:
(a) gives statutory backing to virtual hearings Section 2;
(b) seeks to clarify between the “seat” (legal jurisdiction) and “venue” (physical location) of arbitration Section 20;
(c) recognises agreements executed via digital signatures Section 7(4)(a);
(d) introduces emergency arbitration Section 9-A;
(e) speedy disposals within 60 days of filing Section 8;
(f) replaces Fourth Schedule by ACI for determining arbitrator’s fee;
(g) modifies the post-award interest rate to be 3% above the RBI’s repo rate, replacing the previous method, which calculated it as 2% above the current rate of interest; and
(h) proposes a uniform 60 days’ appeal period under matters relating to Section 37.
However, in midst of this progress, a setback has emerged concerning patent illegality, the Bill has opened a pandora’s box by modifying to Section 34(2-A) of the Draft Bill, which removes the distinction between the domestic and international arbitral awards vis-à-vis patent illegality. This risks jeopardising a decade of well-established jurisprudence. Previously, the Supreme Court by its decision in National Agricultural Mktg. Federation of India v. Alimenta SA62 (NAFED case) confused stakeholders, when it widely interpreted public policy and set aside the arbitral award passed in favour of a Swiss entity, the Court reasoned, that since NAFED being an agency of the Government was denied permission by the Ministry of Agriculture, it became contrary to the public policy of India to enforce the award.
Ironically, the Court itself clarified in Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi SRL63 which was decided 2 months before NAFED, that every breach of economic legislation does not amount to violation of public policy but deviated from the same while deciding NAFED case64. This decision opened the door for review-on-merits at the stage of enforcement of the award. Explanation 2 to Section 48(2)(b) of the Act, holds review-on-merits as impermissible for determining the violation of public policy. The proposed change by the Bill to Section 34 (if implemented) along with decisions like NAFED could potentially undermine the Indian arbitration credibility.
The road ahead
(i) Foreign direct investment and alternate dispute resolution
The foreign direct investment (FDI) of India has had a remarkable journey since the start of the century, reaching an impressive $1 trillion since April 2000. The first half of Fiscal Year 2024-2025 has recorded a growth of 26% in FDI to $42.1 billion.65 This is the testament to India’s growing reputation has global investment destination. A study by the US International Trade Commission found that Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanisms, which allow investors to pursue binding arbitration, result in increased FDI.66 In presence of effective domestic arbitral institutions can positively influence FDI by providing reliable dispute resolution mechanisms.67 The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) policy brief (2019) titled “ISDS as an Instrument for Investment Promotion and Facilitation” mentioned that based on the UNCTAD 2018 Report68 it is necessary for host States seeking FDI to foster commercially supportive framework. In his 2023 study, Xixi Zhang empirically demonstrates that the adoption of tax arbitration mechanisms significantly increases foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, particularly from developed Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries to developing host nations.69 India’s current pathway towards becoming the third largest economy by the end of this decade i.e. 203070 and its desire of becoming a global business and arbitration hub71, necessitates the implementation of faster, user-friendly and enduring dispute resolution structure.
(ii) Suggestions
A survey72 conducted by Khaitan & Co. shows that arbitration is preferred over litigation. Moreover, it mentions that most arbitrations take 24 to 36 months to complete instead of 12 months going against Section 29-A73 and expectations of the stakeholders. The survey report suggested and emphasised on the simplification of award enforcement, constitution of special arbitration Benches, and specific consequences for non-compliance with time-limits. In a previous survey74 conducted by White & Case and Queen Mary University of London found that most preferred seats for arbitration are London, Singapore, Hong Kong, Paris and Geneva. Much of this is attributable to the greater support and better track record in enforcing arbitral awards by the judiciary and the lower courts.
(iii) Sensitisation
In the present Indian context, the sensitisation of Judges in arena of pre-trial case management is required. For the same, ideas can be taken from the National Judicial College of Australia conducts National Judicial Orientation Programme75, wherein Judges are trained for dealing with busy application lists, referral and management of cases, including settlement76, for matters relating to ADR.77 Model of countries such as Singapore could be followed which have already launched Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC), a division of the High Court and part of the Supreme Court of Singapore, designed to handle transnational commercial disputes.78 Furthermore, international institutions like, the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (CIArb) London issues Global Diploma in International Commercial Arbitration (CIArb) and Institute for Transnational Arbitration (ITA) Texas, timely hold conferences, and publish scholarly work and render courses and qualifications for the worldwide adoption and promotion of ADR. A mirroring of the best of the global practices can fastrack India’s ADR.
(iv) Virtual dispute resolution; Integration of SAAPs (Semi-Automated Arbitration Processes)
The progression of artificial intelligence (AI) recently has taken up a fast pace, with the development of large language models (LLMs), large action models (LAMs) and augmented language models (ALM). AI tools now have the capability to perform action-oriented tasks that require complex, goal-directed reasoning. The rich linguistic and contextual understanding and domain-specific adaptability of the AI makes it cheaper, faster and easier to proceed with.
JAMS, acronym for Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services a global ADR service provider has set the bar by embracing hybrid-models, combining in-person and virtual components to enhance accessibility and convenience in dispute resolution, providing assistance whether in a centre or in front of monitor screen.79 The Polish arbitration system currently employs AI to assist with administrative functions pertaining to case and document management, cost analysis, time calculation, presentations, speeches, marketing materials, memoranda and emails.80 It is yet to get tasked with reasoning and judgment pronouncing, however, it is increasing the efficiency by mitigating administrative delays.
Presently, the Indian judiciary uses AI powered portal SUPACE81 (Supreme Court Portal for Assistance in Court’s Efficiency) which was launched in the year 2021, this portal assists with case management and decision-making in order to inculcate AI into the Indian arbitration work, the first step would be creating a dedicated and definite database (Laws). If the models are trained on the existing vast dataset, then there are chances of reflecting human and societal bias. In the Indian context, if AI’s help for patent illegality is to be taken, the first step should be to establish a dynamic public policy database. For the same models of open data portal of European Union82 and Singapore83 can be followed. Thereafter, cross-border arbitration protocol inspired by the UNCITRAL and SIAC models could be adopted where in any dispute, involving a foreign party, universally accepted principles would be applied. This has the potential to streamline the discrepancies that arise due to the difference in national legislations and their interpretation of public policy to set aside the arbitral award.
Conclusion
The Indian regime over the years has achieved many feats, such as progressing from 142nd rank in 2014 to 63rd in 2020 in the World Bank’s Doing Business Report (DBR)84, establishing institutions like Indian Council of Arbitration (ICA), Delhi International Arbitration Centre (DIAC) for developing institutional arbitration and jurisprudential advancement through judicial decisions and legislative actions. However, the system still lacks clarity, there are still lacunae that more possibly obscure the framework rather than enhance its transparency. By inculcation of orientation activities and sensitisation programmes, a different outlook can be provided to ADR, furthermore, harnessing technological assistance in the form of artificial intelligence or medium scale tasks can prove to be time-efficient.
At the end of the day, what matters is how we can truly establish the meaning of ADR which is timely resolution and avoidance of vexatious litigations. However, as discussed above if multiple vulnerabilities and procedural flaws are left unaddressed, allowing exploitative practices and unsolicited intervention, then the fundamental objective behind speedy resolution would become a mere conjecture. It is established that for commercial well-being and advancement, timely disposal becomes a crucial factor. With the present subject-matter at hand, the conclusive nature of arbitral awards, free from endless appeals and minor exploitable loopholes, is the decisive factor here, as echoed by the international conventions and pro-arbitration developed countries. Thus, the Indian framework would fare better if the same is standardised.
*BA LLB (Hons.) from Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur. Author can be reached at: arin.232916@hnlu.ac.in.
**Wealth Analyst, Morgan Stanley, Mumbai. Author can be reached at: thisisachatterjee@gmail.com.
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