Madhya Pradesh High Court: In a writ petition filed by a Former District Judge against the rejection of his appeal against his termination after 28 years of blemish-free service, the Division Bench of Atul Sreedharan* and Dinesh Kumar Paliwal, JJ., allowed the petition, holding that the Former Judge was terminated only on account of passing judicial orders without an iota of material to establish corruption even on the anvil of preponderance of probability. Accordingly, the Court restored his pensionary benefits and directed that he be given back wages from the date of termination to the date he would have otherwise superannuated, with interest at 7 percent. The Court also directed the State and the High Court to pay a total of Rs 5 Lakhs to the Former Judge as compensation.
Background
In 1987, the petitioner was appointed as a Civil Judge Class II (‘Civil Judge’) and thereafter promoted to different posts, with the last one being Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. His service record was blemish-free, not a single punishment was awarded to him, and not even a notice was issued to him concerning the discharge of his official duties or otherwise
In 2015, a charge sheet was issued to the Former Judge regarding his practice of allowing certain bail applications while rejecting others from similarly placed accused persons in the same cases. In the departmental enquiry held against him, only one witness was examined, and no documents were exhibited by the prosecution witness, and the enquiry was closed. The Enquiry Officer submitted a detailed enquiry report holding that the charges against the Civil Judge were proved. Aggrieved, the Former Judge filed his reply.
Thereafter, the impugned order was passed whereby the Former Judge was dismissed from service. Against the order of termination, he filed an appeal under Rule 23 of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (‘the Rules’), but the same was dismissed.
Hence, the present petition.
Analysis
At the outset, the Court noted that there were allegations of corrupt and extraneous considerations only in the third charge. The Court also noted that none of the accused, whose bail application had been rejected, filed a complaint against the Former Judge. Thus, it could be inferred that none of those accused persons felt that their applications were dismissed for non-gratification of extraneous considerations.
The Court further noted that the Former Judge explained himself thoroughly during the disciplinary proceedings. He explained that he had granted anticipatory bail in those cases where on the date of the application the offences were triable by the Court of Magistrate and were under Sections 420 and 419 of the IPC and Section 3 and 4 of the M.P. Recognized Examinations Act, 1937 (‘MP Exams Act’), which were offences punishable with a maximum sentence of three to seven years. While the applications that he had dismissed mentioned charges under other sections that were added subsequently during investigation, which included offences triable by the Court of Sessions, like those under Sections 467 and 468 of the IPC, i.e., graver offences.
Regarding the enquiry, the Court noted that only one witness was examined, who was the Investigating Officer of the case, where incriminating material was yet to be unearthed against those accused who were granted bail. Undisputedly, he did not level any allegations against the Former Judge and merely stated what he did in the investigation. Documents were not exhibited, though not doing so does not affect the case adversely, as this is a departmental enquiry and strict rules of evidence do not apply. The Court further stated that the entire enquiry process examined the orders passed by the Former Judge threadbare like an Appellate Court. Furthermore, the State neither challenged any of those orders before the High Court for cancellation of bail nor applied for cancellation of bail before the Former Judge during the trial.
Thus, the Court concluded that neither those accused whose bail was denied, nor the investigating agency, were aggrieved by the said orders.
Noting the aforesaid, the Court remarked that the instant case revealed a malady that could not be addressed effectively due to the feudal social structure existing in the State, which manifests in the judiciary as well. It is precisely cases like this that result in a large number of bail applications pending before the High Court, as well as Criminal Appeals. The Court added that experience at the Bar gives it the wisdom to opine that the District Judiciary functioned under the perpetual fear of the High Court. Like this case, where the Former Judge was terminated from service on account of passing bail orders in favour of the accused, the message that went down to the District Judiciary was that acquittals recorded in major cases or bails granted by the Courts below the High Court could result in adverse action against Judges.
“The dismal relationship between the Judges of the High Court and the Judges of the District Judiciary is one between a feudal lord and serf.”
The Court added that the body language of the District Judges when they greet a High Court Judge stops short of grovelling before the High Court Judge, making the Judges of the District Judiciary the only identifiable species of invertebrate mammals.
“Instances of the District Judges personally attending to High Court Judges (as desired by them) on railway platforms and waiting on them with refreshments are commonplace, thus perpetuating a colonial decadence with a sense of entitlement.”
The Court further commented that the District Judges on deputation to the registry of the High Court are rarely offered a seat by the High Court Judges, and on a rare occasion when they are, they are hesitant to sit down before the High Court Judge. “The subjugation and enslavement of the psyche of the Judges of the District Judiciary is complete and irreversible, so it seems.”
“The relationship between District Judiciary and the High Court in the State is not based on mutual respect, but one where a sense of fear and inferiority is consciously instilled by one on the subconscious of the other.”
The Court stated that at a subliminal level, the penumbra of the caste system manifests in the judicial structure in this state, where those in the High Court are the savarnas and the shudras are the les Misérables of the District Judiciary. As per the Court, all this added up to the passive subjugation of the District Judiciary, leaving it psychologically emaciated, which ultimately reflected in their judicial work where bails are not granted in even the most deserving cases, convictions are recorded in the absence of evidence by giving the prosecution the benefit of doubt, and charge is framed as though the power to discharge simply does not exist. All this in the name of saving their job, for which the Former Judge in this case suffered, for thinking and doing differently.
Further, the Court remarked that the extent of the rule of law existing in any state was reflected by the independence and fearlessness of its District Judiciary, the first tier of the justice administration system, and not the High Court, which a large number of citizens found difficult to access. But an overbearing High Court, ever willing to excoriate the District Judiciary for the most innocuous of its errors, ensures that the District Judiciary is kept under perpetual and morbid fear of punishment.
“A District Judiciary which is compelled to work perpetually under fear cannot dispense justice and instead shall dispense with justice.”
The Court stated that in the present case, the Former Judge granted anticipatory bail to certain accused and refused it to other similarly situated persons, which the High Court concluded was on account of corrupt and extraneous reasons despite no complaints from aggrieved persons. Even otherwise, the allegation of corruption or extraneous motive found its place only in the third charge; the other charges merely state what the Former Judge did without alluding to any imputation of dishonesty to him. The Court also took note of the Former Judge’s explanation about most of the offences being punishable with a maximum punishment of three years.
Noting the aforesaid, the Court opined that if the High Court on the administrative side is going to question the exercise of discretion under Section 438 and 439 by the District Court Judges in favour of the accused, where the question of corruption was merely an imputation by the enquiry officer, unsustainable by any material on record, the injustice done would be irreversible. The judicial conservatism of the District Judiciary, which results in the denial of bail and unsustainable convictions, which, even if reversed by the High Court in appeal after the appellant has completed fourteen years of his sentence, is a sham masquerading as justice, and all this is merely the symptom.
“The feudal mindset of the High Court governing its relationship with the Judges of the District Judiciary is an untreatable disease. The High Court would do well to introspect and realise that in the era of unbridled social media and unmoderated expression of public opinion, sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander and as we sow, so shall we reap.”
The Court stated that the Former Judge’s service was terminated two years before superannuation after a blemish-free career of almost 28 years. It was only because of his reputation and integrity that he was holding the Court of Special Judge (SC/ST) at the relevant point in time, yet the applications for bail in these matters were listed before him. Additionally, none of the bail orders were reversed on the judicial side by the High Court and if the High Court on the administrative side felt that the orders were passed because of extraneous consideration, the orders could have been taken suo moto on the judicial side also and set aside, but such a course of action was never adopted by the High Court.
Considering the aforesaid, the petition was allowed, and the impugned order was quashed.
Though the Former Judge had superannuated during the pendency of this case, on account of gross injustice suffered by him, the Court restored his pensionary benefits and directed that he be given back wages from the date of termination to the date he would have otherwise superannuated, with interest at 7 percent. The same shall be complied with within three months from the date on which this order is uploaded on the High Court website, failing which the Former Judge shall be entitled to file a contempt petition against the State and High Court for enforcement of this order.
Furthermore, the Court imposed a cost of Rs. 5 Lakhs which shall be paid by the State and High Court in equal parts to the Former Judge, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of injustice suffered by the Former Judge, the hardships he and his family were subjected to, and the humiliation in society that he had to face, only on account of passing judicial orders without an iota of material to establish corruption even on the anvil of preponderance of probability.
[Jagat Mohan Chaturvedi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Writ Petition No. 15070 of 2016, decided on 14-07-2025]
*Judgment authored by: Justice Atul Sreedharan
Advocates who appeared in this case :
For the petitioner: Vipin Yadav
For the respondent: Dy. Advocate General Shweta Yadav, Senior Advocate Aditya Adhikari, and Kaustubh Chaturvedi
Buy Penal Code, 1860 HERE
