The Legality of “Execution Appeals” Under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986

Introduction

A decree is just a piece of paper if not executed. Recognising this, the Consumer Protection Act, 1986¹ (1986 Act) provides for execution of orders passed by the consumer fora, as follows:

(i) Section 25² provides for the attachment of property and the recovery of decretal amounts as arrears of land revenue, whereas;

(ii) Section 27³ prescribes penal consequences, including imprisonment and fines, for non-compliance with orders.

This article examines the legal framework and the judicial approach to the appealability and revisional review of execution orders.

Section 27-A of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986

Under the 1986 Act, the only express provision for an appeal against an order passed in execution is Section 27-A⁴. However, the ambit of Section 27-A is limited to appeals against orders passed only under Section 27 (which provides for penal consequences). The provision states:

27-A. Appeal against order passed under Section 27.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973⁵ (2 of 1974), an appeal under Section 27, both on facts and on law, shall lie from—

(a) the order made by the District Forum to the State Commission;

(b) the order made by the State Commission to the National Commission; and

(c) the order made by the National Commission to the Supreme Court.

Thus, Section 27-A, by its very language, clearly limits appeals to orders passed under Section 27. The legislative intent is evident from the deliberate exclusion of orders under Section 25 concerning the attachment of property and recovery of decretal amounts indicating that such orders cannot be made subject to appeal under Section 27-A.

NCDRC’s approach to execution appeals under Section 27-A

The language of Section 27-A explicitly excludes execution appeals stemming from orders under Section 25, emphasising that such appeals lack a statutory basis. However, the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) has adopted an inconsistent stance by entertaining appeals of this nature.

In April 2024, the NCDRC allowed a bunch of 114 connected execution appeals, overturning the executing forum’s orders on the ground that the decree was wrongly enforced in favour of a non-party to the complaint despite the challenged order being under Section 25.⁶ Similarly, in December 2021, the NCDRC set aside a State Commission’s order under Section 25 directing the refund of TDS (tax deducted at source) deducted from interest awarded as compensation.⁷

Conversely, the NCDRC has, on various occasions, dismissed execution appeals, labeling them as non-maintainable, highlighting a lack of uniformity in its approach.⁸

The NCDRC’s inconsistent approach in entertaining execution appeals against Section 25 orders highlights a fundamental jurisdictional flaw. By erroneously assuming appellate jurisdiction where none exists statutorily, the NCDRC has effectively expanded its powers beyond the legislative mandate.

As what serves as a crucial corrective measure, the NCDRC has categorically held in N. Muthappa v. Aslam Carpets (P) Ltd.⁹, that an order passed by an executing forum under Section 25 is not appealable under Section 27-A. This ruling reinforces the principle that statutory limitations on jurisdiction must be strictly adhered to.

Appealability of execution orders in a “first appeal”

This issue of whether execution orders can be assailed in a “first appeal” under the 1986 Act was directly examined in N. Muthappa¹⁰, where the NCDRC rejected the contention that an appeal under Section 19¹¹ can be maintained against an order under Section 25. The Commission clarified that Section 19, which reads as,

19. Appeals.—Any person aggrieved by an order made by the State Commission in exercise of its powers conferred by sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of Section 17 may prefer an appeal against such order to the National Commission within a period of thirty days from the date of the order in such form and manner as may be prescribed.

Provides a right of first appeal only against orders passed by the State Commission while adjudicating original complaints. The NCDRC further emphasised that execution proceedings are not a continuation of a consumer complaint but are independent in nature. Consequently, an appeal under Section 19 cannot be maintained against an order issued in execution proceedings under Section 25.

A similar limitation exists at the highest appellate level. Section 23 of the 1986 Act¹², which provides for an appeal against orders of the National Commission before the Supreme Court, does not extend to execution orders. This position was reinforced by the Supreme Court in Ambience Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. Ambience Island Apartment Owners¹³, where it was unequivocally held that an appeal under Section 23 of the 1986 Act is not maintainable against an order passed by the NCDRC in the exercise of its execution powers.

These rulings reaffirm the principle that execution proceedings are independent and do not constitute a continuation of the consumer complaint. Consequently, execution orders cannot be challenged under the general appellate provisions of the 1986 Act. However, a limited exception exists under Section 15¹⁴, which permits a first appeal against execution orders of the District Commission before the State Commission, as its language does not restrict appealability to original complaints.¹⁵

Revisional review of execution orders

Can execution orders, in the absence of an appeal, be subjected to the revisional jurisdiction of Consumer Courts?

This issue was addressed by a three-member Bench of the NCDRC in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Perfect Prints¹⁶6, wherein it was observed that:

(i) A revision petition under Section 21(b)¹⁷ would be the appropriate remedy against an order (interim or final) passed under Section 25.

(ii) A revision petition under Section 21(b) would be maintainable against an order passed by the State Commission under Section 27-A.

The ruling in Perfect Prints¹⁸ was premised on the understanding that execution proceedings are a continuation of the “consumer dispute”.¹⁹ However, the correctness of this reasoning was questioned in 2019 in Karnataka Housing Board v. K.A. Nagamani²⁰, wherein the Supreme Court categorically held that execution proceedings are independent and do not fall within the ambit of a “consumer dispute” as contemplated under Section 21(b) of the 1986 Act. It was clarified that a “consumer dispute” refers to only proceedings in a “complaint”. Consequently, the Supreme Court ruled that no revisional jurisdiction can be exercised against an order passed by the State Commission in exercise of its execution powers. Thus, an “execution revision” was declared as non-maintainable.

The Andhra Pradesh High Court in Megacity Builders v. A.P. State Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission²¹, also examined the scope of revisional jurisdiction against execution orders. It held that such jurisdiction can only be exercised in the context of a “consumer dispute”, as stipulated under Sections 17(b)²² and 21(b) of the 1986 Act, which confer revisional powers upon the State Commission and the NCDRC, respectively. Since execution proceedings cannot be treated as a “complaint” or a “consumer dispute”, it falls outside the purview of revisional jurisdiction, rendering any such challenge non-maintainable.

In light of these rulings, it becomes evident that the revisional jurisdiction conferred upon the State Commission and the NCDRC under Sections 17(b) and 21(b), respectively, does not extend to orders issued in execution proceedings.

Challenge to execution orders — An unsettled legal position

Following Karnataka Housing Board²³, the NCDRC initially adhered to the Supreme Court’s ruling, consistently dismissing revision petitions against orders under Sections 25(3)²⁴ and 27-A²⁵. However, despite this binding precedent, the Commission has not maintained a uniform stance — oscillating between dismissing such revisions outright and entertaining them in reliance on Perfect Prints²⁶.

In a recent instance, the NCDRC entertained a revision petition against an order of the State Commission passed under Section 25, reasoning that the larger Bench decision in Perfect Prints²⁷ remained binding on a Coordinate Bench.²⁸ Notably, Perfect Prints²⁹ had also held that a revision petition was maintainable against an order passed under Section 27-A, a view recently reaffirmed by the NCDRC in Rajesh Kudi v. Ram Singh³⁰.

The apparent conflict between Perfect Prints³¹ and Karnataka Housing Board³² one being a three-member Bench decision of the NCDRC and the other being the Supreme Court’s categorical ruling has resulted in a fractured approach, with the NCDRC sometimes treating Perfect Prints³³ as per incuriam while at other times following its reasoning. This lack of clarity continues to create uncertainty for litigants seeking recourse against execution orders.

Conclusion

The conflicting judicial interpretations highlighted above underscore the ambiguity surrounding the remedy against execution orders. Until there is an authoritative judicial pronouncement, the legality of “execution appeals” will continue to be a matter of legal debate.

Nevertheless, the absence of a statutory appellate remedy does not render a litigant remediless. The jurisdictional High Court may always be approached under Article 226 of the Constitution of India³⁴ to seek redress against an erroneous or unjust execution order.³⁵