NRJ Series | Where former court not competent to try subsequent suit, matter decided therein, cannot operate as res judicata [(1954) 2 SCC 765]

This report covers the Supreme Court’s Never Reported Judgment on res judicata, dating back to the year 1954.

res judicata

Supreme Court: The present appeal arose out of a suit for possession of a zamindari in Sitapur known as the Sakran estate, and for mesne profits filed by the respondents as reversionary heirs of one Jangli Bakhsh on the death of his daughter, Indar Kuar. The 4-Judges Bench of M.C. Mahajan, C.J., and N.H. Bhagwati*, B. Jagannadhadas, and T.L. Venkatarama Ayyar, JJ., opined that the proceedings before the settlement officer could not be said to be a former suit in a court competent to try the present suit in which this question was subsequently raised and the settlement court could not be considered competent to try the suit for possession of the Sakran estate and mesne profits. The Supreme Court noted that the settlement court left open for determination at a later stage the question regarding the reversionary heirs to the Sakran estate, therefore, there could be no bar of res judicata by reason of the proceedings in the settlement court.

Background

Sakran estate originally belonged to Partab Bali Singh and later, one of his sons, Gandharp Singh took the Sakran estate as his share, after which his son, Jangli Bakhsh succeeded to Jangli Bakhsh’s estate. Jangli Baksh died in 1861 leaving him surviving his widow Ambar Kuar and daughter Indar Kuar. Ambar Kuar died in 1863, and Indar Kuar succeeded to Jangli Bakhsh’s estate.

The claims were finally decided in 1868-1869 and Indar Kuar was held entitled to a life interest in the Sakran estate. Indar Kuar married Raja Deep Singh, Taluqdar of Sewaijpur, Hardoi in 1872. Indar Kuar’s son, Karan Singh left him surviving his widow, Khem Kuar. Thereafter, disputes arose between Indar Kuar and Khem Kuar and on 07-05-1909, an agreement was arrived at between them by which Khem Kuar was declared the owner of the Sakran estate and Indar Kuar was allotted maintenance during her lifetime and was permitted to retain possession of the Sakran estate in lieu of her maintenance.

On 22-12-1927, Indar Kuar executed a deed of waqf dedicating the whole of the Sakran Village to the deity Sri Ram Chandraji who was installed in a temple in the village. On 13-04-1930, she adopted Appellant 1 as a son to her deceased husband and executed a formal deed of adoption on 04-10-1932 and surrender her life interest in Taluqa Sakran in his favour. Indar Kuar died on 27-03-1937 and on 30-08-1937, the respondents filed the present suit against Appellant 1, the deity Sri Ram Chandraji and the trustees of the deed of waqf. The respondents claimed to be the reversionary heirs of the estate of Jangli Bakhsh and as such entitled to the estate.

The trial court found that Appellant 1 was adopted by Indar Kuar as a son to her deceased husband on 13-04-1930 and held that the adoption was valid, Indar Kuar being entitled to make a valid adoption without her husband’s permission by reason of the custom obtaining in the family. As regards the plea of res judicata, the trial court held in favour of the respondents and held that Appellant 1 was not entitled to reagitate in the suit. On appeal, the Chief Court of Oudh (‘the Chief Court’) reversed the trial court’s decision and decreed the respondents’ claim for possession of the suit property except regarding one-fourth of the property dedicated by the deed of waqf. The Chief Court held that Indar Kuar had no authority from her deceased husband to adopt a son to him and Appellant 1’s adoption was therefore invalid. Hence, the present appeal was filed.

Analysis, Law, and Decision

The Supreme Court opined that both the courts below were in error in holding that the question as to the succession to Zalim Singh-Gandharp Singh’s brother and the respondents’ title as reversionary heirs of Jangli Bakhsh was barred by res judicata.

The Supreme Court opined that the proceedings before the Settlement Officer could not be said to be a former suit in a court competent to try the present suit in which this question was subsequently raised as those proceedings were to effect a mutation of names in the records of rights and the settlement court could by no stretch of imagination be considered to be competent to try the suit for possession of the Sakran estate and mesne profits which was filed by the respondents subsequently in the Court of the Additional Civil Judge, Sitapur.

The Supreme Court noted that Indar Kuar was concerned with supporting her own title as the daughter of Jangli Bakhsh and the settlement court left open for determination at a later stage the question as to who would be the reversionary heirs to the estate of Jangli Baksh after Indar Kuar’s death. The Supreme Court stated that under these circumstances, there could be no bar of res judicata by reason of the proceedings in the settlement court.

The Supreme Court opined that the Chief Court was in error when it stated that in the litigation in the settlement court, Indar Kuar represented the estate of Jangli Bakhsh as his daughter and heir. She was concerned to establish her own title to the estate as against the rival claimants to the same and there was no question of her representing the estate of Jangli Bakhsh against the other claimants. Appellant 1 moreover did not claim through her but as the reversionary heir to the estate of Jangli Bakhsh and whatever be the position of Indar Kuar regarding that litigation he was certainly not bound by anything that Indar Kuar did.

The Supreme Court agreed with the Chief Court’s findings that in the litigation before the settlement court, neither Indar Kuar nor Khem Kuar could be said to represent Jangli Bakhsh’s estate. Therefore, the decision in that litigation could not operate as res judicata.

The Supreme Court agreed with the Chief Court’s conclusion that Umrao Singh was a Brahmin boy who was adopted by Zalim Singh Thakur and that such an adoption could not be considered valid under the Hindu Law. The Supreme Court thus opined that Appellant 1 was not precluded by any bar of res judicata by any of the proceedings in the settlement court in 1868-1869. It was therefore open to Appellant 1 to contend that Umrao Singh-Zalim Sing’s adopted son was a Brahmin boy and could not have been validly adopted by Zalim Singh and that therefore the title of the respondents as the reversionary heirs to the estate of Jangli Bakhsh could not be established.

The Supreme Court held that that Umrao Singh was not the validly adopted son of Zalim Singh and the respondents who claimed to be descended from Umrao Singh could not certainly establish their title as the reversionary heirs of Jangli Bakhsh. Thus, the respondents were not entitled to any relief against either Appellant 1 or the deity Sri Ram Chandraji and the trustees of the deed of waqf. The Supreme Court dismissed the respondents’ suit against the appellants with costs and reversed the judgment of the Chief Court and restored the judgment of the trial court.

[Thakur Harihar Bakhsh Singh v. Musammat Prem Jagat Kuar, (1954) 2 SCC 765, decided on 26-11-1954]

*Judgment authored by: Justice N.H. Bhagwati


Advocates who appeared in this case :

For the Appellant: M.C. Setalvad, Attorney General for India (O.N. Srivastava and Rajinder Narain, Advocates, with him), for the Appellants

** Note: Res Judicata

In Escorts Farms Ltd. v. Commr., Kumaon Division, (2004) 4 SCC 281, the Supreme Court opined that res judicata is a plea available in civil proceedings in accordance with Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (‘CPC’). It is a doctrine applied to give finality to “lis” in original or appellate proceedings. The doctrine of res judicata means that an issue or a point decided and attaining finality should not be allowed to be reopened and reagitated twice over. In City Municipal Council Bhalki v. Gurappa, (2016) 2 SCC 200, the Supreme Court held that the principle of res judicata is a need of any judicial system, to give finality to the judicial decisions of the disputes between parties. It also aims to prevent multiplicity of proceedings between the same parties of the same subject-matter of the lis. An issue which was directly and substantially involved in a former suit between the same parties and has been decided and has attained finality cannot be reagitated before the courts again by instituting suit or proceeding by the same parties on the same subject-matter of earlier lis.

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