‘Indra Sawhney did not limit sub-classification to OBCs; Sub-classification of SC/STs permissible’: A point wise breakdown of Majority Ruling in SC’s 6:1 Verdict

Supreme Court: In a batch of civil appeal and special leave petitions, the seven Judge Constitution Bench comprising of Dr. DY Chandrachud, CJI, B.R. Gavai, Vikram Nath, Bela M. Trivedi, Pankaj Mithal, Manoj Misra, and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ., by a majority of 6:1, held that sub-classification of Scheduled Castes among reserved categories is permissible for granting separate quotas for more backwards within the SC categories. Justice Bela M. Trivedi dissented holding that such sub-classification is not permissible.

CJI Dr. DY Chandrachud penned the judgment for himself and Justice Manoj Misra, to which B.R. Gavai, Vikram Nath, Pankaj Mithal, and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ. agreed. However, they penned their separate opinions alongside their concurrence.

The Majority opinion overruled the E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of A.P., (2005) 1 SCC 394, wherein, it was held that SCs cannot be further classified for the purpose of reservation because they constitute an internally homogenous class by virtue of their inclusion in the Presidential list and thus, as a class, groups within the SCs cannot be treated differently and any further classification and consequent preferential treatment were held to violate Article 14, as it would amount to a constitutionally proscribed ‘micro-classification’.

The EV Chinnaiah Judgment

The validity of the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Castes (Rationalisation of Reservations) Act 2000 was in question. Section 3, which provided for ‘Rationalisation of Reservations,’ apportioned the benefits of reservation among Scheduled Castes into four groups — Groups A, B, C and D – in varying percentages. The Andhra Pradesh High Court rejected challenges to the Andhra Pradesh Act, leading to appeals which came to be decided in Chinnaiah (supra). The 5-Jugde Constitution Bench unanimously held that the Andhra Pradesh Act was unconstitutional. It was held that the SCs form a class by themselves. The Constitution creates a legal fiction in terms of which the SCs constitute a “class as a whole”. The States cannot sub-divide them. Such a sub-classification would tinker with the Presidential list and violate Article 14. If the benefits of reservation are not being distributed equitably, they can be supplemented by additional measures such as training, which would not be contrary to Articles 14 and 15. A further sub-classification amongst the Scheduled Castes would not be reasonable and a uniform yardstick must be adopted to give benefits to the Scheduled Castes.

Background

The State Legislature of Punjab enacted the Punjab Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes (Reservation in Services) Act 2006 (‘the Act’). It provided for reservation in services for the members of the Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes and for matters incidental thereto. Section 4(5) stipulates that fifty percent of the vacancies of the quota reserved for the Scheduled Castes in direct recruitment shall be offered to Balmikis and Mazhabi Sikhs, if available, as a first preference from amongst the Scheduled Castes.

Section 4(5) of the Act was challenged. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana declared Section 4(5) unconstitutional, relying on Chinnaiah (supra). The State challenged the said decision of the High Court, contending that Chinnaiah (supra) was not applicable to the matter at hand and was not consistent with the nine-Judge Bench decision in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992) Supp (3) SCC 217.

On 9-11-1994, the Government of Haryana issued a notification by which the Scheduled Castes in the State were classified into two categories for the purposes of reservation. Block B consisted of Chamars, Jatia Chamars, Rahgars, Raigars, Ramdasias or Ravidasias. Block A consisted of the remaining thirty-six castes in the list of Scheduled Castes for the State. The High Court quashed the said notification on the ground that the sub-classification of castes placed in the list of SCs is unconstitutional in view of Chinnaiah (supra). The SLPs challenging the said judgment are tagged with the appeals involving the challenge to the Punjab Act.

The State Legislature of Tamil Nadu enacted the Tamil Nadu Arunthathiyars (Special Reservation of seats in educational institutions including private educational Institutions and of appointments or posts in services under State within the Reservation for the Scheduled Castes) Act 2009 (‘Tamil Nadu Act’). It provides reservation of seats to Arunthathiyars in educational institutions, including private educational institutions in the State and for appointment in services under the State. The constitutional validity of the Tamil Nadu Act was challenged on the ground that it contravenes the Chinnaiah (supra) decision. The matters challenging the same were also tagged.

Reference of Correctness of EV Chinnaiah

On 20-08-2014, in State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, (2020) 8 SCC 65, a Constitution Bench held that the judgment in Chinnaiah (supra) requires to be revisited by a larger Bench of seven Judges because it failed to consider significant aspects bearing on the issue.

Issues

1. Whether sub-classification of a reserved class is permissible under Articles 14, 15 and 16?
2. Whether the SCs constitute a homogenous or a heterogenous grouping?
3. Whether Article 341 creates a homogenous class through the operation of the deeming fiction?

4. Whether there any limits on the scope of sub-classification?

The Majority Opinion- CJI Dr. DY Chandrachud

The interplay between Article 16 and Article 335

The Court said that reservations under Article 16(4) are not restricted to SC/ STs. The provision provides the State with the enabling power to provide reservations for the “backward classes” which are not adequately represented in the services of the State. The “backward class” encompasses more than SC/STs, it encompasses all classes whose backwardness is attributable to social reasons, including other socially and educationally backward classes such as the Other Backward Class category, women and the disabled. The Court added that applying the additional requirement of “efficiency of administration” only with respect to the exercise of power under Article 16(4) vis-à-vis the SCs and STs would be discriminatory. However, such an interpretative exercise of applying the principle of efficiency of service to restrict the power of the State to provide affirmative action policies is contrary to the express language of Article 335 which is confined to the SCs and STs. The Court opined that the proviso to Article 335, is a guidance to interpret the phrase “efficiency”. The Court reiterated two possible deductions about the scope of the provision, based on a reading of the proviso to Article 335. One possible meaning that can be deduced is that marks in the qualifying examination are not a marker of efficiency of administration because if they were, then a reduction of the qualifying standards/marks would also lead to a reduction in efficiency. Another possible interpretation could be that the premise of the proviso is that while reduction or dilution of the evaluating standards or the qualifying marks is not inconsistent with maintenance of efficiency, a complete removal of the qualifying marks would be. Thus, a policy which allows for lower qualifying marks or standards of evaluation is by the proviso to Article 335 not contrary to efficiency.

Permissibility of sub-classification under Article 14, 15 and 16

The Court held that Article 14 of the Constitution permits sub-classification of a class which is not similarly situated for the purpose of the law. The Court said that it is established that Article 14 guarantees factual and not formal equality. Thus, if persons are not similarly situated in reference to the purpose of the law, classification is permissible. The same logic of classification equally applies to sub-classification. The law can further classify a class that is already created by law for a limited purpose if it is heterogeneous for another purpose. The Court reiterated that such classification within a class is permitted under Article 14.

On the scope of sub-classification, the Court said that it must be determined if the class is an integrated homogenous class. Referring to a trajectory of cases, the Court pointed out the test to determine the validity of the sub-classification of a class, as follows:

1. Whether the class is “homogenous” or “similarly situated” for the purpose of the specific law;
2. If the answer to above is in the affirmative, the class cannot be sub- classified;
3. If the answer to it is in the negative, the class can be sub- classified upon the fulfilment of the following standard:
   1. There must be a yardstick (or intelligible differentia) further classifying the class; and

   2. The yardstick must have a rational nexus with the object of the statute.

Regarding the question of limits to sub-classification, the Court stated that persons are unequal in one or the other aspect. In each situation, even a single individual may be treated as a class by themselves and in such a case, it is particularly important that laws do not micro-classify. The question of whether the classification amounts to a micro-classification which is impermissible under Article 14 would depend on the facts of each case. There are two crucial components of the standard of intelligible differentia which prescribe the limits of sub-classification, (a) the purpose; and (b) the rational basis (or principle) for the differentiation.

Further, it was held that the while testing the validity of sub-classification, the Court must determine if the class is a homogenous integrated class for fulfilling the objective of the sub-classification. If the class is not integrated for the purpose, the class can be further classified upon the fulfillment of the two-prong intelligible differentia standard.

Additionally, the Court clarified that Indra Sawhney (supra), did not limit the application of sub-classification only to the Other Backward Class and upheld the application of the principle to beneficiary classes under Articles 15(4) and 16(4).

Further, on an in-depth study of the historical and empirical evidence, the Court said that it demonstrates that the SCs are a socially heterogenous class. Thus, the State in exercise of the power under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) can further classify the Scheduled Castes if (a) there is a rational principle for differentiation; and (b) the rational principle has a nexus with the purpose of sub-classification.

Deeming fiction in Article 341

The Court while holding that Article 341(1) does not create a deeming fiction, explained that “deemed” is used in the provision to mean that the castes or groups notified by the President shall be “regarded as” the Scheduled Castes. Even if it is accepted that the deeming fiction is used for the creation of a constitutional identity, the only logical consequence that flows from it is that castes included in the list will receive the benefits that the Constitution provides to the Scheduled Castes. The operation of the provision does not create an integrated homogenous class.

Further, the Court held that Sub-classification within the Scheduled Castes does not violate Article 341(2) because the castes are not per se included in or excluded from the List. It was also clarified that such Sub- classification would violate the provision only when either preference or exclusive benefit is provided to certain castes or groups of the SCs over all the seats reserved for the class.

Hence, Article 341 does not create an integrated homogenous class.

Overruling of Chinnaiah (supra)

Holding that sub-classification of SCs is permissible, the Court overruled Chinnaiah (supra), which held that sub-classification of the Scheduled Castes is impermissible.

Scope of sub-classification of the SCs

1. The objective of any form of affirmative action including sub-classification is to provide substantive equality of opportunity for the backward classes. The State can sub-classify, inter alia, based on inadequate representation of certain castes. However, the State must establish that the inadequacy of representation of a caste/group is because of its backwardness.
2. The State must collect data on the inadequacy of representation in the “services of the State” because it is used as an indicator of backwardness.

3. Article 335 of the Constitution is not a limitation on the exercise of power under Articles 16(1) and 16(4). Rather, it is a restatement of the necessity of considering the claims of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes in public services. Efficiency of administration must be viewed in a manner which promotes inclusion and equality as required by Article 16(1).

[State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1860, Decided on: 01-08-2024]