Allahabad High Court: In an appeal under Section 14(A)(1) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (‘SC/ST Act’) read with Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘CrPC’), challenging the order of the Trial Court acquitting the accused of rape charges, the Division Bench of Rahul Chaturvedi and Nand Prabha Shukla, JJ., dismissed the appeal while holding that there existed a difference between making a false promise to marry and committing breach of promise to marry and that, even though laws relating to sexual offences are women centric to protect their dignity, a make partner is not always in the wrong.
Background
The accused was charged under Sections 323, 504, 506, and 376 of the Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’) and Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act. The case originated from a complaint by the prosecutrix to the SSP in Prayagraj, alleging that she met the accused during her educational days in 2014 and developed a certain intimacy under the pretext of helping her with her studies and providing notes. Over time, they became intimate with each other leading to pre-marital sexual relations. It is submitted that the accused would often call her to ‘Yadav Lodge’ at Allahabad for 2-3 days at a time, and then leave her there, and during this period, he promised to marry her. The prosecutrix later moved to Lucknow for her studies, but accused continued to visit her, calling her to various hotels at Lucknow, where they continued their sexual relationship.
In 2018, the accused secured a job at C.M.P. Degree College in Allahabad, after which his behaviour towards her changed. As per the prosecutrix, when she visited him at the college in October 2019, he bluntly informed her that he would not marry her, and also physically assaulted her. She further submitted that when she visited residence of the accused, he and his mother pushed her and made derogatory comments about her caste, stating that as Yadavs, they would not allow a Chamar (Scheduled Caste) into their home. She reported these incidents to the SSP in Prayagraj, leading to the registration of an FIR in November 2019. The police investigated the case, recording her statements under Sections 161 and 164 of the CrPC. Following the investigation, a charge sheet was submitted against the accused, though his mother’s name was excluded. The case was committed to the Special Judge, SC/ST Act on 28-01-2020, and charges were framed on 14-02-2020.
Contentions of the Parties
The prosecution presented witnesses and documents to support their case. After the prosecution concluded, the accused was called to record his statement under Section 313 CrPC. The accused denied the allegations, claiming the prosecutrix fabricated the story on her counsel’s advice to malign him and asserted that in 2016, while working as a Lecturer in Economics at Raghuvar Dayal Pathak Inter College, the prosecutrix misrepresented her caste as Yadav to gain his support in her studies. He accused her of having malicious intentions and blackmailing him for money, claiming she had a hidden agenda and proposed marriage to him deceitfully.
The accused further argued that the FIR was filed five years after the alleged incidents, suggesting a ‘honey-trap’ scenario where the prosecutrix continuously blackmailed him. He submitted that both parties were adults who consensually engaged in a live-in relationship for five years. Upon discovering her true caste, which was crucial for marriage considerations, the accused decided against marrying her. The accused contended that the prosecutrix fabricated the rape allegations after accused refused to marry her. He further highlighted her refusal to undergo extensive medical tests to substantiate the rape claims.
Medical Evidence Analysis
The prosecutrix underwent a primary medical examination by a doctor at the women’s hospital, where the doctor found evidence of continued consensual sexual activity with accused, noting the use of condoms, which indicated the prosecutrix was aware and conscious of avoiding pregnancy. She informed the doctor of their amicable relationship and mutual decision to marry, until the change in the behaviour of the accused, after securing a job. During cross-examination, it was revealed that the prosecutrix declined an internal pathological examination, preventing the doctor from determining whether she had been subjected to any non-consensual sexual acts.
Decision and Analysis
The Court analysed the submissions made by both parties and examined the evidence on record and observed that it was strange that the prosecutrix had refused internal medical examination, when it forms an integral part of the investigation and largely affects the credibility of the prosecutrix. The Court further noted that there was nothing on record to establish that the prosecutrix was subjected to any sexual assault by the accused.
The Court referred noted that even though ‘consent’ under IPC was not defined, it could be inferred from the circumstances and conduct of the parties. In the present case, the case of the prosecutrix was entirely based on rape on the false premise of marriage. The Court noted that the relationship between the accused and the prosecutrix started in 2014 and lasted up to 2018, during which both the parties met at several hotels and lodges and engaged in sexual relations with each other, without any hesitation or resistance by prosecutrix.
The Court said that there existed a stark difference between making a false promise and breach of promise by the accused, further noting that in case of false promise, the accused, right from the beginning, would not have any intention to marry the prosecutrix and would have been deceitful towards the prosecutrix by making a false promise to marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach of promise, there would be a possibility that the accused might have made a serious promise to marry her, and subsequently due to circumstances beyond his control failed to fulfil his promise, hence, it would be incorrect to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and to prosecute a person for the offence under Section 376 of the IPC. The Court referred to Maheshwar Tigga v. State of Jharkhand, (2020) 10 SCC 108, wherein it was held that misconception of fact has to be in proximity of time to the occurrence of the event and could not be spread over a long period of time.
The Court took note of the fact that the prosecutrix was already married to someone in the year 2010 and hence even if the accused that made her false promise of marriage, the same would cease to matter during the subsistence of such marriage.
With regard to the applicability of Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act was concerned the Court remarked “…a lady who is already married and without dissolution of her earlier marriage and concealing her caste has maintained the physical relationship for good 5 years without any objection and hesitation and both of them have visited numbers of hotel, lodges at Allahabad and Lucknow and enjoyed the company of each other. It is difficult to adjudicate who is befooling whom?”
The Court said that even though the Chapter XVI of the IPC, “Sexual Offences”, was rightly women-centric to protect the dignity of women, however, a male partner could not always be in the wrong. The Court, therefore, upheld the order of the Trial Court, holding that there was nothing palpably erroneous in the Order of the Trial Court, and dismissed the appeal.
[Informant/Victim v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine All 2756, decided on 30-05-2024]
Advocates who appeared in this case:
Advocates for the Appellant: Ashutosh Mishra, Kripa Kant Pandey, Advocates
Advocate for the State: G.A.
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