Supreme Court: The present case was an appeal filed by the appellant challenging the judgment passed by the High Court of Pepsu (‘the High Court’), the three-judges bench of M.C. Mahajan*, Chandrasekhara Aiyar and N.H. Bhagwati, JJ., opined that the entries made in the pedigree table prepared at the settlement of 1904 were a weighty piece of evidence, and the High Court was justified in placing reliance on them to prove the respondents’ relationship with Daya Singh. Further, family members on whose information the settlement officer prepared the pedigree in 1904 must be presumed to have given a correct pedigree to him and would have better knowledge in the matter than those on whose information the pedigree was prepared in the 1928, i.e. twenty-four years afterwards.
The Supreme Court opined that in law, presumption of correctness attaches to the records prepared in accordance with the provisions of the Land Revenue Act at whatever period they might have been prepared unless the later record in express terms declared that the earlier entries were incorrect. Thus, the Supreme Court opined that the High Court was right in holding that the respondents were collaterals of Daya Singh in the seventh degree and dismissed the present appeal.
Background
In the present case, the disputed land belonged to Daya Singh, who died childless about thirty-five years ago, leaving him surviving a widow. Thereafter, by a deed executed and registered on 23-12-1944, the widow adopted the appellant. Further, on 15-03-1947, the respondent claiming to be the collaterals of Daya Singh, instituted the suit for a declaration that the adoption was null and void as against their reversionary rights. The Trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the respondents had failed to prove their collateral relationship with Daya Singh, and on an appeal to the District Judge, this decision was affirmed. Subsequently, the second appeal was preferred to the High Court, wherein the High Court held that the respondents had established their relationship with Daya Singh.
Thus, the appellant preferred the present appeal. The appellant relied on Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (‘CPC’) and stated that the High Court had acted more than its jurisdiction in reversing in second appeal on a pure question of fact that the respondents were not the collaterals of Daya Singh. Further, the appellant contended that the pedigree table prepared at the settlement of 1904 was not correct, and a new pedigree table was prepared in 1928 to which the presumption of correctness attaches. The defendant stated that the pedigree table of 1928 showed that Soora and Karmu were heads of two different families, and while Soora’s father’s name was mentioned, Karmu’s father was not mentioned, and this omission negatives the respondent’s case that Soora and Karmu were real brothers.
Analysis, Law, and Decision
The Supreme Court opined that the provisions of Section 100 of CPC, had no application to an appeal preferred to the High Court and it had jurisdiction in a second appeal to correct errors of fact and law of the subordinate courts. Therefore, the Supreme Court abandoned the contention that the High Court had acted more than its jurisdiction in disturbing the finding of the District Judge.
The Supreme Court opined that the entries made in the pedigree table prepared at the settlement of 1904 were a weighty piece of evidence, and the High Court was justified in placing reliance on them to prove the respondents’ relationship with Daya Singh. Further, family members on whose information the settlement officer prepared the pedigree in 1904 must be presumed to have given a correct pedigree to him and would have better knowledge in the matter than those on whose information the pedigree was prepared in the 1928, i.e. twenty-four years afterwards. The Supreme Court took note of the District Judge opinion that a presumption of correctness attaches to the entries made in the revenue papers prepared at a later date, as the later entries were supposed to had corrected errors and opined that this proposition did not seem to be sound. The Supreme Court opined that in law, presumption of correctness attaches to the records prepared in accordance with the provisions of the Land Revenue Act at whatever period they might have been prepared unless the later record in express terms declared that the earlier entries were incorrect.
The Supreme Court opined that pedigree prepared at the settlement of 1904 was certainly presumptive evidence to prove the respondents’ relationship with Daya Singh, and similar presumption attached to the pedigree table prepared in 1928 and the entries made in 1928 had to be presumed to be correct to the extent they went, and no one disputes their correctness. The Supreme Court opined that the omission of Karmu’s father’s name in 1928 pedigree might have been due to the circumstance that the descendants of Karmu were not able to inform the revenue officer the name of Karmu’s father, while the descendants of Soora were able to mention the name of Soora’s father and they were not able to say whether Soora and Karmu were brothers. The Supreme Court opined that the inference could not be drawn that those who stated in 1904 that Karmu and Soora were brothers, had mentioned this fact falsely.
Further, regarding the contention that in 1904 pedigree table Dhandu was entered as the common ancestor of the parties, but in 1928 pedigree table, Nandu was shown as the father of Soora and that he must be a different person. The Supreme Court opined that the High Court was right in the view that Nandu and Dhandu were the names of the same individual, and it seemed that this confusion of names between Dhandu and Nandu was due to some error in recording the names. The Supreme Court opined the view taken by the High Court was also supported by the entries in the jamabandi, wherein it was shown that both these branches have a one-seventh share in a joint patti.
Thus, the Supreme Court opined that the High Court was right in holding that the respondents were collaterals of Daya Singh in the seventh degree and dismissed the present appeal.
[Inder Singh v. Dhanna Singh, (1952) 2 SCC 574, decided on 04-12-1952]
*Note: Presumption of correctness in revenue records
In Partap Singh v. Shiv Ram, (2020) 11 SCC 242 it had been held that presumption of truth attached to the revenue record can be rebutted only based on evidence of impeccable integrity and reliability. The oral evidence can always be adduced contrary to the revenue record, but such oral testimony will not be sufficient to hold that the statutory presumption stands rebutted. The Supreme Court held that the revenue record can be rebutted if such entry was made fraudulently or surreptitiously, or where such entry has not been made by following the prescribed procedure.
*Judgment by- Justice M.C. Mahajan
Advocates who appeared in this case :
For the Appellant: Bakshi Tek Chand, Senior Advocate (A.N. Chona, Advocate, with him);
For the Respondents: Ratan Lal Chawla, Senior Advocate (K.N. Aggarwala, Advocate, with him)
Ok