Tracing the Roots of Modern International Refugee Law: Historical Foundations and Legal Progression

Introduction

The origin of the word “refugee” traces back to the French word “réfugié”, which was used earlier to identify the Huguenots, hundreds of thousands of French Protestants who fled the rule of the staunchly Catholic French crown and found refuge in more welcoming, non-Catholic lands across Europe.¹ The word “refugee” is used to refer to those who are “forced to flee to a place of safety because of a danger of persecution”.² Refugees are those people who are forced to flee their own country and seek protection in another country. They are unable to return to their own country because of fear of persecution as a result of who they are or what they believe in or say, or because of armed conflict, violence, or serious public disorder.³ Seeking refuge in another land out of fear of persecution is not a modern idea. Even in ancient eastern history, deposed monarchs often fled to neighbouring courts after a coup or invasion. Although people have been offering and finding shelter across borders for centuries, it was not until the 20th century that governments began codifying those practices into law, a development rooted largely in European political traditions.⁴

Modern international refugee law (hereinafter “IRL”) is the cumulative product of centuries of State practice and humanitarian response to forced migration, persecution and conflict. Its historical roots can be traced to the early modern period, even though no formal legal regime existed before the 20th century. For example, in late 17th century Europe, State edicts under the banner of religious conformity precipitated mass exoduses. When King Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes in 1685, about 1,50,000 French Huguenots fled France, creating, in the words of one historian, “one of the largest refugee movements of the early modern period”.⁵ Despite such large-scale movements, however, the notion of a specialised body of law for refugees remained virtually undeveloped through the 19th century. As James Hathaway observes, States during that era largely permitted unrestricted immigration, often without distinguishing political exiles from ordinary migrants, and gave little thought to defining the legal category of “refugee”.⁶ It was not until the upheavals of World War I and its aftermath that international society began to codify rules for asylum seekers and refugees. Since, it was established following World War I, contemporary IRL, which is primarily governed by the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, has undergone substantial change. This evolution history is largely shaped by political expediencies, geopolitics, and national interests, according to scholarly analysis. As a result, refugees frequently encounter hostile surroundings and have trouble getting protection. There are worries that the current legal system is insufficient to handle the complexity of contemporary refugee issues and the range of situations that lead to displacement. Some believe that States have diluted the concept of “refugeehood” and compromised protection by limiting their role in the development of IRL to maximise political expediency. The malleability of the refugee concept and the susceptibility to a broader interpretation have provided States with discretion to potentially ignore their international obligations.

The inter-war League of Nations period saw the first multilateral instruments on refugee status, responding to crises of displaced Russians, Armenians and others. Those efforts formed the forerunners of today’s regime. After World War II, the establishment of the United Nations and the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) set the stage for the first comprehensive refugee treaty in 1951, later expanded globally by its 1967 Protocol. In the decades since, IRL has continued to evolve through new regional conventions, supranational frameworks (notably in Europe and Africa), and expanded definitions reflecting broader humanitarian concerns. At the same time, the tension between State sovereignty and the protection of refugees has remained a constant theme, surfacing in debates over non-refoulement, asylum rights and burden-sharing. Today’s discussions about “climate refugees” and mass migration crises build on this deep historical foundation. This paper presents a critical argument that State sovereignty concerns and shifting global dynamics pose significant challenges to modern IRL, which has its roots in specific historical contexts and culminates in the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention). This calls for a more thorough understanding of the law’s development as well as a reformist endeavour that draws on a variety of legal and interdisciplinary approaches. This paper aims to contribute to the ongoing discussion on how to establish a more equitable and successful refugee protection regime in a global context by examining the historical underpinnings and legal development of the international legal regulations defining the fundamental rights that follow from refugee status.

Historical origins of refugee protection

Religious persecution and early migration

Although no IRL existed in the early modern period, States occasionally granted asylum on ad hoc grounds. One of the best-known early episodes was France’s Edict of Nantes (1598), which for the first time formally guaranteed rights to the Protestant minority (Huguenots). Its 1685 revocation by the Edict of Fontainebleau outlawed Protestant worship and forced many Huguenots into exile. An estimated 1,50,000 Huguenots fled to neighbouring countries, significantly bolstering Protestant communities in Prussia, the Netherlands, England and elsewhere.⁷ This migration is often seen as an early example of an organised refugee movement, driven by State persecution. Yet, States of that era treated such displaced peoples as migrants rather than in terms of international obligations. The host governments often welcomed Huguenot skilled artisans and capital, not out of legal duty but for economic and religious sympathy. In general, however, no legal concept of “refugee” existed; instead, European asylum practices were ad hoc, even generous in some liberal regimes, and largely dictated by domestic considerations (religious tolerance, labour needs, or strategic alliances) rather than international law.⁸ Another early pattern of forced migration arose in the Ottoman Empire. Throughout the 19th century, waves of conflict and changing borders in the Balkans and Caucasus displaced large Muslim and Christian populations. For example, the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 triggered the flight of over 1.5 million Ottoman Muslims from newly independent Balkan States back into Anatolia, while Christian populations in Ottoman lands (Armenians, Greeks and Slavs) also moved into Europe and Russia.⁹ Although these movements were immense, they too predated a formal legal regime. The Ottoman and European States that received refugees generally handled them through religious or communal networks, local charity and ad hoc arrangements. They were “protected” insofar as States of origin could not compel return after permanent loss of territory, but there was no binding legal guarantee of asylum.

World War I’s catastrophes — notably the Armenian genocide and the collapse of empires — produced unprecedented displacement. As scholar Keith Watenpaugh recounts, in the wake of the Ottoman Empire’s defeat and the Turkish Nationalist Revolution, hundreds of thousands of Armenians became refugees across the Middle East and Europe.¹⁰ The post-war Treaties of Sèvres (1920) and Lausanne (1923) reorganised national borders, often mandating population transfers. Most famously, the 1923 Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations forcibly uprooted about 1.5 million Greek Orthodox from Anatolia and some 0.5 million Muslims from Greece, an ethnic “exchange” intended to resolve minority issues at the price of massive displacement.¹¹ These events drove the world’s first modern refugee crisis, but again, the response was diplomatic and political rather than legal: There was no neutral tribunal or court enforcing refugee rights, only States negotiating population deals.

Early humanitarian responses (pre-league)

Shortly after the First World War, the plight of uprooted men, women, and children first emerged on the world’s stage as an “international problem”. At that time, many believed this human tragedy would be temporary, that lives torn apart by conflict would soon “settle” back into place. Yet even in those early days, the international response moved slowly and in fits and starts.¹² The League of Nations did name a series of High Commissioners, but each was charged only with one group of refugees (Russians here, Armenians there, Germans elsewhere), and none of those offices endured. When the Second World War finally ended, new bodies sprang up again — this time to address Europeans bereft of home, Palestinians searching for safety, and Koreans displaced by division.¹³ Still, by 1950, no global network of institutions and no unified system of laws existed to protect refugees wherever they might appear. It was not until the formation of the office of the UNHCR in 1950-1951 that the world at last forged a formal structure, a lifeline of offices, standards, and legal guarantees to respond to people driven from their homes and to safeguard their basic rights under international law.¹⁴

The League of Nations, founded in 1920, took up refugee matters under humanitarian auspices, and it was the first intergovernmental organisation established “to promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and security”.¹⁵ In 1921, the League appointed Fridtjof Nansen (a noted explorer and humanitarian) as High Commissioner for Russian Refugees, largely former subjects of the Tsar dislocated by the Bolshevik Revolution. Nansen negotiated an Arrangement with Respect to the Issue of Certificates of Identity to Russian Refugees (July 1922), setting up internationally recognised travel documents (the first “Nansen passports”) for some 4,50,000 stateless Russians.¹⁶ These travel documents facilitated resettlement by giving refugees an internationally accepted identity (Nansen later helped Armenians and other groups similarly). This innovation is often cited as one of the first steps toward international refugee protection. It signalled that States could cooperate to grant legal status to displaced people even without a sovereign State to sponsor them.

By the mid-1920s, the League began formalising refugee status in treaties. In 1926, it adopted the Arrangement Relating to the Issue of Identity Certificates to Russian and Armenian Refugees, extending Nansen’s approach. Under this Arrangement, Russian and Armenian refugees (uprooted by the revolution and genocide, respectively) were defined and given standardised identity papers by contracting States.¹⁷ These arrangements, however, were technical measures concerning travel documents: They did not grant substantive rights like asylum or relief, nor impose duties beyond recognition of the certificates.

It was not until 1933 that the League codified a broad status for refugees. In that year, the Convention relating to the International Status of Refugees was adopted by a diplomatic conference. This Convention defined “refugee” (essentially political refugees of non-European origin, as drafted) and granted them a series of rights: asylum, freedom of religion, judicial protection, and a few others.¹⁸ It also provided that States would not impose penalties on refugees entering without papers (a modest acknowledgment of necessity). Crucially, the Convention left out any explicit duty of asylum and expressly allowed each State to refuse refugees entry to its territory.¹⁹ In practice, only a few countries ratified it, and its impact was limited. In the 1930s, the rise of totalitarian regimes and depression-era nationalism meant that many governments restricted asylum, deported unwanted migrants (including Jews fleeing Nazism), and abrogated refugees’ hopes. Still, the 1933 Convention was the first instance of a multilateral refugee treaty, a step toward treating refugees as objects of common concern.

By the eve of World War II, the refugee problem had been dramatically illustrated — millions of stateless and displaced persons roamed Europe and the Middle East. States had occasionally acted unilaterally (for example, quotas or admissions), but no general regime existed. With the League ineffective in the 1930s, many observers lamented the absence of binding protections for those fleeing persecution.

Post World War II and the United Nations framework

The atrocities and displacements of World War II galvanised the international community to create a comprehensive refugee regime under the United Nations. Millions of Europeans — Jews, prisoners of war, concentration camp survivors, ethnic minorities, and others — were uprooted. The Allied victors and the new UN perceived refugee law as part of a broader human rights and humanitarian agenda.

Creation of UNHCR and statute (1946-1950)

In 1946, the UN passed a resolution creating the International Refugee Organisation (IRO) to resettle tens of thousands of war-displaced persons. The IRO operated from 1947 to 1952 and accomplished massive resettlement programs (moving refugees to new countries rather than insisting on return to destroyed homelands). In 1948, however, it became clear that refugee problems extended beyond the immediate post-war period. The UN General Assembly thus convened a Conference of Plenipotentiaries in 1951 (in Geneva) to draft an IRL framework. In December 1949, the Assembly had already adopted the Statute of the Office of the UNHCR. This statute (entered into force 1-1-1951) created UNHCR as a UN organ mandated to provide international protection and seek durable solutions for refugees globally.²⁰ The UNHCR Statute authorised the High Commissioner “to provide international protection” to refugees and to seek permanent solutions, and was renewed for a full tenure in 1954. Notably, the statute defined a refugee as someone who, “as a result of events occurring before 1-1-1951, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such events, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country”.²¹ This definition in the statute, though ambitious, was time-limited (pre-1951 events) and would later be revised. The UNHCR was forced into functions and areas it had never before envisaged during the massive refugee crises of the 1990s.

The exodus of Iraqi Kurds took place in 1991. After Saddam Hussein’s forces crushed a northern uprising at the end of the Gulf War, hundreds of thousands of Kurds fled towards Turkey, which quickly turned them back at the border. Facing a humanitarian crisis on the mountain slopes, US-led coalition forces stepped in to provide food, medicine, and shelter for these people. They even created a “safe haven” inside Iraq itself: It was indeed a turning point since, for the first time, international relief efforts aimed at stabilising people in their homeland rather than just helping them settle in foreign host States.²²

The disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991 was followed by the largest refugee exodus in Europe since the end of World War II. Ethnic cleansing swept Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the world looking on helplessly as civilians remained trapped in active war zones. Attempts to establish protected “safe areas” failed completely, and it was only after the Dayton Peace Accords in December 1995 that the flow of displaced persons began to taper off. The burden of getting refugees back into their homes was mainly on UNHCR, which had to deal with complicated political and security issues in making repatriation possible.²³

In 1999, about 8,00,000 ethnic Albanians left Kosovo for neighbouring Albania and Macedonia as violence erupted once again in the Balkans. The UNHCR organised one of its biggest-ever emergency evacuations, relocating thousands from Macedonia to third countries for safety. Later that year, when Yugoslav forces withdrew under an internationally brokered peace plan, an estimated 2,00,000 Serbs and other minorities left Kosovo in what came to be called “reverse ethnic cleansing”, again supervised by the UNHCR.²⁴

Together, these three emergencies shaped the mission of the UN refugee agency — pushing it deeper into conflict zones, into the heart of countries of origin, and into complex political negotiations to protect and eventually return the displaced people.

1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol

Article 14 of the UDHR²⁵ became the ground of the landmark outcome of the 1951 Conference, the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Adopted on 28-7-1951,²⁶ it remains the cornerstone of IRL.²⁷ The idea behind this article is to reinforce the ancient system, where people are not restricted from going to the other territories. The Convention created a common legal definition and set of obligations. Under Article 1(A)(2) of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, a “refugee” was defined as a person who, “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”,²⁸ is outside his country of nationality and unable or unwilling to avail himself of that country’s protection.²⁹ This definition, adapted from practice during and after the war, notably omitted events after 1951 and was geographically limited to Europe [as per its Article 1(B)] — reflecting the Cold War context and Western States’ concerns. Many Eastern Bloc and non-Western crises were thus left out initially. The Convention laid down binding rights for refugees: It guaranteed basic civil rights (religion, courts, elementary education), public relief, identity and travel documents, and — crucially — non-refoulement (Article 33), which prohibits expelling or returning a refugee to a territory where his life or freedom would be threatened. The Convention did not create a right to entry or asylum: It assumed refugees would be within or admitted to a contracting State’s territory for the protection to apply.

The 1951 Convention was opened for signature in July 1951 and entered into force in April 1954. It applied to 145 countries by early 2025, though with notable reservations by many (for example, on welfare rights or freedom of movement). In 1967, a protocol removed the temporal and geographic limits of the definition, making the Convention’s provisions applicable to all refugees worldwide. The 1967 Protocol thus affirmed that the refugee definition would apply to “persons coming from Europe” and those from elsewhere, irrespective of date. Together, the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol remain the bedrock of refugee protection.

Regional and supplementary regimes

While the UN system developed these core instruments, various regions also created their own regimes to address specific circumstances. These regional frameworks often broadened the notion of refugee beyond the 1951 Convention’s terms.

The African (OAU/AU) regime

In Africa, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU; now the African Union) recognised that continental conflicts and State fragmentation were producing refugee flows beyond the 1951 definition. In 1969, African States adopted the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (entered into force in 1974). This Convention drew from the 1951 text but expanded the refugee definition and obligations. Article 1(2)³⁰ defined a refugee to include broader language that captured victims of wars, coups and colonial legacies. The OAU Convention also emphasised African States’ responsibilities: It explicitly prohibited evicting refugees if such asylum would expose them to danger,³¹ and recognised that asylum in Africa was a collective responsibility. Importantly, the OAU regime de-emphasised any right of States to refuse refugees on grounds of national sovereignty. In sum, Africa’s refugee law regime institutionalised a more expansive conception of who qualifies as a refugee and underscored regional solidarity and burden-sharing.

The Latin American (Cartagena) approach

Latin American States likewise expanded refugee protection. In 1984, attending a high-level colloquium in Cartagena (Colombia), they adopted the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees. This non-binding declaration, built on the 1951 Convention, affirmed that the refugee concept should include “persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety, or freedom have been threatened by generalised violence or events seriously disturbing public order” (as had become common in Central America).³² Cartagena thus included victims of internal conflicts and widespread human rights abuses, even absent targeted persecution for a Convention ground. The Declaration also reaffirmed non-refoulement as a “cornerstone” of protection and called for fair asylum procedures among the signatory States. Though not a treaty, Cartagena has guided laws in many Latin American countries (for example, in Colombian and Mexican asylum legislation) and represents a regional consensus on broader refugee criteria.

European Union and the common asylum policy

In Europe, refugee protection developed both through UN instruments and through evolving regional cooperation. Early on, Western Europe received refugees from Eastern Europe during the Cold War, but formal EU-level law emerged later. The 1990s saw the EU (then the European Community) establish a Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Important milestones include the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, which recognised asylum as a right and required harmonised procedures, and subsequent directives: the 2001 Qualification Directive (setting common standards for refugee status and subsidiary protection), the 2003 Procedures Directive (standardising asylum processes), and the 2004 Reception Conditions Directive, among others. The Dublin regulation (first in 1990, recast in 2013) also became key: It assigns responsibility for determining asylum claims to the first EU country of entry, effectively controlling asylum flows. The EU asylum regime attempts to balance States’ sovereign control with mutual solidarity: By law, member States must protect refugees according to the 1951 definition, yet still cooperate to prevent uncontrolled secondary movements. The European Court of Justice and the Charter of Fundamental Rights have even recognised non-refoulement as a general principle. Still, tensions persist, as the EU’s recent “refugee crisis” demonstrated.

Definition of “refugee” and State sovereignty

A central feature of refugee law has been the definition of who is entitled to protection, as well as the obligations of States towards such persons. Over time, the definition has evolved from the narrow 1951 terms to broader interpretations in some contexts, while States have continuously asserted their sovereignty over borders.

As noted, Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention set the first multilateral definition in binding form. It emphasised persecution for specific grounds and explicitly required refugees to be outside their home country and unable/unwilling to avail themselves of its protection.³³ This definition was narrow in two ways: it was limited to pre-1951 events, meaning it offered recognition and protection only to someone who, because of events before 1-1-1951, and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution on grounds of race, religion, nationality, and so on, found themselves outside their home country and unable or unwilling to seek its protection. In other words, its shield applied only to those who became refugees before 1951.³⁴ And (by State choice) initially to Europe. That changed when the 1967 Protocol came into force. By then, new waves of displacement had swept the globe, and the old cut-off date no longer made sense. The Protocol extended the Convention’s safeguard to every refugee, whether driven from home by events before 1-1-1951, or afterward, and it did so without any geographic limit. In one stroke, the Protocol breathed new life into the Convention, making its promise of protection truly universal. Thus, the “1951 Convention refugee” remains, conceptually, an involuntary migrant fleeing individualised persecution.³⁵

All major refugee frameworks — including the UNHCR Handbook³⁶ and the Qualification Directive of the EU³⁷ — have built on Article 1(A)(2). Regional instruments, however, have given different emphases. As above, the OAU definition captured collective and war-driven flight, and Cartagena included those fleeing generalised violence or collapsed order. Some countries have taken these definitions into domestic law. For example, the US Refugee Act, 1980 adopted the 1951 definition (via the UN), but State practice (for example, parole policies) has sometimes admitted asylum-seekers on humanitarian or territorial grounds beyond that strict definition. Non-binding instruments like the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998 also reflect evolving thinking: they grant special attention to persons displaced within their own country by conflict or disaster, indicating a concern parallel to refugee issues [though internally displaced persons (IDPs) are not refugees under international law].

Despite these expansions, climate and disaster migrants remain outside the formal refugee regime. As one commentator notes, “legally the concept of ‘climate refugee’ does not exist”, since environmental factors are not among the persecution grounds of the 1951 Convention.³⁸ This gap has prompted proposals for new treaties or instruments to address involuntary environmental migration, but so far, no State has recognised climate-induced displacement as making one a refugee in the legal sense. In practice, some environmental migrants may claim asylum on mixed grounds (for instance, if climate change exacerbated conflict or if they belong to a persecuted group and also face environmental threats), but purely “climate refugees” currently fall outside refugee law, illustrating the continuing limits of the definition.

Closely related to the refugee definition is the principle of non-refoulement, the obligation not to return refugees to danger. Article 33 of the 1951 Convention prohibits expulsion of a refugee in any manner whatsoever “where (his) life or freedom would be threatened”.³⁹ Non-refoulement has since become widely regarded as a norm of customary international law (jus cogens⁴⁰), limiting State sovereignty. As the UNHCR’s 2007 advisory opinion emphasises, non-refoulement is an “essential and non-derogable component of international refugee protection”.⁴¹ Similarly, numerous UN General Assembly resolutions and the Cartagena Declaration have affirmed that no State may expel a refugee to a place of persecution. In other words, even though States retain the right to control their borders, they may not invoke sovereignty as a shield to violate the core duty of non-refoulement.⁴² Indeed, international practice suggests that humanitarian obligations (and human rights norms) can constrain States’ asylum policies. Courts and human rights bodies have sometimes struck down pushbacks and interception practices on refoulement grounds. Nonetheless, the tension remains: during periods of crisis (such as mass flows or high politicisation of immigration), many governments seek to limit asylum access, citing security or capacity concerns. Thus, the refugee regime continuously balances State sovereignty against humanitarian duty.

Contemporary developments and challenges

The historical foundations of refugee law continue to inform current challenges, even as new dimensions arise.

Migration crises of the 21st century

The early 21st century has witnessed several large-scale refugee movements and mixed migration flows. The Syrian civil war (beginning in 2011) forced more than 14 million people of Syria to flee their homes in search of safety, and more than 7.4 million people remain internally displaced in their own country. Even in 2025, more than 16.7 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance.⁴³ Europe experienced a particular crisis in 2015 — 2016, when over 9,11,000 people (refugees and migrants) arrived via Mediterranean routes in a few months, more than 75 per cent of them fleeing conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan or Iraq.⁴⁴ UNHCR described 2015 as a watershed year in Europe’s refugee situation, noting “the sheer weight of numbers” dominated political debate.⁴⁵ This crisis tested EU mechanisms (like relocation quotas and the Dublin system) and revived debates about responsibility-sharing, much as earlier post-war crises had forced reconsideration of burden-sharing (as with the UN’s 1951 Statute and later refugee resettlement programs).

Elsewhere, crises in South Sudan, Myanmar (Rohingya), Central America (Northern Triangle migrants), and sub-Saharan conflicts have strained regional systems. The principle of non-refoulement and the 1951 definition are regularly invoked, but many States rely on externalisation and deterrence. For example, European States have funded border controls in neighbouring regions to prevent asylum-seekers from reaching their territory, a strategy reflecting sovereign prerogative but criticised by advocates as evading legal duties. In the Americas, some States have drawn on the Cartagena approach to grant asylum beyond the 1951 criteria (for example, asylum policies for Hondurans fleeing gangs).

Climate change and new forms of displacement

Perhaps the fastest-growing challenge is displacement related to climate change and environmental degradation. Sea-level rise, desertification, storms, and resource shortages are displacing people, often internally and sometimes across borders. Since, “environmental factors” are not recognised grounds in existing refugee law, many displaced by climate change fall into a legal limbo. Scholars and practitioners have called this group “climate-displaced persons” or “environmental migrants”. Some island nations have proposed new regional arrangements to relocate their populations, but no international treaty yet provides them with formal refugee status. The Guardian interview of the UN Special Rapporteur stated that no consensus has been reached on how to incorporate climate-induced movement into refugee law. As the Forced Migration Review noted, current instruments only tangentially touch on this issue; at best, displaced persons might be protected under complementary human rights or statelessness law if their home disappears. Nonetheless, the historical trajectory suggests that if climate displacement becomes a recognised international problem (analogous to post-war displacement), legal innovation could follow. Just as the 1948 Universal Declaration and 1951 Convention emerged from the unprecedented displacement of World War II, one could argue that a future global consensus on environmental protection might yield new instruments — or an expanded interpretation of “refugee” — addressing climate migrants. Some Pacific States, for instance, lobby for annexes to the Refugee Convention or separate compacts. Others advocate strengthening the Global Compact on Refugees (2018) and national asylum laws to cover “climate refugees” as a form of humanitarian admission.

Lessons from history

The tension between sovereignty and humanitarian commitment remains visible in modern debates. As in the past, States often emphasise border control and national interests in deciding whom to admit (for example, invoking security screenings or economic criteria). At the same time, international and domestic courts, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and some governments invoke the historical principle that those fleeing peril deserve protection irrespective of convenience. The concept of burden-sharing, which underlay the UNHCR Statute and was reaffirmed in regional charters, resurfaces in calls for more equitable refugee resettlement and financial support for host countries. Indeed, many aspects of the current situation echo earlier periods: The 1930s saw walls go up against Jews fleeing Nazi persecution, while today walls exist in the Balkans and North Africa; the post-1945 era saw labour shortages leading to migration recruitment alongside rights for refugees, analogous to today’s debates on integration versus national identity. Understanding how refugee law developed historically — through tragedy, negotiation and compromise — helps clarify why certain categories exist (and why others do not) and why States sometimes push back on humanitarian norms. It underscores that refugee protection is not merely a technical legal question but a reflection of broader political will.

Conclusion

The story of modern refugee law is really the story of people — of ordinary lives upended by fear, exile and hope — meeting the hard realities of borders and governments. Think of the Huguenots, packing what little they could carry as they fled religious persecution in early modern Europe. Fast forward to the shattered world after World War I and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, when millions wandered across Europe’s broken frontiers in search of safety. It was not until the horrors of the next global conflict, though, that the world finally said “never again” with real teeth: The United Nations was born, the UNHCR set up shop, and in 1951, nations signed on to a binding promise to protect those driven from home. That promise was given universal reach in 1967, and since then, Africa’s OAU Convention and Latin America’s Cartagena Declaration have shown how regional voices can adapt the original vision to local wounds.

Yet even the strongest promises can fray under pressure. Governments still struggle to balance the duty to protect with the impulse to seal their borders, sometimes treating non-refoulement (a legal shield against forced return) as negotiable rather than sacred. When Syrians fled bombs and Rohingya families slipped into India’s crowded towns, it became heartbreakingly clear that mid-century rules can stumble over 21st century realities. And now, whole communities vanish into seas surging from climate change, with no legal “refugee” label to claim. Globally, facing rising tides and refugee numbers, we will need more than new definitions; we will need renewed solidarity, real burden-sharing, and a commitment to keep the promise alive. After all, every time the world has been tested by mass displacement, laws have grown stronger — so it must be again, for the sake of everyone still searching for home.