Delhi High Court: In a petition challenging the order dated 29-4-2017, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-01, North District, Rohini Court, Delhi (‘Sessions Court’), in case arising out of FIR registered for offence punishable under Section 376 of the Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’) read with Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (‘POCSO Act’), Dr. Swarana Kanta Sharma, J., stated that it must be remembered that while the law shields individuals with mental disabilities from unwarranted criminal liability, it did not and could not permit a blind discharge of such individuals into society without a proper and informed judicial assessment.
Thus, the Court stated that the omission to follow the mandate of Section 330(3) of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (‘CrPC’), in the present case renders the impugned order legally unsustainable. Accordingly, the Court set aside the impugned order, to the extent it simply discharged the respondent (‘accused’) without following the procedure set out in Section 330(3) of CrPC and remanded the matter back to Sessions Court for compliance of the statutory provision.
Background
In the present case, there were allegations of an attempted sexual assault upon the victim, a minor girl, by the accused. The victim alleged that the accused had attempted to commit an inappropriate act with her, in a vacant plot. The victim was medically examined and the doctor concerned had recorded the alleged history of attempt to sexual assault, as stated by the victim. It was also noted that the accused was not known to the victim.
Further, one witness had claimed to have seen the incident from her residence. According to the witness, the accused had undressed himself as well as the victim and he was about to sexually assault the victim, but he was apprehended before he could commit any further act. After completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the accused for an offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act.
The Sessions Court, vide impugned order, discharged the accused, stating that the mental age of the accused was of a four-year-old child, as per the opinion of the Medical Board constituted at the Institute of Human Behaviour and Allied Sciences (‘IHBAS’), which had diagnosed the accused as a case of severe mental retardation though without any behavioural problems.
The issue that arose for consideration in the present case was whether the Sessions Court had followed the procedure set out under Chapter 25 of the CrPC, while conducting inquiry into the mental state of the accused and discharging him in the present case.
Analysis, Law, and Decision
The Court noted that the impugned order was passed by the Sessions Court, during the stage of inquiry, inasmuch as the charges had yet not been framed in this case. Therefore, the provisions of Chapter 25 of CrPC, which the Sessions Court was required to follow and adhere to, would be Sections 328 and 330 of CrPC.
The Court also noted the statement made by Associate Professor of Psychiatry, before the Sessions Court, wherein he stated that the accused was diagnosed as having a severe case of mental retardation, and he was found unfit to stand trial. It was also deposed that such a mental condition was by birth and was continuous, and as per current scientific knowledge, there was no treatment of this kind of condition.
Thus, the Court opined that the Sessions Court had followed the mandate of Section 328(1) and (1A) of CrPC in its true spirit, by getting the accused examined by the medical board at IHBAS and summoning and recording the statement of medical expert concerned. However, the Court stated that it was incumbent upon the Sessions Court to conduct an assessment under Section 330(3) of CrPC to determine whether the accused, considering the nature of the alleged act and the extent of mental retardation, could be discharged and safely released upon sufficient security.
The Court stated that the Sessions Court simply discharged the accused after noting that there was no ground to proceed against him and only directed the father of the accused to furnish a surety bond in the sum of Rs. 10,000. Thus, the procedure provided under Section 330(3) of CrPC, was not followed by the Sessions Court. The Sessions Court neither undertook any analysis of the nature of the alleged act committed by the accused nor assessed the degree and extent of his mental retardation to arrive at a reasoned conclusion as to whether he could be safely discharged.
Further, the Court stated that the consequences of the Sessions Court’s failure to adhere to the mandate of Section 330(3) of CrPC could not be overlooked. The Court was fully mindful of the legal protections extended to individuals suffering from mental retardation or unsoundness of mind. Such protections were rooted in compassion and in the understanding that a person who was incapable of comprehending the nature or consequences of his actions should not be subjected to criminal prosecution in the ordinary course.
However, the Court stated that it was equally conscious of the corresponding duty to ensure the safety of society at large. It must be remembered that while the law shields individuals with mental disabilities from unwarranted criminal liability, it did not and could not permit a blind discharge of such individuals into society without a proper and informed judicial assessment.
The Court stated that Section 330(3) of CrPC exists precisely because the law recognized that while such persons might not be criminally liable in the conventional sense, they might still pose a threat, either to themselves or to others, if not placed under appropriate supervision or care. That is why the provision mandates the court to carefully consider the nature of the act committed, assess the degree of the mental condition, seek medical or specialist opinion, and then, only upon being satisfied, release the accused with adequate safeguards or refer him to a designated facility equipped to provide the necessary care and rehabilitation.
The Court stated that if the Courts remained unaware of these statutory obligations or fail to follow them, it would not only amount to a grave procedural irregularity but also create a vacuum where neither the rights of the mentally disabled nor the safety of the public were protected. Judicial adjudications must strike this balance and must not allow such important legal duties to be reduced to a mere formality.
Thus, the Court stated that the omission to follow the mandate of Section 330(3) of CrPC, in the present case renders the impugned order legally unsustainable. Accordingly, the Court set aside the impugned order, to the extent it simply discharged the accused without following the procedure set out in Section 330(3) of CrPC and remanded the matter back to Sessions Court for compliance of the statutory provision.
[State v. Neeraj, CRL.REV.P. 763 of 2017, decided on 21-4-2025]
*Judgment authored by-Justice Dr. Swarana Kanta Sharma
Advocates who appeared in this case :
For the Petitioner: Naresh Kumar Chahar, APP for the State.
For the Respondents: Arpit Srivastava, Advocate.
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