Case BriefsDistrict Court

Saket Courts, New Delhi: Anuj Agrawal, Additional Sessions Judge-05, while addressing the present matter, expressed that,

A litigant who takes liberty with court procedure should anticipate the necessary consequences.

a stern message is required to be sent to the litigants who indulge in frivolous and vexatious litigation as such litigation not only clogs arteries of justice delivery system but also deprives genuine litigants of their fundamental right of speedy trial.

It was observed that no application was moved by revisionist under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay in filing present revision petition, challenging the orders passed by the trial court.

Factual Matrix

A complaint alleging commission of an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was filed by revisionist/complainant with the allegation that respondent had issued a cheque for an amount of Rs 5 lakhs in discharge of their legal liability. On presentation of the said cheque, it got dishonoured for reasons ‘insufficient funds’. Respondent did not make payment despite service of notice due to which the complaint under provisions of NI Act was filed.

Last order of the trial court was passed on 4-12-2017, whereas the instant revision petition came to be filed on 19-3-2018. The limitation period as per Article 131 of Schedule to Limitation Act, is 90 days from the date of impugned order (s).

Therefore, in view of the above, the instant revision was filed beyond the limitation period. There was no application for condonation of delay or a whisper about the instant petition being filed beyond period of limitation.

“…law aids the vigilant and not the indolent.”

Settled Law

On expiry o period of limitation, a valuable right accrues in favour of other side and same cannot be defeated in a routine manner and existence of discretion by court for condoning the delay. If the delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, court cannot condone delay merely on asking of aggrieved parties.

Analysis, Law and Decision

Court held that the present revision was hopelessly time-barred with regard to impugned orders.

Bench before parting with this Order, expressed its anguish and was appalled by the insidious and cavalier approach of the revisionist.

In Court’s view, liberal access to justice should not be construed by anyone as a mean to lead chaos and indiscipline and frivolous petitions should be penalized with heavy cost. The sanctity of the judicial process will be seriously eroded if such attempts are not dealt with firmly.

Further, Court stated that

It is only then the courts would be in a position to resolve genuine causes in a time bound manner and answer the concerns of those who are in need of justice. Imposition of real time costs is also necessary to ensure that access to courts is available to citizens with genuine grievances and not to frivolous petitions like the present one.

While dismissing the present revision, cost of Rs 1 lakhs were imposed for the mischievous approach. [Madhulika Tripathi v. Logix Corporate Solution (P) Ltd., Revision Petition No. 207 of 2018, decided on 22-11-2021]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Kerala High Court: Narayana Pisharadi, J., dismissed the revision petition filed by CBI due to its failure to obtain prior sanction of government before prosecuting public servants.

The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) had filed the instant revision petition to assail the order of the Special Judge for CBI Cases, Lakshadweep by which it allowed the applications for discharge filed under Section 239 of the CrPC by accused 4 and 8. The accused were alleged for committing the offences punishable under Sections 7, 12 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and also under Sections 468, 471, 420 and 120B of the Penal Code.

Background

The prosecution case was that the Directorate of Education of the Union Territory of Lakshadweep had directed to supply, free of cost, ready-made uniforms to the school children for the academic year 2005-06. A Uniform Tender Evaluation, Sample Selection and Procurement Committee was formed in this regard. Pursuant to a conspiracy hatched by the members of the committee with one Nagendran, the approver, sub-standard uniforms were purchased, violating the tender conditions and by making false and forged entries on record. Thereby, the accused who were member of the committee were alleged for benefiting with wrongful gain and causing wrongful loss to the Lakshadweep Administration and a criminal case was registered against them.

Decision of Special CBI Court

However, the Special Court had held that prior sanction under Section 197 of CrPC was necessary to prosecute the accused as they were public servant, accordingly, the prosecution against accused 4 and 8 was held bad for want of sanction and the accused were discharged.

Analysis and Decision

As per Section 197(1) of CrPC, when any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction of the Central Government or the State Government.

In Amrik Singh v. State of Pepsu, (1955) 1 SCR 1302, the Supreme Court had held that, “If the acts complained of are so integrally connected with the duties attaching to the office as to be inseparable from them, then sanction under Section 197(1) would be necessary; but if there was no necessary connection between them and the performance of those duties, the official status furnishing only the occasion or opportunity for the acts, then no sanction would be required”. Similarly, in D.Devaraja v. Owais Sabeer Hussain, (2020) 7 SCC 695, after an elaborate discussion of the question, it was held that, “To decide whether sanction is necessary, the test is whether the act is totally unconnected with official duty or whether there is a reasonable connection with the official duty”.

Affirming the reasoning of the Special Court that both the accused did not have expertise in the matter of quality control or checking the standards of stitching or clothes supplied, at the most, they could be blamed only for the omissions in not insisting meetings of the committee. In all probability they might have gone by the certificates issued by the technical member in the committee, hence, they could only be blamed for non feasance, at the most, the Bench stated that the sum and substance of the allegation against accused was that they blindly accepted the certificate issued by Accused 9 without conducting inspection of the uniform materials and consequently, sub-standard materials happened to be purchased.  Hence, the act of accused, who were not experts in the field, in accepting the certificate issued by the technical member of the committee would not take them out of the protection under Section 197(1), which was otherwise available to them.

In the backdrop of above, the Bench held that it was necessary to obtain sanction under Section 197 for prosecution and cognizance of the offences taken against them, without such sanction, was bad in law. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed. [CBI v. Syed Shaikoya, Crl. Rev.Pet No. 509 of 2012, decided on 01-09-2021]


Kamini Sharma, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.


Appearance by:

For the State: ASG P.Vijayakumar

For the Respondents: Advocate Glen Antony, Advocate P.Sanjay and Advocate M.Vanaja

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: Subramonium Prasad, J., while allowing in part the revision petition filed challenging the Family Court’s maintenance order made a very crucial observation, that father’s obligation to maintain a child cannot come to an end once the child turns 18 years of age. Read more to know why.

Instant petition was directed against the Family Court’s Order declining maintenance to the petitioner 1/wife and granting maintenance only to petitioner 2 and 3.

Since the interim maintenance order was an interlocutory order, the respondent’s counsel submitted that the present application was barred under Section 397(2) CrPC.

Further, the counsel for the petitioners contended that after holding that each of the children is entitled to 25% of the amount of the income of the respondent, the learned Family Court ought not to have further apportioned the amount and limited the liability of the respondent only to 12.5% of the amount of the salary earned by the respondent.

Analysis, Law and Decision

High Court stated that since the purpose of granting interim maintenance is to ensure that the wife and the children are not put to starvation, Courts while fixing interim maintenance are not expected to dwell into minute and excruciating details and fact which are to be proved by the parties.

Further, Bench elaborated with regard to other contention of children being entitled to 25% of salary earned by respondent, that, petitioner 1/wife who was earning and was equally responsible for the child can take care of the balance as respondent was married again and had a child from the second marriage.

Court cannot shut its eyes to the fact that the respondent has equal responsibility towards the child from the second marriage.

Petitioner 1/Wife was working as an Upper Division Clerk in Delhi Municipal Corporation earning Rs 60,000 per month and the two children were living with the mother and after the age of majority, entire expenditure of petitioner 2 was being borne by petitioner 1 as petitioner 2 turned major and was still studying but was not earning anything.

Therefore, the family court failed to appreciate that since the respondent was making no contribution towards the maintenance of petitioner 2, the salary earned by petitioner 1 was not sufficient to maintain herself.

Court cannot shut its eyes to the fact that at the age of 18 the education of petitioner 2 is not yet over and the petitioner 2 cannot sustain himself.

Bench held that it cannot be said that the obligation of the father would come to an end as the son reached 18 years of age and the entire burden of his education and other expenses would fall only on the mother.

Adding to the above analysis, it was stated that It is not reasonable to expect that the mother alone would bear the entire burden for herself and for the son with the small amount of maintenance given by the respondent herein towards the maintenance of his daughter.

Hence, Court granted a sum of Rs 15,000 per month as interim maintenance to petitioner 1 from the date of petitioner 2 attaining the age of majority till he completes his graduation or starts earning whichever is earlier.

In view of the above, the revision petition was allowed in part and disposed of. [Urvashi Aggarwal v. Inderpaul Aggarwal, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 3242, decided on 14-06-2021]


Advocates before the Court:

For the Petitioners: Mr Praveen Suri and Ms. Komal Chibber, Advocates

For the Respondent: Mr Digvijay Rai and Mr. Aman Yadav, Advocates

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: Subramonium Prasad, J., addressed a matter wherein it was reiterated that the initial burden of proving the burden of the non-existence of debt is on the accused under Section 118 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

The instant revision petition was filed against the order passed dismissing the appeal and affirming the Metropolitan Magistrate’s order convicting the petitioner for offences punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Petitioner has also challenged the order wherein the petitioner has been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period of two months and also directed the petitioner to pay an amount of Rs 13 lakhs as fine payable as compensation to the respondent as per the provision of Section 143 (1) of NI Act read with Section 357 (1)(3) of CrPC.

Facts that lead to the case

Respondent financed a bus for the petitioner by giving a loan and in discharge of the liability, petitioner handed over the cheques in favour of the respondent. When the said cheques were deposited they were returned as unpaid/dishonored for the reason ‘Funds Insufficient’.

Petitioner submitted that the vehicle was handed over to the respondent company for getting the vehicle converted to CNG but the said vehicle was never returned to the petitioner nor the accounts related to the hire purchase were settled. In fact, the blank cheques given to the respondent earlier were misused.

Though Metropolitan magistrate found the petitioner’s deposition to be inconsistent and found that the bus was already sold by the petitioner.

Metropolitan Magistrate, therefore, held that the accused/petitioner was not been able to rebut the presumption that the cheques had been paid for the discharge of any liability and hence convicted under Section 138 NI Act.

Analysis, Law and Decision

Section 118 of the NI Act raises a presumption that a cheque is issued for consideration until the contrary is proved. It is well settled that the initial burden in this regard lies on the accused to prove the non-existence of debt by bringing on record such facts and circumstances which would lead the Court to believe the non-existence of debt either by direct evidence or by preponderance of probabilities.

In the instant matter, other than mere ipsi dixit of the petitioner there was no debt due and payable nothing was on record to show that the cheques were not issued for discharge of liability for the bus.

Bench stated that the purpose of introducing Section 138 of the NI Act was to bring sanctity in commercial transactions.

Further, the Court noted that the lower courts on perusal of records came to the conclusion that the cheques were given in discharge of the debt.

While expressing that the scope of revision petition under Sections 397/401 CrPC read with Section 482 CrPC is extremely narrow Court referred the following Supreme Court decisions:

State v. Manimaran, (2019) 13 670

State of Haryana v. Rajmal, (2011) 14 SCC 326

In view of the above discussion, Bench did not find any that required the interference in the lower court’s judgment.

Further, the Court added that the respondent did not file the books of accounts was not fatal to the case of the respondent. It was open to the petitioner to produce his books of accounts to rebut the presumption and bring out a prima facie case that there was no debt due and payable on the date the cheques were dishonoured.

Petitioner failed to show as to how there was no subsisting debt on the date when the cheques were dishonoured due to insufficiency of funds.

In view of the above discussion, the revision petition was dismissed. [G.D. Kataria v. AVL Leasing & Financing Ltd., 2020 SCC OnLine Del 1056, decided on 03-02-2021]


Advocates for the parties:

Petitioner: Medhanshu Tripathi, Advocate

Respondent: Anuj Soni, Advocate

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: Subramonium Prasad, J., while addressing the present revision petition expressed that:

“A court in revision considers the material only to satisfy itself about the legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order and refrains from substituting its own conclusion on an elaborate consideration of the evidence.”

The instant revision petition was filed under Section 397/401 CrPC against the Order passed by Additional Sessions Judge. Further, the petitioner has also challenged the Order passed by Metropolitan Magistrate in an application for claiming interim maintenance under Section 23 of the Domestic Violence Act.

Facts leading to the present revision petition:

After marriage, Respondent/wife was inducted as a whole-time Director in the company run by the petitioner/husband. Later, the respondent-wife started living separately claiming that she was deserted by the petitioner after which she filed an application under Section 23 of the protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 for seeking interim maintenance.

Since the respondent was continuing as the Director in the said company of the husband she wasn’t able to take up any other job and was not even getting any salary from the husband’s company which all lead to her not being able to maintain herself.

Initially, she was granted interim maintenance of Rs 1,00,000 but it was rejected by the lower court.

Respondent also approached the Company Law Board for a direction that she should be paid salary during the period she served as the Director of the Company to which the Company Law directed the above-stated company to pay the salary to the respondent.

When the petitioner moved an application under Section 25 of the Domestic Violence Act for the modification in the maintenance order since now the respondent was getting a salary from the Company, the said request was rejected.

Analysis and Decision

Bench opined that the scope of interference in a revision petition is extremely narrow.

Section 397 CrPC gives the High Courts or the Sessions Courts jurisdiction to consider the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding inter se an order and as to the regularity of the proceedings of any inferior court. It is also well settled that while considering the legality, propriety or correctness of a finding or a conclusion, normally the revising court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case.

 Court noted that the findings of the Metropolitan Magistrate as upheld by the Sessions Court was that the petitioner was not providing adequate maintenance to the respondent and since the said maintenance was not being paid, petitioner was directed to pay a sum of Rs 1,00,000 towards maintenance.

Further, the Company which was being run by the petitioner did not release her salary. The respondent had to move the Court and fight for getting her legitimate salary.

To the above, Bench stated that even though the company is distinct from the petitioner but the company is being run by the petitioner and it can be assumed that the salary was not being paid to the respondent only at the instance of the petitioner.

While concluding, the Court held that it is open for the petitioner to raise all the contentions in the matrimonial proceedings pending between the husband and wife while deciding the issue of grant of alimony under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act. [Taron Mohan v. State, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 312, decided on 25-01-2021]


Advocates for the parties:

Petitioner: Vishesh Wadhwa, Advocate

Respondents: Hirein Sharma, APP for the State

Joel, Advocate for the respondent 2.

Case BriefsTribunals/Commissions/Regulatory Bodies

National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC): Anup K Thakur (Presiding Member), held that delivering the vehicle and withholding the documents of the said vehicle would amount to illegal delivery of the vehicle.

Factual Matrix

Respondent 1/ Complainant had purchased a Tata Spacio Car from the petitioner/OP 1. Complainant towards the purchase of the car had paid Rs 30,000 vide two cheques and Rs 8,100 separately for registration, insurance, service charges, etc., to OP 1. However, at the time of delivery, OP 1 had retained original documents of registration and insurance. OP1’s case was and continues to be that these were retained as the complainant had not paid the balance amount to him. Rs 1,15, 236 was yet to be paid after taking into account Rs 30,000 and the loan obtained from OPs 2 & 3.

In view of the above, the complainant had filed a consumer complaint alleging deficiency in service due to non-delivery of the original documents.

District Forum had accepted the complaint and directed OP 1 to send the original documents to the complainant. On appeal, State Commission also agreed with the District Forum and dismissed the appeal.

Petitioners Counsel submitted that an Ikararnama (agreement) was signed wherein complainant undertook to pay the balance amount later after taking delivery of the vehicle. On the said understanding, the vehicle was delivered to the complainant while the original documents such as registration, insurance were kept with OP 1. The case of OP-1 was that instead of paying the said amount and taking the original papers, the complainant filed a consumer complaint.

Hence, after allowing the above-stated complaint and appeal, the instant revision petition was filed.

Analysis and Decision

On considering the facts and circumstances of the instant case, the Commission stated that the revision petition cannot be sustained.

The vehicle was sold to the complainant, with the help of loan provided by OPs 2 & 3. The disputed point as per OP 1 was whether the complainant had paid the full amount to OP 1 or note. The related issue was whether the complainant was correct in alleging deficiency in service because OP 1 had retained the original documents after handing over the delivery of the car to him.

State Commission held that:

Once the vehicle has been delivered to the respondent 1, the appellant dealer cannot withhold the said documents on the plea of some dues still remaining to be paid. The delivery of the vehicle itself could have been delayed for that reason. Besides, since the purchase was financed by respondent 2 and 3, we see no reason how any amount could have been left unpaid and the appellant could still have delivered the vehicle in question to the respondent-complainant.

In the Commission’s opinion, the State Commission’s order had no material infirmity. Further, it was stated that if OP 1 had sold the vehicle and accepted the arrangement implicit in the Ikararnama, it had to bear the consequences.

“…as a responsible dealer, OP 1 could not have delivered the vehicle without the original documents. Such a delivery was illegal.”

No vehicle can legally ply without the above-stated documents.

Commission held that the factum of delivery without documents was illegal per se and certainly a deficiency in service. It is not important nor relevant as to what informal arrangement existed between OP 1 and the complainant. Whatever may have been the arrangement, it cannot justify the action of OP 1.

In view of the above discussion, the revision petition was dismissed. [Fauzdar Motors v. Lok Nath Kushwaha, 2020 SCC OnLine NCDRC 492, decided on 01-12-2020]


Advocates who appeared before the Commission:

For the Petitioner: Sanjay Sehgal, Advocate

For the Respondent:

For the Respondent 1: Nemo
For the Respondents 2 & 3: Ritu Raj, Advocate

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Uttaranchal High Court: A Division Judge Bench of K.M. Joseph and Sharad Kumar Sharma, JJ., had allowed a revision which was filed aggrieved by the order of the Trade Tax Tribunal.

The assessment was done under the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 and the respondent was assessed to tax in respect of sale of imported cement, imported sheet tiles & steel and self-manufactured tiles. The Assessing Officer had also assessed respondent in regard to the sale of steel scrap, sale of discarded items and tender forms. In Appeal, the Appellate Authority had dismissed the Appeal. Thereafter, the respondent preferred Second Appeal No. 117 of 1999 before the Trade Tax Tribunal, which partly allowed the appeal filed by the respondent and had sustained the tax assessed in respect of steel scrap, old discarded items and tender forms. The assessment order in so far it relates to the tax levied in respect of the imported cement, sale of imported sheet tiles & steel and self-manufactured tiles was interfered with. Thus the instant revision was filed.

The issue to be dealt was whether the Commercial Tax Tribunal has erred in law in holding that supply of cement, steel and bricks etc. to the contractors by the Government Department, for which cost is deducted from the bills of the contractors, does not amount to sale? And was it not liable to tax?

The Court relied on the Supreme Court judgment in N.M. Goel & Co. v. Sales Tax Officer, (1989) 1 SCC 335, wherein the Court noted that the appellant was a building contractor and registered dealer under the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act. The C.P.W.D. invited tenders for construction of foodgrain godown. In the tender submitted by the appellant the prices of the material to be used for construction cost of iron, steel and cement were included. The P.W.D. agreed to supply from its stores iron, steel and cement for the construction work and to deduct the price of material so supplied and consumed from the construction from the final bill of the appellant. It was found that all materials supplied to the contractors under the clause remain absolute property of the Government and could not be removed on any account from the site of the work and was at all times open to inspection by the Engineer-in-charge. The clause in fact inter alia provided that the contractor was bound to procure and to supply the material from stores as from time to time required for use of work for the purpose of contract only, and value of the full quantity of the materials and stores so supplied was specified at a rate and got set off or deducted from any sum due or that became due thereafter to the contractor.

The Court keeping in view these observations held that Tribunal was in error in taking the view that no tax to be paid on the sale of imported cement, sheet piles & steel and sale of self-manufactured tiles. The Court also noticed that definition of sale under the U.P. Trade Tax Act under Section 2-h includes transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of a works contract. The Court allowed the revision restoring the order of the Assessing Officer.[Commr., Commercial Tax v. Executive Engineer,  2018 SCC OnLine Utt 193, decided on 21-02-2018]


Suchita Shukla, Editorial Assistant has put this story together

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: Suresh Kumar Kait, J., dismissed a criminal revision petition filed by the State against the order of the trial court whereby the accused-respondent discharged from the offence punishable under Section 12 (prevention from sexual harassment) of the Prevention of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.

An FIR was registered against the accused on the complaint of the mother of the minor victim. It was alleged that while the victim was playing with her friends, the accused came to them and said: “do rupees doonga, mere ghar chal, panch minute ki baat hai”. However, none of the girls went with him. The accused was tried and discharged as aforesaid. Aggrieved thereby, the State (represented by Hirein Sharma, APP) preferred the instant revision petition.

The High Court noted that the observations of the trial court that statement of the victim and the complainant, recorded under Section 164 CrPC did not reflect that the accused committed any offensive act upon the victim or he had any sexual intent. It was further observed that the main ingredient of Section 12 of the POCSO Act, i.e., sexual intent, was missing in the entire act of the accused and, therefore, the prima facie offence of sexual harassment was not made out against him and he was accordingly discharged.

The High Court noted that the victim, in her statement, had not stated anything regarding any sexual intent or sexual assault; the FIR was registered on the statement made by her mother, wherein she had made some allegations against the accused.

The High Court was of the opinion that the fact remains that the victim did not mention any act of sexual assault or sexual intent, therefore, there was no illegality or perversity in the order passed by the trial court thereby discharging the accused. Finding no merits in the instant petition, the Court dismissed the same. [State v. Anil, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 10995, decided on 06-11-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

‘Vigilantibus, non-dermientibus, jura subveniunt’

(the law helps those who are watchful and not those who are asleep)

Delhi High Court: Vinod Goel, J., dismissed Delhi Waqf Board’s applications for condoning the delay of 21 years and restoring a revision petition.

Hashmat Nabi and Swathi, Advocates for the Waqf Board submitted that on 15-05-2018, the newly constituted management took notice of the disposal of the present petition after instructing its standing counsel to prepare a list of matters which have been disposed of. The petition was originally filed though Raman Kapur, Advocate; and B.D. Sharma, Advocate appeared for the Board from 1989 till 1994. However, after that, no appearance was made o behalf of the Board and therefore, the petition was dismissed for non-prosecution. In such background of the case, the application for condonation of 21 years’ delay along with the application for restoration of revision petition was filed.

At the outset, the High Court observed, “it is a well-settled principle of law that a litigant, whether it is an individual or a government body or any legal entity, it owes a duty to be vigilant of its rights and is also expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the court of law against it or initiated at its instance.”Holding that the Board could not be permitted to blame the previous counsel after 21 years for not providing the case record, the Court stated, “it appears that the blame is being attributed to the previous counsel with a view to get the delay condoned. After filing the revision petition, the applicant cannot go off to sleep and wake up from a deep slumber after the passage of a long period of 21 years as if the court is a storage of the petitions filed by such negligent litigants. Simply because there is a change in the management cannot give sufficient cause to the applicant to file such an application for restoration after a long period of 21 years has elapsed.” Relying on N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123, the court reiterated, “the object of the law of limitation is to compel a person to exercise his right of action within a reasonable time as also to discourage and suppress stale, fake or fraudulent claims.” In such view of the matter, the court did not find any merit in the applications and therefore dismissed them. [Delhi Wakf Board v. Mohd. Bi, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 7178, dated 25-01-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Madhya Pradesh High Court: Petitioner preferred this civil revision before a Single Judge Bench of Rajeev Kumar Shrivastava, J., under Section 115 of Civil Procedure Code, against the order passed by 3rd Civil Judge, Class-II, whereby the objection raised by the petitioner under Section 47 read with Section 151 was rejected.

Facts of the case were such that respondent had purchased a shop which is in question, from a person Khusro who is the power of attorney holder of late Jahan. It was alleged that petitioner occupied the shop and failed to pay rent to respondent to whom the shop actually belong by virtue of a sale deed. Petitioner had submitted that they have no relation with the respondent and all the construction done on the shop had been done by them. Trial Court affirmed eviction of petitioner from the shop in question. Later an execution case was filed which was objected under Section 47 read with Section 151 praying for stay of the execution proceedings but the same was denied. Hence, this revision. Petitioner contended that the executing Court should have allowed petitioner to give evidence in order to substantiate and prove his objection, therefore, the impugned order was bad in law and should be set aside.

High Court was of the view that this revision petition should be dismissed. On the basis of facts and circumstances of the case, it was found that decree of eviction was affirmed by the first appellate Court and second appellate Court. The objection raised were not sustainable due to the well-settled principle that Executing Court cannot go beyond the decree. Therefore, this revision petition was dismissed. [Mohasin Ulla Khan v. Nabila Rahil, 2018 SCC OnLine MP 949, Order dated 13-12-2018]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: The Court recently dismissed a revision petition assailing the order of Addl. District Judge noting that in supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court, over subordinate Courts, the scope of judicial review is very limited and narrow. The order assailed by the petitioner was a consented order and the counsel on behalf of the petitioner could not point out any error apparent on the face of record in the impugned orders so as to justify interference by the Court.

The Bench of Mahesh Chandra Tripathi, J. observed that the supervisory jurisdiction of a High Court involves a duty on the High Court to keep the inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner. At the same time, he cautioned its use stating that this power does not vest the High Court with any unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the Court or Tribunal and therefore, it must be restricted to grave derelictions of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principle of law or justice.

The court further referred to various Apex Court judgments stating the same and relied on the case of Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim,  (1983) 4 SCC 566 in which the Supreme Court observed that the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited “to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority,” and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, or anything that is much less than an error of law. Accordingly, the petition stood dismissed for the reason that there was no error of law much less an error apparent on the face of the record in the assailed orders. [Brij Kishor Trivedi v. Kanpur Development Authority Thru Secy,  2017 SCC OnLine All 2513, decided on 5.12.2017]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Punjab and Haryana High Court: Recently before the High Court, a revision petition was filed against the order passed by Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Meham, District Rohtak, dismissing the application for appointment of the Local Commissioner. The lower court had appointed the Local Commissioner to demarcate the suit property for plaintiff and defendant, but it was told to the commissioner by the applicant that a compromise. The court had rejected the application because she herself refused for demarcation and therefore, was not allowed to take advantage of her own wrong.

However, in the Court, petitioner contended that she was defrauded by the other party for they did not honour the settlement. On considering this contention, the Bench of Anil Kshetrapal, J. said that as far as settlement is concerned, the same could not be the subject- matter in the revision petition before him.

The petitioner further argued that the demarcation in their case was absolutely necessary to lead evidence for both the parties in the case further. To this, the Court responded that the Local commissioner was already appointed for the purpose but because she herself did not allow him to demarcate, it was now petitioner’s responsibility to lead the evidence.

Finally, the Court relying on its earlier decisions held that revision petition against the order dismissing the application for appointment of the Local Commissioner is not maintainable and for the very same reason, present revision petition was liable to be dismissed. [Geeta Devi v. Vinod Kumar,  2017 SCC OnLine P&H 2887, decided on 5.09.2017]

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: Deciding an important question of law as to whether provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable in respect of revision petition filed in the High Court under Section 81 of the Assam Value Added Tax Act, 2003 (VAT Act), the Court held that the court cannot interpret the law in such a manner so as to read into the Act an inherent power of condoning the delay by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act so as to supplement the provisions of the VAT Act which excludes the operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act by necessary implications.

Taking note of the fact that Section 84 of the VAT Act made only Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act applicable to the proceedings under the VAT Act, the Court noticed that the legislative intent behind the same was to exclude other provisions, including Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Section 29(2) stipulates that in the absence of any express provision in a special law, provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would apply. If the intention of the legislature was to make Section 5, or for that matter, other provisions of the Limitation Act applicable to the proceedings under the VAT Act, there was no necessity to make specific provision like Section 84 thereby making only Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act applicable to such proceedings, in as much as these two Sections would also have become applicable by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.

The bench of Dr. A.K. Sikri and Abhay Manohar Sapre, JJ said that the VAT Act is a complete code not only laying down the forum but also prescribing the time limit within which each forum would be competent to entertain the appeal or revision. The underlying object of the Act appears to be not only to shorten the length of the proceedings initiated under the different provisions contained therein, but also to ensure finality of the decision made there under. Hence, the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to a proceeding under Section 81(1) of the VAT Act stands excluded by necessary implication, by virtue of the language employed in section 84. [Patel Brothers v. State of Assam, 2017 SCC OnLine SC 19, decided on 04.01.2017]