National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
Case BriefsTribunals/Commissions/Regulatory Bodies

National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC): A Coram of Justice R.K. Agrawal (President) and Dinesh Singh (Member), disposed of a case centered around a car and its defects. and due to its longevity, the car was not so feasible, at this stage in time, to remand back to the District Forum for decision afresh on the (principal) question of ‘defect’ in manufacture as 14 years has passed since it was first brought in the District Forum and now it cannot be put to test before an ‘appropriate laboratory’, to determine that ‘defect’ as laid down in the provisions of the ‘The Consumer Protection Act, 1986’.

In this case, the appellant had filed a case in the District Forum, Yamunanagar in 2005, for manufacturing defects in a car. The District Forum allowed the complaint and also issued directions to replace the car or refund the amount of the car with interest to the aggrieved party, When the appeal went on to the State Commission it allowed the petition and ordered the company to remove the defects “if any”. 

The NCDRC with regard to the decision said that the District Forum should have first decided if the purchaser i.e. the Revisionist Petitioner was a “complainant” in terms of Section 2(1)(d) of ‘The Consumer Protection Act, 1986’ or not. Also, the National Commission made a remark that the District Forum should have referred the goods to the appropriate laboratory under Section 2 (1) (a) of the Act for the determination of defects.

The National Commission in its judgment remarking about the State Commission said that though it rightly concluded that ‘defect’ in manufacture cannot be made out now, but it erred in not remanding the case back to the District Forum for decision afresh, to decide the question of ‘defect’ in manufacture after duly adopting the procedure prescribed in Sections 13(1)(c) to (g) of the Act and also it termed the order of the State Commission as “unreasoned”, “suffering from incongruity” and “inner-inconsistency”.

The National Commission remarked that the correct thing would have been to direct the case back to the District Forum for fresh consideration. However, given that the case had already taken 14 years, it held that doing the same would be “inequitable and result in some miscarriage of justice” to the Petitioner. 

The Tribunal also noted that the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act speaks of “speedy and simple redressal to consumer disputes” and also the Act is for “better protection of the interests of consumers so a Complainant cannot be put to prejudice for faults in adjudication by Consumer Protection Fora. 

However, having said that they also noted, that on presenting its Complaint alleging “manufacturing defects” and no steps were taken by the Complainant for adopting the procedure that is prescribed in Sections 13(1)(c) to (g) before the District Forum. The Commission concluded by saying that it should not be attended as a precedent. [Gopal Aggarwal v. Metro Motors, 2019 SCC OnLine NCDRC 754, decided on 17-12-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: Ram Krishna Gautam, J., dismissed this Application moved under Section 482 CrPC for being devoid of merits.

Counsel for the applicant, Nabi Ullah argued that a certain amount of money was advanced to the complainants and when demanded back false accusations were leveled against him and subsequently got lodged under Sections 354, 323 and 504 of the Penal Code. Moreover, there was no injury nor any such occurrence ever occurred. Thus, this Application, under Section 482 CrPC, a prayer for the exercise of inherent power by this Court for setting aside summoning order as well as an entire criminal proceeding of complaint case, was made by the applicants.

AGA, representing the State of U.P., had opposed this Application. It was submitted that the complaint was made right as the offences occurred. There is no precedent of having a medico-legal report because the ingredient of physical assault with the complainant was there, and a complaint can be made without there being any medico-legal report.

After analyzing the submission of the parties, the Court observed that previous proceedings filed by the accused persons reveals that there were intimate relation between the parties, but because of demanding back of money, advanced, this case came to be filed. Meaning thereby, both sides were acquainted with each other, but merely taking the ground of demanding back of money advanced, the applicants cannot seek the indulgence of this Court, for the exercise of inherent power, under Section 482 of CrPC. Moreover, it is not expected from this Court to meticulously analyze evidences at this juncture, rather it is a question to be decided at the time of trial by the Trial court.

Meaning thereby this inherent power is with High Court (i) to make such order as may be necessary to give effect to any other order under this Code (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court (iii) or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. 

The Court observed the views in certain judgments of the Supreme Court. In State of A.P. v. Gaurishetty Mahesh, JT 2010 (6) SC 588 – While exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable apprehension of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge/Court.

In Popular Muthiah v. State, (2006) 7 SCC 296 Supreme Court had observed that “High Court can exercise jurisdiction suo motu in the interest of justice. It can do so while exercising other jurisdictions such as appellate or revisional jurisdiction. No formal application for invoking inherent jurisdiction is necessary. Inherent jurisdiction can be exercised in respect of substantive as well as procedural matters. It can as well be exercised in respect of incidental or supplemental power irrespective of nature of proceedings”. [Santosh v. State of U.P., Application U/S 482 No.  31442 of 2019, decided on 21-10-2019]

Gauhati High Court
Case BriefsHigh Courts

Gauhati High Court: Reiterating that mere likelihood of suspicion cannot be a reason to charge someone for an offence, Rumi Kumari Phukan, J. allowed a criminal petition and quashed the FIR registered against the petitioners under Section 120-B, 32 and 307 IPC.

The matter related to a long pending land dispute between the petitioners on one hand and the injured and the informant on the other hand. The injured was shot from the backside while riding his motorcycle. The informant, the wife of the injured, lodged an FIR against the petitioners on suspicion that the attack was committed by them in response to their land dispute.

J.J. Borbhuiya, I., Mohan, R. Ali and K.H. Choudhary, Advocates, representing the petitioners vehemently submitted that the criminal proceeding could not stand and continue on sheer suspicion. Per contra, T. Sarma and H.K. Sarma, Advocates, for the informant asserted that the proceedings should continue till the end. However, D. Das, Additional Public Prosecutor, submitted that the injured himself could not identify the assailants.

 Perusing the record, the High Court noted that the informant tried to project the case only on suspicion and there was no supporting evidence to suggest the complicity of the petitioners. It was observed: “Criminal prosecution cannot be permitted to continue on the whims and pleasure of the litigants unless cogent, clear and convicting evidence collected in course investigation.” Holding that the same was very much lacking in the present case, the Court was of the view that continuance of the criminal proceeding against the petitioners would cause a miscarriage of justice. Thus, the prayer made by the petitioners was allowed and the impugned FIR was quashed. [Anuradha Gogoi v. State of Assam, 2019 SCC OnLine Gau 2296, decided on 14-05-2019]

Cyril Amarchand MangaldasExperts Corner

In December 2018, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) amended the Competition Commission of India (General) Regulations, 2009 (General Regulations) and included a new regulation restricting advocates from accompanying individuals summoned by the office of the Director General (DG). Specifically, the newly inserted Regulation 46-A (2) of the Competition Commission of India (General) Amendment Regulations, 2018 does not allow advocates to, “sit in front of the person so summoned” and states that an advocate, “shall not be at a hearing distance and shall not interact, consult, confer or in any manner communicate with the person, during his examination on oath”.[1] In case of contravention of these conditions, the amendment states that an advocate may be held liable for misconduct, such that he or she may be disallowed from appearing before the DG and the CCI for a time period the CCI deems necessary. Additionally, in cases of misconduct, the CCI may also forward a complaint against the relevant advocate to the Bar Council of the State of which the advocate is a member.

Pursuant to the notification of this amendment, the Tamil Nadu Advocates Association (TNAA) along with the former Vice-Chairman of the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu and Puducherry filed a petition challenging the validity of the amendment on grounds of it violating provisions of the Advocates Act, 1961 and that it attempts to usurp the exclusive functions of the Bar Council of India with respect to undertaking disciplinary action against advocates. In this regard, on 4-1-2019, the Madras High Court (HC) issued an interim stay on the implementation of the amendment until further orders. In this context, currently there exists an inherent ambiguity with regard to the position of advocates vis-à-vis the amendment and the Competition Act, 2002.

Inherent Ambiguity and HC Interim Stay

The amendment is the first attempt to frame written rules and/or regulations on advocates accompanying persons summoned by the DG. Despite lack of such rules and regulations, in practice, advocates would, in any case, be placed in a position wherein he or she could not communicate, consult, or confer with the person being examined under oath. While this has now been codified in the amendment, there is additional language that states that an, “advocate shall not be at a hearing distance” from the person being examined under oath. This is a major concern and creates significant ambiguity, as advocates being placed in a different room from the person being examined becomes a real possibility.

Further, the amendment does not elaborate on what essentially constitutes “misconduct” and nevertheless goes on to detail methods of punishment that the CCI can impose on the advocate in cases of misconduct, which includes the ability to disallow an advocate to appear before the DG and CCI. This magnifies the amendment’s ambiguity, as an advocate’s misconduct is left to the subjective assessment of the DG at the time of the deposition/examination of a person under oath. Moreover, the ability to discipline such an advocate who engages in misconduct is also a prima facie encroachment of the powers of the Bar Council of India that is empowered to discipline advocates in accordance with the provisions of the Advocates Act, 1961. While the HC appears to have taken cognizance of the latter fact i.e. potential encroachment of the Bar Council of India’s powers and has issued an interim stay on the implementation of the amendment pursuant to the petition filed by TNAA, the inherent ambiguity of the amendment is yet to be examined as a ground for invalidity.

Prevalent Scenario

In light of the interim stay passed by the HC on the implementation of the amendment, there seems to be a procedural vacuum in relation to advocates accompanying persons summoned by the DG. Prior to the amendment, an advocate would accompany the person without any prior notification to the DG, if there existed an executed power of attorney in favour of the advocate. Presently, despite the interim stay of the HC, advocates duly authorised by a power of attorney to represent the person summoned by the DG must file a letter prior to the date of interrogation requesting that he or she can accompany the person summoned by the DG and the presence of an advocate during such an integration which is essential to the interest of the client is uncertain .

*Anshuman Sakle is a Partner with the Competition Law Practice at Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas and can be contacted at  Dhruv Rajain, Senior Associate can be contacted at and Balaji Venkatakrishnan, Associate can be contacted at with the Competition Law Practice at Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas.

[1] The Competition Commission of India (General) Amendment Regulations, 2018, available at <>.


Canada SC
Case BriefsForeign Courts

Supreme Court of Canada: A five-judge Bench comprising of Wagner CJ and Abella, Côté, Rowe and Martin , JJ. while hearing Crown’s appeal against the decision of Court of Appeals, ruled that in the presence of admitted incriminating evidence on record, Court’s failure to compel a witness to answer a question related to such evidence would not have a bearing on conviction of the accused.

Respondent was convicted at trial of attempting to commit murder, uttering a threat to cause death, breaking and entering a place and committing attempted murder. The trial judge had relied on a few notes found in respondent’s residence, along with other evidence, to find him guilty of these offences. However, in an appeal to the Court of Appeals, the trial court order was set aside. Hence, the instant appeal was preferred by the Crown as a matter of right.

In the trial court, the defence counsel had raised a question to a witness in an attempt to find out as to who had written the two notes found in respondent’s residence. But the witness refused to answer this question. The main submission advanced on behalf of respondent was that the trial judge had erred in the way he addressed witness’ refusal to answer a vital question, and as such his conviction was liable to be set aside.

The Supreme Court, after appreciating the materials on record, noted that since the respondent had subsequently admitted to writing most of the incriminating statements in the notes found in his residence, therefore the trial judge’s failure to take further steps to compel the witness to answer the question put to him did not have an effect on the verdict. It was a proper exercise of the trial court’s discretion in continuing with the main proceedings and leaving the issue of potential contempt proceedings, against the aforesaid witness, for being taken up later in time.

It was observed that even if one assumed that the trial judge had committed an error in his addressal of witness’ refusal to answer the question put to him, any such error did not result in a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice, and therefore respondent’s convictions were upheld as per Section 686(1) (b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. The Crown’s appeal was allowed and respondent’s conviction was restored. [Queen v. Alex Normore, 2018 SCC OnLine Can SC 37, decided on 19-10-2018]

Canada SC
Case BriefsForeign Courts

Supreme Court of Canada: This appeal was filed before a 5-Judge Bench comprising of Wagner, CJ. Abella, Cote, Rowe and Martin, JJ., against the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Newfoundland and Labrador.

Facts of the case were that one Mr. Normore was convicted for attempt to commit murder, uttering a threat to cause death and breaking and entering a place. His appeal against the above conviction was allowed by Court of Appeal. However, this appeal was filed by the Crown.

Supreme Court observed that trial court did not err in addressing a witness’s refusal to answer a question put to him by defence counsel. It was upon the discretion of the trial judge to take further steps in attempting to elicit an answer from the witness. Court found it proper on part of the trial judge to proceed to the main proceedings rather than using its discretion as the same was not found to have caused substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice. Therefore, the convictions were restored pursuant to Section 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.  [Queen v. Alex Normore, No. 37993, dated 17-10-2018]