Case BriefsHigh Courts

Calcutta High Court: Shampa Sarkar, J. stayed the investigation in a matter which came up over an artist’s Facebook post containing intimate image of Lord Krishna and Radha.

The writ petitioner, an artist had posted a portrait of Lord Krishna, which had been displayed in the Christie’s, an auction house. The picture is a depiction of an intimate scene between Lord Krishna and Radha, influenced by Geet Govinda which an epic love poem of Jaya Deva. The petitioner contended that the Facebook post within a specified group of artists, namely, ‘Akiyader Adda’ could not be treated as an offence under Section 295A of the Penal Code, 1860 read with Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000. It was submitted that the complaint did not disclose an offence. The complainant had alleged that the post may hurt religious sentiments and incite communal hatred.

The Court noted that the complaint prima facie does not disclose any cognizable offence. It has been legally settled that the provisions of Section 295A of the Penal Code would be attracted when there is an intention to deliberately hurt religious sentiments.

The registration of the FIR, in the prima facie view of the Court, amounted to curtailment of the right to freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, and also the liberty of the petitioner. The court further pointed out that the complaint was filed on an apprehension that the post may hurt religious sentiments, although the said picture is available publicly at art galleries and in different illustrated and translated version of Geet Govinda.

Advocate appearing for the State respondents submitted that the FIR was lodged by the Cyber Crime Police Station and the same was forwarded by the Superintendent of Police, on the basis of the order of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta.

The Court directed that the investigation shall remain stayed for a period of three months and the inspector-in-charge was asked to produce the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate, on the basis of which the investigation was started only after which the decision as to whether this writ petition shall be heard on the facts and law pleaded or the petitioner will be relegated to the appropriate forum under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 on perusal of the records to be produced by the investigating officer will be taken.

Matter to be taken up on 01-11-2022.

[Jayarshi Bhattacharya v. State of West Bengal, WPA 9658 of 2020, decided on 03-08-2022]

For petitioner: Advocate Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharya

For State: Advocates Lalit Mohan Mahata, Prasanta Behari Mahata

*Suchita Shukla, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: In a case relating to murder versus culpable homicide legal controversy, the Division Bench of M.R. Shah* and B.V. Nagarathna, JJ., held that the Uttaranchal High Court had erred in observing that the case would fall under Fourth exception to Section 300 IPC and had failed to properly appreciate the multiple injuries sustained by the deceased. The Bench expressed,

“…exception Fourth to Section 300 IPC ought not to have been applied by the High Court at all considering the fact that the main second incident had taken place subsequently at 12:00 in the night, much after the first incident of altercation was over in the mehendi ceremony. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is unsustainable both, on facts as well as on law.”

The instant appeal was filed by the State to assail the order of the Uttranchal High Court by which the High Court had held that culpable homicide in the instant case was not murder and consequently converted the sentence from life imprisonment to ten years rigorous imprisonment.

Noticeably, some altercations took place between the deceased Virendra Singh and the accused Sachendra Singh Rawat but due to intervention of the villagers, the matter did not proceed further. Thereafter, at about 12:00 in the night, the accused attacked the deceased by giving him blows by a “Phakadiyat”–a rough piece of wood.  The deceased sustained multiple injuries on the head leading to skull fracture which ultimately caused death of the deceased after a few days.

The trial Court held that the culpable homicide was murder and thereby convicted the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and imposed the sentence of life imprisonment. However, in appeal the High Court opined that since it was not a cold blooded murder; rather a sudden fight which ensued in the heat of passion between the two; as a result of a sudden quarrel in the marriage ceremony and that the weapon used was “Phakadiyat” which was a rough piece of wood, therefore it could not be said that there was any intention on the part of the accused to kill the deceased. Accordingly, opining that the case would fall under the Fourth exception to Section 300 IPC making it a case of culpable homicide instead of murder, the High Court converted the sentence from life imprisonment to ten years rigorous imprisonment.

Noticeably, the incident took place in two places. The first incident of altercation between the accused and the deceased was at the place of mehendi ceremony, thereafter at about 12:00 in the night, which could be said to be the actual incident which happened when the accused attacked the deceased by “Phakadiyat” and gave several blows to the deceased. The Bench opined,

“The second incident cannot be said to be a result of sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel. The accused chased the deceased at about 12:00 in the mid night and even after the deceased reached his house, he was beaten by the accused in front of his house which is witnessed by his wife, PW1.”

Therefore, the Bench held that the High Court had erred in observing that the incident had taken place due to a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel in the mehendi ceremony. The main cause of death was injuries sustained by the deceased on his head since the accused used the “Phakadiyat” with such a force that it resulted in skull fracture at the frontal wound on the left side; stitched wounds with 34 stitches with left side of the skull. The Bench remarked,

“…having caused the grievous injuries with such a force, how can the accused get the benefit of fourth exception to Section 300 IPC. The case would certainly fall under Clauses Thirdly and/or Fourthly to Section 300 IPC.”

Applying the law as laid down in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465, that the question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a serious injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to inflict the injury that is proved to be present, the Bench held that the High Court had committed a grave error in observing that culpable homicide did not amount to murder, by applying exception Fourth to Section 300 IPC.

In the light of the above, the Bench set aside the impugned order and restored the findings of the Trial Court. The accused was held guilty for the offence under Section 302 IPC and was sentenced to undergo life imprisonment.

[State of Uttarakhand v. Sachendra Singh Rawat, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 146, decided on 04-02-2022]

*Judgment by: Justice M.R. Shah

Appearance by:

For the State: Virendra Rawat, Advocate

For the Respondent: Neha Sharma, Advocate

Kamini Sharma, Editorial Assistant has put this report together


Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: The bench of Ajay Rastogi and Abhay S. Oka*, JJ has held that once the prosecution establishes the existence of the three ingredients forming a part of “thirdly” in Section 300, it is irrelevant whether there was an intention on the part of the accused to cause death. Further, it does not matter that there was no intention even to cause the injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature. Even the knowledge that an act of that kind is likely to cause death is not necessary to attract “thirdly”.

Factual background

One Vijay Singh, along with deceased Balveer Singh were forcibly taken in a vehicle. When the vehicle reached unmetalled road, it was stopped. Thereafter, the accused banged deceased Balveer Singh flat on the ground. While the accused no.1 was holding Balveer Singh, the accused nos.4 and 5 started assaulting deceased Balveer Singh. There was no scope for Balveer Singh to resist. Thus, he was taken out of the vehicle and was forced to lie down on the ground. Thereafter, the accused started assaulting him. Apart from the injuries on non-vital parts, there was a fracture of 6th to 10th ribs on the right side and the right lung was ruptured. Even the windpipe and food pipe were ruptured. There was an injury to liver. The cause of death as certified by the Board was excessive bleeding due to injuries on vital parts like right lung as well as liver and the resultant shock.


The Court took note of the ruling in Virsa Singh v.  State of Punjab[1], wherein the Court had explained the facts that the prosecution must prove to bring a case under Section 300 “thirdly”.

“12. To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under S. 300, “Thirdly”;

First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present;

Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These are purely objective investigations.

Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and,

Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.

13. Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and, of course, the burden is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under S. 300, “Thirdly. It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that there was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature (not that there is any real distinction between the two). It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind, they must face the consequences; and they can only escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional.”

Hence, in the facts of the case, the Court held that it is impossible to say that the injuries on the chest which resulted into fracture of 5 ribs and rupture of right lung were accidental or un-intentional. From the medical evidence, it was clear that the injuries on the vital parts like right lung and liver which resulted into bleeding and shock were sufficient to cause the death in the ordinary cause of nature.

The Court noticed that the factum of bodily injuries, its nature and the intention to inflict the particular bodily injuries have been established in the case at hand.

[Vinod Kumar v. Amritpal, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1150, decided on 30.11.2021]


For appellant: Advocate Manish K. Bishnoi

For accused: Advocate Gp. Capt. Karan Singh Bhati

*Judgment by: Abhay S. Oka

[1] 1958 SCR 1495

Case BriefsTribunals/Commissions/Regulatory Bodies

Customs, Excise and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT): Rachna Gupta (Judicial Member) allowed an appeal in relation to evasion of payment of duty.

Appellants were registered under the category of legal consultancy service, work contract service, manpower recruitment/ supply agency service, maintenance or repair service and security/ detective agency service. During the scrutiny of ST-3 Returns of the appellant by AG (Audit), the Department noticed that the appellant had received services of manpower recruitment or supply agency during the period of April, 2015 to March, 2016 and had paid Service Tax under manpower recruitment or supply agency service on 75% of gross service value under reverse charge mechanism as per the provisions of Notification No.30/2012-ST dated 20-06-2012. It was observed that the appellant was otherwise liable to pay Service Tax on 100% of gross service value in terms of the aforesaid Notification being amended vide Notification No. 07/2015-ST dated 01-03-2015 with effect from 01-04-2015.

Short payment of Service Tax of Rs 71,440/- was proposed by the department alongwith the interest and the penalty.

It was submitted on the behalf of the appellant that he was liable to pay Service tax on 75% of gross service value of the services received under reverse charge mechanism. It was submitted that the period in dispute was immediately after the said amended Notification i.e. w.e.f. April 2015 to March, 2016 and the amendment had also to take effect from 01-04-2015. In the given circumstances, intentional evasion may not be alleged against the appellant. The authorities below were alleged to have wrongly held suppression of facts on part of the appellant.

The Tribunal observed that appellant admitted his liability of paying Service Tax for receiving manpower recruitment and supply agency service to the extent of 75% on the gross value of service received under reverse charge mechanism and further opined that non-payment by the appellant for the said period is merely due to his bonafide belief of his liability to the extent of paying the service tax at 75% of the service value. Once there is no apparent malafide on part of the appellant and in view of the aforesaid bonafide belief of the appellant, fastening the allegations as that of concealment fraud and suppression are held to be highly unjustified.

The Tribunal relied on the judgments of the Supreme court in Pushpam Pharmaceuticals Co. v. Collector of Central Excise, 1995 (78) ELT 401 (S.C.) and Continental Foundation Jt. Venture v. CCE, 2007 (216) ELT 177 (SC) explaining the term “suppression of facts”.

When the Revenue invokes the extended period of limitation under Section 11A, the burden is cast upon it to prove the suppression of fact as far as fraud and collusion are concerned, it is evident that intent to evade duty is built into these very words so far as misstatement or suppression or facts are concerned, they are clearly qualified by the word “willful” preceding the words “mis-statement or suppression of facts” which means with intent to evade duty. The next set of words “contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or Rules” are again qualified by the immediately following words” with intent to evade payment of duty”. Therefore, there cannot be suppression or misstatement of fact which is not willful.

The Tribunal allowing the appeal held that alleged non-payment cannot be called as willful or intentional act of the appellant to evade the payment of duty. The findings of Commissioner (Appeals) that there was no documentary evidence to prove the payment of service tax twice in support of appellants contention was therefore held, not at all sustainable.[Mahatma Gandhi University of Medical Sciences and Technology v. CCE & CGST, Service Tax Appeal No. 50962 of 2020 [SM], decided on 08-09-2021]

Suchita Shukla, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: In a case where 2 persons died after being shot during a celebratory firing in a wedding ceremony, a furious 3-judge bench of SA Bobde, CJ and BR Gavai and Surya Kant, JJ said,

“Incidents of celebratory firing are regretfully rising, for they are seen as a status symbol. A gun licensed for self­ protection or safety and security of crops and cattle cannot be fired in celebratory events, it being a potential cause of fatal accidents.”

In the incident dating back to 2007, celebratory gunshots were fired by the accused due to which, out of the 5 injured persons, 2 succumbed to their injuries. Pleading not guilty, the accused argued that he had no intention to cause anyone’s death. He stated that the firing was accidental and was caused by a ball with which some children were playing. The ball struck against the gun in his hand and led to the firing of shots.

Refusing the accept the submission, the Court noticed that the version of eye­witnesses completely belies such a defence story.

“Otherwise also, it does not appeal to common sense that a ball would strike the gun in appellant’s hand resulting in an undersigned firing. Unless the safety lock of the gun was moved forward, the gun wouldn’t go off automatically even if its butt was hit by a play­ball.”

The Court took note of the evidence on record which showed that the appellant aimed the gun towards the roof and then fired. It noticed that though it was an unfortunate case of mis­firing, the appellant of course cannot absolve himself of the conclusion that he carried a loaded gun at a crowded place where his own guests had gathered to attend the marriage ceremony. He did not take any reasonable safety measure like to fire the shot in the air or towards the sky, rather he invited full risk and aimed the gun towards the roof and fired the shot. He was expected to know that pellets could cause multiple gun­shot injuries to the nearby persons even if a single shot was fired.

“Appellant cannot escape the consequences of carrying the gun with live cartridges with the knowledge that firing at a marriage ceremony with people present there was imminently dangerous and was likely to cause death.”

The appellant was, thus, held guilty of an act, the likely consequences of which including causing fatal injuries to the persons being in a close circuit, are attributable to him. The offence committed by the appellant, thus, would amount to ‘culpable homicide’ within the meaning of Section 299, though punishable under Section 304 Part 2 of the IPC.

[Bhagwan Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 407 OF 2020, decided on 18.03.2020]

Chhattisgarh High Court
Case BriefsHigh Courts

Chhattisgarh High Court: In an appeal filed against the conviction of the appellants by the trial court under Section 307 IPC, a Single Judge Bench comprising of Arvind Singh Chandel, J., altered the conviction from Section 307 to Section 308 IPC.

The appellants were alleged to have assaulted the complainant by causing head injury to him. It was alleged that they had an enmity with the complainant and therefore on the day of the incident, they assaulted him with a danda. The appellants were charged under Section 307 IPC for an attempt to murder. The appellants challenged the decision of the trial court.

The High Court on considering the record found that the enmity between the parties arose out of certain money dispute. The Court found that the assault was made in the crowd. It was observed that if the intention to make the assault had been to commit murder, the appellants would not have committed the assault in a crowd. Further, as was evident from the medical report, only one grievous injury was caused on the head of the complainant. However, according to the medical expert, the injury was not dangerous to life. Had the intention of making the assault been to commit murder, the appellants would have caused more than one injury. In such circumstances, the intention to cause murder, a necessary ingredient to prove the offence under Section 307, was absent. The Court was of the view that the offence committed would fall under Section 308 (attempt to culpable homicide) since the appellants were aware that such injury could cause the death of the complainant. The appeals were partly allowed and the conviction was altered from Section 307 to Section 308. [Devi Singh v.  State of M.P.,2018 SCC OnLine Chh 513, dated 18-5-2018]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Rajasthan High Court: Conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC was modified to Section 304(1) by a Division Bench comprising of Sangeet Lodha and Virendra Kumar Mathur, JJ.

The appellant was accused of causing the death of his wife by setting her ablaze. It was alleged that he used to drink and beat his wife and on the day of the incident he kicked her in the stomach, poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze. In this appeal, the appellant did not contend the finding of guilt against him, however, he contended that the conviction may be altered from Section 302 to Section 304(1) on the ground that he had no intention to cause the murder of his wife.

The High Court perused the record and found that the appellant was under the influence of intoxication at the time of the incident. The incident took place after a quarrel. The appellant also had a few burn injuries which might have been due to the reason that he tried to save her. The time gap between the incident and the death of the wife was almost one and a half month. Even the post-mortem report suggested that the cause of death of the deceased were multiple. In such facts and circumstances, the Court held that the intention of causing murder could not be attributed to the appellant. Neither the motive was proved. At best, he could be attributed with the knowledge that his act will cause such bodily injury that may cause death which was an element of an offence under Section 304(1) IPC. Accordingly, the conviction and sentence of the appellant was altered as mentioned hereinabove. [Bhagwan Lal v. State of Rajasthan, 2018 SCC OnLine Raj 1193, dated 15-5-2018]

Jharkhand High Court
Case BriefsHigh Courts

High Court of Jharkhand: The Division Bench comprising of H.C. Mishra and B.B. Mangalmurti, JJ., recently heard an appeal against the acquittal of the respondent who had been accused under Sections 364 and 34 of the Penal Code.

The appellant’s son had been taken forcibly by the respondents owing to certain prevailing land disputes between the two parties. The appellants had alleged that the respondents had broken into their house by breaking through the thatched roof and kidnapped the son which after examining the evidence on record, was found to be untrue by the Trial Court and hence, the accused was acquitted of the charges framed against him.

The Court observed that the victim himself had testified that he had been forcibly taken away from his house for 20-21 days and eventually brought near the Deoghar Court and left by the accused. It noted that Section 364 of the Penal code mandates the intention of murdering the victim or putting him in the danger of being murdered, for the offence to be labeled as kidnapping under the impugned section. Since, the evidence showed that the victim had been left near the Deoghar Court after a few days, it was obvious that no intention to kill had been present in the minds of the accused and hence, offence under Section 364 Penal Code, couldn’t be made out. Thus, the appeal was dismissed. [Kamruddin Sheikh v. State of Jharkhand, 2018 SCC OnLine Jhar 123, order dated 26.2.2018]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Karnataka High Court: A criminal petition was filed under Section 482 CrPC praying to set aside the order of trial Judge; wherein a Single Judge Bench comprising of K.N. Phaneendra, J. held that the trial Judge erred in convicting the petitioner under Section 307 IPC.

The petitioner was accused of inter alia, offence under Section 307. It was alleged by the complainant that the accused was driving a Scorpio car. When the complainant tried to stop the said vehicle, the accused drove the vehicle backwards and stopped thereafter. The accused was charge-sheeted for offence under Section 307. Learned counsel for the petitioner-accused submitted that the contents of the FIR do not show any material to attract the offence under Section 307 IPC.

The High Court perused Section 307 IPC and was of the opinion that in order to attract the provisions of Section 307, there must be intention or knowledge on part of the accused. In such circumstance, if that act of the accused caused death of the victim, he would have been guilty of murder; but if the person survives then the offence under Section 307 is made out. Also, irrespective of the injuries sustained by the party, there may be constitution of offence under Section 307 of IPC.

In the instant case, the Court found that, there was no allegation in the FIR to show that the complainant was behind the car when accused drove the vehicle backwards. Also none of the witnesses made any allegations that the accused tried to run the car over the complainant. The Court was of the view that there was no material to establish that the accused had any knowledge or intention to do away with the life of the complainant.

Accordingly, the petition was allowed and the proceedings against the petitioner under Section 307 IPC were quashed. [Faizal v. Mohamad Aris, Crl. Petition No. 6826 of 2017, order dated 5.12.2017]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: A Single Judge Bench comprising of Pratibha Rani, J, dismissed an appeal against conviction under Section 307 of the IPC. The appellant submitted before the Court that he had no motive to cause death of the injured as they did not know each other and had no enmity between them. The appellant cited these as grounds for motive being absent. The appellant further contended that he had been identified on the basis of a dossier from a Test Identification Parade.

The facts in brief are that, the injured had gone to take dinner at Zakhira and while returning near Zakhira and while returning he was stopped by a boy who asked him to hand over his valuables. Upon denial, the said boy, pushed and slapped him before stabbing him below the abdomen. The injured then ran towards the factory, where he resided. He was later taken to Hindu Rao Hospital by his brother Arjun Singh who also informed the PCR. The injured identified the assailant from the dossier shown during the Test Identification Parade.

Considering the nature of the stab wound on the vital part of the body, the nature of the weapon and the manner in which it was used, along with the motive i.e frustration on not being able to get valuables from the injured, the necessary intention and knowledge of causing injury can be clearly inferred. Appeal dismissed. [Mohd. Khurshid v. State, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 11534, decided on 08.11.2017]

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: In the review petition filed in the Soumya Rape and Murder case where the Court had set aside the death sentence awarded to the accused by the Kerala High Court, the 3-Judge Bench of Ranjan Gogoi, P.C. Pant and U.U. Lalit, JJ issued notice to Justice Markandey Katju, former Supreme Court Judge and requested him to appear in Court in person and participate in the proceedings on 11.11.2016 as to whether the judgment and order dated 15.09.2016 suffers from any fundamental flaw so as to require exercise of the review jurisdiction.

Justice Katju had, in a blog published on Facebook, expressed his views that the Supreme Court has grievously erred in law by not holding Govindaswamy guilty of murder. He had said that the Court had overlooked is that Section 300 IPC, which defines murder, has 4 parts, and only the first part requires intention to kill. If any of the other 3 parts are established, it will be murder even if there was no intention to kill. It is regrettable that the Court has not read Section 300 carefully. The judgment needs to be reviewed in an open court hearing. Taking note of the said post, the Bench said that such a view coming from a retired Judge of this Court needs to be treated with greatest of respect and consideration.

Justice Katju by a post on his Facebook page said that he would be delighted to appear and discuss the matter in open court, but would only like the Judges to consider whether, being a former Supreme Court Judge he is debarred from appearing by Article 124(7) of the Constitution. If the Judges hold that it does not debar him, he would be happy to appear and place his views.

On 15.09.2016, the Court had held that no case of murder was made out against Govindaswamy. It was held that regarding keeping of the deceased in a supine position for commission of sexual assault, the Court held that to hold that the accused is liable under Section 302 IPC what is required is an intention to cause death or knowledge that the act of the accused is likely to cause death. The intention of the accused in keeping the deceased in a supine position was for the purposes of the sexual assault. Further, the fact that the deceased survived for a couple of days after the incident and eventually died in Hospital would also clearly militate against any intention of the accused to cause death by the act of keeping the deceased in a supine position. [Sumathi v. Govindaswamy, 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1145, decided on 17.10.2016]

High Courts

Calcutta High Court:  In the light of the increasing misuse of laws combating crime against women,  while deciding the question  that whether any assault or criminal force as under Section 354 IPC was used on the informant with the intent  to outrage her modesty, the Court held that during an altercation, a woman, if touched or pushed  accidentally in a wrongful manner, the same cannot said to be done with an intention to outrage her modesty and hence, it will not attract the provisions of Section 354 IPC.

In the instant case, owing to an ongoing civil dispute between the landlord and the tenant, a heated exchange took place between the party and the informant, where the petitioner allegedly pushed the informant from the front touching her. The petitioner, through his counsel Mr Rajdeep Majumdar, argued that there was no intention on the part of the petitioner to outrage her modesty and accidental or unintentional touching of a lady during physical altercation will not come in the Section 354 IPC which was refuted by the State, represented by Mr Pawan Kr. Gupta and the counsel for the private opposite party Mr. Iqbal Hussain.

The Court observing the Section 354 IPC and Supreme Court decisions in Vidyadharan v. State of Kerala, (2004) 1 SCC 215, and Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, (1995) 6 SCC 194, observed that intention must be proved for this offence but intention is not the sole criteria for conviction as the offence can be committed by a person assaulting or using criminal force to any woman, if he knows that by such act the modesty of the woman is likely to be affected. On the basis of the facts and the rulings of the Supreme Court, the Court found that there is no use of assault or criminal force on the informant intending to outrage or knowing that it will likely outrage her modesty therefore the informant may complain for physical harassment. Sumit Kumar Gupta v. State of West Bengal, CRR 3236 of 2014, decided on 22.04. 2014

To read the full judgment, refer to SCCOnLine