Case BriefsHigh Courts

Calcutta High Court: The Division Bench of Prakash Shrivastava, CJ and Rajarshi Bharadwaj, J., awarded compensation to a person who was remained in detention for almost 41 years without conclusion of the trial.

Instant suo motu petition was registered by this Court taking note of the factual situation that one person of Nepali origin was arrested and had remained in detention for almost 41 years without conclusion of trial, awaiting the report of appropriate authority as regards his mental status because apparently an issue was raised as to whether the said person was fit to withstand trial on a charge of having committed an offence.

With this Court’s intervention, the above-stated person was released and handed over to his relatives. But the fact remains that the said person was in detention without trial for almost 41 years.

In view of the above background, the issue of awarding compensation to the said person arose.

High Court directed respondent/State to pay a sum of Rs 5 lakhs by transferring the amount in the account of the said person by following due process of law.

Matter to be listed on 17-2-2022. [UTP Dipak Joshi, lodged in Dum Dum Central Correctional Home, In Re., 2021 SCC OnLine Cal 3020, decided on 7-12-2021]


Advocates before the Court:

Mr. Jayanta Narayan Chatterjee, Ms. Jayashree Patra

..for the SLSA.

Mr. Anirban Ray, Mr. Debasish Ghosh

..for the State.

Mr. Saikat Banerjee,

Ms. Juin Dutta Chakraborty, Mr. U.K. Roy

..for High Court Administration.

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Gujarat High Court: Paresh Upadhyay, J., allowed a petition which was filed against the order passed by the Commissioner of Police, Surat whereby the petitioner is detained under the Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act, 1985.

Advocate for the petitioner had submitted that, mere filing of five FIRs against the petitioner itself was no ground, for the detaining authority, to arrive at the conclusion that the activities of the petitioner were prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. It was further submitted that, no legally sustainable satisfaction was recorded by the detaining authority before passing the impugned order.

Assistant Government Pleader for the respondent State Authorities has supported the detention order passed by the detaining authority.

The Court found that the detaining authority had exercised the powers, treating the petitioner as a ‘dangerous person’ within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Act. The five FIRs, which were the basis to treat the petitioner as such a person was referred to in the impugned order and further details in that regard were considered by the Court. The Court finally opined that the detaining authority fell in error in treating the activities of the petitioner as prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order.

It was noted that in the grounds of the detention, the detaining authority had recorded to the effect that, according to him, the activities of the petitioner created a sense of alarm and feeling of insecurity in the minds of public at large, however on weighing this vis-a-vis the material on record, this Court found that, the citation of such words was more in the nature of rituals rather than with any significance to the alleged activities of the petitioner.

The petition was allowed.[Keyur v. Police Commr., 2021 SCC OnLine Guj 1327, decided on 03-09-2021]


Suchita Shukla, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.


Advocates before the Court:

For the Petitioner: Mr Samir Afzal Khan

For the Respondents: Mr Shivam Dixit

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Gauhati High Court: Ajit Borthakur, J., granted bail to an IIT student accused of raping his junior. The Bench stated,

“Both the informant/victim girl and the accused were the state’s future assets being talented students pursuing technical courses at the I.I.T., Guwahati, who were young in the age group of 19 to 21 years only, the continuation of detention of the accused was not necessary.”

The instant petition was filed by the accused, namely Utsav Kadam praying for grant of bail in connection with a rape case pending before the Addl. Sessions Judge. The accused was a youngster aged about 21 years and was a student of B. Tech Pre-final year of Indian Institute of Technology (‘I.I.T.’), Guwahati in chemical engineering.

The case against the accused was that on 28-03-2021 at around 9 p.m., the accused lured the informant/victim female student of the same educational institution to Aksara School premises, in the pretext of discussing about her responsibility as the Joint Secretary of the Finance and Economic Club of the students of the I.I.T., Guwahati and after making her unconscious, by forcibly administering alcohol raped her. The victim regained her consciousness at around 5 a.m., the next morning at Guwahati Medical College and Hospital, where she underwent treatment and forensic examination etc.

The petitioner contended that he had been in judicial custody for about 120 days in connection with the case, which was entirely based on assumption of commission of the offence of rape without any credible evidence. Therefore, it was urged by the petitioner that as the investigation had already been completed and as there was no chance of him jumping the course of justice in any manner, being a student of I.I.T., Guwahati, further continuation of his detention for the purpose of trial may not be warranted and that would amount to causing further damage to his brilliant academic pursuit.

While strongly opposing the bail application, Mr D. Das, counsel for the State contended that allegations made in detail by the victim girl, who was a student of 2nd year B. Tech Chemical Engineering of I.I.T., Guwahati, prima facie established a clear case in favour of the victim girl. Therefore, if liberty of bail was granted to the accused, the trial of the case was certain to be hampered, which may occasion gross injustice to the victim.

On hearing both sides and after considering relevant documents, i.e. FIR, medical report,  statements under Sections 161 and 164 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the contents of the charge-sheet and the Fact-Finding Committee Report etc., the Bench opined that there was a  prima facie case as alleged against the accused petitioner. However, as the investigation in the case was completed and both the informant/victim girl and the accused were the state’s future assets being talented students pursuing technical courses at the I.I.T., Guwahati, who were young in the age group of 19 to 21 years only the Bench was of the view that continuation of detention of the accused was not necessary.

Also, the Court stated that there was no possibility of the accused tampering with their evidence or influencing them directly or indirectly, if released on bail. Hence, the accused was directed to be released on bail of Rs. 30,000 with two sureties of the like amount.[Utsav Kadam v. State of Assam, Bail Appln. No. 1623 of 2021, decided on 13-08-2021]


Kamini Sharma, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.


Appearance by:

Advocate for the Petitioner: Mr. K N Choudhury

Advocate for the Respondent: PP, Assam

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Gujarat High Court: Paresh Upadhyay, J., allowed the petitions which were filed apprehending detention under PASA in connection with the Complaint filed by the State Tax Department in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, under different sub-sections of Section 132 of the Gujarat Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 read with Section 120B of the Penal Code, 1860.

On 15-06-2021 it was informed to the Court that, atleast one of the petitioners could be detained under PASA, and while granting protection in favour of the petitioners, this Court had passed an order.

There was no response from the Finance Department of the State of Gujarat to the above-quoted query of this Court. Instead, affidavit in replies – all dated 22-07-2021 were filed on behalf of the Gujarat Goods and Services Tax Department, wherein, over and above giving details of the allegations against the petitioners, in the concluding part it was stated that, no proposal was made to detain the petitioners under PASA so far, by the State GST Department.

The Court was of the view that not only the query raised by the Court qua the citizen – the trader community, in this case, was not responded by the competent Authority from the Finance Department of the State, the sword kept hanging over the head of the traders, because it was replied by the GST Department that no proposal was made to detain the petitioners under PASA so far. Citizen can not be left in lurch like this.

When the State on the whole and the economy, in particular, is trying to regain the momentum post COVID, such hanging sword situation can not be permitted to continue.

The Court while allowing the petitions found that in the facts like this, the State Authorities can not be permitted to resort to the stringent provisions like detention under the Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act against the petitioners.[Amitkumar Rameshbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, R/Special Civil Application No. 6465 of 2021, decided on 18-08-2021]


Suchita Shukla, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.


For the Petitioners: Mr Tejas M Barot

For the Respondent: Mr Hardik Soni

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J., dismissed the petition and rejected the issuance of writ of habeas corpus by a husband seeking production of his wife.

The facts of the case are such that petitioner 2, wife of petitioner 1, left her matrimonial home sometime in the month of June, 2019 on account of some serious differences with her husband (Petitioner 1) and an application for restitution of conjugal rights was filed by the Petitioner 1 which stands pending before the court of the Principal Judge, Family Court, Saharanpur.

Counsel for petitioners Mr Avinash Pandey submitted that sometime in the month of November, 2020 information was received by him suggesting that petitioner 2 was being detained at her parental home

Counsel for State submitted that petitioner 2 (wife) left her matrimonial home sometime in the month of June, 2019 on account of serious differences with her husband (petitioner 1), it is not a case of illegal and a writ of habeas corpus would not be entertainable.

The Court relied on Mohammad Ikram Hussain v. State of U.P., 1964 AIR 1625 and Kanu Sanyal v. District Magistrate Darjeeling (1973) 2 SCC 674 wherein it was observed that the writ of habeas corpus is a prerogative writ and an extraordinary remedy. It is writ of right and not a writ of course and may be granted only on reasonable ground or probable cause.

The Court further observed that the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would be dependent on the jurisdictional fact where the applicant establishes a prima facie case that the detention is unlawful. It is only where the aforementioned jurisdictional fact is established that the applicant becomes entitled to the writ as of right.

The Court held “the petitioner no. 2 having left her matrimonial home on her own on account of a matrimonial discord, the present petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus at the behest of the petitioner no. 1 (husband) would not be entertainable.”[Mohd Ahmad v. State of UP, 2021 SCC OnLine All 542, decided on 05-08-2021]


Arunima Bose, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: In a case where the detenu was accused of committing a series of criminal offences from October, 2017 to December, 2019 such as cheating in the guise of providing good profit to people by investing their money in stock market and collecting huge amounts to the tune of more than Rs. 50 lakhs, the bench of RF Nariman and Hrishikesh Roy, JJ quashed the detention and held that in such a case,

“… at the highest, a possible apprehension of breach of law and order can be said to be made out if it is apprehended that the Detenu, if set free, will continue to cheat gullible persons. This may be a good ground to appeal against the bail orders granted and/or to cancel bail but certainly cannot provide the springboard to move under a preventive detention statute.”

The case that revolved around Section 3(2) of the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, 1986[1], led to a wider discussion on the true import of “public order” and the Court held that a possible apprehension of breach of law and order cannot be a ground to move under a preventive detention statute.

The Court explained,

“When a person is preventively detained, it is Article 21 and 22 that are attracted and not Article 19. Further, preventive detention must fall within the four corners of Article 21 read with Article 22 and the statute in question. To therefore argue that a liberal meaning must be given to the expression ‘public order’ in the context of a preventive detention statute is wholly inapposite and incorrect. On the contrary, considering that preventive detention is a necessary evil only to prevent public disorder, the Court must ensure that the facts brought before it directly and inevitably lead to a harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof at large.”

Public order is defined in the Explanation to Section 2(a) of the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act to be a harm, danger or alarm or a feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave widespread danger to life or public health.

Explaining that the expressions ‘law and order’, ‘public order’, and ‘security of state’ are different from one another, the Court said that,

“Mere contravention of law such as indulging in cheating or criminal breach of trust certainly affects ‘law and order’ but before it can be said to affect ‘public order’, it must affect the community or the public at large.”

Further, while it cannot seriously be disputed that the Detenu may be a “white collar offender” as defined under Section 2(x) of the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, yet a Preventive Detention Order can only be passed if his activities adversely affect or are likely to adversely affect the maintenance of public order.

In the case at hand, what was alleged in the five FIRs pertained to the realm of ‘law and order’ in that various acts of cheating are ascribed to the Detenu which are punishable under the three sections of the Penal Code set out in the five FIRs. A close reading of the Detention Order showed that the reason for the said Order is not any apprehension of widespread public harm, danger or alarm but is only because the Detenu was successful in obtaining anticipatory bail/bail from the Courts in each of the five FIRs. In such circumstances, the Court held that,

“If a person is granted anticipatory bail/bail wrongly, there are well-known remedies in the ordinary law to take care of the situation. The State can always appeal against the bail order granted and/or apply for cancellation of bail. The mere successful obtaining of anticipatory bail/bail orders being the real ground for detaining the Detenu, there can be no doubt that the harm, danger or alarm or feeling of security among the general public spoken of in Section 2(a) of the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act is make believe and totally absent in the facts of the present case.”

[Banka Sneha Sheela v. State of Telangana, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 530, decided on 02.08.2021]


*Judgment by: Justice RF Nariman

Know Thy Judge| Justice Rohinton F. Nariman

For petitioner: Advocate Gaurav Agarwal

For State: Senior Advocate Ranjit Kumar


[1] Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot-leggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders Land-Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, Insecticide Offenders, Fertiliser Offenders, Food Adulteration Offenders, Fake Document Offenders, Scheduled Commodities Offenders, Forest Offenders, Gaming Offenders, Sexual 1 Offenders, Explosive Substances Offenders, Arms Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders and White Collar or Financial Offenders Act, 1986

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Jammu and Kashmir High Court: Sanjeev Kumar, J. heard the instant petition against the impugned order passed by District Magistrate (the detaining authority), by which the petitioner had been detained in preventive detention to preventing him from indulging in the activities which were prejudicial to the security of Union Territory. The Bench expressed,

“Either there was lapse on the part of police to provide all relevant material to the detaining authority or there was lack of application of mind on the part of detaining authority.”

The impugned order had been passed by the detaining authority on the basis of material supplied by the SSP. As per the dossier supplied by the police, the petitioner had connections with one foreign militant namely Maz Bahi and was providing assistance to the militants of banned outfit Hizbul Mujahideen. It had been alleged that the petitioner was instrumental in strengthening militancy network in the area of Rafiabad. For which he had been apprehended in connection with case FIR No.161 of 2019 under Sections 18, 39 of ULA(P) Act and 7/25 Arms Act which is still under investigation.

The detaining authority, on the basis of dossier of activities arrived at satisfaction that the petitioner though under judicial remand, was every likely to indulge in subversive activities if he is admitted to bail, therefore, it was imperative to put him under preventive detention.

The petitioner has assailed the impugned order of detention, inter alia, on the following grounds:

  1. The grounds of detention were vague and indefinite and no prudent man can make an effective representation against these allegations;
  2. At the time of passing of the detention order, the detenue was already in custody in and he had neither applied for bail nor was bail otherwise due to him. The detaining authority despite having knowledge of the custody of the detenue has not spelled out any justified and compelling reasons to detain the petitioner under preventive detention;
  3. That the relevant material, like copy of dossier, FIR, statements under Section 161 and 164-A Cr. P. C, seizure memos etc. which had been relied upon in the grounds of detention, were never supplied to him to enable him to make an effective representation nor he was made aware of his right to make representation against his detention to the detaining authority or the government.

The Bench observed that the petitioner had been detained under preventive detention for his alleged involvement in subversive activities which led to the registration of FIR No.161 of 2019 under Sections 18, 39 of ULA(P) Act and 7/25 Arms Act. In the aforesaid FIR, the petitioner was released on bail by on 06-02-2020, whereas Superintendent of Police, who forwarded the relevant record including dossier and other connected documents to the detaining authority, did not bring the factum of petitioner having been released on bail to the notice of detaining authority. It was because of this omission on the part of Senior Superintendent of Police, the detaining authority had categorically stated in the grounds of the detention that the detenue was under judicial remand and that there was every likelihood of his being admitted to bail. The detaining authority had also noted that there was well-founded apprehension based on report received from field information that the petitioner, if released on bail, would again indulge in subversive activities.

The Bench opined that either there was lapse on the part of police to provide all relevant material to the detaining authority or there was lack of application of mind on the part of detaining authority. The Bench expressed,

“At the time of passing of the detention order, the detaining authority was not aware whether the detenue was in police/judicial custody or he stood released on bail. It cannot be denied that it was a relevant information that was required to be produced before the detaining authority to enable it to derive subjective satisfaction with regard to necessity of placing the petitioner under preventive detention.”

Hence, the non-application of mind by the detaining authority was fatal and affected the root of the detention and, therefore, the Bench held that the impugned order of detention was worthy of being quashed. Accordingly, direction were issued to the respondents to release the detenue from the preventive custody.

[Riyaz Khaliq Parray v. UT of J&K, 2021 SCC OnLine J&K 311, decided on 27-04-2021]


Kamini Sharma, Editorial Assistant has put this report together 

Appearance before the Court by:

For the Petitioner: Adv. Wajid Haseeb

For UT of J&K: AAG Asifa Padroo

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: In the case where the State Advisory Board had heard a detenu on video conference, without any sufficient prior intimation to the detenu for preparation or arrangement for such hearing, the 3-judge bench of RF Nariman, BR Gavai and Hrishikesh Roy, JJ  has set aside the Detention Order is and has directed the immediate release of the detenu-petitioner. The Court said,

“… it is obvious that no effective hearing was given to the petitioner by the Advisory Board.”

Advocate Saurabh Kirpal, appearing for the petitioner had submitted before the Court that while in the matters of other detenus, the State Advisory Board had suo motu given advance permission to take assistance of a friend to represent their case, in the instant case the written communication of intimation dated 02.02.2021 of the hearing by the State Advisory Board sent by Fax to Jail Authorities was served in jail on or about 03.02.2021, just before commencement of video conference hearing by the State Advisory Board on the same date i.e. 03.02.2021 at 08:40 Hrs (scheduled at 08:30 Hrs).

It was argued that this was against the standard practice followed by the Central Advisory Board to give every detenu a fairly advance written intimation of the date of hearing before them, that too, with an option to keep an Advocate present for effectively representing his case.

Even the denial of specific request for furnishing translated copies and other material and information was also communicated only on or about 03.02.2021 along with the said intimation dated 02.02.2021 of hearing issued by State Advisory Board. Further, despite specific written request made in the representation, even brief reasons for rejecting every request made, were not communicated to the detenu. Nor was the detenu orally informed of the reasons.

“Such empty formality of hearing on video conference, without any sufficient prior intimation to the detenu for preparation or arrangement for such hearing, without permitting any time to seek assistance by any friend or advocate, that too when the detenu has no documents/materials/judgments in his hand, cannot be justified for preventive detention.”

As per the Advisory Board, the proceedings in the present case were conducted in accordance with the provisions of the COFEPOSA Act, 1974 and a memorandum dated 02/02/2021 regarding the hearing to be held on 03/02/2021 through Video Conferencing was communicated to the Superintendent Central Jail with a request to serve a copy to the detenu in accordance with which the  detenu participated in the hearing through Video conference and made his submission before the State Advisory Board.

In Hamida Sarfaraz Qureishi v. M.S. Kasbekar, (1980) 4 SCC 478, no reasonable notice about the date of meeting of the Advisory Board was given to the detenu. It was only about one or two hours before the scheduled time of the meeting of the Advisory Board that a police officer went to the hospital in which the detenu was confined, to inform about the meeting of the Board. Even that information was given only to the wife of the detenu for further transmission to the detenu who was then precariously ill and disabled from doing anything.

In the said case, under Section 11(1) of the PREBLACT, the authority concerned was peremptorily required to afford to the detenu a proper opportunity to be heard in person by the Advisory Board.

In such facts and circumstances, the Court had held,

“The so called opportunity of being heard in person by the Advisory Board, was a farce, and amounted to a negation of the right conferred on him under Section 11(1) of the Act.”

Following this judgment, the Supreme Court in the present case directed the immediate release of the detenu owing to the absence of effective hearing by the Advisory Board.

As per a report published by the Times of India, Bhargav Kanubhai Tanti was detained under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA) for his alleged involvement in smuggling of 1300 kgs of Gold[1].

The Central Government after considering the opinion of the State Advisory Board that there is sufficient cause for the detention confirmed the detention order vide Order dated 25.02.2021 for a period of one year from date of detention i.e. from 16/12/2020.

[Sanjay Kanubhai Tanti v. The Superintendent, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 229, decided on 15.03.2021]

Appearance before the Court by:

For petitioner: Advocate Saurabh Kirpal


[1] Absconder in 1.3 tonne gold smuggling case arrested, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/ahmedabad/absconder-in-1-3-tonne-gold-smuggling-case-arrested/articleshow/79766651.cms

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Jammu and Kashmir High Court: Rajnesh Oswal, J., while rejecting the present petition on lack of merits, said, “…this Court is of the considered view that the order of detention impugned has been issued by the detaining authority well within the parameters of law and no fault can be found with it and, as such, the same is upheld.”

Background

Through the medium of this petition, the petitioner has questioned the order of detention dated 04-07-2019 issued by the respondent 2 by virtue of which the petitioner has been ordered to be detained under the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978.

 Issue

  1. Whether detaining authority followed the Constitutional and Statutory procedural safeguards as provided under Article 22(5) of the Constitution as well as Section 13 of the Public Safety Act?
  2. Whether detaining authority furnished the material relied upon them, that has deprived the petitioner of his right to make an effective and purposeful representation to the Government against the order of detention?
  3. Whether the order of detention has been passed on irrelevant, vague and non-existent grounds, as contended by the petitioner?
  4. Whether the detention order was approved within the statutory period?
  5. Whether it was mandatory for the respondent authorities to invoke the Public Safety Act and the same could not be dealt by procedure under criminal law?

 Observations

Upon the first issue, reliance was placed on the case of Abdul Latif v. B.K. Jha, (1987) 2 SCC 22, wherein it was held by the Supreme Court that the procedural requirements are the only safeguards available to a detenue since the court is not expected to go beyond the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. The procedural requirements are, therefore, to be strictly complied with, if any value is to be attached to the liberty of the subject and the constitutional rights guaranteed to him in that regard. With respect to the present facts and circumstances, the Court noted, “Despite having been informed about the grounds of detention and also furnishing of the relevant documents, the petitioner has not chosen to make any representation either to the Detaining Authority or to the Government. Thus, there is compliance of both the Article 22(5) of Constitution of India as well as section 13 of the Act.”

Addressing the second issue, the Court remarked, “The perusal of detention record reveals that the detention order, notice of detention and grounds of detention and other related documents, 21 in number, have been handed over to the detenue-petitioner on the date of execution of warrant of detention i.e. 10-07-2019 and the execution report has been duly signed by the petitioner… More so, from both the execution report as well as receipt of grounds of detention, it is evident that the grounds of detention were read over to the petitioner in English and explained to him also in Kashmiri language.” It was concluded by the Court that the petitioner was well aware of all the grounds of detention and was also supplied with the documents relied by the detaining authority and therefore any contention claiming otherwise shall be groundless and without merit.”

Answering issue no. 3, Court said, “…the detention order has been issued by the respondent No. 2 on various grounds duly supported by documentary evidence. The grounds cannot be considered as vague, non-existent or irrelevant. Even otherwise, when the detention order has been issued on various grounds and even if one of the grounds is un-sustainable, still the detention order can be sustained as the other grounds.”

To determine the fourth issue, Court placed reliance over the statutory provisions, in the words, “As per the mandate of section 15 of the Public Safety Act, the Detaining Authority within four weeks from the date of detention, has to place before the Advisory Board the grounds on which the order has been made and the representation, if any, by the person affected by the order. As per section 8(2) of the Act, when the order of detention has been issued under this section, the Detaining Authority has to send the order to the Government along with grounds of detention and other particulars as may be required and no detention order has to remain in force for more than 12 days after making thereof, unless it has been approved by the Government. The perusal of the detention record reveals that the detention order has been approved by the Government on 12-07-2019, that is, within the statutory period. More so, the case of the petitioner was also referred to the Advisory Board and the Advisory Board vide its opinion dated 23-07-2019 has opined that there are sufficient grounds for detention of the petitioner and it has also been observed that the detenue was informed of his right to make representation.”

Delving into issue no. 5, Court disagreed with the precedent relied by counsel for the petitioner, stating that, “…the petitioner has indulged in subversive activities prejudicial to the security of the State and such type of activities are not conducted openly but in clandestine manner” and therefore unlike the case relied on, the ordinary law of the land does not seem adequate to take care of such illegal activities. Reliance was further placed on Sasti v. State of West Bengal, (1972) 3 SCC 826, wherein the Supreme Court said, “The detaining authority might well feel that though there was not sufficient evidence admissible under the Indian Evidence Act for securing a conviction, the activities of the person ordered to be detained were of such a nature as to justify the order of detention. There would be no legal bar to the making of detention order in such a case. It would, however, be imperative that the incident which gives rise to the apprehension in the mind of the detaining authority and induces that authority to pass the order for detention should be relevant and germane to the object for which a detention order can be made under the Act. Even in cases where a person has been actually prosecuted in a Court of law in respect of an incident and has been discharged by the trying Magistrate, a valid order of his detention can be passed against him in connection with that very incident.”

 Decision

While rejecting the present petition, Court discussed at length, the requisites of a valid detention order and compliance of the same in the present case.[Asif Rashid Mir v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, 2020 SCC OnLine J&K 714, decided on 30-12-2020]


Sakshi Shukla, Editorial Assistant has put this story together

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: The 3-judge bench of SA Bobde, CJ and AS Bopanna and V. Ramasubramanian, JJ has refused to interfere with Allahabad High Court’s decision quashing Dr. Kafeel Khan’s detention.

The Court has, however, made clear that the observations in the judgment will not determine the outcome of the prosecution and that the criminal cases will be decided on their own merits.

After the Citizenship Amendment Act received President of India’s assent on December 12, 2019, which triggered protests across several parts of the country, Dr. Kafeel Khan and Dr. Yogendra Yadav addressed a gathering of protesting students at Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh. On December 13, 2019, a criminal case was lodged against Dr. Khan under Section 153-A of the Indian Penal Code at Police Station Civil Lines, Aligarh. The offences under Section 153B, 109, 505(2) Indian Penal Code were added subsequently, and Dr. Khan was arrested on January 29, 2020.

Despite the release order by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Aligarh dated February 10, 2020, Dr. Khan was neither released nor was produced before the Magistrate. Hence, another release order was issued on February 13, 2020.

However, on February 13, 2020 itself the District Magistrate passed an order to detain Dr. Khan in – accordance with National Security Act, 1980 after a request was made for the same by the Deputy Inspector General of Police/Senior Superintendent of Police, Aligarh.

The Allahabad High Court, in its judgment dated 01.09.2020, calling the detention illegal, said,

“In absence of any material indicating that the detenue continued to act in a manner prejudicial to public order from 12.12.2019 up to 13.02.2020 or that he committed any such other or further act as may have had that effect, the preventive detention order cannot be sustained. In fact, the grounds of detention are silent as to public order at Aligarh being at risk of any prejudice in February, 2020 on account of the offending act attributed to the detenue of the date 12.12.2019. What remains is a mere apprehension expressed by the detaining authority without supporting material on which such apprehension may be founded.”

The High Court also noticed that the grounds for detention along with material were to be supplied to Dr. Khan in light of clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India enabling him to submit representation to the competent authorities at earliest. However, the material so given was a compact disk of the speech delivered by Dr. Kafeel Khan on December 12, 2019 at Bab-e-Syed gate of Aligarh Muslim University. No transcript of the speech was supplied to the detenue. The High Court hence observed,

“The non-supply of transcript would have been of no consequence, if a device would have been supplied to the detenue to play the compact disk. It is the position admitted that no such device was made available to the detenue.”

Further, noticing that the orders of extension were never served upon the detenue, the High Court concluded that neither detention of Dr. Kafeel Khan under National Security Act, 1980 nor extension of the detention are sustainable in the eye of law.

It is pertinent to note that Dr. Kafeel Khan was also arrested in September, 2017 after an unfortunate incident resulted into the deaths of 50 children 2017 due to unexpected shortage in supply of liquid oxygen at the B.R.D. Medical College, Gorakhpur in the intervening night of 10/11 August. Dr. Khan was released on bail in April, 2018 by the Allahabad High Court.

[State of Uttar Pradesh v. Nuzhat Perween,  2020 SCC OnLine SC 1033, order dated 17.12.2020]

For Petitioner: Solicitor General Tushar Mehta

For Respondent: Senior Advocate Indira Jaising

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Punjab and Haryana High Court: In a peculiar case of illegal detention of a woman who happens to be the petitioner’s wife, Harinder Singh Sidhu, J., ordered for her release and for her to be reunited with the petitioner.

The instant habeas corpus petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of Constitution of India by the petitioner (husband of detenue) seeking relief. The factual matrix in the present case is that petitioner had solemnized marriage with the detenue on 27-08-2020 at Sirsa. Respondents 4 to 7, detenue’s parents are relatives were against the marriage and had made their disapproval evident. During a post-marriage visit, detenue’s kin took her away with the assurance that they would drop her back at the house of the petitioner in a short while. Since then, the detenue has not returned and she has been illegally detained against her will by her family.

The Court after taking cognizance of the said matter directed the Superintendent of Police, District Sirsa to ensure the presence of the alleged detenue in the Court after which the detenue appeared in the Court accompanied by SHO/SI Sunita, Police Station Bada Gudha, District Sirsa. On being asked, the detenue stated in the Court that she has married the petitioner out of her own free will and that she is a major and wants to join the petitioner at her matrimonial home.

After careful consideration, the Court directed the SHO/SI to take the detenue and lodge her in the protection home at Sirsa and on a subsequent day, the petitioner would present himself at Police Station Bada Gudha, District Sirsa where he would be reunited with the detenue.

In view of the above, the petition has been disposed of.[Pass Ram v. State of Haryana, 2020 SCC OnLine P&H 1744, decided on 20-10-2020]


Yashvardhan Shrivastav, Editorial Assistant has put this story together

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Jammu and Kashmir High Court: Rajnesh Oswal, J. allowed the application and enlarged the applicants on bail.

The applicants in the instant case were arrested for offences falling under Sections 8/21 and 29 Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. It was alleged that the recovered contraband was heroin.

Counsels for the applicants, Mohd. Yaseer Choudhary, Syed Aaqib Mujtaba, and Ashfaq Mir argued that the said contraband, even if taken as a whole, didn’t fall within the category of commercial quantity and rather would fall within the category of the intermediate quantity. Further, the applicants had been in custody for more than eight months without trial because the proceedings not being conducted because of restrictions imposed due to COVID-19 pandemic and no witness has been examined by the trial court to date. It is further submitted that apart from the FIR, the prosecution didn’t bring forth any incriminating facts before the Court showing involvement of the applicants in any similar type of offences earlier.

The respondent-Union Territory objected by contended that filed the application was not maintainable for the reasons that to maintain a subsequent/successive bail application, change of circumstance is required. However, in the instant application, there is no change of circumstance rather the applicants are trying their luck before this Court. It was further contended that that the applicants did not deserve to be enlarged on bail as they are drug peddlers. This objection was raised by relying on the Supreme Court verdict in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2005) 2 SCC 42.

The Court went the other direction and relied on another verdict of the Supreme Court in Jagmohan Bahl v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2014) 16 SCC 501 wherein it was held that the findings of the Court or higher court while rejecting the earlier bail application are to be considered when the bail application is filed subsequently either before the same court/ court of coordinate jurisdiction or before the subordinate court. Further, as a rule, the successive bail application is required to be heard by the same judge. Once the higher Court rejects the bail application, then the fresh bail application cannot be entertained by the subordinate court unless there is a change of circumstance/situation. Even before the same Court, the successive bail applications cannot be entertained on the same facts when the earlier bail application has been rejected. The principle of bar in entertaining successive bail application without change of circumstance shall apply in those cases where the subsequent bail application is filed before the same court or the court of co-ordinate jurisdiction. Thus if the bail application is rejected by the Court, the accused is well within his right to approach the higher court on similar facts for grant of bail but not vice-a-versa.

Furthermore, in Diwan Singh v. State of J&K, 2010(3) JKJ 367 it was held that once an anticipatory bail application is rejected by the Sessions Court on the same cause of action, fresh application before High Court can be filed.

Thus, the Court while pronouncing its decision stated that:

“The conclusion of the trial may take some time as there is no possibility of the conclusion of trial in near future so the applicants cannot be kept in custody for long time as a matter of punishment.”

Nevertheless, the Court also held that since the quantity of recovered contraband was an intermediate quantity, the rigors of Section 37 of the NDPS Act could not apply.[Liaqat Hussain v. Union Territory of J&K, 2020 SCC OnLine J&K 424, decided on 25-08-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Jammu and Kashmir High Court: Ali Mohammad Magrey, J. quashed the detention order and allowed the petition as the Detaining Authority had failed to mention in the detention order about the petitioner’s right to make representation.

In the present appeal, Wajid Haseeb, counsel for petitioner vehemently opposed the detention order passed against him. The detenu is who is already facing trial before a competent court of law detenu was enlarged on bail by the competent court of law but despite such order, he was not released. It was further contended that owing to this, the possibility of the detenu to be implicated in anti-national protests, such as stone-pelting seems farfetched and grounds taken in the detention order and the material referred to and relied upon has no relevance as he wasn’t actually released. Furthermore, it was submitted that the absence of material the detention order is passed on mere ipsi dixit of detaining authority, therefore, the detention order is bad in law.

The Court relied on certain decisions of the Supreme Court to reach its verdict:

Khudiram Das v. State of W. B., (1975) 2 SCR 81 — the Supreme Court explained what is meant by ‘grounds on which the order is made’ in context of the duties cast upon the detaining authority and the corresponding rights accruing to the detenu under Article 22(5).

Icchu Devi Choraria v. Union of India, (1980) 4 SCC 531 — the Supreme Court has taken the view that documents, statements and other materials referred to or relied upon in the grounds of detention by the detaining authority in arriving at its subjective satisfaction get incorporated and become part of the grounds of detention by reference. The right of the detenu to be supplied copies of such documents, statements and other materials flow directly as a necessary corollary from the right conferred on the detenu to be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the detention, because unless the former right is available the latter cannot be meaningfully exercised.

The Court opined that the only precious and valuable right guaranteed to a detenu is of making an effective representation against the order of detention. Such an effective representation can only be made by a detenu when he is supplied the relevant grounds of detention, including the materials considered by the detaining authority for arriving at the requisite subjective satisfaction to pass the detention order. Since the material was not supplied to the detenu, the right of the detenu to file such representation was clearly impinged upon and the detention order stood resultantly vitiated. [Junaid Ahmad Dar v. State, 2020 SCC OnLine J&K 408, decided on 18-08-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Jammu and Kashmir High Court: Puneet Gupta, J. dismissed the writ petition and set aside the detention order on the grounds that it did not stand the test of law.

According to the factual background of the present case, the petitioner has challenged the order passed by the respondent whereby the petitioner was detained under Section 8 of the J&K Public Safety Act, 1978, on the score that the petitioner has not explained the grounds of detention while passing the order thereby he was not in a position to make proper representations to the Government.

Further, Ankur Sharma, counsel on behalf of the petitioner contended that the impugned order lacks application of judicial mind and is a duplication of the dossier of the police.

The Court on taking note of the representations made by the petitioner and delving deeper into the facts and circumstances of the case reiterated certain Supreme Court verdicts which were noteworthy and applicable to not just the case at hand but also future cases.

Rajesh Vashdev Advani v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 8 SCC 390 — Non-application of mind by the Court and duplication of police dossier attracts setting aside the said order passed by it.

Jai Singh v. State of J&K, (1985) 1 SCC 561 — A detention order encapsulating the same wordings as the dossier is liable to be quashed.

Union of India v. Dimple Happy Dhakad, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 875 — Subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is not immune from judicial reviewability.

Nevertheless, the Court did not hesitate to point out the very underpinning purpose of a preventive detention order which is to prevent the person from committing the acts prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The detention order cannot be passed in a casual manner by the concerned authority thereby depriving the person of his liberty. [Surinder Singh v. Union Territory of J&K, 2020 SCC OnLine J&K 394, decided on 11-08-2020]

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: After Solicitor General Tushar Mehta submitted before the bench of AM Khanwilkar and Dinesh Maheshwari that as of today only ten petitioners in the Tablighi Jamaat case have decided to contest the criminal cases pending against them and are not willing to exercise the option of plea bargaining, the Bench directed that the criminal cases concerning these ten petitioners pending in different Trial Courts in the NCT of Delhi be brought before the same Court i.e. to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, South-East Delhi, Saket Court Complex, Saket, so that all the cases can be disposed of expeditiously. It further directed the said Court to dispose of all the cases expeditiously preferably within eight weeks from today.

SG also submitted before the Court that  if the concerned petitioners tender apology, as envisaged by the Madras High Court in the concerned criminal case, the said petitioners can be permitted to leave India despite the pendency of the criminal case but subject to such orders that may be passed by the concerned Trial Court.

He also told that Court that the look out notices issued against the petitioner(s) before this Court stand withdrawn and that the concerned petitioner(s) will be free to leave India subject to any other pending proceedings including order passed by the Court requiring his/her presence in the stated proceedings.

The Court has listed the matter after 8 weeks.

Petitioners who are foreign nationals were arrested by respondent police on the ground that they had engaged in religious activities in breach of visa conditions. They defied COVID-19 lockdown norms as were imposed by the Government. In the norms, religious places were ordered for closure, yet the petitioners allegedly stayed inside the mosques in groups by defying the norms laid down by the Government.

Thus, in view of the above stated reasons, FIRs were lodged against the petitioners for committing offences under Section 13 and 14 of the Foreigners Act, 2014, Sections 188, 269, 270, 271 and 278 of IPC, Section 3 of Epidemic Diseases Act 1897, Section 58(4), 134, 135 of the Tamil Nadu Public Health Act, 1939 and Section 51(b) of the Disaster Management Act, 2005.

Madras High Court had, in it’s June 12 order said that the petitioners had come to India to serve the cause of their religion. Circumstances suddenly turned adverse and landed them in prison. They have spent more than 70 days in what are truly difficult conditions.

“Merely because the petitioners have contravened the visa conditions, they cannot be seen as criminals.”

[Maulana Ala Hadrami v. Union of India, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 629, order dated 06.08.2020]


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Madras HC | Tablighi Jamaat | Foreigners who attended congregation not criminals: HC grants bail and allows return of foreigners to native country


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Case BriefsHigh Courts

Madras High Court: G.R. Swaminathan, J., while addressing a petition with regard to release of Tablighis, stated that,

Covid-19 should teach us to care for each other rather than use the arsenal of law.

Petitioners who are foreign nationals were arrested by respondent police on the ground that they had engaged in religious activities in breach of visa conditions.

They defied COVID-19 lockdown norms as were imposed by the Government.

In the norms, religious places were ordered for closure, yet the petitioners stayed inside the mosques in groups by defying the norms laid down by the Government.

Thus, in view of the above stated reasons, FIRs were lodged against the petitioners for committing offences under Section 13 and 14 of the Foreigners Act, 2014, Sections 188, 269, 270, 271 and 278 of IPC, Section 3 of Epidemic Diseases Act 1897, Section 58(4), 134, 135 of the Tamil Nadu Public Health Act, 1939 and Section 51(b) of the Disaster Management Act, 2005.

There are accusations that its puritanical and revivalist project prepares the ground for islamic radicalization.

Court’s opinion on “Tablighis”

[Categorization can have serious pitfalls]

Bench recorded,

Prof. Upendra Baxi’s remark in his recent essay on “Exodus Constitutionalism” published by The India Forum that “there is, also, no such thing as ‘migrants’ but only persons and groups with distinctively (and often disturbingly) different needs and abilities…”

The above stated helped the Court to see the petitioners as “30 individuals” instead of collectively thingifying them as “Tablighis”.

Justicing has to be an individualized exercise.

Further the Court added that, there are scores of foreign Tablighis who are presently in detention. They hail from different countries. Some of them are women. Quite a few are senior citizens. They are normal human beings. They are now stuck in alien surroundings.

The petitioners came to India propelled by a sense of religious idealism. But their mission went awry.

The stated petitioners are eager to return back to their families and are also willing to admit through affidavits that they had violated the visa conditions and were willing to undertake that they will not enter India for the next ten years.

Entitled to bail?

Offences which the petitioners are alleged to have committed are not akin to those offences for which there are limitations for grant of bail.

The Bench states that there cannot be any objection for granting bail to the petitioners.

Continued incarceration of the petitioners will not serve any purpose. Since the petitioners are foreigners, it would obviously be difficult for them to arrange local sureties.

Thus, petitioners shall be released on their own bond.

Right to return to native country

Bench stated that the petitioners had come to India to serve the cause of their religion. Circumstances suddenly turned adverse and landed them in prison. They have spent more than 70 days in what are truly difficult conditions.

Merely because the petitioners have contravened the visa conditions, they cannot be seen as criminals.

Court feeling sensitive to the petitioners’ misery in the present COVID-19 times, posed a question, whether it is acting beyond jurisdiction?

To the above, bench stated,

The Hon’ble Chief Justice has allotted the subject of Criminal Original Petition-Bail, Anticipatory Bail Petitions, Criminal Appeal and Criminal Revision Petitions to be dealt with by me. But, in view of my being a Judge of the High Court, I certainly have the inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary to secure the ends of justice.

Failure to respond to the petitioners’ existential horror would amount to judicial abdication.

Of course, the petitioners having violated the visa conditions cannot demand that they must be allowed to return as a matter of right. But then, the authorities cannot arbitrarily deny the said request.

Unjust, Unreasonable and Unfair

Petitioners are willing to bear the cost of transportation. They will coordinate with their embassies and consulates and arrange their return. All that the respondents need to do is to play a facilitatory role. Instead of doing so, if the respondents insist on detaining the petitioners and prosecuting them, it can only be characterized as unreasonable, unjust and unfair.

Thus, in view of the above, Court issues following directions:

  • Petitioners are granted bail.
  • After the petitioners are released on bail, it is open to the authorities to require the petitioners to stay at the special camp earmarked under Section 3(2)(e) r/w 4(2) of the Foreigners Act, 1946.
  • If the petitioners execute appropriate affidavits expressing their regret for having violated the visa conditions, proceedings against them shall be concluded by filing final reports recording the same.
  • It is for the petitioners to coordinate with their respective embassies/consulates and arrange their return to their respective nations. Government of Tamil Nadu or the Government of India will only play a facilitatory role.

[Md Kameual Islam v. State, 2020 SCC OnLine Mad 1171 , decided on 12-06-2020]

Case BriefsCOVID 19High Courts

Allahabad High Court: A Division Bench of Shashi Kant Gupta, and Saurabh Shyam Shamshery, JJ., asked the State Government to ensure that persons who have tested negative and completed their quarantine period should be released from the Quarantine Centres.

Present matter was registered on a letter received by an Advocate, Shaad Anwar seeking release of members of Tablighi Jamaat quarantined in Uttar Pradesh.

Pursuant to Court’s Order dated 21st May, 2020, Advocate Shaad Anwar furnished the details of 45 members of Tablighi Jamaat who were sent to the quarantine centre within the  State of Uttar Pradesh.

The said matter was again taken up on 29th May, 2020 by which State was directed to furnish all the details pertaining to the members of Tablighi Jamat, who were quarantined, released after completing the quarantine period or have yet not been released despite completing tenure of quarantine. Further the State was also asked to give reasons for not release of such persons.

Update in the matter

State in today’s hearing provided the details that, total of 3001 Indians as well as 325 foreigners who were the members of Tablighi Jamaat were quarantined.

Further, all the 3001 members of Tablighi Jamat, who were Indians, have been released after competing the quarantine period, however, 21 members out of them have been detained in Jail, as such, none of the members of the Tablighi Jamat are in Quarantine Centers.

Additional Advocate General, Manish Goyal submitted that members of Tablighi Jamaat who were quarantined in the centres within the State of U.P. have returned to their respective States barring a few who have made their own private arrangements for stay.

Thus, in view of the statement made by the Additional Advocate General Court accepted the stand of State, however it would be open for the petitioner to approach the appropriate forum in case it discovers later on that some members of Tablighi Jamat are still detained in the Quarantine Center despite completing the requisite period of quarantine.

In a parting remark, Court added that,

Persons, who have completed their quarantine period and have tested negative can not be further detained in the Quarantine Centers against their wishes. It would be in violation of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Thus, State Government is directed to ensure that persons who have completed their quarantine period be released from the Quarantine Centres provided they have tested negative.

Bench also directed the Chief Secretary, State of Uttar Pradesh to set up a three members committee in every district to ensure smoother, greater and more effective functioning of the Quarantine Centers.

With the above observations, petition was disposed of.[Shaad Anwar v. State of U.P., 2020 SCC OnLine All 682 , decided on 30-05-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Uttaranchal High Court: Alok Kumar Verma, J., allowed a bail application filed in connection for the offences punishable under Sections 3, 5, 11 of the Uttarakhand Protection of Cow Progeny Act, 2007 and Section 11 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960.

The FIR stated that police party had raided the house of the present applicant on 15-12-2019 and recovered 245 Kg. beef with equipments meant for slaughtering and the applicant was arrested. The counsel for the applicant Mohd Safdar submitted that the applicant was an innocent person; he had been falsely implicated; nothing had been recovered from the possession of the applicant; there was no independent witness of the alleged recovery; the applicant had no criminal history; the applicant was in custody since 15-12-2019; the co-accused had been granted bail by this High Court. 

The Court while allowing the bail application stated that the object of keeping an accused person in detention during the trial was not punishment and as the applicant was a resident of Haridwar his presence can be secured anytime. [Mursalin v. State of Uttarakhand, First Bail Application No. 179 of 2020, decided on 03-03-2020]

Hot Off The PressNews

Supreme Court: The 3-judge bench of Arun Mishra, Vineet Saran and MR Shah, JJ has issued a notice to the Jammu and Kashmir administration seeking its response on a plea filed by Iltija, daughter of former chief minister Mehbooba Mufti, challenging her mother’s detention under the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978. The bench also asked Iltija to file an affidavit that no similar case is pending before any other court and posted the matter for hearing to March 18.

During the hearing, senior advocate Nitya Ramakrishna appearing for Iltija assured the court that no petition is pending before any court. The court also asked the counsel about the situation in the Kashmir.

“What’s the position now? Schools have started? It came in the newspaper,”

At the outset, the bench even suggested the counsel to approach Jammu and Kashmir High Court. Senior counsel responded that High Court had taken a view that it can’t go into
the administrative issues, to which the bench replied that it’s not an administrative issue. “Cheap politics among masses,” counsel argued while reading out reasons for Mufti’s detention. The counsel also said that they (administration) have not referred to a single instance against former Chief Minister of inciting people.

The Jammu and Kashmir administration had, on February 5, invoked PSA against the former Chief Ministers Mehbooba Mufti and Omar Abdullah. Both the former Chief Ministers were detained after the government abrogated Article 370 last year. Earlier, the bench had also sought response from Jammu and Kashmir administration on a plea of former Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Omar Abdullah’s sister challenging his detention under the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act.

(Source: ANI)

Hot Off The PressNews

Supreme Court: A bench headed by Justice Arun Mishra has issued a notice to the Jammu and Kashmir administration on the plea of National Conference leader Omar Abdullah’s sister challenging his detention under the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978. The Jammu and Kashmir administration has to file a reply by March 2. Justice Mohan Shantanagoudar on Wednesday had recused from hearing the plea.

The Court inquired whether any similar plea filed by any person is pending before the High Court. On this, senior lawyer Kapil Sibal, who is appearing for Omar’s sister Sara Abdullah Pilot, said “no”.

In her plea, Sara Abdullah Pilot, Omar’s sister and wife of Rajasthan Deputy Chief Minister Sachin Pilot, said the order of detention is manifestly illegal and there is no question of him being a “threat to the maintenance of public order”. She also said that exercise of powers by authorities under the CrPC to detain individuals, including political leaders, was “clearly mala fide” to ensure that the opposition to the abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution is “silenced”.

The plea has sought quashing of the February 5 order detaining Omar Abdullah under the PSA and also sought his production before the court.

“The intent of exercise of power was to incarcerate not just him but the entire leadership of the National Conference, as well as the leadership of other political parties, who were similarly dealt with including Farooq Abdullah, who has served the State and the Union over several years… stood by India whenever the situation so demanded,”

The plea added that the grounds for the detention order are wholly lacking any material facts or particulars which are imperative for an order of detention. The Jammu and Kashmir administration on February 5 had invoked the stringent PSA against former Chief Minister Abdullah and People’s Democratic Party leader Mehbooba Mufti. Both the former Chief Ministers were detained after the government abrogated Article 370 last year.

On August 5, the Centre had abrogated Articles 370 and 35A of the Indian Constitution and the Parliament had passed the Jammu and Kashmir (Reorganisation) Act, 2019, bifurcating the former state into two Union Territories – Jammu and Kashmir and Kashmir with legislature and Ladakh without one. Following this, a batch of petitions was filed in the top court challenging the move.

(Source: ANI)