Case BriefsHigh Courts

Madras High Court: V Bharathidasan, J., held that,

Mere harassment without any mens rea which lead to the suicide would not amount to an offence under Section 306 Penal Code, 1860.

Petitioner, sole accused was charged for an offence under Section 306 of the Penal Code, 1860 sought to quash criminal proceedings.

Deceased, son of the second respondent was working in a private courier company with the petitioner/accused. Deceased borrowed the petitioner’s car and went to Puducherry, while he was returning back, the car met with an accident. Later, the deceased got the car repaired and handed it over to the petitioner/accused.

On not being satisfied with the repair, the petitioner/accused insisted the deceased get the car properly repaired.

In view of the above, the deceased committed suicide by hanging in his friend’s house and left two suicide notes alleging that due to the harassment of the petitioner he was committing suicide. Subsequently, the mother of the deceased filed a complaint.

Analysis, Law and Decision

High Court noted that the allegation against the petitioner was that, the deceased borrowed the petitioner’s car to go to Puducherry and on his way back, the car met with an accident, which was not properly repaired, which ultimately led the deceased committing suicide.

Bench on perusal of the suicide notes found no offence, much less an offence under Section 306 IPC was made out. In the suicide notes, there was nothing to suggest that the petitioner instigated the deceased to commit suicide. To bring the case within the ambit of Section 306 IPC, there must be materials to show that, the persons who is stated to have abetted the commission of suicide played an active role in instigating and facilitating the commission of suicide.

In the present matter, materials on record do not indicate that the petitioner intentionally abetted the deceased to commit suicide, and no prima facie offence under Section 306 IPC was made out.

Therefore, the criminal proceedings were liable to be quashed. [M. Maryson v. State, 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 5993, decided on 25-11-2021]


Advocates before the Court:

For Petitioner: Mr. R. Rajarathinam

For Respondent 1: Mr. C.E. Pratap, Government Advocate (Crl. Side)

For Respondent 2: No appearance

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court: Sandeep K. Shinde, J., explained as to when a charge in the alternative can be framed against an accused and when it is not permissible to do so.

Factual Background

Mehnaz (Deceased) was a 15-year-old girl and her mother had expired when she was 4 months old. Deceased was brought up by her maternal uncle, Yusuf. Salim was the brother of deceased’s maternal uncle. Applicant 1 wife of Yusuf and applicant 2 wife of Salim.

One day, on hearing commotion from the house of the applicants, neighbours rushed to the spot and found the deceased lying in an unconscious state. On enquiry, the inmates of the house informed that the deceased fell in the bathroom and became unconscious. Later the hospital declared her dead before admission.

Prosecution case was, accused used to ill-treat and harass the deceased and in furtherance of criminal conspiracy, the deceased was done to death by strangulation, and they caused the disappearance of evidence.

Analysis, Law and Decision

In the instant case, the trial Judge framed the charge under Section 302 IPC and in alternative under Section 306 IPC.

High Court stated that framing of charge under Section 302 and in alternative under Section 306 is not permissible inasmuch as when there is doubt as to facts, Section 221 of CrPC has no application.

In the Supreme Court decision of Prasoon Gupta v. State of U.P., 2010 SCC OnLine All 1887, Supreme Court held that the question framing of charge in alternative can arise, when there is no doubt about the facts, which can be proved but doubt is as to what offence will be constituted on those facts.

It is not permissible in law, to frame a charge for accused having abetted the suicide and a charge in alternative of murder, as it shows doubt as to facts. The offence under Sections 306 and 302 are diametrically opposed to each other.

In the instant matter, Court noted from the autopsy report that the deceased died by ligature strangulation of the neck.

Bench stated that,

I have no reason to disbelieve surgeons’ opinion at least in these proceedings, which rules out the case of hanging and suicide.

 Adding to the above, it was noted that the applicants (accused) on being medically examined had injuries in nature of scratch and linear on the person of applicant 1 whereas 11 simple injuries in the nature of bruises were found on the person of applicant 2.

Bench expressed that evidence of witness, apparently neither suggests nor leads to infer that deceased had attempted to commit suicide and suffered a suicidal death, and the medical evidence validates the prosecution case under Section 302 IPC.

In Court’s opinion, there was sufficient evidence to frame charges against the applicants under Section 302 IPC.

Thus, the order to the extent framing the charge alternatively under Section 306 of IPC against the accused 1 and 2 is quashed and set aside. Only to this extent, the application was allowed. [Sabirabano Yusuf Sayyad v. State of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 4138, decided on 24-11-2021]


Advocates before the Court:

Mr. Rizwan Marchant a/w Mr. Faisal F. Shaikh i/by Mr. Rizwan Marchant and Associates, Advocate for Applicants.

Mr. Y.M. Nakhawa, APP for State.

Mr. Ravindra Wani, P.S.I., Antop Hill Police Station.

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: A Division Bench of S. Abdul Nazeer and Krishna Murari, JJ. refused to interfere in the judgment passed by the Gujarat High Court whereby the appellants (husband and mother-in-law of the deceased) were found guilty of committing cruelty to the deceased and abetting suicide committed by the deceased. Noting that although the prosecution failed to adduce any direct evidence to establish that accused abetted deceased into committing suicide, the Supreme Court observed:

“Admittedly, in the case at hands, the evidence clearly establishes the offence of cruelty or harassment caused to the deceased and thus the foundation for the presumption [under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act] exists. Admittedly the appellants have led no evidence to rebut the presumption.”

It was prosecution’s case that the accused husband constantly asked the deceased to bring Rs 25,000 from her father. On her failure to do so, the accused husband started frequently beating the deceased, and the accused mother-in-law used to pick up quarrel with her on the pretext that she neither knew how to cook nor did any household work properly. The deceased committed suicide by consuming poison at her matrimonial home for the sole reason that she was unable to bear continuous mental and physical cruelty meted out to her by the appellants in a short span of 8 months of her marriage.

The trial court convicted the appellants for offences punishable under Section 498-A (cruelty to women) and Section 306 (abetment of suicide) of the Penal Code, 1860. On appeal, the High Court confirmed the judgment of the trial court. Aggrieved, the appellants approached the Supreme Court.

At the outset, the Supreme Court noted that Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, provides for presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman within seven years of marriage, by her husband or any of his relative. Section 113-A reads thus: “When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband”. Further, the Explanation added to Section 113-A of the Evidence Act clearly provides that ‘cruelty’ shall have the same meaning as in Section 498-A IPC.

Considering first the offence under Section 498-A IPC, the Court noted the consistent evidence of witnesses who were related to the deceased. The Court opined that most often the offence of subjecting the married woman to cruelty is committed within the boundaries of the house which in itself diminishes the chances of availability of any independent witness. It was observed:

“The evidentiary value of the close relatives/interested witness is not liable to be rejected on the ground of being a relative of the deceased. Law does not disqualify the relatives to be produced as a witness though they may be interested witness.”

The Court found that the witnesses (family members) though related to the deceased, were natural witnesses. Their evidence was consistent without any material contradiction and inspired confidence. Thus, from the evidence of prosecution witnesses, the Court concluded it was proved that the deceased was harassed with a view to meet unlawful demand of Rs 25,000. The Court held that the prosecution was successful in proving the charge of cruelty under Explanation (b) of Section 498-A IPC.

Next, the question that fell for consideration was that the prosecution having successfully established the charge of cruelty as laid down in Explanation (b) of Section 498-A IPC and also the fact that the deceased committed suicide by consuming pesticide within seven years of marriage, whether the accused could also be held guilty for the offence punishable under Section 306 IPC with the aid of Section 113-A of the Evidence Act.

The Court noted that the prosecution failed to adduce any direct evidence to establish that the accused abetted deceased into committing suicide. The prosecution placed reliance on Section 113-A of the Evidence Act to establish the charge of abetment against the accused. Relying on its earlier order in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618, the Court concluded that to attract the applicability of Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, three conditions are required to be fulfilled: (i) the woman has committed suicide; (ii) such suicide has been committed within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage; (iii) the accused had subjected her to cruelty.

In the instant case, all the three conditions stood fulfilled. The deceased committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and accused had subjected her to cruelty, as it was confirmed that prosecution was successful in proving the charge of cruelty under Section 498-A IPC.

The Court said that it is no doubt correct that the existence and availability of the above said three circumstances are not to be invoked like a formula to enable the presumption being drawn and the presumption is not an irrebuttable one. However, in the instant case, the evidence clearly established the offence of cruelty or harassment caused to the deceased and, thus, the foundation for the presumption existed. Admittedly, the appellants led no evidence to rebut the presumption.

In such view of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the trial court, as well as the High Court, committed no illegality in holding that the appellants abetted suicide of the deceased. The appeals were therefore dismissed. [Gumansinh v. State of Gujarat, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 660, decided on 3-9-2021]


Tejaswi Pandit, Senior Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: In a case relating to dowry death, the bench of NV Ramana*, CJ and Aniruddha Bose, J has said that judges need to be extra careful while conducting criminal trials relating to Section 304-B, IPC. The Court went on to summarise the law under Section 304­B, IPC read with Section 113­B, Evidence Act and the guidelines to be followed by the Courts while conducting trials in such cases.

The Court noticed that, often, Trial Courts record the statement of an accused under Section 313, CrPC in a very casual and cursory manner, without specifically questioning the accused as to his defense.

“It ought to be noted that the examination of an accused under Section 313, CrPC cannot be treated as a mere procedural formality, as it is based on the fundamental principle of fairness.”

Hence, the Court must put incriminating circumstances before the accused and seek his response. A duty is also cast on the counsel of the accused to prepare his defense, since the inception of the trial, with due caution, keeping in consideration the peculiarities of Section 304¬B, IPC read with Section 113-B, Evidence Act.

Dowry deaths – Facts and Figures

A study titled “Global study on Homicide: Gender-related killing of women and girls”, published by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, highlighted that in 2018 female dowry deaths account for 40 to 50 percent of all female homicides recorded annually in India. The dismal truth is that from the period 1999 to 2016, these figures have remained constant.

The latest data furnished by the National Crime Records Bureau indicates that in 2019 itself, 7115 cases were registered under Section 304-B, IPC alone.

Law on dowry death – The trajectory

Section 304¬B, IPC is one among many legislative initiatives undertaken by Parliament to remedy a long-standing social evil of dowry death. The pestiferous nature of dowry harassment, wherein married women   are   being   subjected   to   cruelty   because   of   covetous demands by husband and his relatives has not gone unnoticed. The Parliament enacted the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 as a first step to eradicate this social evil. Further, as the measures were   found   to   be   insufficient,   the   Criminal   Law   (Second Amendment) Act, 1983 (Act 46 of 1983) was passed wherein Chapter XX-A was introduced in the IPC, containing Section 498¬A.

The need for a stringent law to curb dowry deaths was suo motu taken up by the Law Commission in its 91st Law Commission Report. The Law Commission recognized that the IPC, as it existed at that relevant time, was insufficient to tackle the issue of dowry deaths due to the nature and modus of the crime.

The Parliament, then, introduced amendments to the Dowry Prohibition Act, as well as the IPC by enacting Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1986 (Act 43 of 1986). By way of this amendment, Section 304-B, IPC was specifically introduced in the IPC, as a stringent provision to curb the menace of dowry death in India.

Margaret Alva, who presented the Amendment Bill before Rajya Sabha observed:

“You have never really heard of a girl being burnt while cooking in her mother’s  house or her husband’s  house. It is always in the mother-in-law’s house that she catches fire and is burnt in the kitchen. Therefore, getting evidence immediately becomes a great bit problem. Therefore, we have brought in a couple of amendments which give certain presumptions where the burden of proof shifts to the husband and to his people to show that it was not a dowry death or that it was not deliberately done.”

Dowry Death and Criminal Trial – Law Summarised

  1. Section 304¬B, IPC must be interpreted keeping in mind the legislative intent to curb the social evil of bride burning and dowry demand.
  2. The prosecution must at first establish the existence of the necessary ingredients for constituting an offence under Section 304-B, IPC. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the rebuttable presumption of causality, provided under Section 113¬B, Evidence Act operates against the accused.
  3. The phrase “soon before” as appearing in Section 304¬B, IPC cannot be construed to mean ‘immediately before’. The prosecution must establish existence of “proximate and live link” between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for dowry demand by the husband or his relatives.
  4. Section 304-B, IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in categorizing death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The reason for such non categorization is due to the fact that death occurring “otherwise than under normal circumstances” can, in cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental.
  5. Due to the precarious nature of Section 304-B, IPC read with 113¬B, Evidence Act, Judges, prosecution and defence should be careful during conduction of trial.
  6. It is a matter of grave concern that, often, Trial Courts record the statement under Section 313, CrPC in a very casual and cursory manner, without specifically questioning the accused as to his defense. It ought to be noted that the examination of an accused under Section 313, CrPC cannot be treated as a mere procedural formality, as it based on the fundamental principle of fairness. This aforesaid provision incorporates the valuable principle of natural justice “audi alteram partem” as it enables the accused to offer an explanation for the incriminatory material appearing against him. Therefore, it imposes an obligation on the court to question the accused fairly, with care and caution.
  7. The Court must put incriminating circumstances before the accused and seek his response. A duty is also cast on the counsel of the accused to prepare his defense since the inception of the Trial with due caution, keeping   in consideration the peculiarities of Section 304-B, IPC read with Section 113¬B, Evidence Act.
  8. Section 232, CrPC provides that, “If, after taking the evidence for the prosecution, examining   the accused and hearing the prosecution and the defence on the point, the Judge considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence, the Judge shall record an order of acquittal”. Such discretion must be utilized by the Trial Courts as an obligation of best efforts.
  9. Once the Trial Court decides that the accused is not eligible to be acquitted as per the provisions of Section 232, CrPC, it must move on and fix hearings specifically for ‘defence evidence’, calling upon the accused to present his defense as per the procedure provided under Section 233, CrPC, which is also an invaluable right provided to the accused.
  10. In the same breath, Trial Courts need to balance other important considerations such as the right to a speedy trial.
  11. The presiding Judge should follow the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court while sentencing and imposing appropriate punishment.
  12. Undoubtedly, the menace of dowry death is increasing day by day, however, sometimes family members of the husband are roped in, even though they have no active role in commission of the offence and are residing at distant places. In these cases, the Court need to be cautious in its approach.

[Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 404, decided on 28.05.2021]


Judgment by: Chief Justice of India NV Ramana 

Know Thy Judge| Justice N.V. Ramana

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: In a case where a woman died of burn injuries one year into her marriage, the bench of NV Ramana*, CJ and Aniruddha Bose, J has held that Courts should use their discretion to determine if the period between the cruelty or harassment and the death of the victim   would come within the term “soon before” as the factum of cruelty or harassment differs from case to case.

“When the legislature used the words, “soon before” they did not mean “immediately before”. Rather, they left its determination in the hands of the courts.”

Background

A woman got married to a man in July, 1994. As fate would have it, she died exactly after year after receiving burn injuries, allegedly after she set herself ablaze due to being subjected to cruelty and dowry demand at the hands of her husband and in-laws. The appellants were convicted by the Trial Court in December, 1997 for the offences under Sections 304¬B and 306, IPC and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years for the offence punishable under Section 304-B, IPC and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years for the offence punishable under Section 306, IPC.

In November, 2008, the Punjab and Haryana High Court also  upheld the order of the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal filed by the appellants.

Analysis

Was the offence under Section 304-B IPC made out?

“Soon before” – Interpretation

When the legislature used the words, “soon before” they did not mean “immediately before”. Rather, they left its determination in the hands of the courts. The factum of cruelty or harassment differs from case to case. Even the spectrum of cruelty is quite varied, as it can range from physical, verbal or even emotional. This list is certainly not exhaustive. Therefore, Courts should use their discretion to determine if the period between the cruelty or harassment and the death of the victim   would come within the term “soon before”.

“What is pivotal to the above determination, is the establishment of a “proximate and live link” between the cruelty and the consequential death of the victim.”

When the prosecution shows that ‘soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry’, a presumption of causation arises against the accused under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. Thereafter, the accused has to rebut this statutory presumption.

Further, Section 304-B, IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in categorizing death as homicidal   or suicidal or accidental, as was done earlier. The reason for such non categorization is due to the fact that death occurring “otherwise than under normal circumstances” can, in cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental. However, the Section 304-B, IPC endeavors to also address those situations wherein murders or suicide are masqueraded as accidents.

“Therefore, if all the other ingredients of Section 304¬B IPC are fulfilled, any death whether caused by burns or by bodily injury or occurring otherwise than under normal circumstances shall, as per the legislative mandate, be called a “dowry death” and the woman’s husband or his relative “shall be deemed to have caused her death” unless proved otherwise.”

Chain of circumstances  – Where did it lead?

  • The deceased and accused were married on 01.07.1994, and the death of the lady occurred on 31.07.1995.
  • According to the evidence of the doctor, the entire body of the deceased was doused with kerosene oil. Therefore, the possibility of an accident was ruled out.
  • The Deceased had disclosed to her brother, within a month after her marriage that the accused, husband and mother-in-law, used to physically harass her on the account of bringing insufficient dowry. Furthermore, the accused persons had made a specific demand of a scooter. Pursuant to this disclosure, she was brought back to her paternal house.
  • Only a month prior to her death, the deceased had returned to her matrimonial house. However, the accused still used to harass the deceased for dowry. The aforesaid fact was revealed by the deceased to her father, when she had come to visit him.
  • Just a week before the death, on the occasion of Teej festival, another brother of the deceased had visited her while she was in her matrimonial home. The deceased had reiterated her plight to her
  • On 31.07.1995, the father of the deceased was informed by some villagers that his daughter has been admitted in the hospital. Upon reaching, the father discovered that the deceased succumbed to burn injuries.

“The aforesaid chain of circumstances proves that there existed a live and proximate link between the instances of demand of dowry and the death of the deceased.”

The court noticed that since the ingredients of Section 304¬B, IPC stoodsatisfied, the presumption under 113¬B, Evidence Act operated against the appellants, who are deemed to have caused the offence specified under Section 304-B of IPC. The burden therefore shifted on the accused to rebut the aforesaid presumption, who in turn, failed to make out a case for acquittal.

Was the offence under Section 306 IPC made out?

A bare reading of the provision indicates that for the offence under Section 306, IPC the prosecution needs to first establish that a suicide has been committed. Secondly, the prosecution must also prove that the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide, has played an active role in the same.

With respect to this latter requirement, Section 113¬A, Evidence Act creates a presumption against the husband and/or his relative with respect to the abetment of suicide of a married woman, under certain conditions. Not going into the other conditions, a perusal of the provision indicates that such presumption shall be attracted only if the factum of suicide has been established by the prosecution first.

However, in the present case, the conclusion reached by the Courts below was based on assumptions, as there is no evidence on record to support the same.

The reasoning of the Trial Court in this regard was:

“Further, there is no direct evidence having been adduced by the prosecution the (sic) any of the accused caused death by sprinkling kerosene on the body of the deceased, the only possibility is that Meena Kumari put an end to her life by sprinkling kerosene on her body.”

Hence, since there was insufficient evidence to prove the factum of suicide beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption under Section 113-A, Evidence Act, is not of much help for the prosecution. The essential ingredient of deceased committing suicide has not been proved by the prosecution by adducing sufficient evidence.

“In the present case, the prosecution has failed to establish that the death occurred due to suicide. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the finding of the Courts below convicting the appellants under Section 306, IPC merits interference by this Court.”

Conclusion

Conviction under Section 304-B IPC was upheld and conviction and sentence under Section 306, IPC was set aside.

[Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 404, decided on 28.05.2021]


Judgment by: Chief Justice of India NV Ramana

Know Thy Judge| Justice N.V. Ramana

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court: V.M. Deshpande, J., held that merely drinking can never be an abetment for a person to commit suicide.

The decision of Additional Sessions Judge, wherein the appellant was convicted for an offence punishable under Section 305 of the Penal Code, 1860.

It has been stated that charge was framed for the offence punishable under Section 306 IPC, appellant denied the charge. During the investigation, a suicide note was also found. During the trial, the charge was altered for the offence punishable under Section 305 IPC in view of the deceased being 16 years of age at the commission of suicide.

In the present matter, it was alleged that the appellant who was the father of deceased was a drunkard and under the influence, of liquor he used to take up quarrels with his wife and maltreat his three progeny

Question for consideration:

Whether the appellant was responsible and/or has abetted commission of suicide of deceased Pavan?

Analysis, Law and Decision

In view of the circumstances and facts of the case, Bench stated that the only difference between Section 305 and 306 of IPC is that Section 305 is a punishing section for abetting an insane or a child whereas Section 306 IPC is a punishing section for the accused who abetted any other person to commit suicide.

In the Court’s opinion, parameters for deciding the fact under Sections 305 and 306 IPC are identical.

Bench noted that the prosecution’s case was that the deceased used to prosecute his studies, there was nothing on record to show that at any point of time, the deceased was declared unsuccessful in any of his academic years.

Different persons may react differently to the same situation.

Further, the Court added that merely because the deceased by writing a note mentioning about the drinking habit of his father and committed suicide, cannot be treated as an abetment, especially when the prosecution evidence could not show that there used to be ill-treatment at the hands of the appellant under the influence of liquor to the deceased so as to drive the deceased to take the extreme step of his life.

Hence, the High Court held that the Lower Court’s Judge swayed away with the fact that the deceased boy committed suicide for an admitted position that the appellant was a drunkard.

Therefore the present appeal was allowed. [Ramrao Kisan Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 29, decided on 04-01-2020]


Advocates who appeared in the case:

S.D. Chande, Advocate for the appellant

V.A. Thakare, A.P.P. for respondent

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Gujarat High Court: Gita Gopi, J., while addressing an issue with regard to abetment to suicide held that in accordance with the ingredients of Section 306 of the Penal Code, 1860 the act of demanding the repayment of money would not bring a case within the meaning of Section 306 of the Penal Code, 1860.

The instant petition was filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing and setting aside the first information under Sections 306, 384, 385, 387 of the Penal Code, 1860 and Section 40 of the Gujarat Money Lenders Act and proceedings initiated in pursuance thereof.

Allegation

Deceased had borrowed money from the present applicant and the applicant was often demanding repayment along with interest and the husband of the complainant could not make arrangements of the money and remained under tension.

Further, it was alleged that the applicant used to often threaten him on phone for the money and had instigated the complainant husband to commit suicide.

Appearance: Rathin P Raval for applicant 1, Nirali Gajjar for respondent 2 and Pranav Trivedi for respondent 1.

Decision

Bench referred the Supreme Court decision in M. Mohan v. State, (2011) 3 SCC 626, with regard to the ingredients of Section 306 of the Penal Code, 1860.

Court stated that the act of demanding the repayment of money would not bring a case within the meaning of Section 306 of the Penal Code, 1860. There would not be any mens rea of the applicant as he would not be benefitted from the act of suicide of the deceased and thus prima facie the allegation in the FIR taken at its face value do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

Hence, the High Court allowed the present petition in the above-view. [Jorubhai Amrubhai Varu v. State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 1189, decided on 19-08-2020]

Case BriefsSupreme Court

“When truth meets sunshine, justice will not prevail on the living alone but after Life’s fitful fever, now the departed will also sleep well. Satyameva Jayate.”

Supreme Court: A single judge bench of Hrishikesh Roy, J has held the ongoing investigation by the CBI to be lawful and further directed that if any other case is registered on the death of the actor Sushant Singh Rajput and the surrounding circumstances of his unnatural death, the CBI is directed to investigate the new case as well. Such enabling order will make it possible for the CBI to investigate the new case, avoiding the rigors of Section 6 of the DSPE Act, requiring consent from the State of Maharashtra.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

The order came on Rhea Chakraborty’s plea seeking the transfer of an FIR, from Patna to Mumbai, accusing her of abetting in Sushant Singh Rajput’s alleged suicide on June 14, 2020. Chakraborty, who was reportedly Sushant Singh’s girlfriend at the time of his death, has challenged Bihar police’s jurisdiction in the matter, given that the alleged crime took place in Maharashtra. Apprehending that all facets of the death of the his son will not be investigated properly by the Mumbai police, Krishna Kishore Singh has filed the above FIR on 25.07.2020, which led to registration of the case by Rajeev Nagar Police Sation, Patna. Several allegations are leveled against Chakraborty in connection with the suicidal death of the Actor and, therefore, she has filed this Petition for transfer of the proceedings from the Bihar Police to the Mumbai Police Authorities. Bihar Police had, however, recommended for a CBI probe into death case of actor and the Centre has accepted the same.

DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGMENT

TRANSFER POWER UNDER SECTION 406 CRPC

The scope of exercise of this power is for securing the ends of justice. The precedents suggest that transfer plea under Section 406 CrPC were granted in cases where the Court believed that the trial may be prejudiced and fair and impartial proceedings cannot be carried on, if the trial continues. The Court held that only cases and appeals (not investigation) can be transferred.

SCOPE OF SECTION 174 CRPC PROCEEDING AND MUMBAI POLICE’s EXERCISE OF POWER THEREOF

The Court noticed that the proceeding under Section 174 CrPC is limited to the inquiry carried out by the police to find out the apparent cause of unnatural death. These are not in the nature of investigation, undertaken after filing of FIR under Section 154 CrPC.

It further said that the Mumbai Police has attempted to stretch the purview of Section 174 without drawing up any FIR and therefore, as it appears, no investigation pursuant to commission of a cognizable offence is being carried out by the Mumbai police. They are yet to register a FIR. Nor they have made a suitable determination, in terms of Section 175(2) CrPC. Hence,

“The inquiry conducted under Section 174 CrPC by the Mumbai police is limited for a definite purpose but is not an investigation of a crime under Section 157 of the CrPC.”

JURISDICTION OF PATNA POLICE TO REGISTER COMPLAINT

The Court held that the Patna police committed no illegality in registering the Complaint. Looking at the nature of the allegations in the Complaint which also relate to misappropriation and breach of trust, the exercise of jurisdiction by the Bihar Police appears to be in order.

“Registration of FIR is mandated when information on cognizable offence is received by the police and at the stage of investigation, it cannot be said that the concerned police station does not have territorial jurisdiction to investigate the case.”

Moreover, the allegation relating to criminal breach of trust and misappropriation of money which were to be eventually accounted for in Patna (where the Complainant resides), could prima facie indicate the lawful jurisdiction of the Patna police.

It has hence, been held that the stage of investigation, they were not required to transfer the FIR to Mumbai police. For the same reason, the Bihar government was competent to give consent for entrustment of investigation to the CBI and as such the ongoing investigation by the CBI is held to be lawful.

INVESTIGATION ENTRUSTMENT TO CBI

“While the CBI cannot conduct any investigation without the consent of the concerned state as mandated under section 6, the powers of the Constitutional Courts are not fettered by the statutory restriction of the DSPE Act.”

The Court noticed that the FIR at Patna was transferred to the CBI with consent of the Bihar government during pendency of this Transfer Petition. However, in future, if commission of cognizable offence under section 175(2) CrPC is determined, the possibility of parallel investigation by the Mumbai Police cannot be ruled out. Section 6 of the DSPE Act, 1946 read with Section 5 prescribe the requirement of consent from the State government, before entrustment of investigation to the CBI.

“As the CBI has already registered a case and commenced investigation at the instance of the Bihar government, uncertainty and confusion must be avoided in the event of Mumbai Police also deciding to simultaneously investigate the cognizable offence, based on their finding in the inquiry proceeding.”

The Court was hence of the opinion that a decision by this Court on the point would confer legitimacy to the investigation.

“… for the innocents, who might be the target of vilification campaign. Equally importantly, when integrity and credibility of the investigation is discernible, the trust, faith and confidence of the common man in the judicial process will resonate.”

COURT’S DIRECTION ON INVESTIGATION

Noticing that as because both states are making acrimonious allegations of political interference against each other, the Court said that the legitimacy of the investigation has come under a cloud. Accusing fingers are being pointed and people have taken the liberty to put out their own conjectures and theories.

“Such comments, responsible or otherwise, have led to speculative public discourse which have hogged media limelight. These developments unfortunately have the propensity to delay and misdirect the investigation.”

The Court was, hence, of the opinion that to ensure public confidence in the investigation and to do complete justice in the matter, it is appropriate to invoke the powers conferred by Article 142 of the Constitution.

It further noticed that while the steps taken by the Mumbai police in the limited inquiry under Section 174 CrPC may not be faulted on the material available before this Court, considering the apprehension voiced by the stakeholders of unfair investigation, this Court must strive to ensure that search for the truth is undertaken by an independent agency, not controlled by either of the two state governments. Most importantly, the credibility of the investigation and the investigating authority, must be protected.

The Court, hence, noted that a fair, competent and impartial investigation is the need of the hour. The expected outcome then would be, a measure of justice for the Complainant, who lost his only son. For the petitioner too, it will be the desired justice as she herself called for a CBI investigation. The dissemination of the real facts through unbiased investigation would certainly result in justice.

[Rhea Chakraborty v. State of Bihar, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 654, decided on 19.08.2020]

Hot Off The PressNews

Supreme Court: A single judge bench of Hrishikesh Roy, J has reserved verdict actor Rhea Chakraborty’s plea seeking the transfer of an FIR, from Patna to Mumbai, accusing her of abetting in Sushant Singh Rajput’s alleged suicide on June 14, 2020. The Court has, in the meantime, asked the parties to submit written submissions by Thursday i.e. August 13, 2020.

Chakraborty, who was reportedly Sushant Singh’s girlfriend at the time of his death, has challenged Bihar police’s jurisdiction in the matter, given that the alleged crime took place in Maharashtra. Apprehending that all facets of the death of the his son will not be investigated properly by the Mumbai police, Krishna Kishore Singh has filed the above FIR on 25.07.2020, which led to registration of the case by Rajeev Nagar Police Sation, Patna. Several allegations are leveled against Chakraborty in connection with the suicidal death of the Actor and, therefore, she has filed this Petition for transfer of the proceedings from the Bihar Police to the Mumbai Police Authorities.

Earlier, Senior Advocate Vikas Singh, appearing for Sushant Singh Rajput’s father, submitted that

“the Complainant is apprehensive about misdirection of the investigation by the Mumbai Police and, therefore, the Bihar Police Authorities should be permitted to carry on their investigation into the suspicious circumstances on the death of the son of the Complainant.”

Solicitor General Tushar Mehta also informed the Court that Centre has accepted Bihar government’s recommendation for CBI probe into death case of actor. the Bihar Police

State of Maharashtra on the other hand, argued that Patna police has no jurisdiction to either lodge an FIR or investigate it and this has been made a political case. Senior advocate R. Basant submitted,

“the Bandra Police Authorities are conducting a professional investigation and he be given time to place on record the stage and nature of the investigation, conducted so far.”

Senior Advocate Shyam Devan, appearing for Chakraborty, argued that the case is registered at the instance of the deceased actor’s father by the Patna Police Authorities, without any jurisdiction.


SCC Online is now on Telegram and Instagram. Join our channel @scconline on Telegram and @scconline_ on Instagram and stay updated with the latest legal news from within and outside India

Hot Off The PressNews

Supreme Court:  A bench headed by SA Bobde, CJ dismissed a public interest litigation (PIL) seeking a probe by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) or National Investigation Agency (NIA) into the death of actor Sushant Singh Rajput.

“Who are you. You are a total stranger who is unnecessarily interfering in the case. The victim’s father is pursuing the case. We are dismissing your petition. Dismissed,”

The Supreme Court was hearing a petition filed by law student DD Dubey seeking a CBI or NIA probe into the death of the actor.

Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, the senior law officer of the Central government, submitted before the Supreme Court that the FIR registered in Patna in the case has already been transferred to the CBI for investigation.

CJI asked the petitioner,

“We are told CBI has filed an FIR. What is the locus standi of yours (petitioner), in the matter,”

Advocate Subhash Jha, appearing for the petitioner, had sought a CBI probe into the death case, to which the bench said, “don’t argue like this and make absurd statements”.

Bihar Chief Minister Nitish Kumar had earlier sent a recommendation to the Central government for CBI investigation in the case filed in Patna based on the complaint of Sushant’s father KK Singh against actor Rhea Chakraborty under sections including abetment of suicide on July 25.

Bollywood actor Rhea Chakraborty has also filed plea before Supreme Court  seeking the transfer of an FIR, from Patna to Mumbai, accusing her of abetting in Sushant Singh Rajput’s alleged suicide on June 14, 2020. Chakraborty, who was reportedly Sushant Singh’s girlfriend at the time of his death, has challenged Bihar police’s jurisdiction in the matter, given that the alleged crime took place in Maharashtra.

Apprehending that all facets of the death of the his son will not be investigated properly by the Mumbai police, Krishna Kishore Singh has filed the above FIR on 25.07.2020, which led to registration of the case by Rajeev Nagar Police Sation, Patna. Several allegations are leveled against Chakraborty in connection with the suicidal death of the Actor and, therefore, she has filed this Petition for transfer of the proceedings from the Bihar Police to the Mumbai Police Authorities.

A single judge bench of Hrishikesh Roy, J has directed Mumbai Police to to file status report on probe conducted so far in Bollywood actor Sushant Singh Rajput death case. Asking the parties to file reply within 3 days, the Court has said that it would hear the matter next week. Read more

(Source: ANI)


SCC Online is now on Telegram and Instagram. Join our channel @scconline on Telegram and @scconline_ on Instagram and stay updated with the latest legal news from within and outside India

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: A single judge bench of Hrishikesh Roy, J has directed Mumbai Police to to file status report on probe conducted so far in Bollywood actor Sushant Singh Rajput death case. Asking the parties to file reply within 3 days, the Court has said that it would hear the matter next week.

The Court is hearing Bollywood actor Rhea Chakraborty’s plea seeking the transfer of an FIR, from Patna to Mumbai, accusing her of abetting in Sushant Singh Rajput’s alleged suicide on June 14, 2020. Chakraborty, who was reportedly Sushant Singh’s girlfriend at the time of his death, has challenged Bihar police’s jurisdiction in the matter, given that the alleged crime took place in Maharashtra.

Apprehending that all facets of the death of the his son will not be investigated properly by the Mumbai police, Krishna Kishore Singh has filed the above FIR on 25.07.2020, which led to registration of the case by Rajeev Nagar Police Sation, Patna. Several allegations are leveled against Chakraborty in connection with the suicidal death of the Actor and, therefore, she has filed this Petition for transfer of the proceedings from the Bihar Police to the Mumbai Police Authorities.

Senior Advocate Vikas Singh, appearing for Sushant Singh Rajput’s father, submitted that

“the Complainant is apprehensive about misdirection of the investigation by the Mumbai Police and, therefore, the Bihar Police Authorities should be permitted to carry on their investigation into the suspicious circumstances on the death of the son of the Complainant.”

Solicitor General Tushar Mehta also informed the Court that Centre has accepted Bihar government’s recommendation for CBI probe into death case of actor. the Bihar Police

State of Maharashtra on the other hand, argued that Patna police has no jurisdiction to either lodge an FIR or investigate it and this has been made a political case. Senior advocate R. Basant submitted,

“the Bandra Police Authorities are conducting a professional investigation and he be given time to place on record the stage and nature of the investigation, conducted so far.”

Senior Advocate Shyam Devan, appearing for Chakraborty, argued that the case is registered at the instance of the deceased actor’s father by the Patna Police Authorities, without any
jurisdiction.

Observing that truth should come out so far as actor’s death is concerned, the Court placed the matter for hearing next week.

” three days time is granted to all parties to place on record their respective stand in the matter. The State of Maharashtra should apprise the Court on the stage of investigation by the Mumbai Police by the next date.”

[Rhea Chakraborty v. State of Bihar, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 625 , order dated 05.08.2020]


SCC Online is now on Telegram and Instagram. Join our channel @scconline on Telegram and @scconline_ on Instagram and stay updated with the latest legal news from within and outside India

Case BriefsHigh Courts

“People from the past, have a tendency to walk back into present and run over the future.”

Orissa High Court: S.K. Panigrahi, J., while addressing a bail application observed that,

Tik Tok Mobile App which often demonstrates a degrading culture and encourage pornography besides causing pedophiles and explicit disturbing content, is required to be properly regulated so as to save the teens from its negative impact.

In the present petition and application has been filed under Section 439 of CrPC to seek bail. She is an accused for an offence under Sections 306 and 34 of Penal Code, 1860.

Background

Allegation against the accused/petitioner is that she along with the co- accused have inflicted direct and indirect mental torture on the deceased (Padmalochan Barik) which resulted in the commission of suicide by the deceased.

With the statements recorded it was revealed that petitioner was alleged to have been in a love relationship with the co-accused before she got married with the deceased.

Co-accused had forwarded some of the intimate Tik Tok videos with petitioner to the deceased and the same were alleged to have been streamed on social media as well.

The underpinnings of familial shame made deceased suffer a lot internally in the form of tremendous mental pressure which invited a dangerous haste in ending his life by hanging himself.

Abetment of Suicide

From the investigation it was clear that the co-accused was responsible for the abetment of suicide.

Petitioner’s Counsel L.N. Patel

It was submitted that petitioner had no role in the abetment of suicide of her husband and the same has not yet been established. Hence she may be granted bail.

Decision 

On perusal of the above, bench stated that it is a prima facie view that the incident might have been perceived to be just a streaming of Tik Tok videos of the deceased’s wife and her former beau but it was morally and legally heinous as the same led to an ugly consequence.

Petitioner being wife should have the deceased’s emotional safety, instead she became the cause of his emotional insecurity.

Offence of abetment to suicide under Section 306 of IPC is endowed with twin essential ingredients:(i)a person commits suicide (ii) such suicide was abetted by the accused. The offence involves a mental process of instigating a person of intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing.

In Court’s opinion, the Tik Tok videos had escaped the investigation officer’s attention.

Tik Tok Videos 

Bench stated that the above-mentioned Tik Tok videos became the cause for tragic end of an innocent life. Transmitting Tik Tok videos with offensive content to harass victims are on prowl and are gradually on the rise.

Of late, Cyber bullying activity like the instant case, has reared its ugly head and swept away so many innocent lives through many of its ugly manifestations.

With regard to Information Technology Act, what the Court said?

Information Technology Act, 2000 does impose an obligation upon such companies to take down content and exercise due diligence before uploading any content, but India lacks a specialized law to address the crime like cyber bullying.

In the present matter, Court stated that,

Further digging up, the instant case might bring some surprises, but at the moment the role of the co-accused seems to be quite apparent in terms of preparing the Tik Tok videos having some inappropriate content and sending the same to the deceased. This aspect of the taint cannot be properly established sans a befitting trial process.

Even a positive role of the petitioner in the entire episode cannot be ruled out, however, at the moment, invoking Section 306 would be preposterous. Hence, without more ado petitioner is granted bail. [Shibani Barik v. State of Odisha, 2020 SCC OnLine Ori 425, decided on 28-05-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court: K.R. Shriram, J., while deciding the appeal filed impugning the order and judgment passed with regard to acquittal for offence punishable under Sections 498A (Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty) and Section 306 (Abetment of suicide) of Penal Code, 1860, observed that,

“Cruelty must be of such a degree as contemplated by the Section, i.e., it must be wilful conduct of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb and health of the woman.”

Prosecution case was that complainant’s daughter Sunita was married to the respondent (accused). Respondent used to ill-treat Sunita and under the influence of alcohol he used to beat her while insisting to bring cash amount of Rs 20,000 from her father (complainant) so that he could start a business.

After sometime respondent started to sell fruits and in the meanwhile Sunita conceived and gave birth to a daughter. On or about 18-09-2001, it was informed that Sunita had committed suicide by jumping in front of a running train.

In view of the above circumstances, PW-1 had lodged the complaint for offences punishable under Sections 498A and 306 IPC.

Supreme Court in its decision, Muralidhar v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 5 SCC 730, held that

“…unless the conclusions reached by the trial court are found to be palpably wrong or based on an erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, Appellate Court should not interfere with the conclusions of the Trial Court.”

Citing the above, Court stated that, it must be kept in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of respondent and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed by the trial court.

In Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat, 1996 SCC (Cri) 972, Supreme Court held that,

“…If Appellate Court finds that there was nothing wrong or manifestly erroneous with the order of the trial court, the Appeal Court need not eve re-appraise the evidence and arrive at its own conclusions.”

Thus, High Court while analysing the present set of facts and circumstances stated that it does not find anything wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable in the impugned judgment.

Court noted that,

PW-1 (Complainant) stated that the accused was not doing any work and under the influence of liquor, used to beat Sunita and was insisting her to bring cash from parents for doing some business.

PW-1 admits that in his statement before the police, he has not mentioned that Sunita had gone to his house for delivery and after her delivery she resided with him for 15 days. He also admits that in his statement to the police, he has not mentioned that during that stay Sunita had informed him about the ill-treatment and demand for cash by accused.

DW-1 in whose quarters Sunita and accused were residing stated that in her presence no dispute took place between Sunita and accused, nobody used to visit their house and Sunita never complained about accused.

On perusal of the above, Court stated that apart from the general statements by PW-1, there was nothing on record to show that accused used to beat Sunita under the influence of alcohol.

Stating the above, bench gave another point of significance in such cases that,

“.. It is to be kept in mind that it is easy to accuse somebody of ill-treatment after someone dies, but it will not be wise to convict somebody based on such general statements.”

“It is settled law that under Section 498A of IPC, every cruelty is not an offence.”

With regard to abetment, Court stated that, in order to amount abetment, there must be mens rea or community of intention. Without knowledge or intention, there can be no abetment and the knowledge and intention must relate to the act said to be abetted, i.e. suicide, in this case. To constitute ‘abetment by instigation’, there must be a direct incitement to do the culpable act.

Thus, in Court view, no evidence is found to suggest that Sunita committed suicide because of ill-treatment or cruelty by the accused. There is also no evidence whatsoever that the accused by their acts intended Sunita to commit suicide.

In view of the above, order of acquittal need not be interfered with. [State of Maharashtra v. Shri Balu Ravji Abhang, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 307, decided on 20-02-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court: V.M. Deshpande, J. allowed an appeal against the judgment of the trial court whereby the appellant was convicted under Section 305 (abetment of suicide of child or insane person) of the Penal Code, 1860.

The appellant’s son had committed suicide by hanging himself. He left behind a suicide note wherein he had mentioned that his father, the appellant, was habitual to drinking. According to the prosecution, the deceased was under great stress due to the appellant’s behavior and, therefore, committed suicide. The appellant faced trial and was convicted as aforesaid. Aggrieved thereby, he filed the instant appeal.

The High Court referred to Section 107 (abetment of a thing) as well as Sections 305 and 306 and noted that the law on abetment to commit suicide is well crystallised by numerous decisions of the Supreme Court. It was also stated that the only difference between Sections 305 and 306 IPC is that Section 305 is a punishing section for abetting the suicide of an insane or a child, whereas Section 306 is a punishing section for the accused who abetted any other person to commit suicide. However, said the Court: “The parameters for deciding the fact under Section 305 and 306 IPC are identical.”

The Court noted various admitted facts on record and observed: “The admitted position also speaks that the mother of the deceased was a psychic patient having nothing to do with the drinking of the appellant. Therefore, he used to be always under depressing conditions. Different persons may react differently to the same situation. Therefore, merely because the deceased by writing a note mentioning about the drinking habit of his father and committed suicide, in my view, it cannot be treated as an abetment, especially when the prosecution evidence falls short to show that there used to be ill-treatment at the hands of the appellant under the influence of liquor to the deceased so as to drive the deceased to take the extreme step of his life.”

The Court was of the view that the trial court had swayed away with the fact that the deceased boy committed suicide for an admitted position that the appellant was a drunkard. However, according to the Court: “Merely drinking can never be an abetment for a person to commit suicide.”

Accordingly, on the representation of the entire prosecution case, the Court allowed the instant appeal and set aside the conviction of the appellant as recorded by the trial court. [Ramrao Kisan Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 29, decided on 04-01-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: The Bench of Sanjeev Sachdeva, J. discharged the petitioner-wife of the offence under Section 306 IPC for allegedly abetting suicide of her husband.

Petitioner was wife of the deceased who committed suicide in 2015. It was alleged that on 31-7-2015, petitioner had slapped the deceased in front of other family members. On 02-08-2015, the deceased attempted to commit suicide and expired on the next day. Alleged suicide note was also discovered from his bed. An FIR was registered as per which deceased committed suicide as he was upset about petitioner slapping him. According to the trial court, there was prima facie material against petitioner to frame a charged under Section 306. Petitioner impugned trial court’s order in the present petition.

Lohit Ganguly, Advocate for the petitioner submitted that the trial court failed to appreciate that the material did not suggest that petitioner instigated the deceased to commit suicide.

The High Court referred to Section 107 (abetment of a thing); and decisions in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618 where Supreme Court laid down as to what conduct amounts to incitement or instigation; and Pawan Kumar v. State of H.P., (2017) 7 SCC 780 where expression “abetment” was elaborated upon. In the present case, Court did not find any material suggest that petitioner instigated, conspired or aided in the commission of suicide by the deceased. Mere act of wife slapping the husband would not instigate him to commit suicide by the deceased. Furthermore, the alleged suicide did not refer to any incident of slapping. In such circumstances, it was held that no charge under Section 306 could be made against the petitioner. Thus, the petition was allowed and the petitioner was discharged. [Shikha Gupta v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2019 SCC OnLine Del 6394, decided on 08-01-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court: A Division Bench comprising of P.N. Deshmukh and M.G. Giratkar, JJ. allowed an application for quashing an FIR lodged for the offence punishable under Section 306 read with Section 34 IPC.

One Rupchand Sirsat, 54, working as Group Secretary in Kherda-Mozari Coop. Society committed suicide and left a suicide note making allegations against the applicant and other MPs and MLAs. The wife of the deceased informed the police, pursuant to which the FIR came to be registered for the offence as mentioned above. The applicants had filed the instant application for quashing of the said FIR.

The High Court, while considering the issue, referred to its previous decisions wherein it was held that for bringing an offence under Section 306, specific abetment as contemplated by Section 107 on the part of the accused, with an intention to bring about the suicide of the person concerned, is required. Further, in order to convict a person under Section 306, there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. However, on the facts of the present case, the Court was of the view that the applicant cannot be said to have abetted the deceased to commit suicide. From the contents of FIR, the Court gathered that the deceased was mentally disturbed due to the death of his son. The concerned death note was written two months prior to the commission of suicide. After writing the said note, the deceased had proceeded on leave. In view of such facts and circumstances, the Court quashed the FIR registered against the applicants. [Pramod Shriram Telgote v. State of Maharashtra,  2018 SCC OnLine Bom 1456, dated 04-07-2018]