Case BriefsCOVID 19Supreme Court

Supreme Court: In an important verdict concerning the Small Scale Industries, particularly the MSMEs, facing the financial strain due to the Corona Virus Pandemic, the 3-judge bench of Ashok Bhushan, R. Subhash Reddy and MR Shah*, JJ has held that there shall not be any charge of interest on interest/compound interest/penal interest from any of the borrowers who availed RBI’s loan moratorium scheme for the period between March 1, 2020 till August 31, 2020 during the COVID-19 lockdown.

The Court held that whatever the amount is recovered by way of interest on interest/compound interest/penal interest for the period during the moratorium, the same shall be refunded and be adjusted/given credit in the next instalment of the loan account.

The Court, however, refused to extend the moratorium period and also refused to grant the relief of total waiver of interest. 

Background

The Court was hearing a batch of petitions challenging the Covid-19 Regulatory Package notified by the RBI vide notification dated 27.03.2020 seeking total waiver of interest being charged on the loan amount during the moratorium period and also further extension of the moratorium period. It was also prayed before the Court that the relief packages which are offered by the UOI/RBI/Bankers/Lenders were not sufficient and some better and/or more reliefs should be offered.

However, on 23.10.2020 , the Central Government came out with a policy decision by which it is decided not to charge the interest on interest on the loans up to Rs. 2 crores.  However, such relief was restricted to these 8 categories.

It was Central Government’s case that if the Government were to consider waiver of interest on all the loans and advances to all classes and categories of borrowers corresponding to the six-month period for which the moratorium was made available under the relevant RBI circulars, the estimated amount is more than Rs. 6 lakh crores. “If the banks were to bear this burden, it would necessarily wipe out a substantial and a major part of their net worth, rendering most of the banks unviable and raising a very serious question mark over their very survival.” This was one of the main reasons why waiver of interest   was   not   even   contemplated and only payment of instalments was deferred.

After careful consideration and weighing all possible options, the Central Government decided to continue the tradition of handholding the small borrowers and, therefore, granted the relief of waiver of compound interest during the moratorium period, limited to the most vulnerable categories of borrowers.

Ruling 

Total Waiver of interest during moratorium period

The bankers/lenders have to pay the interest to the depositors and their liability to pay the interest on the deposits continue even during the moratorium period. They also have to bear the administrative expenses. Continue payment of interest to depositors is not only one of the most essential banking activities but it shall be a huge responsibility owed by the banks to crores and crores of small depositors, pensioners etc. surviving on the interest from their deposits. There may be several welfare funds schemes, category specific and sector specific which might be surviving and are implemented on the strength of the interest generated from their deposits. All such welfare funds would depend on the income generated from their deposits for the survival of their members.

“Therefore, to grant such a relief of total waiver of interest during the moratorium period would have a far-reaching financial implication in the economy of the country as well as the lenders/banks.”

Hence, when a conscious decision has been taken not to waive the interest during the moratorium period and a policy decision has been taken to give relief to the borrowers by deferring the payment of installments and so many other reliefs are offered by the RBI and thereafter by the bankers independently considering the Report submitted by Kamath Committee consisting of experts, the interference of the court is not called for.

Insufficient Relief packages

No   mandamus   can   be   issued   to   grant   some   more reliefs/packages. The court cannot interfere with the economic policy decisions on the ground that either they are not sufficient or efficacious and/or some more reliefs should have been granted. The Government might have their own priorities and the Government has to spend in various fields and in the present case like health, medicine, providing food etc.

Economic decisions are required to be taken keeping the larger economic scenario in mind and as such the Central Government has already given various reliefs and by providing various reliefs, they have already expanded huge financial burden. Further, the pandemic has caused stress to large and small businesses and the individuals who have lost jobs and livelihoods. By and large, everybody has suffered due to lockdown due to Covid-19 pandemic.

“No State or country can have unlimited resources to spend on any of its projects. That is why it only announces the financial reliefs/packages to the extent it is feasible.”

Extension of moratorium period

Extension of moratorium period is a policy decision.  Even otherwise, almost five months were available to eligible borrowers when circular dated 6.8.2020 was notified providing for a separate resolution mechanism for Covid19 related stressed assets.  Therefore, sufficient time was given to invoke the resolution mechanism.

Restriction of not charging interest on interest with respect to the loans up to Rs. 2 crores only for a few categories

In absence of any justification shown by the Government to restrict the relief of not charging interest on interest with respect to the loans up to Rs. 2 crores only and that too restricted to the aforesaid categories, the Court found such decision to be irrational.

It was also noted that the scheme dated 23.10.2020 granting relief/benefit of waiver of compound interest/interest on interest contains eligibility criteria and it provides that any borrower whose aggregate of all facilities with lending institution is more than Rs. 2 crores (sanctioned limit or outstanding amount) will not be eligible for ex-gratia payment under the said scheme.  Therefore, if the total exposure of the loan at the grant of the sanction is more than Rs. 2 crores, the borrower will be ineligible irrespective of the actual outstanding.

Giving an example, the Court explained

“if the borrower has been sanctioned a loan of Rs. 5 crores and has availed of the same, even though he might have repaid substantially bringing down the principal amount of less than Rs. 2 crores as on 29.02.2020, but because of the sanction of the loan amount of more than Rs. 2 crores, he will be ineligible. It also further provides that the outstanding amount should not be exceeded to Rs. 2 crores and for this purpose aggregate of all facilities with the lending institution will be reckoned.   Therefore, if a borrower, for example, MSME Category has availed and has outstanding of business loan of Rs. 1.99 crores and also has dues of its credit card of Rs. 1.10 lakhs, thereby making the aggregate to Rs. 2.10 crores, it stands ineligible. Therefore, the aforesaid conditions would be arbitrary and discriminatory.”

Further, the compound interest/interest on interest shall be chargeable on deliberate/willful default by the borrower to pay the installments due and payable. Therefore, it is in the nature of a penal interest.

By notification dated 27.03.2020, the Government has provided the deferment of the installments due and payable during the moratorium period.

“Once the payment of installment is deferred as per circular dated 27.03.2020, non-payment of the installment during the moratorium period cannot be said to be willful and therefore there is no justification to charge the interest on interest/compound interest/penal interest for the period during the moratorium.”

Therefore, there shall not be any charge of interest on interest/compound interest/penal interest for the period during the moratorium from any of the borrowers and whatever the amount is recovered by way of interest on interest/compound interest/penal interest for the period during the moratorium, the same shall be refunded and to be adjusted/given credit in the next instalment of the loan account.

[Small Scale Industries Manufacturers Association v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 246, decided on 23.03.2021]


*Judgment by: Justice MR Shah

Appearances before the Court by:

For Petitioners: Senior Advocate Ravindra Shrivastava, Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Kapil Sibbal

For Union of India: Solicitor General of India Tushar Mehta

For RBI: Senior Advocate V. Giri

For Indian Bank Association: Senior Advocate Harish Salve

For SBI: Senior Advocate Mukul Rohatgi

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COVID-19| Seeking waiver of interest on interest for loan during the moratorium period? SC asks Govt to implement decision to forego compound interest on these 8 categories

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: In a breather to customers in the case relating to waiver of interest on loan during the moratorium period, the 3-judge bench of Ashok Bhushan*, R. Subhash Reddy and MR Shah, JJ has directed that all steps to implement the decision dated 23.10.2020 of the Government of India, Ministry of Finance be taken so that benefit to the eight categories contemplated in the affidavit can be extended.

The affidavit dated 23.10.2020, states that

“ (…) the decision taken by the Central Government for granting various reliefs for the COVID-19 pandemic for benefit of waiver of interest upto Rs.2 Crores in eight categories has been approved by the Union Cabinet in its meeting dated 21.10.2020 and Ministry of Finance has issued directions dated 23.10.2020 on the subject, which has been brought on record alongwith the affidavit.”

The eight categories are:

(i) MSME loans

(ii) Education loans

(iii) Housing loans

(iv) Consumer durable loans

(v) Credit card dues

(vi) Automobile loans

(vii) Personal loans to professionals

(viii) Consumption loans up

Solicitor General Tushar Mehta submitted before the Court that the Central Government is fully conscious of the difficulties faced by the various sectors and the stakeholders of various sectors and the Finance Ministry, after the outbreak of COVID-19, has taken several measures of reliefs dealing with the potential problems faced by several sectors and in several spheres of all financial worlds.

It was further highlighted that in pursuance of circular dated 23.10.2020,

“… the State Bank of India has informed that as on 13.11.2020, as per provisional, unaudited information received so far from various lending institutions, such lending institutions have released ex-gratia amount of an aggregate exceeding Rs.4,300 Crores in over 13.12 Crore accounts of borrowers covered under the Scheme.”

The Court will continue to hear the matter on 02.12.2020.

[Gajendra Sharma v. Union of India, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 963, decided on 27.11.2020]


*Justice Ashok Bhushan has penned this judgment

For petitioner: Senior Advocate Rajiv Dutta

For RBI: Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, Senior Advocate V. Giri and Advocate Ramesh Babu M.R.

Case BriefsTribunals/Commissions/Regulatory Bodies

Customs, Excise and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT): P. Venkata Subba Rao (Technical Member) allowed an appeal which was filed against the judgment of Commissioner (Appeals).

The appellant imported Benzothiazole through Visakhapatnam Port declaring an assessable value of US$ 3.5 per Kg being the transaction value. The Assistant Commissioner enhanced it to 4.3523 per Kg. The appellant paid the enhanced duty under protest and appealed to Commissioner (Appeals) who set aside the enhancement. Thereafter the appellant had filed an application for refund of the excess duty paid by them. The Assistant Commissioner rejected the refund claim and on appeal, the rejection of refund was upheld by Commissioner (Appeals).

The Assistant Commissioner had sanctioned the refund but had not paid interest. On appeal Commissioner (Appeals), by the impugned order, held that the liability to pay interest arises only if the refund was not made within three months from the date of receipt of the Tribunal’s Order. Since the refund had been paid within three months from the date of receipt of the Tribunal’s order no interest was payable.

The counsel for the appellant, M. Rajendran submitted that it was a well-settled principle of law that interest had to be paid if the refund was not sanctioned within three months from the date of refund application.

The Tribunal explained that Section 27A of the Customs Act, 1962 provided for the payment on interest on delayed refunds. The Tribunal further stated that if there was any delay in sanctioning the amount of refund if any available to the appellant as per the Tribunal’s Order he can make a claim of the same from the Department. The respondent had sanctioned the refund of Duty and Interest vide impugned order which was well within the time period of three months from the date of order of Appellate Tribunal. Hence the interest on delayed refund under the provisions of Section 27A of Customs Act, 1962 does not arise in the present case. The Tribunal allowed the appeal finding that the appellant was entitled to interest on the delayed refunds from three months from the date of receipt of refund application till the date of which the refund has actually been paid and orders the Department to pay the interest.[Andhra Organics Ltd. v. Commr. Of Central Tax, 2020 SCC OnLine CESTAT 328, decided on 10-11-2020]


Suchita Shukla, Editorial Assistant has up this story together

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court: V.L. Achliya, J., while addressing the issue with regard to the interest on compensation awarded in a motor accident case, observed that,

“…discretion vests with the tribunal to award the interest at ‘such rate’ and from ‘such date’ over the compensation awarded.”

Appellants being aggrieved by the decision of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal preferred this appeal with a limited challenge of award of interest.

Claimants presented a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act seeking compensation of Rs 2 lakhs on account of the accidental death of the deceased who dies in a motor accident.

At the time of the accidental death, the deceased was earning Rs 6,000 per month.

Claimants assessed the compensation to be payable as Rs 14,51,000 but restricted the claim petition to Rs 2 lakhs.

Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Parbhani allowed the claim petition and awarded compensation of Rs 3,64,500 [inclusive of NFL] with interest @ 6% per annum from the date of petition till realization.

Being dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the claimants have preferred Appeal.

In the first appeal, Appellate Court had remanded the case to the Tribunal for deciding the same afresh. While remanding the case, Appellate Court observed that the amount already withdrawn by the claimants under the earlier award would be retained by them and the same shall be subject to further order to be passed by the tribunal.

Further, the Tribunal awarded the compensation of Rs 10,22,208 making the respondent liable to pay the same. Tribunal directed that after deducting the compensation amount of Rs 3,64, 500 which was awarded earlier the claimants shall entitle to recover the balance amount with an interest of 6% per annum from the date of passing Award till its realization.

Aggrieved with the interest from the date of passing of the Award the appellants preferred this appeal.

Decision

Bench referred to Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act which provides for the award of interest over the compensation awarded which spells out that discretion vests with the tribunal to award the interest at ‘such rate’ and from ‘such date’ over the compensation awarded.

There is no statutory obligation cast upon the Tribunal to award the interest from the date of making application for compensation. The only restriction that has been cast upon Tribunal under Section 171 of Motor Vehicles Act is to ensure that interest to be awarded be a simple interest and same shall be payable not earlier than the date of making claim.

Thus, except the embargo cast upon that interest can not be awarded from the date earlier to date of making claim, no other restrictions have been imposed upon the discretion of the Court/ Tribunal to award interest.

To understand the meaning of Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, Court referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Abati Bezbaruah v. Geological Survey of India, (2003) 3 SCC 148.

Further, the bench stated that no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the rate at which interest to be awarded and date from which such interest to be payable.

While awarding interest, the Tribunal has to take into consideration the facts and circumstances of individual case.

Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act does not provide the rate at which interest has to be payable nor the date from which interest to be awarded.

Adding to the above, Court stated that the only restriction that has been put under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act over the exercise of powers of the Tribunal is not to award interest from the date earlier to fling of claim petition and interest to be awarded to be simple interest.

Hence tribunal’s order is clear and unambiguous and the present appeal was dismissed in light of the same. [Sangita v. Allanur, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 931, decided on 24-07-2020]

Case BriefsTribunals/Commissions/Regulatory Bodies

Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL): A Division Bench of Manjula Chellur, J. (Member) and S.D. Dubey, (Technical Member) passed an order for implementation of the Tribunal’s order for the payment of the sum of money due with interest.

An application for the implementation of the order was made by the appellant when after a reasonable time the respondent didn’t pay any heed towards the order against them.

Aman Anand, Aman Dixit, counsels for the appellant submitted that the order was received for the payment after increasing the recovery of interim transfer of lignite to 85 percent in place of 70 percent. It was submitted by the appellant that no appeal was pending against the said order. Hence, this application.

R.K. Mehta, Himanshi Andley, P.N. Bhandari, counsels for the respondents, submitted that the matter related to the increase in the tariff was pending in the Commission and that the appellant had rushed to the tribunal prematurely in order to prejudice the pending decision of the Commission.

The Tribunal after submission by the parties held that although the matter is pending in the Commission the payment due is for the previous year and thus the same is to be made by the respondent as per the order of the Tribunal. It was further reiterated that, the said order was passed by this Tribunal at the premise of financial hardship to the generator which was being allowed considerably at less transfer price than they actually claimed. The Court concluded that, the maintenance of judicial discipline is a part of our judicial process. Thus, the order was made for the implementation of the order of the Tribunal in its true spirit.[Barmer Lignite Mining Co. Ltd. v. Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission, 2019 SCC OnLine APTEL 27, decided on 17-05-2019]

Case BriefsTribunals/Commissions/Regulatory Bodies

Securities and Exchange Board of India: The Board comprising G. Mahalingam as  Whole Time Member, allowed Oil India’s application seeking exemption/relaxation from strict enforcement of the requirement contained under Regulation 24(i)(e) of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Buyback of Securities) Regulations, 2018.

The aforesaid application was necessitated on account of the transfer of 333,20,401 equity shares held by the promoter of the company, i.e., Government of India to the Asset Management Company (AMC) of Central Public Sector Enterprise Exchange Traded Fund (CPSE–ETF). This activity was carried out as a part of the government’s disinvestment process.

Oil India submitted that the proposed buy–back inter alia will help in optimizing its capital structure and improve its key financial ratios and would also lead to a reduction in outstanding shares, improvement in earnings per share and enhanced return on invested capital.

The Board noted that as per Regulation 28 of the Buy–back Regulations, SEBI may, in the interest of investors and the securities market, relax the strict enforcement of any requirement of aforesaid Regulations except the provisions incorporated from the Companies Act, if it is satisfied that the requirement is procedural in nature or the requirement may cause undue hardship to investors.

It opined that the strict enforcement of Regulation 24(i)(e) of Buy–Back Regulations against Oil India, at this point in time, may result in undue hardship to investors including shareholders of the company who may seek to participate in the proposed buyback. In view thereof, the exemption/relaxation sought for by Oil India was allowed.[Buy-back of securities in Oil India Ltd., In re, WTM/GM/CFD/87/2018–19, Order dated 31-01-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Madras High Court: A Single Judge Bench comprising of N. Seshasayee, J., allowed an appeal on the ground that the respondent gave up his interest in the Order that he had obtained in his favour. 

The facts of this case are that respondent is the biological father of the child and the appellant is the maternal grand father of the child. Seeking custody of the minor child, the respondent filed a petition before the Additional District Court, and the same was ordered in his favour. Challenging the order of the lower Court, the appellant preferred the present appeal.

The counsel for petitioner, Advocate R.Shivakumar, argued that the respondent had gotten married and settled down and did not turn up to see his daughter. It was also reported that the child was 17 years and she does not remember to have seen her father.

The counsel for the respondent, Advocate N.U. Prasanna submitted that the respondent had no interest to take immediate custody of the child since the child was only few months to attain majority and that she had not been in his care through out the duration of this litigation.

This Court allowed the appeal on the ground that the respondent gave up his interest in the order that he had obtained in his favour. [R. Venkatesan v. J. Gunasekaran, 2017 SCC OnLine Mad 35492, Decided on 10-11-2017]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Calcutta High Court: A Single Judge Bench comprising of Arijit Banerjee, J. disposed of a writ petition by granting payment of interest to a retired employee on the amount of delayed payment of pension.

The petitioner was retired in 2007 while working as a teacher in a higher secondary school. The first payment order was issued in 2007 itself. Under ROPA Rules, 2009 there was a revision of pensionary and gratuity amount payable to the petitioner which order was made in 2012. The arrear revised pension was disbursed in 2013. The petitioner claimed interest on delayed payment of revised pension.

The High Court, at the outset, observed that the Limitation Act in terms does not apply to writ petition. Furthermore, it is a settled law that a retired employee is entitled to some amount of interest on delayed payment of pension. In the present case, it was a bounden duty of the State to disburse the due date. If it failed to do so and released such amount after an unexplained delay, it was obliged to pay interest to the retired employee. In such view of the matter, the Court directed the Director of Pension, Provident Fund and Group Insurance to pay interest to the writ petitioner at the rate of 9% per annum on the arrear of revised pension calculated on and from 1 June 2009 till actual date of payment. The petition was disposed of in the terms above. [Purna Chandra Mondal v. State of W.B.,2018 SCC OnLine Cal 7366, dated 03-10-2018]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: A Single Judge Bench comprising of Valmiki Mehta, J. dismissed an appeal filed by the appellant-tenant impugning the judgment of the trial court whereby mesne profits were awarded to the respondent-landlord.

The appellant was a tenant in the subject premises. The tenancy commenced in 1986 and was terminated in 1998 vide legal notice. The appellant in the meanwhile, during the pendency of suit for possession and mesne profits, handed over the possession of the tenanted premises to the landlord in 1999. Therefore, the mesne profits were calculated from May 1998 to August 1999 (date of filing the suit to date of handing over of possession). Against the award of mesne profits, the appellant filed the present regular first appeal under Section 96 CPC.

The High Court noted that the trial court relied on the rent paid by another tenant to calculate the mesne profits. It was also observed that some amount of honest guess work is always involved in calculation of mesne profits, therefore, once the rent paid on similar premises on same area was taken as the basis, there was no illegality in the award of the mesne profits passed by the trial court. Furthermore, the definition of mesne profits in Section 2(12) CPC provides that mesne profits include the interest payable thereon. Holding that the judgment impugned did not require any interfere, the learned Judge went on to observe that there is no inherent right in citizens of this country, who are tenants, to violate the law by overstaying in the premises where the tenancy stands dismissed. The appeal was dismissed. [Hindustan Motors Ltd. v. Seven Seas Leasing Ltd.,2018 SCC OnLine Del 11391, decided on 19-09-2018]

Case BriefsTribunals/Commissions/Regulatory Bodies

National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT): A two-member bench comprising of Justice S.J. Mukhopadhaya, Chairperson and Justice Bansi Lal Bhat, Member (Judicial), dismissed an appeal filed by the Operational Creditor against the judgment of the National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai whereby appellant’s application under Section 9 I&B Code was dismissed.

The appellant had filed an application for initiation of Insolvency Resolution Process against the Corporate Debtor. Before the NCLT, the respondent submitted that the principal amount of debt due was already paid. The NCLT dismissed the application of the appellant. Aggrieved thus, the present appeal was filed. The appellant, placing reliance on Section 3(11) of the Code which defines debt, contended that debt means a liability or obligation in respect of a claim which is due from any person and includes a financial debt and operational debt. It was submitted that the debt as defined in the Code, includes the interest due on the principal amount as well.

The Appellate Tribunal was of the view that such submission was untenable. It is NCLT, not every interest that can be treated as a debt. If in terms of the agreement, interest is payable to the Operational or Financial Creditor, then the debt will include interest; otherwise, the principal amount is to be treated as debt which is the liability in respect of the claim that can be made from the Corporate Debtor. The Court noted that in the present matter, the principal amount had already been paid, and as per the agreement, no interest was payable. As such, the application under Section 9 on the basis of entitlement of payment of interest was not maintainable. The appeal was accordingly dismissed. [Krishna Enterprises v. Gammon India Ltd.,2018 SCC OnLine NCLAT 360, dated 27-07-2018]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: A Division Bench comprising of G.S Sistani and V Kameswar Rao, JJ., dismissed an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter “Arbitration Act”) read with Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966 and Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 against the order of a Single Judge wherein the appellants had raised objections against the award of the arbitrator under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.

The crux of the argument of the appellants was that the arbitrator failed to follow the principles of natural justice by not making a full and fair disclosure that he had been appointed as an arbitrator by the respondent in as many as 43 cases prior to the present case. The appellants pleaded that on this ground alone, the award rendered by the arbitrator should be set aside. The appellants, admittedly, had not urged this argument before the Single Judge.

The Court noticed that the arbitrator had issued a notice to the parties, wherein the following relevant sentence was quoted, “….currently adjudicating on multiple claims filed by the claimant company.” The order-sheet reflected that the hearing was attended by counsel for both parties. Consequently, the Court found no grounds for interfering with the order passed by the Single Judge for two reasons. The first being that the argument urged before the Court was not raised in front of the Single Judge, and secondly, the judgment in Aditya Ganapa v. Religare Finvest Ltd. (OMP No. 1038 of 2014, decided on 30.01.2015) relied on by the appellants did not fit in the factum of the present case where the arbitrator had indeed, disclosed his interest to the parties. Appeal dismissed. [Sidhi Industries v. M/s Religare Finvest Ltd.,  2017 SCC OnLine Del 12685, decided on 11.12.2017]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Kerala High Court: A Division Bench comprising of Antony Dominic and Dama Seshadri Naidu, JJ. heard appeals dealing with the issue as to whether interest accrued from donations received by a charitable institution are taxable or not. The respondent-assessee, a charitable institution, entitled to exemption under Section 11 of the Income Tax Act of 1961 (which deals with exemption from tax on income from property held for charitable or religious purposes), was receiving contributions from donors with express directions that the contributions were to be added by the assessee to its corpus which was exempt from tax.

However, the Revenue rejected this contention and the interest earned from the contributions was brought to tax. In appeal, the interest was exempted and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal confirmed the order. The Revenue then approached the High Court in appeal. Perusing the conditions laid down in Section 11(1)(d) of the Income Tax Act, the Court came to the conclusion that “interest earned on the contributions already made by the donors would also partake the character of income in the form of voluntary contributions made with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust”. Therefore, the interest so earned would qualify for exemption under Section 11(1) of the Income Tax Act. [Commissioner of Income Tax, Kochi v. Mata Amrithanandamayi Math, 2017 SCC OnLine Ker 17573, dated  22.08.2017]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Calcutta High Court: The petition has been filed by the primary school assistant teacher asking for interest on the gratuity amount which was released to his account after a long delay. The petitioner retired from the position of primary school assistant teacher on 31.7.2002, and his gratuity amount which is his statutory right was released on 19.04.2004, thereby he claimed interest on the delayed payment.

Various orders of the court have settled that if there is any delay on the payment of gratuity to a retired employee, then he is absolutely liable to claim interest on the delay. Arijit Banerjee, J., by taking the reference of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648, stated that gratuity is not a bounty to be handed out by the State at its whim. If there is any delay in his payment of gratuity he is entitled to get interest on that delay. Therefore, the Director of Pension, Provident Fund and Group Insurance, Government of West Bengal as also the Treasury Officer concerned were directed to pay interest at the rate of 9% per annum on the calculated gratuity amount from August 1, 2002 till the actual payment date. [Ramchandra Majumdar v. State of West Bengal, 2017 SCC OnLine Cal 10043, decided on 19.07.2017]