Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: In a case filed by CROSSFIT gym (‘Plaintiff’) having CROSSFIT trademarks seeking permanent injunction against defendant gym using the identical mark, Prathiba Singh, J. granted permanent injunction against defendants and imposed a cost of Rs 10 lakhs to be paid to the plaintiff within three months. The Court also issued contempt notice against the proprietor of the defendants to show cause why contempt must not be initiated against him and his company, as they continued using the CROSSFIT mark under challenge, in blatant violation of interim injunction being granted.

The Plaintiff claims to be the proprietor of the registered trademark ‘CROSSFIT’ used in respect of services in the health, fitness and nutrition sector, providing services for strength training, fitness programs in addition to conducting fitness seminars and providing trainer certifications. The Plaintiff coined and adopted the mark ‘CROSSFIT’ in the year 1995 and has been continuously and extensively using the said mark in respect of its products and services. The Plaintiff also registered the domain name ‘’ in October, 1999.

The grievance of the Plaintiff is that the Defendant is a gym and fitness center owned and operated by its proprietor Mr. Arun Sharma and is using the identical mark ‘CROSSFIT’ in respect of identical services relating to gym and fitness. The case of the Plaintiff is that the Defendant has been prominently displaying the mark ‘CROSSFIT’ at its premises, literature, online pages as well as on various online directories and social media platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, Justdial, Fitternity etc.

A legal notice dated 29-09-2020 and notice regarding pre litigation mediation was issued to which no reply was received. No reply has been received for emails, telephonic calls or summons by Court. However, on the date of listing of the matter, an ex parte ad-interim injunction was granted on 29-10-2021 which was made absolute on 15-02-2022.

Placing reliance on Disney Enterprises Inc. v. Balraj Muttneja, 2014 SCC OnLine Del 781, wherein the Court held “where the defendant is ex parte and the material before the Court is sufficient to allow the claim of the plaintiff, the time of the Court should not be wasted in directing ex parte evidence to be recorded and which mostly is nothing but a repetition of the contents of the plaint.”

Thus, the Court decreed the suit and granted permanent and mandatory injunction in favour of the Plaintiff as they were able to make out a prima facie case.

The Court on further coming to knowledge of the fact, that defendant is not complying with the interim order and continuing to use the mark ‘CROSSFIT’ despite the injunction granted, without choosing to defend the plaintiff’s claim or reply to the notices issued. Thus, the Court awarded Rs. 10,00,000 in favour of the Plaintiff due to brazen violation of the orders of the Court by the defendant.

The Court noted that the conduct of the Defendant in the present case prima facie amounts to contempt. The Court issued contempt notice to the defendant’s proprietor Mr. Arun Sharma to show case as to why contempt action ought not to be initiated.

The Court directed the plaintiff to approach the concerned social media platforms for taking down of the infringing listing and posts of the Defendant, using the mark ‘CROSSFIT’, which shall be taken down, within 48 hours.

The Court further appointed Ms. Meghna Jandu, Advocate as the Local Commissioner, subject to the mandate listed by the Court, to visit the premises of the Defendant to ensure compliance of the orders of the Court by removing any hoardings and any other billboards, signage, display material, brochures, packaging, and literature bearing the mark ‘CROSSFIT’.

[CROSS FIT LLC v RTB GYM and Fitness Center, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 2788, decided on 06-09-2022]

Advocates who appeared in this case :

Mr. Saif Khan and Mr. Shobhit Agrawal, Advocates, for the plaintiff;

None for the defendant.

*Arunima Bose, Editorial Assistant has put this report together.

Kerala High Court
Case BriefsHigh Courts

Kerala High Court: In a PIL seeking extension of facilities to every person with a disability in need of special assistance irrespective of the percentage of disability, the Division Bench of S. Manikumar CJ., and Shaji P. Chaly, J., issued notice to Union Government and the State of Kerala.

The petitioner, a person with 25% learning disability, had approached the Court with an allegation that the disability criteria for the students in need of special assistance in the State Government schools for the SSLC (Secondary School Leaving Certificate) and Higher Secondary Examinations is still 40% or above and that the State Government has not framed any rules for the differently abled students as directed by the High Court in Blessen Baby v. State of Kerala, 2020 SCC OnLine Ker 714.

Noticeably, when the petitioner was studying in Class X, his request for a scribe as per Section 4(2) and 17(i) of the Right of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 for the public examination was rejected by the authorities on the ground that the disability should be 40% or above for the assistance of a scribe for the SSLC examination for the year 2020.

While hearing the petitioner, at that time, the Court in Blessen Baby case (supra) had directed the State Government to re-visit the guidelines in vogue issued by the Government of Kerala and to issue fresh guidelines, after taking note of the guidelines issued or to be issued by the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, Union Government in tune with the directions issued by the Supreme Court in Vikash Kumar v. Union Public Service Commission, 2021 SCC Online SC 84.

Pursuant to the directions of the Court, the petitioner had passed his Xth and XIIth standard examinations with the aid of a scribe.

In Avni Prakash v. National Testing Agency (NTA), 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1112, the Supreme Court observed that despite the clarification of the position in law in Vikash Kumar (supra), the law continues to be violated and NTA has continued to restrict the grant of facilities only to Persons with Benchmark Disability (PwBD). To address the hardships faced by the persons with disability, the Supreme Court issued the following directions:

  • “The facility of reservation in terms of Section 32 of the Rights of Persons with Disability (RPwD) Act, 2016 is available to PwBD. Other facilities contemplated by the RPwD Act, 2016 for PwD cannot be so restricted by an administrative order which would be contrary to the provisions of the statute.

  • Individual injustices originating in a wrongful denial of rights and entitlements prescribed under the law cannot be sent into oblivion on the ground that these are a necessary consequence of a competitive examination.

  • Having due regard to the decision of this Court in Vikash Kumar (supra) and the statutory provisions contained in the RPwD Act, 2016, facilities which are provided by the law to PwD shall not be constricted by reading in the higher threshold prescribed for PwBD;

  • By way of abundant caution, it is clarified that for the purpose of availing of the reservation under Section 32 of the RPwD Act, 2016 or an upper age relaxation as contemplated in the provisions, the concept of benchmark disability continues to apply; and

  • The persons working for the first respondent and exam centres like that of the second respondent should be sensitised and trained, on a regular basis, to deal with requirements of reasonable accommodation raised by PwDs.”

On the contention of the State that it had already issued guidelines in the matter of extending concession to the candidates with special needs having 40% or more disability, the petitioner submitted that irrespective of the percentage of disability, the benefits of the earlier judgment of the Court may be extended to all the students in need of special assistance in SSLC as well as first year and second year Higher Secondary examinations.

Considering the above, the Court had issued notice to the Union Government and the State of Kerala.

[Blessen Baby v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine Ker 4269, decided on 04-08-2022]

Advocates who appeared in this case :

Mr. Sheji P. Abraham, learned counsel for the petitioner;

S. Manu, learned ASGI, Sri. N. Manoj Kumar, learned State Attorney.

*Kamini Sharma, Editorial Assistant has put this report together.

Allahabad High Court
Case BriefsHigh Courts


Allahabad High Court: The Division Bench of Suneet Kumar and Syed Waiz Mian, JJ. held a Police Officer guilty of contempt for deliberately bypassing the mandate of the Supreme Court in the case of Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273 and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for 14 days.

An application under Section- 167 CrPC was moved before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-III, by Investigating Officer (contemnor) seeking 14 days judicial remand of accused under Sections- 353, 504, 506 IPC which was rejected in compliance of the directions of the Supreme Court rendered in Arnesh Kumar. The mandate of Section 41-A CrPC was not complied by the Investigating Officer, further, he had to furnish reasons for arresting the accused. Magistrate, thereafter, made contempt reference against Investigating Officer, noting therein that the opposite party, therein, did not follow the direction of Supreme Court rendered in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) 8 SCC 273, therefore, the Investigating Officer was liable to be punished under the Contempt of Court Act.

It was found that though the concerned offences were covered under the provisions for which maximum punishment was not more than 7 years, however, the mandate of Section 41A was not complied with by the Investigating Officer and no proper reason for the arrest of the accused was recorded in writing. The contemnor had claimed that there was an apprehension of communal riots and therefore, he had arrested the accused however there was no entry in the General Diary that there was any such apprehension of a communal flare-up.

The Court noted the fact that that the contemnor, being a member of disciplined Force, in exercise of his powers of arrest, had willfully and deliberately bypassed the mandate of the Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar case, which is binding on all the authorities, including, the Magistrate, in view of Article 141 of the Constitution of India.

Refusing to take a sympathetic view on the quantum of punishment, Court awarded simple imprisonment for 14 days to the contemnor and further imposed a fine of Rs. 1000.

[In Re v. Chandan Kumar, Contempt Application (Criminal) No. – 5 of 2022, decided on 18-08-2022]

Advocates who appeared in this case :

Sudhir Mehrotra, Advocate, Counsel for the Applicant;

R.V. Pandey, Abhishek Mishra, Ashutosh Kumar Pandey, R.V. Pandey, Advocates, Counsel for the Opposite Party.

*Suchita Shukla, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Punjab and Haryana High Court: Expressing that, in a democratic set-up, there always would be voices of dissent and opinions against rules and protest against actions, Vinod S. Bhardwaj, J., observed that, some protests may have aggression but still an act of dissent would not be ordinarily labeled as sedition.

Instant petition was filed for grant of regular bail to the petitioners in a case under Sections 307, 438, 427, 148 and 149 of the Penal Code, 1860; Sections 121, 121-A, 122, 124-A, 115 and 120-B of the IPC, 1860; Sections 11, 12, 13, 17 and 18 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as ‘UAPA Act’); Sections 25/54/59 of the Arms Act, 1959 and Section 66-F of the Information and Technology Act, 2000.

Analysis, Law and Decision

Balancing of right of an accused to seek speedy trial viz-a-viz the entitlement of the State to keep an accused in custody for a prolonged period

High Court expressed that, it is a well-settled position in law that power of bail is not a substitute to inflict sentence on an under trial and that unless sufficient circumstances exist justifying confirmed incarceration, as accused would rather be entitled to a concession of bail.

“…Article 21 of the Constitution of India guarantees right to speedy trial.”

Further, it was noted that the trial in question was stayed even prior to the Supreme Court order in the matter relating to Section 124-A IPC. In Court’s opinion, it does not appear probable in the near future that, the trial shall make any progress.

“Section 124-A IPC was widely worded to cover bringing or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt, or attempt to excite dis-satisfaction towards government established by law. The object being to subjugate Indian people and to function on absolutism and to crush any people’s movement ignoring the fundamental rights embodied in the Constitution of India recognizing freedom of speech and expression as well as the freedom to assemble.”

Bench added to its observation that, to attract an offence such as Section 124-A IPC, there must be deliberate resistance and conscious defiance of authority with a conceived plan aimed to unsettle elected government.

With regard to the imprisonment of the accused, Court stated that once the trial in a case is not proceedings, the accused cannot be penalized by being forced to undergo confinement.

High Court deemed it appropriate to enlarge the petitioners on bail. Hence, the petition was allowed.[Dharminder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2022 SCC OnLine P&H 1115, decided on 17-5-2022]

Advocates before the Court:

Mr. Arnav Sood, Advocate for the petitioners.

Ms. Amarjit Kaur Khurana, DAG Punjab.

Telangana High Court
Case BriefsHigh Courts

Telangana High Court: A Division Bench of P Naveen Rao and M G Priyadarshini, JJ. dismissed the petition and held that contempt has taken place and no apology must be given.

The facts of the case are such that the appellants sold some of the suit schedule properties in spite of decree granted to her by the trial Court and trying to alienate some more, she filed I.A.No.1 of 2019 praying to grant injunction against the respondents not to alienate suit schedule properties. The instant Contempt case was filed alleging violation of the directions issued by this Court in I.A.No.1 of 2019 in A.S.No.260 of 2017.

Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines ‘civil contempt’ to mean wilful disobedience of any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a Court.

Issue 1: Has there been an alleged violation of deliberate and wilful violation of the orders of the Court and thus committed contempt of Court?

The Court observed that if a party, who is fully in the know of the judgment/order of the Court, is conscious and aware of the consequences and implications of the order of the Court, acts in violation thereof, it must be held that disobedience is wilful. To establish contempt of court, it is sufficient to prove that the conduct was wilful, and that the contemnor knew of all the facts which made it a breach of the undertaking. Whether the conduct of contemnor is deliberate and wilful can be considered by assessing the material on record and attendant circumstances.

The Court remarked The sanctity to judicial proceedings is paramount to a society governed by law. Otherwise, the very edifice of democracy breaks and anarchy rains. The Contempt of Courts Act is intended to correct a person deviating the norm and trying to breach the law/assuming law on to himself. It intends to secure confidence of the people in the administration of justice by disciplining those erring in disobeying the orders of the Court/undertaking given to court.

The Court further observed that the respondents did not deny that the property sold is part of the suit schedule land on which decree is granted to the petitioner. Firstly, the property is covered by the preliminary decree of the trial court and in terms thereof petitioner is entitled to 1/6th share. Contrary to the judgment and decree, it could not have been sold. This decree is not stayed by this Court. Secondly, the order dated 13-8-2019 was passed in the presence of the counsel appearing for them. Therefore, they can not plead ignorance. Thus, the sale transaction undertaken by them is clearly in violation of the orders of the Court. In the facts of this case, it is also safe to assume that the violation is deliberate and willful.

Issue 2: Whether offering apology is bona fide to purge the petitioner from contempt?

Section 12(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, and the explanation thereto, enables the Court to remit the punishment awarded for committing contempt of court on an apology being made to the satisfaction of the Court.

The court observed that an apology can neither be a defence nor a justification for an act which tantamount to contempt of Court. An apology can be accepted in cases where the conduct, for which the apology is given, is such that it can be “ignored without compromising the dignity of the court”, or it is intended to be evidence of real contrition. It should be sincere. Apology cannot be accepted in case it is hollow, there is no remorse, no regret, no repentance, or if it is only a device to escape the rigour of the law. Such an apology is merely a “paper apology”.

The Court observed that in the facts of this case also, it is seen that apology offered is not sincere and bona fide. It is clear from facts on record that it is made only to escape the consequence of deliberate and willful disobedience of the order of the Court. Contemnors did not accept their mistake and expressed apology at the first opportunity offered to them.

The Court remarked, ‘Wilfully and deliberately they have sold the suit schedule property in utter violation of the orders of this Court. It is intended to frustrate the judgment and decree rendered by the trial Court and orders of this Court and deprive the petitioner the fruits of her success.’

The Court thus held “Contemnors are held guilty of contempt; their apology is rejected and is imposed sentence of imprisonment with fine.”[Veldanda Srilatha v. Gundumalla Anantha Reddy, Contempt Case No. 1034 OF 2021, decided on 29-04-2022]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: Whether the third party can be absolved from contempt if they are informed that their conduct would violate the Court order, Subramonium Prasad, J., reiterated the well-settled position that though broadly a person who is not a party to the proceedings cannot be proceeded against for violation of the order, but a third party cannot seek to absolve themselves if they are informed about the fact that their conduct amounts to a violation of the Court and that despite the information, they choose to willfully flout the mandate of the Court.

A contempt petition had been filed for wilful disobedience of this Court’s Order.

Factual Matrix

Petitioner had inherited a property from her late sister. The brother-in-law i.e., R.N. Kapur of the petitioner resided on the ground floor of that property along with his wife who was also the petitioner’s sister. On her death, R.N. Kapur filed a suit claiming to be the owner of the ground floor of the property.

It was stated that the above-stated suit was settled before and in terms of the said settlement, a joint application under Order XXIII Rule 1/3 read with Section 151 CPC was filed before this Court and a decree was passed in presence of the plaintiff and defendants. After the death of R.N. Kapur, the petitioner with directions of this Court took possession of the property.

Further, it was found that respondents 1,2 and 3 had trespassed the property in question. Consequently, the petitioner filed a complaint before the local police and an FIR was registered under Sections 448/34 IPC.

Respondents were also made aware of the undertaking given by R.N. Kapur and despite being made aware of the same, they did not vacate the premises which resulted in the present filing of contempt petition.

The question that arose in the present matter was:

Whether respondents committed contempt of Court or not?

Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines “civil contempt” as wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a Court. 

High Court expressed that the law of contempt had been brought primarily to secure public respect and confidence in the judicial process and provide a sanction for any act or conduct which is likely to destroy or impair such respect and confidence.

In U.N. Bora v. Assam Roller Flour Mills Assn., (2022) 1 SCC 101, after analysing the various principles of law on the point rendered, the Supreme Court itself has laid down the parameters as to when action under the Contempt of Courts Act should be initiated.

As per the facts of the case, respondent 1 claimed ownership of the property through Will given by R.N. Kapur which was executed before the decree was passed on 14-3-2012 which was passed in pursuance of the Settlement Agreement which was based upon the undertaking that had been given by R.N. Kapur.

The Bench stated that the undertaking given by R.N. Kapoor before this Court will take precedence over the Will executed by him prior to giving the said undertaking.

The Court opined that the undertaking given to the Court has to be respected and cannot be permitted to be circumvented by saying that the respondents were not parties to the suit and have not given the undertaking.

Hence, the contention that the respondent cannot be held liable for the contempt of the Court as they were not parties to the Suit and had not given the undertaking to the Court cannot be accepted.

The Court observed that,

Disobedience of an order of the Court, if permitted, will result in striking at the root of the rule of law on which our system of governance is based.

Therefore, the power to punish for contempt is necessary for the maintenance of an effective legal system and the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 had been legislated to prevent interference in the course of administration of justice.

Stating the assuming that respondent 1 was initially not aware of the consent decree, the moment she was informed about the undertaking given by R.N. Kapur, through whom respondent 1 derived title, she ought to have respected the same and not breached it, hence the High Court held that obstinate and wilful act on the part of the respondent not to obey consent decree amounted to civil contempt.

High Court decided that the respondents were liable for punishment under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. [Indra Pasricha v. Deepika Chauhan, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1090, decided on 19-4-2022]

Advocates before the Court:

For the Petitioner:

Mr Ashutosh Lohia, Mr Soumya Kumar, Advocates

For the Respondents:

Mr Ravi P Mehrotra, Senior Advocate with Mr Vibhu Tiwari, Advocate for R-1 & R-3

Mr Gautam Narayan, ASC for GNCTD with Mr Aditya Nair, Advocate for SHO, Hauz Khas

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: While enunciating that “Nobility and contribution to freedom struggle of our nation are the two attributes which rush to our minds whenever and wherever the profession of law practice is ever referred to” the Division Bench of Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya and Narendra Kumar Johari, JJ., stated that, judiciary neither has power of sword nor that of purse, it stands tall only by virtue of trust and faith of people.

 This Court was called upon to deal with the criminal contempt proceedings instituted on a letter dated 17-8-2001 written by the then District Judge, Gonda whereby a reference had been made to initiate contempt proceedings against 12 lawyers.

“It is painful for this Court to deal with the contempt proceedings drawn against the lawyers who are supposed to be the officers of the Court first and whose role stands recorded in the annals of history in strengthening the judiciary of our country which is supposed to embark upon a perilous and painstaking path of imparting justice to our citizenry.”

Further, the Bench observed that, in the present times, Court had noticed the uncalled for and unwarranted conduct/behavior of the lawyers which has the potential of eroding the faith and trust of the public in the judicial system.

What did the letter contain?

The said letter of the District Judge contained allegations that on 01-12-2000 the lawyers resolved to go on strike and boycott the court of First Civil Judge (Junior Division), Gonda and on that date the respondents-lawyers along with their colleagues indulged in an act of destruction and throwing away the records of the said court. However, further mishappenning could be avoided as the Presiding Officer of the said court went on leave. The letter further stated that on 01-12-2000 itself the respondents and their fellow advocates misbehaved with the then In-charge District Judge.

The allegation in the letter further was that the District Judge took charge on 11-08-2000 and immediately thereafter he received certain complaints about the functioning of the then Chief Judicial Magistrate. The letter further stated that a complaint was received against the then Chief Judicial Magistrate in respect of certain misconduct regarding his misbehaviour with a girl whose statement was recorded by him under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The District Judge in the said letter had further stated that he went to Allahabad to apprise the Registrar General of this Court.

On 14.11.2000 the lawyers passed a resolution to go on strike on the said date on the instigation of the then Chief Judicial Magistrate and the First Additional District Judge.

The letter also stated that for maintaining peace and order in the court premises, on the request of the District Judge, police personnels were deployed and it is in these circumstances that the District Judge by the said letter requested to initiate contempt proceedings against the contemners.

High Court Decision

In the instant matter, what Court noted was that the notices were issued only on 31-10-2001 and accordingly the rigour of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act will operate in this case as well.

Another significant point which was noted was that out of 12 respondents, 6 respondents have since died.

Further, it stated that all the respondents are senior citizens, who are aged between 62 years to 78 years. The incidents, on the basis of which contempt proceedings have been instituted, are said to have occurred about 21 years ago.

Respondents who are alive had submitted their unqualified apology and condemned their alleged incidents.

In view of the above stated, Bench opined that the present matter now needs to be given a quietus, on accepting the apology of the respondents.

Before parting with the matter, Court wanted to put on record its anguish and concern emanating from the reports which this Court receives almost on daily basis about the conduct and behaviour of the Advocates.

Certain observations have been made about the nature of the legal profession by Supreme Court in the case of R. Muthur Krishnan v. Registrar General, (2019) 16 SCC 407, Ex Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India, (2003) 2 SCC 45 and certain other decisions.

Lastly, the High Court stated that

“We understand that the approach of the Court while dealing with contempt specially against the lawyers should be correctional…”

Court hopes that no such incident shall be repeated. [State of U.P. v. Rama Kant Pandey, 2021 SCC OnLine All 918, decided on 24-12-2021]

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: The Division Bench of R. Subhash Reddy* and Hrishikesh Roy, JJ., held that once the fresh notification is issued by the State for land acquisition, no cause of action survive on previous notification and actions taken therein, when that proceeding is declared lapsed. Quoting the case of R.N. Dey v. Bhagyabati Pramanik, (2000) 4 SCC 400, the Bench stated,

“Discretion given to the court in dealing with the proceedings under Contempt of Courts Act is to be exercised for maintenance of court’s dignity and majesty of law and further an aggrieved party has no right to insist that court should exercise such jurisdiction, inasmuch as contempt is between contemner and the court.”

These contempt petitions were filed under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 alleging that the respondents had wilfully and deliberately violated directions issued by the Court in the order dated 17-08-2015, 29-08-2016 and 05-01-2017.


The land admeasuring 29.38 acres belonging to the petitioner was acquired under provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894; the notification was issued under Section 4(1) of the Act at the first instance on 25-03-1981. Pursuant to which the said land was subsequently declared as a protected forest under Section 29 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. However, as no award was passed pursuant to the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act, a fresh notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was issued on 24-05-1995.

Litigation History

The subsequent notification was challenged before the Patna High Court, wherein the High Court held that notwithstanding the delay in passing the award, possession of the land as well as title vested in the respondent State. Noticeably, during the pendency of the said petition an award was passed on 27-09-2006, purportedly pursuant to 1981 notification. Consequently, the petitioners approached the Supreme Court with their grievance, wherein, the Court held that the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 would apply as much as State had not progressed beyond making a declaration under Section 6 of the Act, pursuant to subsequent notification. The land acquisition proceedings were declared lapsed by the Court, and the respondent State was directed to initiate fresh acquisition proceedings or to take any other action available under law.

Alleging wilful and deliberate violation of the directions issued in the aforesaid order, contempt petitions were filed, however, noticing that fresh notification was issued during the pendency of the contempt petitions and the possession of the land was already undertaken by authority, the petition was disposed of with the direction that the petitioner shall be paid the amount of compensation as per the provisions of Section 40 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.

Grievances of the Parties

The petitioners submitted that at first instance land was acquired by invoking urgency clause, and in spite of directions for payment of compensation by following the provisions under Section 40 of the 2013 Act, respondents had passed the award without adhering to the same and the acquired land was being used for construction of office and residential buildings, and contrary to various directions issued by the Court, land was treated as agricultural forest land, a concept unknown to law.

On the other hand, the State contended that the Court had directed that a fresh notification would be issued wherein; the Court had not expressed any opinion on the nature of the land etc. and left open all the issues. It was the case of the respondents that if the petitioner was aggrieved by the determination of compensation, it was always open to avail remedy under Section 64 of the 2013 Act, however, without availing such remedy under guise of contempt, the petitioner was trying to enlarge the scope of directions issued by the Court.

Factual Analysis

Noticeably, consequent to the Court orders, the respondents-State had issued a fresh notification under Section 11 of Act, 2013; pursuant to award inquiry was conducted. Therefore, rejecting the contention of the petitioners that the respondent-state had not granted the benefits as per Section 40 of the 2013 Act, the Bench expressed,

“It is to be noted that subsequent in the latest notification issued under Section 11 of the 2013 Act respondents have not invoked urgency clause at all. When the notification was issued under Section 11 of the 2013 Act, without invoking urgency clause, the question of extending the benefits as per Section 40 of the 2013 Act will not arise.”

Reliance was placed by the Bench on J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar, (1996) 6 SCC 291, wherein it was that once there is an order passed by the Government on the basis of directions issued by this Court, there arises a fresh cause of action to seek redressal in an appropriate forum. Similarly, in R.N. Dey’s case it was held that a decree obtained under Land Acquisition Act, is an executable decree and no contempt can be maintained for noncompliance of such decree. In the same judgment it was observed that weapon of contempt is not to be used in abundance or misused.

Therefore, in view of the last notification issued under Section 11 of the 2013 Act on 14-02-2020 and the award passed by the respondent authorities, the Bench opined that it could not be said that respondents had deliberately and intentionally violated any directions issued by the Court, attracting the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. On the submissions of the petitioner that land was wrongly categorized in the award for fixation of market value, the Bench opined that while it was open to the petitioner to avail the remedies available in the Act for proper determination of compensation,

Section 64 of the 2013 Act, makes it clear that any person interested, who has not accepted the award, by written application to the Collector may seek reference to the competent authority constituted under Section 66 of the 2013 Act. Even after adjudication made by such authority on reference, there is a further remedy available under Section 74 to the High Court.”


Consequently, the Bench held that while it was open for the petitioner to pursue remedies available in law, there was no contempt as alleged. Accordingly, the contempt petitions were dismissed. The Bench further clarified that it had not expressed any opinion either on the categorization of the land or on the determination of market value in the award.

[Soorajmull Nagarmull v. Brijesh Mehrotra, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1252, decided on 14-12-2021]

Kamini Sharma, Editorial Assistant has put this report together 

Appearance by:

For the Petitioners:  A.M. Singhvi and Mr. Gopal Sankarnarayanan, Senior Advocates

For the Respodnents: Ranjit Kumar, Senior Advocate

*Judgment by: Justice R. Subhash Reddy

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Madhya Pradesh High Court: The Division Bench of Sheel Nagu and Anand Pathak, JJ., decided upon a petition which was in reference under Section 15(2) of The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 sent by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Datia in respect of the conduct of respondent.

A criminal case was going on before the concerned trial Court in which accused were facing charge of offence under Sections 452, 294, 323/34 and 506(part II) of IPC. On 10-02-2021 case was fixed for prosecution evidence. Respondent -Pankaj Mishra who was a practicing Advocate at District and Sessions Court, apparently appeared for complainant, although at the time of appearance he did not file Vakalatnama on behalf of complainant nor any application under Section 301 of Cr.P.C. was filed. It appeared that the prosecution witness went out from courtroom for the time being during cross examination which was taken note of by the trial Court and matter was kept after tea break. After tea break when trial Court sought explanation of conduct of prosecution witness and asked the accused counsel for relevance of questions asked by him then counsel for the accused showed inclination to answer but sought moving of complainant counsel out of courtroom so that his defence may not be disclosed to the witness. After discussion with counsel for accused/defence, complainant and his counsel were called back. This step infuriated counsel for the complainant (respondent herein) and he made following remarks:

मुझे पंकज मिश्रा कहते हैं मेरा नाम नोट कर लीजिए I भविष्य में आपके लिए परेशानी हो जाएगी, आप ऐसे नौकरी नहीं कर पाएंगीI”

Thereafter, Court found conduct of respondent contemptuous and therefore, showed her intention to draw contempt proceedings against contemnor.

An affidavit has been filed by the respondent Pankaj Mishra on 13-09-2021 and without trying to explain the event from his perspective at the outset he tendered unconditional apology. It is his submission that in respect of alleged incident mentioned in the order-sheet dated 10-02-2021, contemnor by filing his reply at the earliest, tendered unconditional apology before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Datia (trial Court) and denied the occurrence of any such event. He also prayed for recalling of the observation mentioned in order-sheet dated 10-02-2021. He expressed his immense respect to this Court as well as all other Courts of law and expressed his commitment to do everything to protect the dignity of judiciary.

The Court started with the quote of French Writer Vauvenargues “Emotions have taught mankind to Reason” in order to elaborate concept of Justice. The Court further went on to remind that Law is a Noble Profession and Bar and Bench are two wheels of the chariot of justice. In fact Bar is the genus from which species of Judges, Advocates, Senior Advocates and other Constitutional Legal Functionaries like Attorney General, Advocate General etc. evolve. Therefore, Bar and Bench share common platform for the cause of justice. All other professions are guided by the spirit of Service and Integrity but this profession beside this spirit, also primes Compassion, Mercy and above all Empathy.

The Court further quoted the relevant excerpts from the Supreme Court’s decision in Yatin Narendra Oza v. Khemchand Rajaram Koshthi, (2016) 6 SCC 236, D.P. Chadha v. Triyugi Narain Mishra, AIR 2001 SC 457 and Mahabir Prasan Singh v. M/s Jacks Aviation Private Ltd., AIR 1999 SC 287, etc.

The Court reiterated that Spirit of Adjudication and the role of Bar and Bench in reaching to the cause of justice and unless both the wheels do not move in tandem then casualty is Justice and nothing else.

The Court was of the opinion that, In the present case, learned Judge was a female Judge and it was expected from the Bar members that they will appreciate the multitasking performed by a lady judge while taking care of her home, family as well as work front and therefore, more thoughtfulness and sensitivity is required in this regard. Therefore, it appeared that JMFC rightly referred the matter for contempt. But at this juncture, respondent at the outset had expressed unconditional apology and keeping the quote “To err is human and to forgive is divine” in mind the Court believed that it is in the interest of cause of justice that bonhomie be revived so that matter may proceed further without causing delay and friction.

The Court issued certain directions while disposing of the petition:

  • Respondent shall not indulge in any contemptuous act in future while committing misbehavior and misconduct with any Judge of any Court of law and would not try to undermine the authority and majesty of the Court.
  • As per the undertaking he shall plant 20 saplings either in the District Court campus if space is available for plantation and if not then these saplings may be planted to any suitable place earmarked by the District Administration for plantation and shall take care of them till they grow into full fledged trees. It is expected from the respondent that he shall submit photographs by downloading the mobile application (App) prepared at the instance of High Court for monitoring the plantation through satellite/Geo-Tagging.
  • It is expected that this unfortunate event would not leave any scar over the relationship of Bar and Bench at District Court, Datia and individuals connected with the proceedings either as Judge and Lawyer would come out as better individuals from this incident and would strive to become “Healers of Society” for cause of Justice.

[In Re State of M.P. v. Pankaj Mishra, Contempt Petition Criminal No.05 of 2021, decided on 20-10-2021]

Suchita Shukla, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.

For State: Shri MPS Raghuvanshi, Additional Advocate General and Shri Rajesh Shukla, Dy.A.G.

For respondent/contemnor: Shri J.P. Mishra, Shri P.S. Bhadoriya and Shri Dileep Awasthi

Shri Pankaj Mishra -respondent present in person

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: The bench of Sanjay Kishan Kaul* and R. Subhash Reddy, JJ has temporarily restored the senior designation of Advocate Yatin Narendra Oza who was stripped off this designation after he levelled charges of corruption against the registry of the Gujarat High Court.

What is the case about?

On 21.03.2020, Oza wrote a letter to the Chief Justice of India making serious allegations against a senior-most Judge of the Gujarat High Court in his capacity as President of the Bar Association. He then transgressed all limits by circulating the letter in the Bar Association’s WhatsApp group after calling the High Court a “Gamblers Den” in a Press Conference.

Oza was then stripped off his Senior Advocate designation. The Court cited Rule 26 of the High Court of Gujarat (Designation of Senior Advocates) Rules 2018, which states “In the event a Senior Advocate is found guilty of conduct which according to the Full Court disentitles the Senior Advocate concerned to be worthy of the designation, the Full Court may review its decision to designate the person concerned and recall the same”. Read more

High Court’s line of arguments

The High Court labelled the apology rendered by Oza as a repeated behaviour of what would amount to “slap, say sorry, and forget”. The High Court objected to the Writ Petition filed before the Supreme Court on the ground that what has been withdrawn is a ‘privilege’ and not a ‘right’. It was further argued that the conferment of this privilege weighs not only on the existence of certain legal acumen but a much higher standard of behaviour and if such presupposition disappears, the authority is empowered to withdraw the privilege. Hence, re-conferment of this right on the petitioner through a writ of mandamus would be de hors the exercise of powers under statutory rules.

Oza’s line of arguments

Oza’s case on the other hand was that the Supreme Court should show compassion. The withdrawal of designation is not limited by time and is disproportionately harsh as the petitioner is not being given an opportunity to redeem himself. The filing of an application afresh for designation after the specified time bar is stated to not really be a redemption.

It was argued that he has bona fidely raised issues within the institution regarding non-circulation of matters, based on a large number of complaints received from the members of the Bar by him by reason of his holding the position of the President. He endeavoured to resolve the grievances within the system by writing several letters and making many representations which were in a sober and restrained language and that the grievance was stated to be not one against the Judges, but against the manner of working of the Registry. The Press Conference was stated to be the culmination of his inability to resolve the disputes, as a last resort where he got emotionally overwhelmed and made utterances of which he has been very apologetic from the very beginning.

Supreme Court’s ruling

While the Court found little ground to interfere with the High Court’s decision, it still thought it proper to give one more and last chance to Oza and hence, temporarily restored Oza’s Senior designation for a period of two years from 1.1.2022.

“It is the High Court which will watch and can best decide how the petitioner behaves and conducts himself as a senior counsel without any further opportunity. It will be for the High Court to take a final call whether his behaviour is acceptable in which case the High Court can decide to continue with his designation temporarily or restore it permanently.”

The Court made clear that if there is any infraction in the conduct of the petitioner within this period of two years, the High Court would be well within its rights to withdraw the indulgence.

“In effect, the fate of the petitioner is dependent on his appropriate conduct as a senior counsel before his own High Court, which will have the final say. All we are seeking to do is to  give him a chance by providing a window of two years to show that he truly means what he has assured us. We can only hope that the petitioner abides by his assurances and does not give any cause for the High Court or for us to think otherwise.”

[Yatin Narendra Oza v. High Court of Gujarat, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1004, decided on 28.10.2021]


For Petitioner: Senior Advocate Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi

*Judgment by: Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul

Know Thy Judge| Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul

Himachal Pradesh High Court
Case BriefsHigh Courts

Himachal Pradesh High Court: Tarlok Singh, J., discharged the contempt notice and accepted the unconditional apology.

 The present petition was filed suo motu as a news-item appeared in “Divya Himachal” a vernacular newspaper on 27.08.2021, reporting and commenting with respect to the proceedings of this Court concerning the matters of recruitment to the posts of JOA (IT). The tone and tenor of above noticed news-item prima-facie amounts to interference in the Court proceedings and also in the administration of justice. Thus, a notice was issued to the Editorand Publisher of the vernacular newspaper “Divya Himachal” and also to the Author/Scribe of the news-item dated 27.8.2021 published under the title “JOA post Code 817 bharti par stay” to show cause as to why proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 be not initiated against them.

The Court observed that an apology for criminal contempt of court must be offered at the earliest since the belated apology hardly shows the “contrition which is the essence of the purging of contempt”. However, even if the apology is not belated but the court finds it to be without real contrition and remorse, and finds that it was merely tendered as a weapon of defence, the Court may refuse to accept it.

The Court also observed that contemnors are truly contrite and have offered the apology at the first available opportunity; therefore, we are inclined to accept the apology and discharge the contempt notice by admonishing the contemnors so that justice is tempered with mercy.

The Court further observed that the Press Council of India has also framed rules, Principles and Ethics by the name of Norms of Journalistic Conduct. Clauses 1, 2, 3, 12 (a), 12 (b) 13 and 16 are relevant for this case.

The Court held “contemnors are truly contrite and have offered the apology at the first available opportunity; therefore, we are inclined to accept the apology and discharge the contempt notice by admonishing the contemnors so that justice is tempered with mercy.”

 The Court further held “the unqualified apology tendered by the contemnors oral as well as in written is accepted and the notice of contempt is ordered to be discharged.”

[Court on its Motion v. Editor, 2021 SCC OnLine HP 7563, decided on 04-10-2021]

Arunima Bose, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.


For respondents: Kul Bhushan Khajuria

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: Explaining the doctrine of merger in case of dismissal of Special Leave Petitions (SLPs), the bench of L. Nageswara Rao and BR Gavai*, JJ has held that doctrine of merger would not attract and that it doesn’t matter if the SLP has been dismissed by a non-speaking order or a reasoned one.

The Court had, in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359, clearly enunciated the law on this point and had held,

“27. A petition for leave to appeal to this Court may be dismissed by a non-speaking order or by a speaking order. Whatever be the phraseology employed in the order of dismissal, if it is a nonspeaking order, i.e., it does not assign reasons for dismissing the special leave petition, it would neither attract the doctrine of merger so as to stand substituted in place of the order put in issue before it nor would it be a declaration of law by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution for there is no law which has been declared. If the order of dismissal be supported by reasons then also the doctrine of merger would not be attracted because the jurisdiction exercised was not   an   appellate   jurisdiction   but   merely   a discretionary jurisdiction refusing to grant leave to appeal. (…) Still the reasons stated by the Court would attract applicability of Article 141 of the Constitution if there is a law declared by the Supreme Court which obviously would be binding on all the courts and tribunals in India and certainly the parties thereto. The statement contained in the order other than on points of law would be binding on the parties and the court or tribunal, whose order was under challenge on the principle of judicial discipline, this Court being the Apex Court of the country. No court or tribunal or parties would have the liberty of taking or canvassing any view contrary to the one expressed by this Court. The order of Supreme Court would mean that it has declared the law and in that light the case was considered not fit for grant of leave. The declaration of law will be governed by Article 141 but still, the case not being one where leave was granted, the doctrine of merger does not apply. The Court sometimes leaves the question of law open. Or it sometimes briefly lays down the principle, may be, contrary to the one laid down by the High Court and yet would dismiss the special leave petition. The reasons given are intended for purposes of Article 141. This is so done because in the event of merely dismissing the special leave petition, it is likely that an argument could be advanced in the High Court that the Supreme Court has to be understood as not to have differed in law with the High Court.”

What was the case about?

On 22nd January 2016, the Supreme Court had, dismissing the SLPs against a Madras High Court order, held that the seniority list has to be prepared on the basis of merit list of selection and that the list drawn on roster point would not be valid in law.

Here is what the Court said in it’s reasoned order:

“The fundamental principle which has been applied by the Division Bench in the cases on hand relates to the question as to what should be the basis for drawing a seniority list. In that context, the Division Bench has noted that at the time when the Service Commission drew the list in 2000 the same was in tune with the judgment of this Court in P.S. Ghalaut v. State of Haryana & Others, reported in (1995) 5 SCC 625. The Court also found that the said list which was approved by the State Government did not achieve the finality and that ultimately when the seniority list came to be issued on 29.2.2004, by which time the judgment of this Court in Bimlesh Tanwar v. State of Haryana and others, reported in (2003) 5 SCC 604 had came into effect which reversed the judgment in Ghalaut (supra). The Division Bench, therefore, held that there was no delay in the challenge made to the seniority list. After the emergence of the judgment in Bimlesh Tanwar (supra), the fundamental principle relating to drawl of seniority list was that it should be based on merit list of selection and that the list drawn based on roster point can have no application for the purpose of seniority list. As the said fundamental principle was applied by the High Court in passing the impugned judgment, we do not find any merit in these special leave petitions. The special leave petitions are dismissed. The learned Attorney General for India, appearing for the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission, raised an issue that with reference to a contra view taken by another Judgment of Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court, at the instance of one of the employees an SLP is pending in this Court. Since the issue is now covered by the decision of this Court in Bimlesh Tanwar (supra), the pendency of the said SLP will be of no consequence as the said SLP should also be covered by the said judgment of this Court, namely, Bimlesh Tanwar (supra).”

Hence, it can be seen that while dismissing the SLPs, the Court reiterated the legal position as laid down in the case of Bimlesh Tanwar to the effect that while determining seniority, what is relevant is the inter se merit in the selection list and not the roster point.

The Court held that though it cannot be said that the second judgment of the Madras High Court has merged into the order dated 22nd January 2016, still the declaration of law as made in the said order, would be binding on all the courts and tribunals in the country and in any case, between the parties.

Hence, the respondents were bound to follow the law laid down by this Court.

[V. Senthur v. M. Vijayakumar,  2021 SCC OnLine SC 846, decided on 01.10.2021]



For appellant: Advocate Prashant Bhushan,

For TNPSC: Senior Advocate C.S. Vaidyanathan

For respondents: Senior Advocates Mukul Rohatgi, V. Giri and P. Wilson

*Judgment by: Justice BR Gavai

Know Thy Judge| Justice B.R. Gavai

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court: The Division Bench of Dipankar Datta, CJ and M.S. Sonak, J., observed that,

“Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the community in the due administration of justice and, so, it is entrusted with the power to punish for its contempt.”

Petitioner pointed out that respondent 1 by making false and scurrilous allegations against some judicial officers of the District Judiciary and uploading the said content on YouTube and WhatsApp committed criminal contempt as defined under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

Further, he added that he obtained consent under Section 15 of the said Act from the Advocate General.

In view of the above background, the petitioner urged action against respondent 1.

Analysis, Law and Decision

Petitioner pointed that respondent 1 who was possibly based in the UK was in the habit of uploading videos on YouTube and WhatsApp Groups alleging that some of the members of the District Judiciary in Goa are corrupt.

Prima Facie, the content allegedly uploaded by respondent 1 was quite contumacious and might, if established, constitute criminal contempt.

Whether we ought to proceed any further in this matter or it is better to proceed with confidence in our institutions and our judicial officers who function to the best of their abilities without fear or favour?

Bench stated that the shoulders of this institution are broad enough to shrug off the scurrilous allegations.

“Dignity and authority of our judicial institutions are neither dependent on the opinions allegedly expressed by respondent 1 nor can the dignity our institution and its officers be tarnished by such stray slights or irresponsible content.”

High Court observed that inquiries made on the administrative side revealed the irresponsibility of the comments and the possible use of the uploader as a front by some disgruntled litigants.

Therefore, Court opined that to take this matter further might only serve to feed the publicity craze of those who uploaded the content to provoke rather than out of some concern to bring to fore some genuine grievance concerning the administration of justice in Goa.

Lord Denning summed up the above-stated approach in R V. Metropolitan Police Commr., (1968) 2 QB 150, Judge refused to be provoked by the scathing article by a Lawyer:

“Let me say at once that we will never use this jurisdiction as a means to uphold our own dignity. That must rest on surer foundations. All we would ask is that those who criticise us will remember that, from the nature of our office, we cannot reply to their criticisms. We cannot enter into public controversy. Still less into political controversy. We must rely on our conduct itself to be its own vindication.”

In the decision of Haridas v. Usha Rani Banik, (2007) 14 SCC 1, Court held that the majesty of law continues to hold its head high notwithstanding any scrullious attacks made by persons who feel that the law Courts will absorb anything and everything, including attacks on their honesty, integrity and impartiality. The Courts generally ignore irresponsible statements which are anything but legitimate criticism. This magnanimity is not its weakness but its strength.”

Another reference was made stating that the Chief Justice of the UK, deposing before the Phillimore Committee gave evidence to the following effect:

“Judges” backs have got to be a good deal broader than they were thought to be years ago.”

Lord Atkin also once said, “Courts are satisfied to leave to public opinion, attacks or comments derogatory or scandalous to them.”

Elaborating the above, Court stated that it is the people that have a vital stake in the free and effective administration of the Justice.

Concluding the matter, relying on the decision of Supreme Court in Delhi Judicial Service Assn. v. State of Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC 406, it was held that the power to punish for contempt is to be only sparingly exercised, not to protect the dignity of the Court against insult or injury, but, to protect and vindicate the right of the people so that the administration of justice is not perverted, prejudiced, obstructed, or interfered with. [Kashinath Jairam Shetye v. David Clever, 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 2235, decided on 18-08-2021]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Madras High Court: M. Dhandapani, J., expressed that:

“…advocates are not above law and, in fact, it is the advocates who have to give more respect to the law, as it is their bread and butter.”

“Court should not be a mute spectator to the legal gimmicks…”

Factual Matrix

Respondent Police had registered a case wherein 2nd petitioner was stopped by police officials on duty while she was proceeding in her car. Her car was stopped as the lockdown was imposed and on query she responded that she had come out for the purpose of purchasing medicines, however, respondent 2 informed that she had stated that she came out for purchasing fish.

It was also stated that she had no valid pass for going out during the lockdown period.

In light of the above incident, a challan of Rs 500 was issued

Crux of the matter

The whole melee started on the issuance of challan, after which 2nd petitioner started quarrelling with police officials.

Overall scene that has led to the present matter was that, petitioner 1 claimed and proclaimed that she was an advocate, used filthy, abusive and unparliamentary language, used derogatory words and castigated the police officials on duty and in fact threatened them that they will be stripped off their uniforms, if they tried to intervene and cause any hindrance to the movement of the petitioners.

Police officials were smeared all over with mud by 1st petitioner. Hence, for total violation of lockdown guidelines and non-adherence to the provisions of the Disaster Management Act and violation of the provisions of the Penal Code, petitioners were slapped with by filing of the above complaint and further leading to registration of case.

In Court’s earlier order, Bar Council of Tamil Nadu was directed to file a status report as to the mechanism that was in place for taking action against those unruly advocates, who cast a slur by their act, demeaning the whole legal profession without bothering about the impact of their acts on the disciplined and law-abiding members of the legal fraternity.

As per the status report, a mechanism was envisaged under Section 35 of the Advocates Act for proceeding against a member of the Bar for unprofessional conduct or other misconduct. However, the said provision spoke only about the complaint received on which action is initiated by the Bar Council.

Though, from the status report it was not clear as to the suo motu powers of the Bar Council in dealing with such instances, where the unprofessional act comes to the knowledge of the Bar Council, though not on the basis of a complaint, in which case, the matters such as the present one goes unnoticed, though it was in the public domain and reached the ears and eyes of the public through the visual media.

Sine the status report was silent, it led to the inference that generally no action was taken against such persons, if there was no complaint before the Bar Council.

It is also not clear whether the Bar Council has deliberated on this aspect of initiation of suo motu action against such unruly members of the Bar, who damage and stature and sanctity of the institution and also the members associated with the said institution.

Police personnel | Frontline Workers

It is to be pointed out that the police personnel has been one of the frontline workers in trying to curb the spread of the deadly virus by maintaining the lockdown guidelines imposed by the Government from time to time since March, 2020 and it is further to be pointed out that the pandemic is not yet over and caution has been given about the on-coming of the 3rd and 4th wave, which are predicted to have a still more detrimental impact on the human race.

Police personnels have not only been working overtime but also working with least concern for their family and themselves and have been dedicating their lives to the cause of humanity. In such a scenario, the least expected of the general public and also the intellectual group of legal professionals that they should be given the minimum basic respect and courtesy while handing them.

Advocates Stature

Advocate because of his avocation and his social-minded acts, rise up the pedestal and in fact that was the reason law gave them the stature to question even the police. But that stature should be used in a legal and lawful manner without maligning the reputation and position of any individual person or any official of the Government.

Further, it was elaborated that,

Usage of the position of advocate for other than just causes is nothing but an act of corrupt nature, which requires to be cut down by the sword held in the hands of the statue of Justice.

The doyens of the Bar, more especially the Madras Bar, have held aloft the rule of law for centuries together and Madras Bar is always looked upon with awe and admiration.

 A very significant observation made by the Court was that, nowadays, a few members, just to enrich themselves and for their selfish cause, throw to the winds the larger interest of the legal fraternity and cause irreparable damage to the other members of the legal profession by their acts, as has been done in the present case. 

Bench noted that 1st petitioner indulged in the above-stated act in Infront of her daughter 2nd petitioner who was said to be a 4th-year student. In such a backdrop, it is more expected of the 1st petitioner to teach the 2nd petitioner the ethics for following the rule of law, as otherwise, her act as in the present case, would engrave upon the mind of the 2nd petitioner, which would not be a welcome sign to the legal profession.

High Court expressed that if it allowed such mindset to go unnoticed, it would be a great injustice that this Court would be doing to the legal profession and also to the genuine, dignified and respectful legal professionals, who respect this profession and the robes they wear and would also be sending a wrong signal to send 2nd petitioner who is slowly climbing up the ladder to enter the legal profession.

In view of the above discussion, Court did not grant anticipatory bail to the 1st petitioner.

With regard to 2nd petitioner, Court stated that mere quarrelling with the police officials cannot be said to be a wrongful act, which would attract the penal provisions pressed into service by the respondents against 2nd petitioner and any view taken to the contra would be negating the rights guaranteed to the citizens under the Constitution.

Law Enforcement Agency and their role

The law enforcing agency is manned by persons, who have experience in dealing with criminals and not each and every individual, who commits a mistake should be branded as a criminal by bringing the individual within the four corners of the penal code.

Unnecessary infliction of charges of this nature on every individual would only make the individual look into the loopholes of the system and try to wriggle out of the same after committing mistakes, which should be avoided at all costs.

Hence, Bench stated that respondents shall ponder dropping of all the charges made against 2nd petitioner as there was no substance in the said charges.

Bar Councils’ Mechanism to deal with erring Advocates

Law has given the legal professional privilege and status, but the said privilege is to be used sparingly and only for upholding the majesty of law and following the rule of law. It is not given for the purpose of maligning the rule of law and demeaning the other members of the Bar to the benefit of the individual.

Any infraction by this Court in not safeguarding the interest of the legal profession would be a doom for the entire judiciary and the legal fraternity as a whole.

 Bar Council in its report submitted that it takes action only when it receives any complaint against any erring advocate.  However, what this Court was more bothered about was the fact that not all unprofessional conduct or other misconducts lead to a complaint being written by the Bar Council.

Any unprofessional conduct of a member of the legal profession, coming to the knowledge of the Bar Council through the visual media for which no complaint emanates from any quarter, can the Bar Council allow that instance to go unnoticed for the mere reason that the Advocates Act does not envisage suo motu action?

Court feels that it is high time the Bar Council enforces Section 35 of the Advocates Act, which gives it power and authority to initiate action suo motu on the incidents, which comes to its knowledge through the digital/print media, for which there is no complaint given by any individual.

In view of the above discussions, 2nd petitioner deserves anticipatory bail while dismissing the petitioner insofar as 1st petitioner.

Another issue that the Court dealt was a WhatsApp audio which was circulated by one R. Krishnamurthi, a member of the Bar who circulated the audio on social networking platforms attributing mala fides to the Bench.

advocate has further stated that I should recuse from hearing the case any further and has also attributed dishonesty and also stated that I am taking a lopsided view in favour of the law enforcing agency. Though I have called only for certain particulars, the advocate has gone on to make allegations that I have taken a biased view and I am leaning towards the law enforcing agency and has even casted aspersions against me openly in the social networking domain

Adding to the above, Bench also noted that the advocate imputed allegations against the Judiciary in falling to take any action against the law enforcing agency for very many irregularities committed by them during the pandemic situation, which are not in consonance with law.

The act of the advocate is very much contumacious and attracts initiation of criminal contempt proceedings. The whole audio paints a very gloomy picture and without any material aspersions are attributed against the Bench.

It was noted that the said Krishnamoorthy was a total stranger to the proceedings, yet he had made derogatory statements in the social media against the judicial functions of the Bench, including seeking Judge’s recusal, which was nothing but interference with the administration of justice.

Hence, High Court held that the act of aforesaid advocate attracted Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act.

This Court would not fall prey to such acts perpetrated by gossip mongers and unscrupulous elements, with a view to scuttle the judicial process and make the judiciary dance to their tunes.

Bench directed Registry to issue notice regarding initiation of Suo Motu Criminal Contempt proceedings against the said R. Krishnamoorthy as provided for under Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act and, thereafter, place the matter before the Hon’ble Chief Justice for being listed before the appropriate Bench for hearing. [Tanuja Rajan v. State, 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 2242, decided on 18-06-2021]

Advocates before the Court:

For Petitioners: Ms. A.Louisal Ramesh

For Respondent : Mr. A.Gopinath, GA (Crl. Side) for R-1 Mr. Haja Mohideen Gisthi for R-2

Madras HC | Is there any mechanism to take action against members of legal fraternity for their misbehaviour with officials on duty? Bar council of Tamil Nadu to respond


Case BriefsHigh Courts

Madhya Pradesh High Court: Atul Sreedharan, J., addressed the instant contempt petition. The Court while expressing concern over State inaction, stated, “The inaction on the part of the State for a good seven years shows the sheer insensitivity of the State and its bureaucracy and is worthy of dereliction in the strongest terms.”

The present contempt petition was filed for non-compliance of order passed in W.P. No. 806 of 2013 on 18-01-2013. The facts of the case were that the petitioner who was a daily wage cook, employed in the Government Post-Matric Scheduled Caste Boys Hostel filed a petition seeking direction to the respondents, that regular pay-scale be granted to him in the light of circular dated 17-03-1978. It was submitted that the aforesaid circular gave daily wage employees engaged in the Tribal Welfare Department, benefit which had been given by the order passed in Dhanu Bai v. State of M.P., (W.A. No. 85/2011). The Court had ordered the State to consider if the order of Dhanu Bai case would squarely apply on the petitioner; and the State was given liberty to take into consideration any subsequent circular issued by the State Government in respect of grant of wages to daily wage.

The Court observed that, undue liberty that had been granted from time to time and again by this Court for the compliance of its orders, was being taken for granted. The abject disdain of the State and its functionaries to the orders passed by this Court was only on account of the leniency shown by this Court. Time and again, looking at the work load of the State and its functionaries, this Court has been loath to proceed against the guilty in contempt. This has emboldened them repeatedly and they put the orders passed by this Court in the back-burn. It had taken seven years to the State to come out with a pathetic response. The Court said,

The power that is given to the State and its functionaries are not without concomitant responsibility. Rudyard Kipling, a famous author whose association with the State is legendary on account of his work ” The Jungle Book”, has observed “power without responsibility – the prerogative of the ****** throughout the ages. Time and again, the State has, by its violation or its non-compliance to the orders passed by this Court; shown that it is an institution that prefers to have powers without responsibility.

 Considering that the respondents were aware with the order passed by this Court at least from 03-04-2013, if not before that, the Court remarked that, the inaction on the part of the State for a good seven years shows the sheer insensitivity of the State and its bureaucracy and is worthy of dereliction in the strongest terms. It was further stated by the Court, “The State through its inactivity is partly responsible for the flood of writ petition before this Court and after the orders passed by this Court, it leads to filing of the contempt petition because the State and its instrumentalities do not comply with the order passed by this Court within the time period given in the order.”

In the light of above, the instant petition was disposed of with the direction to the respondent to take a decision within a period of two weeks from passing of this order. [Sona Bai v. Principal Secretary Tribal Welfare Department, Mantralaya, CONC-1455-2014, decided on 13-01-2021]

Op EdsOP. ED.

The consent of the Attorney General to initiate criminal contempt proceedings against Kunal Kamra underlines a significant point – that the freedom of speech is subject to the law of contempt. Ubiquitous as it may seem, this fundamental norm appears to have been put into desuetude by the critics of the judiciary in recent times. This basic norm of Indian free speech jurisprudence may appear contrary to the American position where it was once believed that the law of contempt is limited by the first amendment.

Much has been said as to how the offence of scandalising the court is no longer relevant and should be done away with. Succour is sought from the unfair and not-so-lovely comments of the Privy Council in McLeod v.  St. Aubyn[1]:

…But it must be considered that in small colonies, consisting principally of coloured populations, the enforcement in proper cases of committal for contempt of court for attacks on the Court may be absolutely necessary to preserve in such a community the dignity of and respect for the Court.

Coloured population we may be, but our Court in Perspective Publications[2]  has clearly held that it is not correct that committals for scandalising the court has become obsolete. Further, what the advocates of unqualified free speech undermine is what is pertinently said by our Court in Rama Dayal Markarha v. State of M.P.[3]:

“14 In this country justice at grass-root level is administered by courts set up in rural backward areas largely inhabitated by illiterate persons. It is they who bring their problems to the court for resolution and they are the litigants, or consumers of justice service. Their susceptibility is of a different type than the urban elite reading newspapers and exposed to wind of change or even wind of criticism. The people in rural backward areas unfortunately illiterate have different kinds of susceptibilities. A slight suspicion that the Judges pre-disposed or approaches the case with a closed mind or has no judicial disposition would immediately affect their susceptibilities and they would lose confidence in the administration of justice. There is no greater harm than infusing or instilling in the minds of such people a lack of confidence in the character and integrity of the Judge…”

True it may be that in that case the Court was concerned with a mofussil court, but it must not be lost sight of that the higher judiciary in our country, right up to the Supreme Court, is flooded with litigation emanating from rural areas. That includes a large number of criminal cases where the accused may be seeking bail or anticipatory bail. Proliferation of social media in rural India is well known. Unabated circulation of reckless comments is bound to create an impression in those susceptible minds, who unfortunately constitute the vast majority.

The Contempt of Courts Act has been enacted keeping in mind the developments and trends in other countries, without ignoring the ground realties and prevalent socio-economic conditions in India. (Arundhati Roy, In re[4]).

Critics of our courts have been vociferous as to how the power to punish for contempt is antithetical to the freedom of speech and expression and how the law of contempt has become anachronistic. Much has been said about how the law of contempt has been diluted even in a conservative country like the United Kingdom. Lord Templeman in the Daily Mirror case and the opinion of Lord Denning in the Blackburn case have been quoted ad nauseam.

It was generally believed that the approach of the American courts was that the contempt power of all courts is limited by the guarantee of the first amendment against interference with freedom of speech or of the press. This stems from the opinion of Justice Hugo Black in Bridges v.  California[5]. However, even in a country as liberal as the United States in terms of freedom of speech and expression, the necessity to have the power to punish for contempt and drawing lines distinguishing free-speech from interference with the course of justice has been recognised. In that very case of Bridges[6], Felix Frankfurter, J. penned his dissenting opinion which has gained currency in later times. He took the view that the summary power over contemptuous publications is deeply rooted in common law and that the power to punish for contempt is not a censorship in advance but a punishment for past conduct and, as such, like prosecution for criminal libel is not offensive either to first or to the fourteenth amendments. In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada[7],  is an instance where  Rheinquist, C.J. took the view that “the substantial likelihood of material prejudice” standard is a constitutionally permissible balance between the first amendment right of attorneys in pending cases and the State’s interest in fair trials.

Vilification of Judges is also bound to affect the psyche of Judges. Felix Frankfurter, J. in Pennekamp[8], rightly observed:

Judges, however stalwart, are human and the delicate task of administering justice ought not to be made unduly difficult by irresponsible print.”

In Attorney General v. BBC[9], Lord Dilhorne, disagreeing with the opinion of Lord Denning who wrote from the Court of Appeals, held:

It is sometimes asserted that no Judge will be influenced in his judgment by anything said by the media and consequently that the need to prevent the publication of matter prejudicial to the hearing of a case only exists where the decision rests with laymen. This claim to judicial superiority over human frailty is one that I find some difficulty in accepting……

                                                                                      (emphasis supplied)

Borrie and Lowe in their commentary[10] on contempt of court state that Lord Denning’s view is “more a statement of policy rather than literal truth”. Cardozo, in his “Nature of the Judicial Process” referring to the forces which enter into the conclusions of Judges” observed that “the great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men, do not turn aside in their course and pass the Judges by”.

The bottom line, therefore, is fair criticism – for that is what is permissible in our law. A judgement can be criticised respectfully, and instances closer home are aplenty. Seervai has severely criticised the judgement of  Bhagawati, J.  in E.P. Royappa[11]. He says the judgment suffers from the logical fallacy of undistrbuted middle, but the criticism is benign and is a pleasure to read. Constructive criticism, without attacking any particular Judge or court, has also been held to be out of the ken of contempt. A contempt petition was filed against Chief Justice E.S. Venkataramaiah for his interview lamenting the state of the judiciary as such. The Court declined to proceed with contempt.[12]

Consent for criminal contempt has been granted. The speaker claims to be a comedian. But it is the Attorney General who is standing up for a free and fearless judiciary by exercising his discretion wisely.

Kunal Kamra claims to be a comedian, but it is the Attorney General who is standing up for a robust judiciary. Freedom of speech does not licence vilification of Judges and the judiciary. Irresponsible onslaught on Judges is bound to affect their psyche. ‘There can be no claim of judicial superiority over human frailty’ said Lord Dilhorne, disagreeing with Lord Denning. Benign humour/satire a la Daphtary is welcome; not calculated vituperation clothed as humour. The power of contempt is warranted to ensure the free and fair administration of justice-free speech jurisprudence under our Constitution.

* Advocate-on-Record, Supreme Court. Author can be contacted at

[1] McLeod  v. St. Aubyn, (1899) AC 549

[2] Perspective Publications (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (1969) 2 SCR 779

[3] (1978) 2 SCC 630

[4] (2002) 3 SCC 343

[5] 314 US 252 (1941)

[6] Ibid.

[7] 501 US 1030 (1991)

[8] 328 US 331 (1946)

[9] 1981 AC 303 (HL)

[10] Borrie and Lowe, The Law of Contempt, (3rd Edn., 1996)

[11] E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N., (1974) 4 SCC 3

[12]Vishwanath v. E.S. Venkatramiah, 1990 SCC OnLine Bom 441

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: The 3-judge bench of Ashok Bhushan, R. Subhash Reddy and MR Shah, JJ has issued notice to cartoonist Rachita Taneja and comedian Kunal Kamra in two separate cases relating contemptuous social media posts.

After obtaining Attorney General for India KK Venugopal’s consent a law student had filed a petition against Taneja for initiating proceedings for contempt for publishing contemptuous posts on her social media pages, Sanitary Panels, which allegedly scandalise and undermine the authority of the Supreme Court. The petitioner has filed this contempt petition.

Similarly, an advocate and 2 law students sought for initiation of criminal contempt proceedings against the Kamra for publishing contemptuous tweets on his twitter handle.

While giving consent in Kunal Kamra’s case, the Attorney General had noted,

“I find that today people believe that they can boldly and brazenly condemn the Supreme Court of India its judges by exercising what they believe is their freedom of speech. But under the Constitution, the freedom of speech is subject to the law of contempt and I believe that it is time that people understand that attacking the Supreme Court of India unjustifiedly and brazenly will attract punishment under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1972.”

The notices are returnable within six weeks and both the contemnors have been spared from appearing in person.

[Shrirang Katneshwarkar v. Kunal Kamra, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1041, order dated 18.12.2020 and Aditya Kashyap v. Rachita Taneja, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1042, order dated 18.12.2020]

Kerala High Court
Case BriefsHigh Courts

Kerala High Court: P. Somarajan, J., observed that,

“…fourth estate is not expected to shy away from the matters governing public importance, but it is their solemn duty to serve the society with the news item with its pros and cons so as to bring the society more functional and vigil.”

The Managing Editor, the Chief Editor and the Printer and Publisher of a daily newspaper came up to quash the proceedings initiated on the allegation of the offence under Section 500 of Penal Code, 1860 through a private complaint on which cognizance was taken by the magistrate and process was issued under Section 204 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.

The news item published was based on a report submitted by the Vigilance to set the criminal law in motion against the defacto complainant.

With reference to the news item published, it was clear that what was reported was the true version of report submitted by the Vigilance against the defacto complainant and three others after conducting a preliminary enquiry and recommended registration of crime against them.

It is true that they were referred to as accused persons in the news item, even before registration of crime in connection with the allegations.

While addressing the instant matter, Court observed that,

It is the duty of the fourth estate to publish all news materials, especially having public importance and it is their further duty to comment on the news material with its pros and cons so as to enlighten the society to remain vigil on the matters of public importance.

It was further noted that,

fourth estate being one of the rostrums to address and comment on each and every matter governing public interest/ public importance in a democratic society, the news item published with necessary comments, though sometimes contemptuous, may not itself amount to defamation as defined under Section 499 IPC unless the same is lacking in good faith and not concerning with a matter of public interest or public good.

Section 499 IPC Proviso 1

Bench observed that the said provision has a wide canvass in a Democratic system and right to publish a news item with its necessary comments and views though sometimes contemptuous, cannot be defeated unless malafides writ large on its face and not concerning with a matter of public interest.


Court observed that, Contemptuous nature of news item, if it is connected with the imputation of truth, which requires publication for the public goodwill not attract the offence and there shall not be any misunderstanding with respect to the requirement to attract Section 499 IPC with the first exception.

Hence, in the instant case, news item published will not attract the offence of defamation as defined under Section 499 IPC.

Further, it was that the private complaint submitted was really intended to defeat the solemn function vested with the fourth estate and it will tell upon what is behind it. The said fact is an abuse of the process of court, liable to be quashed. [Philip Mathew v. State of Kerala, 2020 SCC OnLine Ker 5105, decided on 13-11-2020]

OP. ED.SCC Journal Section Archives


The internet is one of the most used and innovative additions in the lives of people in this modern world. With the arrival of social media, the internet took socialising to a whole new level because initially it became the medium of sharing thoughts and soon grew into a medium of official communication between people and people, government and government and government and people. With all sorts of information on the social media, humour is one of the biggest user-generated and shared content. The internet brought the expression of humour in the form of satire, sarcasm, and wit with social media posts on the fingertips and memes all over the place, bringing out the dark sense of humour hidden in people as well. Getting in trouble for humour isn’t new, but with the vast reach of the internet, people posting from one corner of the country and someone getting immediately offended from another corner of the country has become common. This opens room for debate on the questions like ‘How can someone be arrested for a joke?’, ‘How can a joke be criminal?’, ‘Should law take social media seriously?’, ‘Is arresting for a social media post a violation of free speech?’ and ‘Do we really need laws to monitor everything on social media?’

The present elaborated discussion is a study of various cases in India related to humour and social media and observes how humour is used as a tool to commit crimes, and how laws are used against them, reasonably and unreasonably. It also observes the nature of people over the internet and how it affects their real lives. It also studies the laws present in India to analyse what the country requires in order to prevent the misuse of both, the laws and the social media, and in the end, concludes with a suggestion of separate Media Law and why it is necessary.


Humour is to speech what salt is to food”.1

The internet is “a cooperative message-forwarding system linking computer networks all over the world”.2 The rise of the internet has given a new platform to the people and has grown enough to become a part of reality. From a common citizen’s social media profile to official government notifications being released on websites, with the passage of time, the internet not only remains a source of information and education, but also of global trade & commerce, of personal and professional connection, and of charity & crime.

The swiftness with which the internet has integrated into the lives of people, it would not be wrong to state that it is now an extension of their own personality. Due to the degree of anonymity and vast reach it provides, it brings out the untamed selves of people, which can be closely associated with what Sigmund Freud referred to as the Id,3 making the internet the “Wild West”.4 “Researchers assume that analysis of comic texts provides us with important insights about what is lurking in the social mind behind the façade of platitudes, conventions, and political correctness”.5 One of the basic reasons behind this is that, over the internet, there exists a very low chance of face to face backlash. Even though countries across the world have taken steps to counter it,6 a complete success in preventing Cybercrime is nowhere in sight.

Along with all types of content, the internet has now also become a platform for sharing humour in an electronic form, which can be done in the form of texts, images, videos or other formats. “Rather than light-hearted entertainment, jokes are in fact important arenas in which sensitive and troubling issues are processed and negotiated”.7 Sigmund Freud happens to be the most important authority on jokes and he called them “a combination of [comic] technique and [humorous] thought”.8 Another popular term on the internet in terms of humour is ‘Memes’. The term meme was coined by Richard Dawkins in his book ‘The Selfish Gene’. The Oxford Dictionary defines meme as “An element of a culture that may be considered to be passed on by non-genetic means, especially, imitation”.9 The term is basically associated with pictorial or video jokes, perhaps because they (as a form of presentation of humour or idea), grew on the internet the most, where they spread, most of the times as a trend, through immediate sharing or imitation.

[Read more]

Note: This Article was first published in RMLNLU CMET Law Journal 6 CMET (2019) 77.  The extract has been reproduced with the kind permission of RMLNLU.

* Student, BA LLB (Hons), KIIT School of Law Bhubaneswar, Odisha.

1 ‘Political Satire in Modern India’ (The Hindu, 6 April 2018) <https : //> accessed 14 January 2019.

2 Douglas A Downing and others, Dictionary of Computer and Internet Terms (10th edn, Barron’s Educational Series Inc US 2009) 256.

3 Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id (first Published 1923, Courier Dover Publication 2018) 8.

4 Megan Carpentier, ‘Online Abuse : How Different Countries Deal with It’ (The Guardian, 12 April 2016) <https : //> accessed 15 January 2019.

5 Limor Shifman and Dafna Lemish, ‘“Mars and Venus” in Virtual Space : Post-feminist Humor and the Internet’ (2011) 28 (3) Critical Studies in Media Law 253, 254.

6 The Guardian (n 257).

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: Disgruntled with the respondent for non-compliance with the Court’s earlier orders, Vivek Kumar Birla, J. allowed the present contempt application and issued a show-cause notice to the concerned delinquent officers.

The present contempt application has been filed by the applicant pleading for an action against the respondent for wilful disobedience of the judgment and order dated 18-09-2018 passed by this Court in Special Appeal Defective No. 656 of 2018 and the order dated 17-09-2019 passed in Contempt Application (Civil) No. 5773 of 2019

Counsel for the applicant, Kushmondeya Shahi has submitted that the copy of the order had been served to the respondent and yet nothing was done in that regard. Left with no other option, the applicant filed the present application seeking relief. The respondent had been granted more time for compliance vide order dated 17-09-2019 but even after the expiry of the period, any decision is yet to be taken by the respondents.

Upon careful perusal of the facts and circumstances, the Court has found it fit to initiate contempt proceedings against the respondent.

Lamenting over the sorry state of affairs with respect to the compliance of its orders, the Court has passed strict remarks taking the concerned administrative officers to the task. The remarks have been reproduced below for reference:

“This Court is noticing every day that apparently the officers concerned, who were directed to act as per the order of the Court, are not complying with the orders at the first instance and the aggrieved party is forced to file contempt application and even after granting further time to comply with the order of the writ Court passed in contempt application, the orders not being complied with. Apparently, the Officers are becoming habitual and not complying with the orders of this Court at the first instance.

This is a sorry state of affairs and it is expected that the opposite party shall make every effort and shall also issue necessary orders in this regard to the subordinate authorities to strictly comply with the orders at the first instance itself, otherwise the Court will take a serious view of the matter.”

 In view of the above, the Court has allowed the present contempt application issuing notice to the respondent to appear in person and show cause as to why charges be not framed against him under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act for wilful disobedience of the aforementioned orders. [Arun Kumar v. Renuka Kumar, Contempt Application (Civil) No. 3033 of 2020, decided on 08-09-2020]

Yashvardhan Shrivastav, Editorial Assistant has put this story together