Supreme Court: In a significant exposition of criminal procedure, the bench of Sanjay Karol and N. Kotiswar Singh, JJ acknowledged the practical complexities of investigation but made clear that investigations cannot continue endlessly and hence, issued the following directions in this regard.
-
Supplementary Chargesheet & Court’s Role: In Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali, (2013) 5 SCC 762), the ‘leave of the court’ to file a supplementary chargesheet, is a part of Section 173(8) CrPC. However, the Court is not rendered functus officio having granted such permission. Since the further investigation is being made with the leave of the Court, judicial stewardship/control thereof, is a function which the court must perform.
-
Importance of Reasons in Criminal Proceedings: Reasons are indispensable to the proper functioning of the machinery of criminal law and form the bedrock of fairness, transparency, and accountability in the justice system. If the Court finds or the accused alleges (obviously with proof and reason to substantiate the allegation) that there is a large gap between the first information report and the culminating chargesheet, it is bound to seek an explanation from the investigating agency and satisfy itself to the propriety of the explanation so furnished.
-
Investigation Timelines & Right to Certainty:
-
The investigations cannot continue endlessly.
-
The accused is not out of place to expect, after a certain point in time, certainty- about the charges against him, giving him ample time to preparing plead his defence.
-
If investigation into a particular offence has continued for a period that appears to be unduly long, that too without adequate justification, such as in this case, the accused or the complainant both, shall be at liberty to approach the High Court under Section 528 BNSS/482 CrPC, seeking an update on the investigation or, if the doors of the High Court have been knocked by the accused, quashing.
-
Delay in completion of investigation will only function as one of the grounds, and the Court, if in its wisdom, decides to entertain this application, other grounds will also have to be considered.
-
-
Importance of Reasons in Administrative Matters: Reasons are not only important in the judicial sphere, but they are equally essential in administrative matters particularly in matters such as sanction for they open the gateway to greater consequences. Application of mind by the authorities granting or denying sanction must be easily visible including consideration of the evidence placed before it in arriving at the conclusion.
Background of the Case
The Court was dealing with a case related to issuance of licences under the Arms Act, 1959, wherein the investigation took more than a decade to be completed.
-
As per the FIR, the appellant, then District Magistrate-cum-Licensing Authority, Saharsa, was named as an accused for criminal conspiracy and abetment as some arms licenses were issued to persons physically incapable and in violation of Section 13(2), Arms Act, 1959, allegedly to provide undue benefit to applicants.
-
The initial investigation led to a chargesheet on 09-07-2005, in which one accused, was sent for trial while investigation against others continued.
-
A supplementary chargesheet dated 13-04-2006 observed that no offence was made out against the appellant, labelling the allegations as false, with the complainant recording no objection.
-
However, requests for re-investigation were made in November 2007 and October 2008. On 19-06- 2009, the Chief Judicial Magistrate refused re-investigation but permitted further investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC.
-
In administrative proceedings, the Bihar Government, by letter dated 10-12- 2015, asked the appellant to show cause regarding the issuance of licenses to 16 accused, and the explanation was accepted, leading to the discharge of disciplinary proceedings on 25-02- 2016.
-
The further investigation culminated in chargesheet submitted on 31-08- 2020, with the State granting sanction under Section 197 CrPC on 27-04- 2022, and cognizance taken by the Court on 01-06- 2022.
-
The appellant subsequently approached the Patna High Court against the said order.
Patna High Court’s Ruling
The High Court rejected the appellant’s application under Section 482 CrPC, noting multiple irregularities in the issuance of licenses, including issuance to physically unfit persons, listing the appellant’s bodyguard in the “column of care” on some applications, and granting licenses within two days of requesting police reports, which were not yet received.
Regarding departmental proceedings, the High Court observed that while the appellant was discharged, the directive to “remain careful in the future” did not amount to exoneration. The Court further emphasized that the powers under Section 13(2A) of the Arms Act must not be exercised arbitrarily or unjustly.
It, however, directed the Trial Court to expedite the trial, conducting it on a day-to-day basis given the many years elapsed since the case began.
Supreme Court’s Analysis and Ruling
On Prescribed Time-Limit under the Arms Act, 1959
The Court held that obtaining a police verification report is mandatory and must be submitted to the licensing authority within a “prescribed time,” as defined under Section 2(g) of the Arms Act, which defines prescribed to be that which has been described in the rules made under the Arms Act.
While at the relevant period (2002—2004), the Arms Rules, 1962, did not specify any timeline for police submission or licensing decisions, however, it is a generally understood position in law that when a legislation or a rule does not provide for limitation/time limit for a particular aspect, the same is to be governed by the standard of reasonable time. Hence, the licensing authority is expected to act within a logically reasonable timeframe.
On grant of sanction before cognizance under Section 197 CrPC
The Court noted that the purpose of granting sanction before cognizance under Section 197 CrPC the threat of criminal prosecution does not hang over the heads of the officials in discharge of their public duty. However, at the same time, it is not intended to protect officers who have transgressed the boundaries of their duty for some act/benefit which otherwise would not be termed acceptable. Hence, the sanctioning authorities must not act mechanically; they are required to examine the materials provided by the investigating agency and reach a prima facie satisfaction regarding the officer’s involvement in the alleged offence.
In the case at hand, the sanction granted to the appellant was based on vague references such as “perusal of the documents and evidences mentioned in Case Diary,” without proper reasoning or application of mind. Noticing that the substance of why a sanction is required was however entirely missed by the sanctioning authority, the Court held that such sanction was legally invalid, and consequently, all actions relying on it, including taking cognizance of the chargesheet, were quashed.
On delay in investigation
Talking about the evolution of the law on timely investigations, the Court noted that while during the colonial period, criminal investigations were largely under police control with minimal judicial oversight, subsequent reforms, beginning with the CrPC of 1898 and later the CrPC of 1973, introduced judicial oversight and procedural accountability, through provisions such as Sections 61, 167, 173(1), and 173(2) of the respective Codes. Modern iterations of the criminal procedure, including BNSS 2023, continue to embed timelines and oversight mechanisms, reflecting the evolution of legislative wisdom from minimal judicial control to structured supervision and recognition of the need for timely investigation.
The Court observed that it may be true that no strict timelines are provided in the CrPC, but it is equally so that investigations are to be completed in reasonable time.
The Court observed that investigation is covered under the right to speedy trial and that violation of this right can strike at the root of the investigation itself, leading it to be quashed. However, noticing that further investigation or rather permission therefor, can be granted even after commencement of trial, the Court said that timelines cannot be set in stone for an investigation to be completed nor can outer limit be prescribed within which necessarily, an investigation must be drawn to a close.
The Court, however, explained that Article 21 would be impacted in a situation where no reason justifiable in nature, can be understood from record for the investigation having taken a large amount of time.
“The accused cannot be made to suffer endlessly with this threat of continuing investigation and eventual trial proceedings bearing over their everyday existence.”
The Court took note of the extreme delay in the investigation in the case at hand wherein the permission for further investigation was granted in 2009, but the resulting chargesheet was submitted only in 2020—11 years later—despite earlier findings in a previous chargesheet that the allegations against the appellant were false. No reason is forthcoming for this extended period either in the chargesheet or at the instance of the Court having taken cognizance of such chargesheet. By 2024—2025, trial proceedings had barely moved forward, raising serious concerns about the prolonged uncertainty faced by the appellant.
Conclusion
The Court, hence, concluded that even though, in the one case that has been consistently highlighted by the State, it cannot be said that the appellant acted within the scope of authority as given by Section 13(2A) of the Arms Act, but given that the administrative authorities have already discharged him, that issue need not be taken further. On the issue of sanction being improper and large delay in filing of chargesheet as also consequent action, the Court decided in favour of the appellant. The prosecution was hence quashed.
[Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu v. State of Bihar, Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s).10130/2025, decided on 20.11.2025]
*Judgment Authored by Justice Sanjay Karol
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For Petitioner(s): Mr. Maninder Singh, Sr. Adv. Mr. Santosh Kumar, AOR Ms. Richa Singh, Adv. Mr. Abhishekh Tripathi, Adv. Mr. Shravanth Paruchuri, Adv.
For Respondent(s): Mr. Manish Kumar, AOR Mr. Sivam Singh, Adv. Mr. Divyansh Mishra, Adv. Mr. Kumar Saurav, Adv. Mr. Ishwar Singh, Adv. Mr. Shubham Jhanghu, Adv. Mr. Yoshit Jain, Adv

