Calcutta High Court: In a revisional application filed by the petitioner, an advocate and politician, challenging the summons issued in a defamation case for sharing pages from a 2015 book containing personal allegations and a letter about the Chief Minister of West Bengal, which he claimed was publicly available and not subject to any ban, a Single Judge Bench of Apurba Sinha Ray, J., while dismissing the application held that republication of defamatory imputations makes the person liable in the same manner as the original author. The Court emphasised that every republication gives rise to a new cause of action, and the absence of action against the original publication does not shield the subsequent publisher from legal consequences.
Background:
The case arose from the petitioner uploading pages of a book on social media and making televised comments that allegedly defamed the Chief Minister. The book, first published in 2015 and not banned by any government order, claimed that the Chief Minister secretly married someone and included other personal details from before she assumed office. It suggested that her public claim of being unmarried was false and questioned her integrity. The book also contained a letter dated 30-04-2012 addressed to the Chief Minister, asking whether a certain individual attended her oath-taking ceremony on 20-05-2011 and whether that person was present in her official chamber at Writers’ Buildings before her arrival.
Based on the petitioner’s republication of these contents and alleged defamatory remarks, the State, through the Public Prosecutor, filed a complaint under Section 356(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (‘BNS’), invoking Section 222(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (‘BNSS’), after obtaining statutory sanction. The Chief Judge, City Sessions Court, Calcutta, took cognizance of the offence and issued summons after hearing the petitioner under Section 223 BNSS.
The petitioner argued that the book was old and publicly available, that he merely reposted its contents, and that only the Chief Minister could initiate defamation proceedings not the Public Prosecutor, since the statements did not concern her official conduct. The State countered that the Court should rely on prima facie materials and that the petitioner’s intent to malign was evident. The Chief Judge rejected the petitioner’s plea for dismissal, noting that the alleged defamatory statements referenced the Chief Minister’s office and could not be dismissed at the preliminary stage.
Analysis and Decision:
The Court emphasised that the allegations concerning the undisclosed marriage of the Chief Minister and other deeply personal matters were undoubtedly aspects of her personal life. The Court observed that to suggest a deep and intimate alleged relationship between the person concerned and the Chief Minister, the author referred to her behaviour and demeanour during the oath-taking ceremony, where the concerned person was allegedly present, presumably with her consent. It was further noted that the author was confident about the presence of the said person in her office chamber, which, according to the author, could not have occurred without the Chief Minister’s permission.
The Court emphasised that neither the term ‘public function’ nor its nature or degree is defined in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (‘CrPC’). Therefore, it broadly held that each and every second of the Chief Minister’s presence in her chamber is presumed to be for the discharge of her official duties. The burden to prove that she was acting beyond her official duties while in office lies on the person making such a claim. The Court concluded that any meeting with any person in her office chamber is deemed to have been arranged for official purposes unless proven otherwise. In the Court’s considered view, it was the author of the book or the person who reproduced its contents who must prove such an allegation.
The Court further noted that an important point raised that the applicant did not author the book but merely reproduced its pages, which allegedly contained defamatory remarks. It was also pointed out that the book was not banned by any Government order, and hence, the applicant’s publication could not be deemed illegal. However, the Court observed that the key question was whether the reproduction of a defamatory statement attracted similar punishment.
The Court highlighted the decision in Arvind Kejriwal v. State, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 719, where it was observed that retweeting or reposting defamatory content without any disclaimer regarding agreement, verification, or belief in the truth of the content amounts to republication. It was emphasised that such republication has the potential to lower a person’s moral or intellectual character or credit. It was further noted that when a public figure, especially one with political standing, republishes defamatory content, the implications are broader, affecting societal perception and public opinion.
The Court observed that from the precedents, republication of defamatory imputations makes the person liable in the same manner as the original author. It was emphasised that every republication gives rise to a new cause of action, and the absence of action against the original publication does not shield the subsequent publisher from legal consequences. Therefore, the person republishing defamatory content does so at his own peril and is legally obligated to justify his actions.
The Court further noted a significant legal issue raised by the applicant, who argued that since the original book was not banned and was available in the market, his republication should not be actionable. However, the Court highlighted that there existed a legal embargo in that regard. It was observed that the book was produced during the hearing and kept under sealed cover with the consent of the Public Prosecutor. The Court emphasised that the second page of the book clearly stated that no part of it must be printed, published, sold, or distributed without the author’s permission. It was noted that no material was placed before the Court showing that the applicant obtained permission to publish the letter dated 30-04-2012.
The Court observed that the initiation of the complaint by the Public Prosecutor is not barred. It was held that lodging a complaint under Section 222(2) CrPC by the Public Prosecutor is permissible, subject to certain conditions. The Court emphasised that without examining the relevant evidence, it cannot be concluded at this preliminary stage that the cognizance taken by the Chief Judge is legally flawed.
The Court noted that there were allegations of two prior cases initiated by private individuals on similar grounds. It was clarified that whether such individuals can file defamation suits or criminal proceedings in their personal capacity is a matter for appropriate legal forums. However, the Court reiterated that the Public Prosecutor has a statutory right to initiate proceedings if a Minister is defamed in relation to his conduct in the discharge of public functions.
Therefore, the Court found no infirmity or irregularity in the order passed by the Chief Judge, City Sessions Court, Calcutta. The Court affirmed the order dated 18-06-2025 and clarified that all observations made are tentative and solely for the purpose of disposing of the revisional application.
Consequently, the Court dismissed the revision on contest with no order as to costs. The application was also disposed of, and any interim order stood vacated. The Court further directed that the book submitted for the revisionist be returned accordingly.
[Koustav Bagchi v. State of West Bengal, 2025 SCC OnLine Cal 8528, decided on 31-10-2025]
Advocates who appeared in this case :
For the Petitioner: Rajdeep Mazumder, Sr. Adv., Moyukh Mukherjee, Adv., Samrat Mondal, Adv.
For the State: Debasish Roy, Ld. P.P., Rudradipta Nandy, Ld. APP
Buy Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 HERE
