Supreme Court: While considering this petition challenging the affirmation of accused person’s conviction and sentence under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (‘POCSO Act’) and Section 506 of the Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) by Himachal Pradesh High Court; the Division Bench of Aravind Kumar and Sandeep Mehta, JJ., confirmed the decisions of the Trial Court and the High Court. Noting that the accused in the case is the father of the victim, the Court strictly emphasised that incestuous sexual violence committed by a parent is a distinct category of offence that tears through the foundational fabric of familial trust and must invite the severest condemnation in both language and sentence. When a child is forced to suffer at the hands of her own father, the law must speak in a voice that is resolute and uncompromising.
“There can be no mitigation in sentencing for crimes that subvert the very notion of family as a space of security”.
Therefore, the Court exercising its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, directed that a sum of Rs 10, 50,000 to be paid to the victim as compensation as per the Scheme by the State of Himachal Pradesh in the peculiar facts of the case.
Background:
The accused who is the father of the victim, was found to have committed repeated aggravated penetrative sexual assault upon his own minor daughter, who was just around 10 years old at the time of the incident.
“The acts were not isolated incidents but sustained, deliberate assaults within the safety of the home, a place where every child expects protection”.
The Trial Court, upon evaluation of the oral testimony of the victim, the corroborating evidence of her elder sister, and the forensic and medical records, had returned a verdict of guilt. The High Court in reasoned judgment, had affirmed the conviction and imposed the sentence of life imprisonment, in addition to fine.
Court’s Assessment:
Perusing the case, the Court grimly pointed out that the facts of the instant case reveal a story of unspeakable betrayal of trust by none other than the father of the victim who was convicted under POCSO and IPC.
Taking note of the accused person’s contention that he was falsely implicated due to strained domestic relationships and disapproval of romantic alliances of his daughters, the Court stated that such contention is completely hollow.
“No daughter, however aggrieved, would fabricate charges of this magnitude against her own father merely to escape household discipline”.
It was pointed out that the POCSO jurisprudence has evolved as a bulwark against the predatory crimes targeting the innocence of childhood. Section 29 of the POCSO Act creates a statutory presumption of guilt, once foundational facts are established.
The Court pointed out that in the present case, this presumption stood unrebutted. The victim’s testimony was unwavering, medically corroborated, and free from embellishment; her disclosure, though delayed, was truthful and borne out of perennial trauma and threats she had undergone.
The Court further pointed out that the Trial Court and the High Court did not just accept the victim’s account, but they also validated it through unimpeachable scientific evidence. The DNA report sealed the evidentiary chain and dispelled all doubts in the prosecution case.
The Court further noted that the accused also sought an interim relief of bail. On this, the Court said that the judicial conscience does not permit casual indulgence in a prayer for interim relief of bail where the conviction has been rendered after full-fledged trial, affirmed in appeal, and the testimony of the victim is clear, cogent, and duly corroborated. The Court reiterated that in serious offences under the POCSO Act, particularly those involving familial betrayal of trust, relief cannot be granted as a matter of routine. Where two courts have concurrently found guilt and the findings are not shown to be perverse, interference under Article 136 is neither warranted nor justified. The Court unambiguously emphasised that entertaining of the instant petition or remotely considering the grant of bail in a case of this nature, after the guilt has been proved and affirmed, would not merely undermine the majesty of the law, it would amount to a betrayal of the constitutional promise made to every child of this country. “It would be, in the considered view of this Court, a judicial insult to the sanctity of womanhood and a blow to every mother who teaches her child to believe in justice”.
Taking a grim note of the facts of this case, the Court reiterated in offences involving sexual abuse, especially against children, the trauma suffered by the victim is lifelong. The scars are not merely physical but psychological, cutting across every fibre of trust, safety, and dignity. Such offences deserve nothing but the severest condemnation and deterrent punishment. The Court firmly stated that to pardon such depravity under any guise would be a travesty of justice and a betrayal of the child protection mandate embedded in the constitutional and statutory framework.
“When the perpetrator is none other than the father, the natural guardian, the crime assumes a demonic character”.
The Court strictly pointed out that when a father who is expected to be a shield, a guardian, a moral compass, becomes the source of the most severe violation of a child’s bodily integrity and dignity, the betrayal is not only personal but institutional.
“The law does not, and cannot, condone such acts under the guise of rehabilitation or reform”.
The Court thus opined that to entertain a plea for leniency in a case of this nature would not merely be misplaced, it would constitute a betrayal of the Court’s own constitutional duty to protect the vulnerable. “The home, which should be a sanctuary, cannot be permitted to become a site of unspeakable trauma, and the courts must send a clear signal that such offences will be met with an equally unsparing judicial response”.
Therefore, dismissing the petition, the Court directed that the victim be given monetary compensation. It was reiterated that justice must not be limited to conviction, it must, where the law so permits, include restitution. “In awarding this compensation, we reaffirm the constitutional commitment to protect the rights and dignity of child survivors, and to ensure that the justice delivered is substantive, compassionate, and complete”.
[Bhanei Prasad v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1636, decided on 4-8-2025]
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For Petitioner(s): Mr. Krishna Pal Singh, AOR Ms. Anvita Aprajita, Adv. Mr. Mohan Singh Bais, Adv. Mr. Seemab Qayyum, Adv
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