Supreme Court: The instant appeal challenged the decision by Division Bench of Hyderabad High Court for State Telangana, whereby it had set aside the direction to Telangana State Road Transport Corporation (TSRTC) to provide the appellant, who is colour blind, with an alternative employment. The Division Bench of J.K. Maheshwari and Aravind Kumar*, JJ., allowed the appeal by holding that the Appellant was prematurely retired from service on medical grounds without any meaningful effort by the Corporation to explore his suitability for alternate employment. This action was taken in disregard of Clause 14 of the binding Memorandum of Settlement dated 17-12-1979 and without adherence to principles of fairness or accommodation and is therefore, unsustainable in law.
The duty of a public employer is not merely to discharge functionaries, but to preserve human potential where it continues to exist. The law does not permit the severance of service by the stroke of a medical certificate without first exhausting the possibility of meaningful redeployment. Such obligation is not rooted in compassion, but in constitutional discipline and statutory expectation. The Court said that when an employee is removed from service for a condition he did not choose, and where viable alternatives are ignored; the Court is not crossing a line by intervening as it is upholding one drawn by the Constitution itself. “The employer’s discretion ends where the employee’s dignity begins”.
Background:
Appellant herein was selected and appointed as a ‘driver’ in the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (“APSRTC” —i.e., the predecessor-in-title TSRTC) on 01-05-2014, after fulfilling the eligibility criteria fixed for the post. On a periodical medical examination conducted by the medical officer of the dispensary belonging to the corporation, it was found that the appellant was ‘colour blind’ and was declared unfit to hold the post of ‘driver’.
The appellant preferred an appeal challenging the observation regarding his fitness for the post of ‘driver’, alternatively, the appellant also sought for alternate employment in the event, he was declared ‘medically unfit’. However, the appellant’s efforts met with disappointment. The appellant’s representation seeking alternate employment came to be rejected by the corporation on the ground that extant rules do not provide for granting alternate employment to colour blind drivers. The Corporation, vide order dated 27-01-2016, passed an order retiring the appellant w.e.f. 06-01-2016 and directed him to avail the additional monetary benefits provided under the policy governing the same.
Aggrieved with the decision, the appellant approached the High Court and sought for a direction to the corporation to provide him alternate employment contending his disability falls under the category of disablement under the provisions of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (the Act) and therefore, he cannot be discriminated. The Single Judge Bench of the High Court allowed the writ petition holding that the category of ‘colour also falls within the category of disablement within the provisions of the Act.
The Corporation challenged the single Judge Bench’s decision before the High Court’s Division Bench, which thereby relying on APSRTC v. B.S. Reddy, (2018) 12 SCC 704, set aside the order of the Single Judge and directed the appellant to make a representation to the corporation seeking the benefit as prescribed under the regulations and the scheme governing the corporation.
Issues Framed:
Perusing the facts of the case and contentions raised by the parties, the Court formulated the following issues:
- Whether the retirement of the Appellant on due to colour blindness, without offering alternative employment, is legally sustainable in light of applicable service regulations and binding settlements?
- Whether Clause 14 of the Memorandum of Settlement dated 17-12-1979, executed under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, remains valid, binding, and enforceable despite the subsequent 1986 settlement and internal administrative circulars?
- Whether the Respondents complied with their duty to make a bona fide assessment of alternative employment options for the Appellant, as required by law, policy, and principles of natural justice?
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Whether the reliance placed by the High Court on B.S. Reddy (supra) was legally tenable in the context of the Appellant’s independent rights under a binding industrial settlement?
Court’s Assessment:
Perusing the issues, the Court pointed out that the Appellant’s retirement from service on the ground of colour blindness was effected without any demonstrable effort by the Corporation to identify or assess the feasibility of alternative employment, despite the Appellant having expressed willingness to be reassigned to a non-driving post. Such inaction violates both statutory obligation and administrative fairness. The Court further stated that the burden lay on the Corporation and not the employee to establish that no suitable alternate post was available or could reasonably be created. “Mere invocation of a medical certificate, or the silence of a circular, cannot constitute compliance. Inaction is not neutrality; in such cases, it is a form of institutional exclusion”.
The Court further pointed out that the Appellant’s entitlement to redeployment arose from Clause 14 of the binding Memorandum of Settlement dated 17-12-1979, which specifically provides for alternate employment to drivers declared colour blind, with pay protection and continuity of service. This clause remains valid and enforceable. Subsequent 1986 settlement neither expressly overrides nor impliedly nullifies the 1979 settlement. Both settlements operate harmoniously, with the latter being general in scope and the former addressing a specific category of disability.
The Court further explained that internal circulars issued by the Corporation in 2014 and 2015, which purport to deny alternate employment to colour-blind drivers, are administrative instructions that cannot override binding service conditions created by a statutory settlement under the Industrial Disputes Act.
Answering the issue related to proper application of B.S. Reddy (supra), the Court pointed out that the High Court’s Division Bench erred in applying the judgment in B.S. Reddy (supra), which dealt with the limited scope of Section 47 of the Act, and did not consider claims arising independently under industrial settlements. The present case stood on an entirely different legal footing.
The Court further deemed it necessary to reaffirm the broader legal framework that governs cases involving employees who acquire disability during service. Referring to Kunal Singh v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 524, the Court stated that there is a distinction between persons suffering from disability and persons who have acquired disability during service.
“When a disability is acquired in the course of service, the legal framework must respond not with exclusion but with adjustment”.
The Court effectively reaffirmed that even in the absence of enforceable right under a statutory industrial settlement, employees who acquire disabilities during service must not be abandoned or prematurely retired without being afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity for reassignment. The obligation to reasonably accommodate such employees is not just a matter of administrative grace, but a constitutional and statutory imperative, rooted in the principles of non-discrimination, dignity, and equal treatment.
Therefore, the Court reiterated that beneficial and remedial legislation must not be diluted by narrow interpretation, and the protections offered therein must be extended purposively to protect the livelihood, dignity and service continuity of employees who acquire disabilities during employment. “In doing so, we not only vindicate the Appellant’s rights but also reaffirm our constitutional commitment to a just and humane employer-employee relationship”.
Decision:
The Court citing the Corporation’s commitments under relevant statutes and the Constitution, directed it to appoint the Appellant to a suitable post, consistent with his condition, and on the same pay grade as he held on 06-01-2016.
[Ch. Joseph v. Telangana State Road Transport Corporation, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1592, decided on 1-8-2025]
*Judgment by Justice Aravind Kumar
Advocates who appeared in this case :
For Petitioner(s): Mr. C. Mohan Rao, Sr. Adv. Mr. R. Santhana Krishnan, Adv. Mr. Lokesh Kumar Sharma, Adv. Mr. Dharmendra Kumar Sinha, AOR
For Respondent(s): Mr. Satyam Reddy Sarasani, Sr. Adv. Ms. Sri Ruma Sarasani, Adv. Mr. Shishir Pinaki, AOR
