Patna High Court: In a criminal revision petition filed by the accused against the judgment and order passed by the Fast Track Court upholding the conviction and sentence passed by the Juvenile Justice Board (‘JJB’), in a case of alleged penetrative sexual assault, the Single Judge Bench of Jitendra Kumar, J., observing that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt, and noting that the purpose of Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, (‘JJ Act’) was reformative and rehabilitative instead of punitive, set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed against the accused.
Background
The case originated from the fard-e-beyan of a minor victim girl, alleging an offence under Section 376(2)(g) of the Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’), against the accused and the co-accused. As per the fard-e-beyan the victim was alone in the house when both the accused entered her house, put gamcha on her eyes and mouth, and took her to a maize field where they committed penetrative sexual assault on her, causing injury to her private parts. Both accused raised a plea of juvenility, leading to the transfer of their records to the JJB. After investigation, a chargesheet was submitted against the accused, while the co-accused was later summoned under Section 319 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (‘CrPC’), with their records being subsequently separated.
The JJB found the accused guilty of the offence punishable under Section 376 of the IPC and was directed to be kept in a Special Home for two years under Section 15(1)(g) of the JJ Act. Aggrieved by this decision, the accused filed an appeal before the Sessions Court, which upheld the JJB’s judgment of conviction and order of sentence. The accused had filed the present criminal revision petition.
Court’s Analysis and Findings
The Court noted that the revisional jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is a kind of paternal or supervisory jurisdiction under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the CrPC to correct the miscarriage of justice arising out of judgment, order, sentence or finding of subordinate Courts by looking into correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order as recorded or passed by subordinate Courts and as to the regularity of any proceeding of such inferior Courts. This is discretionary and is to be applied judiciously in the interest of justice. Further, it is different from appellate jurisdiction as the courts here cannot re-appreciate the evidence, unless there are exceptional situations like glaring error of law or procedure and perversity of finding, causing flagrant miscarriage of justice, brought to the notice of the High Court.
I. On the Conviction
The Court noted that while the victim reiterated her allegations in examination-in-chief, her cross-examination revealed an admitted enmity between her family and the accused’s family. Crucially, the victim did not depose that she had handed over blood-stained clothes to the police. No other prosecution witnesses were direct eyewitnesses, with most being hearsay witnesses or relatives.
The Court noted that the doctor in her deposition had stated that no spermatozoa was found in the victim’s vaginal swab, despite the examination being conducted on the same day of occurrence. The doctor explicitly stated she was ‘not in a position to decide whether the rape was committed’. Further, the Investigating Officer had admitted to not seizing blood-soaked soil from the alleged place of occurrence or the victim’s blood-stained clothes.
The Court further noted the absence of scientific investigation, such as a DNA test, connecting the accused to the alleged offence. In light of the afore-stated facts, the Court held that it would be unsafe and unjust to find the accused guilty. The Court observed that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, and hence, the judgment of conviction was not sustainable in the eyes of the law.
II. On Sentencing Policy under the JJ Act
The Court observed that the order of sentence passed under Section 15 of the JJ Act was not in consonance with the object and spirit of the JJ Act. The Court, referring to the Preamble of the JJ Act, emphasised that the JJ Act was founded on the belief that children in conflict with the law should be reformed and rehabilitated, not punished, and that a punitive approach is self-destructive for society.
Referring to Rule 3 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (‘JJ Rules’), the Court highlighted that the principle of best interest should be considered when taking any decision concerning any juvenile in conflict with law. As per the best interest principle, traditional objectives of criminal justice, retribution, and repression, must give way to rehabilitative and restorative objectives of juvenile justice. It also meant seeking to ensure physical, emotional, intellectual, social, and moral development of the juvenile in conflict with the law or child so as to ensure the safety, well-being, and permanence for each child and thus enable each child to survive and reach his or her full potential. The Court further noted that the institutionalization of a child or juvenile in conflict with the law has been contemplated as a last resort after reasonable inquiry, and that too for the minimum possible duration.
The Court noted that from the conjoint reading of Sections 15 and 16 of the JJ Act and Rule 3 of JJ Rules, it was clear that any court before passing an order against a juvenile in conflict with the law must take into consideration the social investigation. The Court referring to Salil Bali v. Union of India, (2013) 7 SCC 705, and Jitendra Singh v. State of U.P., (2013) 11 SCC 193, observed that the purpose of JJ Act was restorative and not retributive providing for rehabilitation and reintegration of children in conflict with law with the mainstream of the society.
In the instant case, the Social Investigation Report indicated no criminal antecedents of the accused, his cooperative nature, and his family’s poor economic background. The Court observed that the J.J. Board and the Appellate Court had failed to consider this report to determine the best interest of the accused, and by sending him to a special home for two years, he was prevented from continuing his studies.
In light of the afore-stated facts, the Court held that the judgment of conviction and order of sentence were not sustainable in the eyes of the law and were liable to be set aside.
III. On Compensation to the Victim
The Court noted that the JJB had not passed any order regarding compensation payable to the victim, which in the Court’s opinion they were duty bound to pass. The Court noted that the general principles of compensation to victims in a criminal trial had been provided under the Sections 357 and 357A of the CrPC and the Bihar Victims Compensation Scheme, 2014, made by the State of Bihar under Section 357A.
The Court, referring to its decision in Sunil Kumar Jha v. State of Bihar, 2024 SCC OnLine Pat 960, reiterated that any court conducting a criminal trial is duty-bound to pass a reasoned order regarding victim compensation, irrespective of conviction, acquittal, or discharge. The Appellate and Revisional Courts are equally bound if proceedings arising out of the crime are pending. The Court noted that general principles of compensation under the afore-stated sections are equally applicable to criminal proceedings before JJBs and Children Courts, as the JJ Act does not provide separate provisions for victim compensation.
The Court observed that it was duty-bound to recommend that the Bihar State Legal Services Authority pay compensation to the victim, as per the Bihar Victim Compensation Scheme 2014, within one month of receipt of this order.
In light of the afore-stated reasons, the Court set aside the judgment of conviction, and the order of sentence passed by the JJB, and the Appellate Court, and the accused was acquitted of all charges.
Further, the Registrar General was directed to circulate a copy of the judgment to Presiding Officers of JJBs and Children Courts of Bihar and the Bihar Judicial Academy for discussion in training programs.
[X v. State of Bihar, Criminal Revision No. 819 of 2019, decided on 07-07-2025]
Advocates who appeared in this case :
For the Petitioner: Pankaj Kumar Jha, Advocate
For the Respondent: Upendra Kumar, APP, Raja Ram Mishra, Advocate
Amicus Curiae: Shashi Priya, Advocate
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